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Abstract 
Real Estate Construction and Holding Companies (RECHCOs) have been 
used by governments in the Arab world as a vehicle for stimulus to promote 
development. This thesis will examine two particular examples of RECHCOs 
within city centres: Solidere in Beirut and Abdali in Amman. The RECHCOs in 
these instances were completely private companies presented as the 
inevitable choice for the rehabilitation of the centre to create a modern 
downtown, accompanied by a slew of benefits including job creation, 
investment, increased tourism potential, and upgraded infrastructure. In return 
the RECHCOs received political support, public subsidies, tax incentives and 
exemptions, and the right to expropriate privately owned land, generally 
reserved for governments. The thesis aims to explore this narrative through 
the lens of RECHCOs' impact on Arab cities' citizens. It will make the 
argument that though RECHCOs seem to be appealing and easy tools for 
contemporary cities they do not live up to their promises of political, economic 
and social benefits, especially as seen from the perspective of city citizens. 
The thesis contributes a comprehensive empirical case study to the literature 
on the modern Arab world, which to date has not explored the impacts of 
projects such as RECHCOs. The research included stakeholder interviews, a 
representative sample survey of over 1,500 Amman residents, a 
comprehensive literature review, a thorough media review, a legislative 
review, examination of company records, and data gathering from 
government databases and published statistics. 
Within three chapters dealing with the social, political and economic impacts 
of RECHCOs, the case studies presented are discussed across several 
themes central to urban planning literature both in the context of the Arab city 
and beyond. The Thesis includes a discussion of the role of the city centre 
within the city, and the RECHCOs' diminishing effect which undermines the 
centre as a place of society, gathering, economy and politics. The Thesis 
looks at heritage and memory in the city in the context of RECHCOs whereby 
as a consequence of ignoring established traditions in cities RECHCOs have 
a detrimental impact. RECHCOs undercut political processes, bypass social 
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and traditional heritage, and destroy physical historical structures. RECHCOs 
are framed within an examination of privatised and contested public space 
within cities. The new RECHCO downtowns are physically isolated and 
privately guarded. They are housed with exclusive functions, high-end luxury 
commercial establishments, and highly priced residential and office space. 
Previous residents are priced out of the area through gentrification, and the 
economic windfalls of RECHCOs are diverted towards transnational investors 
and local elite with limited distributional and trickle-down benefits. The 
subsequent exclusive – and segregated - space created by the RECHCO 
gives rise to a sense of antagonism amongst city citizens. RECHCOs thus 
interrupt the interaction between public space and participation damaging 
active citizenship within the city. The thesis frames RECHCOs as a tool of 
urban governance and policies, in the context of weakened local governments 
and the alienation of citizens. The thesis concludes with a series of lessons 
learnt. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
On a hot Saturday mid-morning on the 23rd of June 2007, a group of panicked 
property owners gathered outside the office door of the director of the Greater 
Amman Municipality's Expropriation Department1. Few of them had the 
means to hire lawyers to object in their stead. Most were older men angrily 
holding expropriation notices; some had brought their wives along and at least 
a couple their young infants and toddlers. Just before the weekend, the group 
had received officially stamped letters condemning their homes to make way 
for the capital's aggressive construction project driven by Saudi-Lebanese 
investors – a 'new downtown' for the city in the form of the high-density Abdali 
project set to replace Amman's existing city centre (Talal Abu Ghazaleh 
International, 2007c). 
Of that moment, Abu Najib recalls that he felt helpless; given three months to 
vacate the home he had inherited from his father by the eve of Eid al-Fitr - the 
Muslim celebration at the close of Ramadan. With limited political recourse he 
felt he had little else to do "but pray" (Thesis Survey, 2012). To this group, the 
shiny Abdali project was less "iconic" of a modern progressive Amman, but 
more a symbol of the "disconnect" and disenfranchisement they now felt as 
citizens of the city (Thesis Survey, 2012). 
Abu Najib Al-Far's family thus found itself caught up in an emerging Arab 
World2 phenomenon. This phenomenon is one that has looked like the 
                                                          
1 
Expropriation is the act of taking of privately owned property by a government to be used for the benefit 
of the public. Projects such as highways and dams use this all over the world.  
2
 While there is no globally accepted definition, this thesis will assume that the Arab World comprises 
the 22 countries and territories of the Arab League stretching from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to 
the Arabian Sea in the east, and from the Mediterranean Sea in the north to the Horn of Africa and 
the Indian Ocean in the southeast (Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, 
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen). The Middle East will be defined as the region that 
roughly encompasses a majority of Western Asia (excluding the Caucasus) and Egypt. 
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neoliberalisation3 of cities to some, been called the Gulfanisation of cities by 
others, and been labelled 'modernisation' by yet others. It is the concept of the 
privately owned city centre, built by a private company, replacing the 
traditional centres of smells, hagglers, street vendors and colours, with 
something far more sterile and modern, with higher-density buildings that are 
contemporary and sometimes flanked with glass faҫades. Lined with upper-
end stores and protected by private security forces, the creation of new 
private 'downtowns'4 is supported by governments to propel their cities into 
what is perceived as the modern Arab World.  
As part of this trend, the Abdali project is a huge endeavour to develop 1.7 
million square metres (sqm) of built-up space to replace Amman's historic city 
centre in a contemporary new location towards the west of the city, marketing 
itself as 'Amman's New Downtown' (Abdali, 2012)5. With the same anchor 
investors, Abdali is modelled after the 1994 Solidere project, the keystone of 
the post-Civil War Lebanese reconstruction effort, spread out over 2 million 
sqm in Beirut's original city centre to create a new and modern downtown 
ready for "the 21st century" (Sodic and Solidere, 2012, p3)6. Both these 
projects were huge private undertakings, supported at the governmental level 
as modern attempts at promoting development in the city, initiated by almost 
the same group of transnational investors. Both also involved contested 
expropriations of property from city residents within, and surrounding, the 
sites. There is no question that the two projects are interconnected and - at 
least in some aspects - are imported urbanism - whether this comes in the 
form of petrodollars from the Gulf, the emergence of 'starchitects' in the region 
                                                          
3
 Neoliberalism is a political philosophy whose advocates support economic liberalisation, free trade and 
open markets, privatisation, deregulation, and enhancing the role of the private sector in modern society 
(the term is sometimes used as a sort of condemnation of these policies).  
4
 Historically, the Middle East and Europe have used the term 'city centre' in Arabic wast al-balad ( طسو
(دلبلا  or wast al-madinah (ةنيدملا طسو) . The 'centre' refers often to historic, or first inhabited districts, of 
cultural and political significance. In both these contexts, while the 'city centre' may include the 'central 
business district' or CBD it does not necessarily refer to the same concept with the CBD referring to an 
area of economic or financial significance, nor do they have to be in the same geographical location by 
definition (La Défense in Paris as compared to the Paris city centre). CBD focuses primarily on aspects 
of economic and financial significance. In the context of the United States the term 'downtown' has been 
used since the early 1900's to indicate the commercial heart of the city, and is synonymous with 'CBD'. 
The RECHCOs refer to themselves as downtowns. This thesis will continue to refer to the historic 
centres as the 'city centre' or simple 'centre'. 
5
 In 2010 Abdali contributed an average of 51% of the total new built up area in Amman.  
6
 Solidere SAL represented what was called the largest public share offering in the Middle East at the 
time and contributed a significant percentage of Lebanon's Gross National Product (GNP). 
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who worked on both projects; or even the use of foreign expertise in the urban 
planning related to the project.  
These sorts of large projects around the world, often exceeding the billion 
dollar mark, gain the highest attention from the government based on their 
positive expected impacts on social groups, environments and economies 
(Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). The projects are turned to by governments for 
their job creation potential, their ability to generate investments, increase 
tourism to the city, regenerate urban fabric for the purposes of rehabilitation, 
reduce crime, and expand public spaces and modern infrastructure.  
Certainly in the cases of Solidere and Abdali7, some of these impacts were 
very clear. Looking at the 'before' and 'after' images of the city centre, to many 
observers, Beirut's Central District (BCD) was transformed from a pile of 
rubble, devastation and refugees into what many classify as a global city 
centre once again. Ayman Trawi, reflecting on the downtown, describes 
Solidere as shining "bright on the Mediterranean coast, a reminder of past 
achievements and the entailing great civilisations that followed" (Trawi, 2003, 
p2). Others have seen Solidere as transforming Beirut into a "new blossoming 
international centre of finance and commerce" (Gavin et al., 1996, p34). Much 
international media has also described Solidere rebuilding the ―Paris of the 
Orient‖ (Nicholson, 1994b). Gavin and Maluf (1996) go so far as to describe a 
situation where Solidere plays a large role in the modernisation of Lebanon‘s 
regulatory and institutional framework for urban development (Gavin et al. 
1996). Especially when compared to the reconstruction efforts in the rest of 
Lebanon, Solidere was considered by some nothing short of remarkable 
(Trawi, 2003).  
                                                          
7
 The thesis will use the names 'Solidere' and 'Abdali' to mean the project's geographic boundaries and 
all that is within them of which the projects have property ownership rights. These are also the manner 
in which the names are used colloquially. The companies which own the Solidere and Abdali projects 
shall be referred to as they are registered, Société libanaise pour le développement et la reconstruction 
de Beyrouth, Societe Anonyme Libanaise (Solidere SAL) and Abdali Investment and Development PSC 
(AID) respectively. In the literature this distinction is not made, however I feel it is important here to 
represent the company as independent from the project as in the citizens' vernacular 'Solidere' and 
'Abdali' now refer to a physical and real neighbourhood in the city. The companies themselves have 
private investors and shareholder structures that are somewhat independent to the physical project. It is 
the case currently however that AID and Solidere SAL are dedicated wholly to the Abdali and Solidere 
projects. 'Abdali' is also the name of one of Amman's twenty seven geographic districts, to avoid 
confusion this district will be referred to by the thesis only as the Abdali District.   
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To this end, when one considers the RECHCO projects within the frame of a 
real estate development initiative, they may indeed be interpreted very 
successfully. However, the impact of the RECHCOs goes well beyond this. 
Solidere's story has been packaged as that of a private company that rescued 
a city from despair, saving the public sector from rehabilitation and 
reconstruction costs. A similar argument in terms of economic gains can be 
made for Abdali in Amman. In both the official government narratives of 
Amman and Beirut promoting Abdali and Solidere, the projects emerged as a 
'must' in one case to help Beirut return its vibrant city centre, and in the other, 
to give Amman the downtown it would need to become a modern capital. As 
such, the private downtowns receive public funding and support. 
These sorts of pragmatic arguments promoting Solidere and Abdali have fit 
neatly into the neoliberal narrative focusing on market-driven development8. 
These authors have argued that only market rationality could effectively 
ensure the reconstruction of the BCD to "provide proper leadership and attract 
funds" (Kabbani, 1996, p66). Solidere and Abdali are not the lone projects in 
the Arab World following this model. There are others in Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Syria, Morocco and Egypt. This thesis will term these mega-project 
developments Real Estate Construction and Holding Companies (RECHCOs). 
Solidere's planners referred to a historical precedent to justify their plans in 
projects such as the London Docklands. However, this resort to comparison 
as a strategy of justification was flawed. There remain very important 
differences between the Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) and 
Solidere SAL and Abdali Investment and Development (AID) which make 
these Arab examples unique. While many large projects share characteristics 
of magnitude and investment levels, this thesis will concern itself primarily 
with those RECHCO mega-projects related to the redevelopment of city 
centres, receiving full government support for their massive private initiatives, 
and with allowances for expropriations. These projects also have important 
implications relating to transparency, public participation and the city's 
                                                          
8
 Adham, 2004; Al-Hamarneh, 2010; Barthel, 2010; Daher, 2008; Daher, 2012; Elsheshtawy, 2008; 
Kanna, 2010; Parker, 2009, amongst others have classified mega-projects such as Solidere and Abdali 
as part of a neoliberal urban policy. 
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economy, as a result of specific investor and corporate structures. And as 
such, these mega-projects are important9.  
The implications these projects have on cities can be grouped into several 
main themes which will be explored throughout the thesis and returned to as 
reflections in Chapter Six's Conclusion. The first of these themes focuses on 
the role of the city centre within the city, and the RECHCOs' effect on this.  
The second looks more closely at the interaction between RECHCOs and 
public space, participation and citizenship. The third looks at RECHCOs' as 
tools within a framework of urban governance and policies.  The fourth 
examines heritage and memory in the city in the context of RECHCOs.  The 
fifth looks at the consequences on space specifically with an eye towards 
privatised, contested and segregated public space within cities.  These 
themes will also be seen across the Literature Review worked into the 
broader categories.  
 
City Centres: The Public's Heart of the City 
 
The city centres are interesting to look at because they represent what is 
objectively the most meaningful space in the city to its residents. A space that 
is considered the meeting ground for different groups, a space conducive to 
self-expression, participation and politics. The old city centre in Amman 
included a mixed-use pattern of religious institutions, residential 
neighbourhoods, government offices and commercial establishments, sites for 
political gathering, as well as being a brief meeting point linking the East and 
West as common ground for the city's socio-economic groups and ethnicities. 
Similarly, in Beirut, as one editorial in the business monthly Al-Iqtisad wal-
Amal put it, the centre of Beirut was "the heart of the capital...the heart of all 
                                                          
9
 Throughout the thesis some of the analysis and conclusions that relate to RECHCOs may also relate 
to what people commonly refer to as 'mega', 'big' or 'prestige' projects. Breaking down this terminology a 
bit further several meanings can be attached to these terms.  The first is that these sorts of projects are 
widely staged (and narrated by the media, politicians and communicants). The term qualifies the 
importance given by institutions and policy-makers (which follows over-investment of human, technical 
and financial resources away from other areas of the city). The terms are suggestive of the scale of the 
urban 'realities' (issues) involved and integrated in the framework; and, finally the terms reflect the 
magnitude of reconfiguration implied in the urban socio-spatial organisation (Barthel, 2010, p134). The 
argument that RECHCOs are in fact mega-projects will be made.  
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Lebanon" (Real Estate Agency, 1992, p42), considered a "mediating space 
for the Lebanese" (Haugbolle, 2011, p83) neighbouring the Green Line which 
separated Muslim West Beirut from the Christian East. Centres as a hub of 
the economic and political are not simply an Arab phenomenon. Richard 
Sennett of the London School of Economics and Political Science notes "as a 
secular space, the public space of the modern city has always been a hybrid 
of politics and commerce" (Sennett, 1992, p21 - 22). 
 
Threatening the Centre's Values  
 
The RECHCOs in their published mission statements aim to recreate the type 
of historic centre described above, though the extent of their success in doing 
so is debatable. RECHCOs self-describe as "city-makers" (Solidere, 2008, p8) 
but in the physical urban fabric they construct, the regenerated centres begin 
to be defined by exclusions. RECHCOs deal a "fatal blow" to the memory of 
historic centres (Scott, 2008, p208). Once meeting grounds and healing-
spaces across religions and income-levels, with busy markets, places10 of 
worship and mixed-residential areas; RECHCOs reconstructed centres as 
commercialised elite islands within the city. Spatial and social displacement 
created within the framework of privately-owned RECHCOs seems to 
undermine traditional centre functions and both physical and social fabric 
through exaggerated architecture, density provisions and guarded entrances 
isolating the new district. With new Western visions of downtowns within 
oriental cities (Adham, 2004), the discourse has evolved to question the 
                                                          
10
 'Place' and 'Space' in planning literature often have very separate and distinct meanings. In looking for 
A Space for Place in Sociology Gieryn (2000) notes that 'places' across the literature have three 
necessary and sufficient features that "spaces" do not: (1) Geographic location: allowing people to 
distinguish it with boundaries, near and far (Entrikin, 1989, 1991); (2) Material form as a place has 
'physicality' and material objects (DuPuis and Vandergeest, 1996) (so 'place' cannot be found in 
cyberspace) though this is a large issue in the literature; (3) Investment with meaning and value: places 
are filled with identification, or representation by ordinary people (Feld and Basso, 1996). Social 
processes (difference, power, inequality, collective action) happen through the material forms that we 
design, build, use, and protest (Habraken 1998). Places are also interpreted, narrated, perceived, felt, 
understood, and imagined (Soja, 1996). Massey (2005) further notes that places are constructed 
overtime; interact with one another; and decay and renew. In this literature, place is not space-which is 
more properly conceived as abstract geometries (distance, direction, size, shape, volume) detached 
from material form and cultural interpretation (Hillier and Hanson 1984). Space is what place becomes 
when the unique gathering of things, meanings, and values are removed (de Certeau 1984, Etlin 1997). 
Put positively, place is space filled up by people, practices, objects, and representations. The definitions 
commonly used in this literature are adapted here and the thesis will not explore the terms further. 
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extent to which privatised centres - within their 'neoliberal' construct - are able 
to accommodate a changing Arab society. Ultimately, the RECHCO affects 
how citizens function within the political frame of their city. 
Indeed, if "one explores the new systems of movement and connection being 
etched into cityscapes...these concrete structures tell a story of transformation 
that has been lost in transition-oriented accounts of Arab political life" (Parker, 
2009, p110). This thesis shall look at two such structures within city centres - 
the modern heart of the polis - the Solidere project in Beirut, and the Abdali 
project in Amman. Solidere SAL and AID were presented as healing agencies 
and tools of economic growth, supported by public funds, these RECHCOs 
are changing cities in a variety of ways. On the political front, the 'why' of 
these projects, and the 'how' of their development have certain implications on 
the well-being of city citizens and their perception of themselves as 
constituents of a larger political order. RECHCOs as such touch upon the very 
essence of what it means to live in a city. It is important that alternatives to 
development at the participation level are acknowledged and explored.  
 
Public Space, Participation, Citizenship and the Centres 
 
The Centres and the Social Contract  
 
From the earliest cities, the centres historically represented both the focus of 
politics and participation (Mumford, 1961). The earliest philosophers, 
contemplating the 'ideal' city, found it to be a reflection of both the individuals 
within it and their attitudes towards each other, forming its governance 
system. Socrates' 'Kalliopolis' from Plato's Republic (Plato, 1993) was 
testament to justice in the city being achieved only through justice in the soul. 
The city in these writings was indistinguishable from the individual; and the 
individual's character inextricably tied up to the city's political institutions. It 
was from the city that the notion of citizenship stemmed, and from within the 
city walls that the concept of the social contract began between resident and 
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ruler - a contract strong enough to build the greatest of cities, or sufficiently 
unstable to cause the uprisings seen across the region in the Arab Spring.  
In Eastern tradition, descriptions of social cohesion – or lack of it – can be 
traced to the Arabic historiographer Ibn Khaldoun (Ibn Khaldoun, 2005)11 who 
described the concept of 'asabiyya referring to social solidarity and a sense of 
shared purpose to achieve social cohesion. 'Asabiyya is not specifically a 
nomadic concept, or one based purely on blood relations; it simply refers to 
solidarity, and loyalty to one's group (whether family, ethnicity, religion, city or 
empire). More modern terminology might place 'asabiyya in a frame of social 
capital found in social networks. The concept of 'asabiyya rooted in the sense 
of belonging is an alternate description to the Western social contract and is a 
concept still thought to be valid in the Arab World today (Ahmed, 2006). 
Andreas Kavylas (2010) in more recent thinking on the unspoken contract that 
binds citizens to their cities and institutions has relooked at Solon's Laws of 
ancient Athens as inspiration for what it truly means to be a citizen of a city. In 
writing about citizenship he notes that the defining feature of citizenship is 
partisanship, where "civic participation is an act of choosing, making 
distinctions between friends and enemies, deciding one‘s position on the 
political field, taking sides on a public issue of common concern" (Kalyvas, 
2010, p358). An important concept that first emerged in Solon's political 
poetry was the notion that political participation is not just a privilege rather it 
is a citizen's duty to choose a "concrete position in the civic realm" (Kalyvas, 
2010, p358). The citizens were given a place to do so; the question is what 
happens when that space is removed; both physically, changed by citizens no 
longer having access to the centre; and politically through a closed-off 
process through which participation in decision-making related to their city's 
future was prohibited12. 
 
                                                          
11
 1332 AD –1406 AD.  
12
 Active citizenship according to Solon is one that dictates that a citizen must stand for his belief and 
express his concerns about the good of the city (Kalyvas, 2010). A citizen is therefore essentially 
defined by political action, what (s)he does; rather than by who (s)he is by virtue of birth, naturalisation 
or marriage. This thesis will refer to the term citizen as meaning residents of the city with the ability and 
interest to participate in politics. The concept of what it means to be a citizen within a city has evolved 
over time. Citizenship, at least theoretically, in the literature, confers membership, identity, values and 
rights of participation, and assumes a body of common political knowledge (Enslin, 2000). 
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Public Sphere within the Centre's Public Space 
 
Belonging to the city is premised on belonging to that city's experience, in 
other words, participating in the design of that city's destiny. Rousseau, in the 
18th century, outlines how only active participation in the decision-making 
process of a community turns individuals into citizens in contrast to merely 
being 'subjects' (Rousseau, 1762). The central notion of Rousseau's definition 
of citizenship is that only citizens can make up a city, not any of the other 
physical manifestations within it. Passive city-residents, not active in decision-
making become only subjects rather than citizens which has implications on 
social cohesion and loyalty to the city explored later. It thus becomes the case 
that Rousseau recognises that the individual as a political agent is the 
essence of citizenship, relating directly to the political process involved in the 
creation of the RECHCO that will be explored in this thesis. 
Part of the RECHCO narrative promotes this fact. The Solidere 2011 Annual 
Report entitled the City in Scenes noted (Solidere, 2011, p37):  
The word politika (politics) comes from the word polis (city) – two 
words that have grown quite apart in meaning over time so that no 
one is able to make a connection between them. Essentially, 
politika and polis are the same. Their origin is Greek, dating back 
to when an elected person in Greece had to promise: "I shall give 
you back a more beautiful Athens than the one you gave me." It is 
the ability to look after what is common to the people, meaning the 
city: the polis, the community. 
 
Amongst the questions tackled by this thesis is what happens when aspects 
such as property rights and an established 'asabiyya are undermined – when 
participation is not only discouraged, but actively prevented. Modern literature, 
looking at 'structurally deficient' countries - even including the modern United 
States (Ekiert and Foa, 2011), has drawn a picture of 'democracies without 
citizens' with a political elite that fails to enhance civic engagement at the 
most basic and grassroots levels (Ekiert and Foa, 2011), describing far 
reaching consequences. 
The lack of civic engagement, allowing for forms of agnostic citizenship (with 
citizens freely expressing their desires for their city), has left citizens with the 
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inevitability of becoming antagonistic. When unheard, and unable to change 
their governments through dialogue, citizens feel almost forced to 
aggressively and physically invade the space that their dialogue could not 
shape - their exclusion becomes highly charged and politicised (Kalyvas, 
2010, p360). The 'Occupy' movements in the West are testament to this, as 
are early forms of movements similar to the Arab Spring. This is apparent 
across the Arab World when public sites are taken over through protests as 
physical manifestations of politics where spaces are hijacked when they 
cannot be shared. The tent protests covering the downtown Solidere area in 
Beirut in 2006 or the sit-ins at the Nakheel Plaza, and the disruption of traffic 
near the Abdali District, in Amman are other examples. When the constituted 
power does not respond to include all factions of the constituent power, the 
constituent power will force its inclusion. Antagonism becomes a political 
strategy and philosophical framework for this inclusion. Eventually the power 
to constitute must be recognised as the greater power, and the constituted 
power recognised as that 'mortal' power which can be overthrown. 
The Egyptian daily Al-Ahram, in an opinion piece, mentions that "modern 
states need citizens, and these are nowhere to be found in Arab countries" 
(Abdul-Hussain, 2009, p11). The Al-Ahram article goes on to note that the 
system operates on a social contract and constitution that is also drafted 
based on the will of the 'popular majority'. As such the basic tenant of the 
constitution is equality of citizens before the law - a stark contrast to the 
"older hierarchies based on divine right" (Abdul-Hussain, 2009, p11). Failures 
of the Arab regimes to acknowledge this, according to the author, is what led 
to the Arab Spring. The Case Studies explored by this thesis are illustrations 
of citizenship looking at both the 'means' and the 'end' of a powerful 
development tool pushed upon their cities. 
 
Contested, Privatised and Segregated Space 
 
The space created by RECHCOs not only avoids democratic principles in its 
planning but also has an end-result that is secluded in nature. Focusing 
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exclusively on high-end retail and residential space, Solidere and Abdali are 
distinct from the rest of the city. In Amman, unlike the city centre, a meeting 
ground full of life, home to the city's markets; Abdali marking itself as 'the new 
downtown' further polarises the lower-income east from the more affluent west 
of the capital. Rami Daher, a Jordanian architect and critic of neoliberal 
urbanism, describes the project as turning its back on Amman's original city 
centre which will inevitably lead to privatised and isolated space (Daher, 
2012). Space is not inviting to everybody. When people are excluded from 
public spaces, their presence in the 'image' of the public dissolves and so 
gradually they are also sidelined from public politics. Solidere similarly found 
its critics imagining the project as creating only an elite centre marginalising 
ordinary citizens (Makdisi, 1997a and Harb, 1998).  
As Ayn Rand's philosophy seems to describe, the making of markets has 
become a total way of life, reflected completely in the making of places (Rand, 
2007). Space is transformed as a direct product of ideological struggles. 
Daher describes these consumerist utopias as geographies of inequality 
(Daher, 2007c). The spaces used as places for representation theorised by 
Lefebvre (1974) come across through social public movements, located 
geographically in what is viewed as the most public of places, the city 
centre13. The built environment is important, because as John Short in his 
chapter on Urban Imagineers points out, "space is turned into place through 
acts of discursive representation. The generality of space is turned into the 
particularities of place through acts of description and evaluation‖ (Short, 
1999, p38). This means if the 'space' that represented inclusiveness is 
destroyed, what will be left is nothing more than exclusive geography that 
cannot possibly fill the gap of creating spatial inclusion. As such, the 
RECHCO story can be told within the frame of impact on citizens and has 
several major components related to participation, property, justice and 
ultimately identity, making it an issue larger than the mere physical presence 
of 'new' towers replacing 'historic' centres. 
                                                          
13
 Lefebvre (1974) has looked at three type of space. The perceived (perҫu); the conceived (conçu); and 
the lived (vécu). Perceived space, or spatial practice, encompasses the material spaces of daily life 
where social production and reproduction occurs. Conceived space, or representations of space, refers 
to the socially constructed discourses, signs, and meanings of space. Lived space, or representational 
space, encompasses the coexistence and interaction of the first two types of space.  
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On the economic front, the RECHCOs' promoted narrative is one of economic 
gain, with justifications in jobs, taxation revenues and increased investments, 
as its exchange for public funding and support and ability to expropriate. In 
reality many complained that these returns were not justified and that funds 
were being routed away from projects with widespread benefits to projects 
geared towards a certain elite. The RECHCO thereby has certain economic 
impacts from the perspective of the city citizen, in addition to economic effects 
related to the loss of property. Locke, in the Second Treatise is very firm on 
this stand. He notes in the early Chapters that man is a property-acquiring 
acquisitive animal and protection of property is the basis of why man would 
need the social contract14. 
 
Heritage and Memory 
 
RECHCOs Destroying Social Fabric 
 
To many of the RECHCO critics, the narrative pushed by the public sector has 
underestimated the negative externalities of RECHCOs on the city. Direct 
costs include those related to expropriation and taxation, as well as costs for 
upgraded infrastructure. In terms of less tangible costs, are implications on 
property rights as landowners and investors lose confidence in a system 
where the sacred rights of eminent domain are used precariously for a private 
company framed as working for the 'public benefit'. In addition, left out of the 
story publicised to the world, is the struggle of the stakeholders – the city's 
citizens and long-time residents of the centre that had their family homes 
taken and land expropriated. The expropriations meant eviction of the existing 
population and RECHCOs were accused of ―eliminate[ing] the social fabric,‖ 
while the dissolution of the ―medieval patterns‖ of property within the city 
would ―decimate the physical fabric‖ (Salam, 1998a, pp131-133). The town 
centre would become ―a dead city, an empty field open to the speculative 
                                                          
14
 Others such as Rousseau take a different view on private property linking it heavily with inequality, 
wealth and power.  
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ambitions of developers‖ (Salam, 1998a, p132), its citizens marginalised. The 
heritage of the city was seen to be undermined by the new wave of 
privatisation and modernisation and public meeting spaces disappeared 
(Thesis Survey, 2012). There is no question that what arises from these 
projects is ultimately considered "contested space" (Post, 2013) with 
implications on the political, social and economic. 
The thesis aims to explore this narrative, and debate the necessity of 
RECHCOs through the lens of the impact of RECHCOs on Arab cities' 
citizens. It will make the argument that though RECHCOs seem to be 
appealing and easy tools of modern cities they do not live up to their promises 
in terms of political, economic and social benefits, especially as seen from the 
perspective of city residents. Instead, RECHCOs are detrimental both by 
destroying the heritage that ties city dwellers to their cities and through 
increasing social segregation and divisions. Resources are diverted towards a 
certain elite, and the non-inclusive processes that secure the approval of the 
RECHCOs and the subsequent exclusive public space give rise to inevitable 
antagonism within urban governance systems.  
 
Undermining Urban Memories 
 
Many within the urban field have identified this time as an essential one. 
Besma Momani of the University of Waterloo pinpoints this period as one that 
marks cross-roads in the region (A Book Workshop, 2012). Christopher 
Parker of Ghent University in Belgium, speaking on Amman, notes the period 
as one where we are witness to the crafting of places, with authenticity called 
into question, and different paradigms emerging of what it means to be a 
community; with global sites increasingly recognised as local (A Book 
Workshop, 2012). On the social front a theme that underlies the story of the 
RECHCOs, but is not the main topic of analysis for this thesis, is that of 
memory and identity. Memory acts as a gateway for citizens in that it is what 
created the 'place' of the centre from the historic space. The physical urban 
fabric of cities holds memories. As this thesis will show, the new urban fabric 
28 
 
of the RECHCOs undermines these memories to create a certain kind of 
'public' where the spectacle of 'the public' dissolves into public spectacle 
(Mitchell, 1995) – centres become places to look at, rather than be in or be 
part of15.  
Once the spatial organisation changes rapidly, as is the case in RECHCOs, 
citizenship adjusts as well, in ways that provoke divisions to surface, thereby 
causing discord. The memories associated with the spaces, in this sense, are 
tools for collective nostalgia, building an identity towards citizenship. The 
centres represent a time of togetherness and peace that in fact has a physical 
manifestation - in the form of a coffee-shop in the centre for instance, or a 
mosque or a church amongst other houses of worship, where rich and poor 
residents of varying ethnicities go to pray, protest, socialise and interact: an 
intangible healing space in the city, distorted by the presence of the 
RECHCO.  
 
Urban Governance and Policy: Real Estate Projects and Centres 
 
Following on from the above, reflecting on city planning, Davidoff writes, "city 
planning is a means for determining policy" (Davidoff, 1965, p331). In this 
regard, Beirut and Amman's downtown projects are not the value-free neutral 
zones that they present themselves as: spaces, turned places, to nourish a 
public sphere16 where political debate and discourse occur - thus 
problematising conceptions of what it means to live in a city and participate in 
a "good life" (Paden, 2001, p24). This thesis will argue that RECHCOs, 
framed as vehicles for development, sabotage the social contract; directed by 
market forces rather than the inclusion of the public.  
As this thesis will show, the RECHCOs offer an approach of urban 
governance that bypasses the state which is seen as passive and fragmented 
(Hall and Hubbard, 1996). The withering away of the state (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1995) was observed by critics of mega-projects in the form of UDCs 
                                                          
15
 Mitchell goes on to argue that these spaces create a certain kind of "public" where public protest and 
anger are controlled in a manner which is ultimately non-threatening to established structures of order.  
16
 The definition of public sphere is explored more in the Literature Review.  
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in the UK where the host of different arrangements between the private sector 
and local authorities at one level, and transnational investors at another level 
undermined local citizens living around the project. Similarly, RECHCOs and 
the links they forged with local politicians, groups, civil servants and others, 
essential for their licensing and success, is an integral part of their story and 
their impacts on city citizens. A full understanding of the RECHCOs is thus 
only possible by recognising their full "webs of interaction" (Imrie and 
Thomas, 1999b, p5).  
As an urban governance choice for development, the privatisation of the most 
sacred of public spaces, the city centre, is not a negligible phenomenon. One 
Al-Nahar editorial fretted that the ―fate of Lebanon may now be in the hands of 
a private real estate company‖17. This thesis has the overall objective of 
examining the impact of RECHCOs on their city's citizens by better 
understanding them as tools of development within cities through the eyes of 
citizens as related to their social, political and economic effects. The 
conclusion will also put forth a set of recommendations to ensure that if 
RECHCOs are used, their externalities are positive.  
 
Thesis Components 
 
The thesis will be divided into several main Chapters. The first Chapter 
consists of this Introduction. The second is composed of four major sections. 
Two sections will give context on Jordan and Lebanon, showing the build up 
and political and economic environments present in both countries that 
allowed for the creation of Abdali and Solidere. The next two sections are an 
in-depth look at AID and Solidere SAL as examples of RECHCOs focusing on 
the major stakeholders in each Case Study, the corporate structure defining 
each, as well as design aspects and public reception.  
Chapter Three looks at the social impact of RECHCOs from the perspective of 
a city resident qualitatively. Within this Chapter, the working hypothesis is that 
RECHCOs are not vehicles to preserve historical architecture and heritage 
                                                          
17
 Op-ed in Al-Nahhar the 21
st
 of December 1991. 
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related to traditional city centres and their role as meeting grounds; rather 
they focus on modern and contemporary faҫades and uses and create "elite 
islands" instead ultimately dividing cities.  
The first section concentrates on a discussion of whether a RECHCO 
preserves or destroys the city's heritage and the impact on citizens as a 
result. The main issues tackled in this section include a review of the original 
downtowns and their meaning to citizens in Amman and Beirut; a look at the 
branding of the 'new downtowns'; an analysis of RECHCOs and existing 
heritage within the city; and consideration given to the impacts of the new and 
modern downtowns on citizens within the city. 
The second section looks at how RECHCOs affect cities by looking at issues 
of inclusion and exclusion within the 'new downtowns'. Questions to be 
discussed include considering if RECHCOs encourage the creation of 
exclusive enclaves for the elite within the city without provisions for those of 
middle or limited incomes; if RECHCOs further divide cities; and an analysis 
of RECHCOs as effective tools creating public meeting spaces, and providing 
space for unifying the city. 
Chapter Four looks at the political impact of RECHCOs. The Chapter will 
argue that with ineffective and inefficient government structures and systems 
in place, failures of policy, institutions and processes are a common 
phenomenon of RECHCOs. In its first section, it will look specifically at the 
process that allowed for the establishment of the RECHCOs and what impact 
it had. It will include a discussion of both the political and institutional factors 
and civil society response. The Chapter will look at questions relating to how 
RECHCOs were conceived and framed as an "inevitable" choice; outline the 
challenges faced by the RECHCOs; analyse the types and strengths of the 
RECHCOs' linkages with government to guarantee approvals; look at the 
relationship between private investors and RECHCOs; examine the 
RECHCOs' institutional framework; describe the opposition RECHCOs faced; 
and consider the relationship between RECHCOs and corruption. It will also 
analyse the impact this had on citizens' relationship to the political system. 
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The second section will focus on how property rights were impacted by the 
RECHCOs. The hypothesis here is that property rights are inevitably 
undermined during expropriation by the RECHCO moving from one private 
owner to another. The questions to be answered in this section include an 
examination of the compensation methods and values and whether they were 
conceived as unfair; a look at whether RECHCOs undermine property rights 
and how this affects investor confidence; a consideration of whether eminent 
domain should be considered an appropriate tool for redevelopment given 
that a private company is undertaking the project; and a look at in which 
circumstances should RECHCOs be considered tools of choice. 
The Chapter's third section and conclusion will look at how the RECHCOs' 
creation permanently altered 'doing business' in Beirut and Amman, and will 
argue that the effect has in fact been negative. The Chapter will look at those 
doing business practices that have changed as a result of the RECHCOs' 
existence and transparency issues relating to the RECHCOs.  
Chapter Five examines the economic impact of RECHCOs and looks at 
whether they provide positive financial gains to city citizens looking at the 
RECHCO quantitatively. This Chapter argues that when conducting a cost-
benefit analysis the employment, tourism and investment gains achieved will 
be found to be consistently below those that have been promised by the 
RECHCO and compared to the public costs the RECHCOs require. The 
Chapter's first section looks at economic benefits of RECHCOs including a 
calculation of employment, tourism, investment gains, taxation, and how these 
economic benefits are distributed. 
The second section looks at RECHCOs and public costs and incentives, 
asking what sort of public economic subsidies are associated with RECHCOs; 
what tax incentives are offered; how and if RECHCOs skew the real estate 
market and distort prices; whether RECHCOs inevitably crowd-out private 
sector firms; whether RECHCOs have monopolistic advantages; and what 
other costs exist. The final section of this Chapter takes a tally of the analysis 
to offer conclusions and a commentary on how much value the general public 
places on RECHCOs. 
32 
 
The final Chapter aims to provide a wrap up of the arguments made in the 
previous Chapters, and synthesise the lessons learnt across the RECHCO 
Case Studies. The Chapter's first section rearticulates the importance of 
RECHCOs and summarises the objectives of this thesis examining to what 
extent its initial objectives were satisfied and methodology effective in 
undertaking an analysis of the impact of RECHCOs.  The second section pulls 
together the main conclusions over the next three chapters.  The final section 
puts forth a series of lessons learnt and suggests next steps.  
By studying RECHCOs more closely there is something to be learnt about 
their nature, the political systems that they operate in, and how to gain a 
better understanding of them as tools for development. Yasser Elsheshtawy, 
discussing struggling and emerging Arab cities, describes redeveloped 
centres that have become a model for the Arab World, a new Arab metropolis 
that is "unburdened by history...free to create a new identity and in turn serve 
as a model for the rest of the Arab World." (Elsheshtawy, 2008, p2).This 
thesis will attempt a critical look at this model - testing its sustainability for 
development for the first time - to examine its suitability for replication. 
 
The Arab Urban Development Context 
 
It is important to understand this thesis in light of the changing nature of the 
Arab World, specifically, in terms of rapidly urbanising cities. Cities are an 
increasingly important force within the construct of nations, with urban 
populations much higher in Lebanon and Jordan than others in the developed 
world. Of the 300 million residents in the Arab World, more than 50% live in 
cities. Following closely behind Latin America, the Arab World boasts the 
fastest rate of urbanisation amongst the developing world. Recent estimates 
put urban population growth at about 25% over the next ten years, compared 
to rural population growth at about 8.5% (Bakshi, 2009). Within the Levant 
region, Jordan has seen a population growth of 2.2% in 2010.  
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Figure ‎1-1: Annual Percentage Growth of Urban Population (1990-2010 
average) 
 
Source: Data selected and graphed from World Bank, 2012 
 
The Levant region of the Arab World has seen amongst the largest 
concentrations of population in its nations' largest city. In 2010, Beirut was 
home to about 52.5% of Lebanon's total population. Amman in Jordan is 
home to approximately 23.3% of the Kingdom's residents; the Arab World 
region as a whole shows an average of 23.1%. These stand out in 
comparison to the European Union (EU) average of 15.1% - reflecting the 
heavy weight carried by the capital cities within the Arab World, where 
centralised politics, limited resources and concentrated infrastructure draw 
residents, investment and attention to one major city.  
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Figure ‎1-2: Urban Population as Percentage of Total Population, 2010 
 
Source: Data selected and graphed from World Bank, 2012 
 
Population growth rates are also much higher within the Arab World than the 
developed world, putting additional stress on infrastructure facilities, 
government budgets, and the ability of the public sector to keep pace with the 
needs of a growing population. This need becomes even greater as we 
examine the youth bulge of populations (in Jordan and Lebanon, 37% and 
25%, of the population is below the age of 15 respectively - compared to 17% 
in the UK and 18% in France) which brings with it surges of growth 
(Population Reference Bureau, 2011). Amman's population especially has 
seen sudden jumps; in 1990 for instance over 250,000 residents returned to 
the city. In 2003, estimates project the number of Iraqis who came to Jordan 
as just under 1 million. In 2013, Syrian refugees in Amman stand at almost 
half a million people. The city has therefore suffered from severely strained 
infrastructure.  
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Figure ‎1-3: Annual Population Growth % 1960-2010 
 
Source: Data selected and graphed from World Bank, 2012 
 
This thesis is important because it contributes one of the first substantive 
works documenting the Case Studies in detail at a time when cities and their 
populations are growing in importance. For Abdali, it is the only academic text 
that looks at creating a written history of the project. It is also a new attempt 
to link the two RECHCO cases to offer a more general analysis on the 
impacts of RECHCOs from the perspective of the citizen. The research will 
have significant policy implications, not just for the identified case studies, but 
also for the Arab World as a whole. For this reason, the Conclusion Chapter 
will focus on a series of lessons learnt from the RECHCO experience. 
 
1.2 Methodology  
 
The thesis focuses on two case studies in particular. The first is the case of 
Solidere in Beirut (near completion) and the second is the Abdali case in 
Jordan, modelled after the Solidere experience to assess the social, the 
political and the economic impacts on cities' citizens. There is much overlap 
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between these three pillars of evaluation, for this reason impacts may be seen 
to lie across the three areas, and be interrelated. While there is a dedicated 
Chapter for each impact, as mentioned in the text on the sections of the 
thesis, the combined threads of impact will be discussed in the conclusion.  
Despite having critics, especially regarding generalisability, case studies have 
long been established as legitimate means of studying wider phenomenon 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006), rather than merely producing anecdotal evidence (Eysenck, 
1976), and their use is not new by any means (Eckstein, 1975 and Campbell, 
1975). Ultimately, all case studies are specific and context-dependent; 
however case studies are extremely useful where they represent likely cases 
that can be emulated for the future. Case studies provide practical knowledge, 
and even one case can contribute to scientific development. They can also be 
useful for generating hypotheses and can be concisely described within the 
framework of the thesis (Stake, 1995; Ragin and Becker, 1992).  
Wholly predictive theories that are universal in nature are not to be found in 
the social sciences. However, to fully give a case study its worth, Lisa Peattie 
of MIT's Urban Planning Department, explicitly warned against summarising 
dense case studies (Peattie, 2001, p. 260) – each case must be detailed 
sufficiently. Generalisability of case studies can be increased by the strategic 
selection of cases (Ragin, 1992; Rosch, 1978). Amman and Beirut for 
instance, both saw the use of RECHCOs in spite of highly dissimilar political 
and socioeconomic backgrounds and so serve as interesting cases that one 
may generalise from. In both cases the RECHCO is a completely private 
entity, which expropriated land. While differences in the RECHCO structure 
do exist between the two, and will be discussed in detail in later Chapters, the 
models are similar enough in terms of size, investment type and approval 
process to provide a framework from which generalisations of RECHCOs can 
be made. Indeed, the very different contexts of Amman and Beirut show just 
how universal the impacts of RECHCOs are when they are found to be similar 
in both cases. Amman is representative of a modern capital working to attract 
transnational investors, Beirut is a capital that was emerging from a tense 
post-war environment, and is also a key RECHCO case, being the most 
famous, and a model upon which others were built.  
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The thesis will take a snapshot of the two cases at different times. The first of 
these cases is over a decade old; that of Solidere in Beirut. It is one where 
tangible results have been seen, and where citizen feedback can be 
examined in retrospect with the 'end' result, an almost completed project, 
already on the ground. The second case is that of Abdali in Amman, modelled 
after Solidere in Lebanon, and still in the process of being constructed. 
Reactions of a different nature will be gleaned from this case, as the process 
leading to the RECHCO's approval is still fresh in citizens' minds, and their 
evaluation will be focused more on the 'means' aspect. The analysis of the 
cases is divided up into several major components, with a unique 
methodology for each. In addition to being representative cases in terms of 
emerging from two varied backgrounds, both the cases of Amman and Beirut 
are ones I am extremely familiar with allowing for the translation of personal 
observations and experiences along with the other methodological tools for 
evaluation. 
The cases offered enough in terms of diversity and settings that significant 
conclusions can be drawn from both. Given Solidere's condition as a "first" of 
its kind, it can be considered a 'critical' case of sorts (Thomas, 2011) that has 
been present for a decade and which would allow several key deductions to 
be made as a result. Amman's RECHCO case can be considered a typical 
case of the RECHCO of sorts, with transnational investors, high-order of 
government support, appropriation of land, and international outreach of the 
RECHCO. One of the most effective uses of a case study relates to Karl 
Popper's falsification (Yin, 2009; Thomas, 2011a). As the RECHCOs are 
marketed as being of great benefit on the economic, social and political fronts 
(as is described in the case studies), if the subsequent analyses are able to 
provide observations to the contrary then the conventional thinking about 
RECHCOs in cities must be changed. Within the time and geographic 
limitations of this thesis, two case studies were able to serve the purpose of 
offering a comparative view of RECHCOs and their potential impacts on 
citizens within the Arab World.  
There are several major components to the cases. The first major component 
is based on mapping the histories of the Abdali and Solidere projects, piecing 
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together the 'story' related to the idea's inception and following it through to 
implementation. The second is gathering a comprehensive understanding of 
citizen's views of the project on the social and political fronts. The third is 
evaluating the project's impact through an analysis of the costs and benefits. 
The fourth is giving consideration to the lessons learnt from the RECHCOs. 
These components will be composed using several distinct research 
methodologies outlined below: 
(1) The first component is based on several research techniques. The first is 
a series of interviews with key stakeholders which is one of the few ways 
of capturing a previously undocumented story properly like that of the 
Abdali case. Through storylines established from newspapers, interviews 
and literature, a comprehensive list of stakeholders was identified in both 
cities, and the project discussed with them in order to be able to piece 
together a picture of the approvals process relating to the project and its 
key benefits and costs. These interviews took place in both Lebanon and 
Jordan, and were conducted in the language the interviewee was most 
comfortable with (Arabic, English). The literature reflects the essential use 
of interviews to help illustrate logic chains outlining activities, outputs and 
outcomes (Cambridge, 2010) in these types of analyses.  
A comprehensive Literature Review was undertaken as the second key 
contribution to the research effort. The review began by looking at 
literature discussing the earliest cities and citizens' relationship with the 
city and their centre then focused in on literature relating to Arab Cities. A 
more specific Literature Review looked at papers discussing the Solidere 
experience, and that of the Urban Development Corporations in the UK as 
a predecessor of the RECHCOs. In the case of Amman, no documented 
history of Abdali or AID exists. For this reason a media review was 
invaluable in piecing together the events that helped to create the project. 
This took the form of a systematic review of the archives of the three most 
popular dailies in Amman from 2002 to date. In Beirut the media coverage 
helped contribute to the analysis of public opinion and articles were 
similarly collected. An Internet scan of blogs and other forms of 
expression was also included in this review, although these sources 
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cannot be taken as factual records. In addition to the media review, the 
companies' published records were a good source of information for 
tracking profitability, investments and corporate structure. Public records, 
such as land rights contributed to the analysis. The corporate offices of 
Solidere SAL and AID provided such information, alongside the related 
ministries in Lebanon and Jordan. A legislative review was a final step of 
this component as it was important to note the laws, bylaws, regulations 
and court decisions, enacted to help bring the RECHCOs into existence, 
and to track their legal authority and extra-legal activities.  
(2) In trying to attain a comprehensive understanding of citizens' views 
relating to the projects, a different approach was taken for Amman and 
Beirut. In the case of Beirut, interviews took place in Beirut over the 
summer of 2013. Approximately 20 street interviews were conducted 
within Beirut; about 10 in and around the Solidere area and an additional 
10 in the Hamra area, another vibrant commercial district. The interviews 
were equally portioned across men and women of a wide age range. 
Solidere's costs and benefits as an established project from the 
perspective of citizens were more easily accessible than those of Abdali. 
In addition, Solidere is well debated and discussed in the public sphere.  
Within Amman, for the 'non-market' aspects18, the research approach 
adopted provided a conceptual framework to estimate the benefits and 
costs of the RECHCOs. The thesis undertook an assessment of the 
evidence base in order to provide an approach for the appraisal and 
evaluation of the RECHCO as a tool for development, and expand an 
extensive set of recommendations to maximise its functions. The non-
market valuation technique that was used in this thesis was based on 
examining stated preferences through contingent valuation19 and directly 
elicited monetary values from respondents with choice and direct 
valuation questions through a survey to help place a dollar-value upon the 
perceived 'public benefit' of the project. The stated preference survey will 
                                                          
18
 These include any project features that cannot be 'bought' or 'sold'. This includes development gains 
such as improved standards of living in the city, or the expansion of public space and facilities that are 
not traded directly in markets, so no direct market value can be assigned. While job creation and 
investment can be measured with direct statistics, other softer gains cannot be quantified directly.  
19
 Contingent valuation is a survey based economic technique for the valuation of non-market 
resources. It is a type of stated preference model. 
40 
 
also estimate preferences and therefore provide values for the kind of 
changes that are not bought or sold but rather just 'felt' by citizens, and 
this will be especially important in the case of Amman20.  
The use of surveys has been long established to examine 'willingness to 
pay' (Alberini et al., 2004; Azevedo, Herriges and Kling, 2003; Bateman et 
al., 2006; Dolan and Metcalfe, 2008; Earnhart, 2001; Ghermandi et al., 
2007). From the UK, literature has shown the long-term use of stated 
preference surveys for public goods to assess willingness-to-pay which 
has been commonly used for almost thirty years (Azevedo et al., 2003). In 
2009 the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) 
began a series of studies on valuing the benefits of regeneration looking 
at potential costs and benefits, part of which included a stated 
preferences survey. The literature shows that methodologically the 
relevance of the stated preference studies is high (Dolan and Metcalfe, 
2008 and Earnhart, 2001). Stated preference studies have had positive 
results and covered a wider variety of topics. Urban green space has 
been looked at by Bullock (2005) and Oppewal et al. (2005); historic and 
cultural sites regeneration by Riganti (2005); public realm by Alberini et al. 
(2004). Bateman et al. (2006) have shown the positive use of contingent 
valuation alongside choice experiments. Other works show the need to 
include screening and quota questions, introductory questions, choice 
experiments, and socio-economic questions (Riganti, 2005 and Bateman 
et al., 2002), and these were included in the survey conducted. 
Sufficient citizens were surveyed, to provide a large enough sample size 
to ensure appropriate representation (Amman has a population of 
approximately 2.5 million people). To this end, a 1,500+ person paper-
based survey was distributed within Amman21 in order to try to quantify 
the 'non-market' benefits or costs of the projects. This survey sample size 
will give a confidence interval of 97%22. The survey was required for 
                                                          
20
 A National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Blue Ribbon Panel (Arrow et al., 1993) 
was created to consider the validity of these survey methods. The results found that stated preferences 
and revealed preferences were very highly correlated and that much extremely useful information can 
be found from properly designed stated preference surveys.  
21
 A full translated survey can be read in Appendix I. 
22
 The confidence interval is a type of interval estimate of a population parameter used to indicate the 
reliability of the estimate. 
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gathering a base of public opinion regarding the Abdali project within the 
city of Amman not available in the media and literature as it was for 
Beirut. The survey helped to assess how people of different incomes and 
geographies across Amman perceive the real estate project within their 
city, and to what extent they view it as a public good. Only a survey in 
Amman could provide this kind of data. The Thesis Survey looks at how 
the respondents saw and interacted with Abdali within their city and how 
this impacted them politically, economically and socially. In addition to 
background questions about the respondent and direct questions relating 
to opinions about the Abdali project, a series of questions were used 
within both a stated preferences technique as well as contingent valuation 
to directly elicit values from respondents with choice and direct valuation 
questions.  
The survey was paper-based and distributed across the different districts 
of Amman within commercial districts (during and after working hours) 
and coffee-shops. A research team of five trained individuals were used, 
with the initial five interviews concluded by each person attended by 
myself. The survey was not left with respondents, but rather conducted in 
an interview format where additional comments could be added freely, 
and so gave allowance for more qualitative feedback so that additional 
anecdotes and details could be recorded in an interview fashion. Open 
ended questions and comments were included. Participants filled out the 
survey in Arabic. A researcher was available to explain the survey 
questions and one resident per household over the age of 18 was allowed 
to fill out the survey. The survey lasted on average about 30-40 minutes. 
A daily tally helped ensure that the numbers of respondents living within 
each of Amman's 27 districts were in-line with the sampling strategy23. 
10% double data entry was used as a quality control measure, and only 
surveys more than 85% filled were considered to be acceptable24. 
The sample was stratified across four categories. It was important due to 
the survey being distributed in commercial areas that these four 
                                                          
23
 The full sampling plan can be seen in Appendix II. 
24
 For the Ethical Approval Certificate based on permission forms, data storage and ethical 
considerations inline with the University of Exeter guidelines please see Appendix III. 
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categories were adhered to, in order to ensure that there was sufficient 
representation across all societal categories. Where significant 
differences exist and where relevant, cross-tabulation analysis of these 
results will be drawn out to show how different segments of society were 
impacted differently by REHCOs. These categories were: 
 Gender: the sample ensured proportionate distribution of gender as 
reported by Jordan's latest Population and Housing Census25; 
 Age: the sample was distributed across four age categories: 18-25; 
26-50; 51-65; over 65 as outlined by Jordan's census; 
 Districts: proportionate distribution across the districts of the Greater 
Amman Municipality (GAM) was ensured; 
 Monthly income: was proportionate to the following annual household 
incomes in Jordanian Dinar (JD) as measured by the Department of 
Statistic's Income and Expenditure Survey: less than JD 3,600 
annually (USD 5,076), between JD 3,600 – 6,000 annually (USD 
5,076 – 8,460); JD 6,000 - JD 12,000 annually (USD 8,460 – USD 
16,920); above JD 12,000 annually (USD 16,920). 
The decision to use a survey tool in Amman and conduct interviews in 
Beirut was mainly due to the fact that the Solidere project is two decades 
old and already well-established and discussed in the public domain with 
plenty of associated literature making the use of a large-scale survey in 
Beirut unnecessary. 
In addition to the interviews and survey, by being physically present in 
Amman and Beirut for extended periods, and having lived in both cities 
and spent time in the project areas, I was able to accumulate my own 
observations of Solidere and Abdali and how people interact with, and 
react to, the sites. 
(3) The third major methodological component is examining whether the 
RECHCO actually delivers on promised development gains, which will be 
analysed by undertaking an economic cost-benefit analysis. A series of 
indicators was designed to benchmark the development benefits of the 
                                                          
25
 The Population and Housing Census is conducted every ten years by the Department of Statistics. 
The latest available was undertaken in 2004. 
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RECHCO against their drawbacks. In the case of Solidere in Beirut, the 
project history spans twenty years with the company still very much 
operational. In the case of Jordan, there are only preliminary projections. 
The benefits - and costs - attributed to RECHCOs have several data 
sources that can be used to support the analysis. The first is hard data 
that was gathered through interviews with developers and published 
statistics. Data that was collected included job creation averages, as well 
as foreign investment levels (in terms of quantity, quality, and sources of 
funding), tourism figures, land values, corruption indices, and national 
economic statistics amongst other statistics. In terms of costs, actual 
government grants - including hidden taxes - were examined, as well as 
publically expensed land and construction. There was also data 
generated on the long-term as related to the use of funds and revenues 
on the part of the RECHCO, as well as data related to the crowding out of 
domestic and foreign investors, influence (actual or potential) on the 
exchange rate, and impact on legislation and the business environment26. 
This thesis will similarly use the data where applicable to examine the 
distribution of the benefits amongst the entire community in Beirut and 
Amman. 
(4) The final component includes an analysis to synthesise across the 
impacts to create a series of lessons learnt for potential future processes 
to enhance the benefits of RECHCOs and their sustainability. This stage 
involved certain interviews with policy makers as well as reflection and 
analysis of the results generated by other components. 
                                                          
26
 The literature has much to offer on this topic. In terms of issues relating to tourism gains, cases in the 
UK have looked at value transfer from environmental improvements due to additional visitor expenditure 
(Ecotec, 2006; GHK, 2007). One report from the Land Economy Department in the University of 
Cambridge compares across a series of indicators, which include: skills and education; employment and 
unemployment; sustainable economic growth, wealth creation, competitiveness and business support; 
improving housing; initiatives of benefit to ethnic communities; crime and community safety; quality of 
life, health, culture, sports facilities; amongst others (The Department of Land and Cambridge Policy 
Consultants, 1999)
26
 which are all factors to be included in the economic evaluation. The UDC 
evaluations that were undertaken within the UK did not use stated preferences within the work. Some 
studies looked at the London Docklands Development Corporation during its first 10 years using a set of 
criteria to assess regeneration - especially regarding housing, employment, and transportation 
infrastructure (Oc and Tiesdel, 1991).  
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1.3 Literature Review  
 
The concepts of RECHCOs touch upon several fields of literature. For the 
purposes of this thesis I feel the story of the RECHCOs is most strongly 
situated in the writings that have taken place on the Arab city. The Arab city in 
modern literature has not been well explored empirically, and especially not 
when considering its relationship to its citizens as cities expand and 
populations demand additional rights. The Literature Review will not be 
exploring literature related to architectural spatialisations. While mainly an 
empirical thesis, this Literature Review nevertheless is an opportunity to 
further expand on the theoretical issues the thesis also addresses. The 
themes addressed above are also to be found in the Literature Review.   
The Literature Review is structured into four major sections. The first looks at 
how to understand the city centres within cities and how to look at projects 
within the city context and within neoliberal trends that may give rise to 
contested space within cities. The second looks at the literature on the public 
space and the public sphere, looking into these of public space and 
participation and citizenship further. The third looks more specifically at the 
Arab city and its evolution, taking this analysis a step further and bringing in 
issues of heritage and memory. The fourth section looks at the trends 
encouraging the creation of these large projects within cities, within the 
context of urban governance and policy. The Chapter's conclusion looks at 
the literature that exists on Amman and Beirut specifically relating to the 
RECHCOs and how this segues to the thesis. Much of the specific literature 
on the more theoretical approaches used to evaluate such large projects 
within the UK and Europe I have left to later Chapters. Similarly the literature 
on property rights is left to Chapter Three.  
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The Evolving City 
 
In considering how large privately held real estate companies might impact 
cities in a 'good' or 'bad' way, I found no limit to literature addressing 'good city 
form' and how ideal cities interact with their citizens through the various 
components27. The literature on city form is essentially the rational starting 
point for this thesis, providing an understanding of citizens' relationship to the 
city and the projects within it, albeit not making the functional jump to 
discussing developmental aspects as measured by the more quantitative 
impersonal economic indicators of employment, crime, and investment, 
amongst others28.  
I have divided the literature into three major categories that attempt to explain 
whence cities (and their components) come and to reconcile this with the 
literature on city planning and observations of the modern world. The first 
branch is 'normative theory' which deals with connections between human 
values and settlement form, in other words 'how to know a good city (project) 
when you see one'. The second is 'functional theory', which focuses 
specifically on the form of cities, and attempts to explain why they take the 
character they do and how they perform functions within this form. The third is 
'decision theory', which relates to how decisions are made in complex political 
and economic enterprises within the city - especially relating to large projects 
or plans. This thesis will deal most directly with the functional and decision 
theory, and to a much lesser extent normative theory. 
 
  
                                                          
27
 While a rigorous definition of the city is not really needed for this thesis, I have found it useful for the 
purpose of this Literature Review to adhere to a common definition within the urban planning field, which 
is simply to imagine the city as a story, ―a pattern of relations between human groups, a production and 
distribution space, a field of physical force, a set of linked decisions, or an arena of conflict‖ (Lynch, 
1984, p38).  
28
 One of the comprehensive guides on the matter of what a good city is remains Kevin Lynch's 
monumental work on Good City Form, offering five basic dimensions of city performance: vitality, sense, 
fit, access, and control, and two extra 'meta-criteria', which are efficiency and justice (Lynch, 1984). 
Lynch discusses the need to imagine the city as a complete and adhesive unit, meaning that in order to 
fully grasp the impact of RECHCOs, we must do so in the context of the overall city. 
46 
 
Normative Theories: The City Centre in History 
 
The Greek City 
 
While there is agreement that the earliest cities were built for functions of 
worship, in addition to others of economy and defence, functions that 
remained entrenched in modern cities (Mumford, 1961), the structure of cities, 
and especially their centres has evolved. The earliest thinkers on cities date 
back to 300 B.C. (the times of city-construction for the parent cities of 
Greece). From Aristotle we learn about the ideal state, designed by Phaleas 
who believed in complete equality of property; and we hear about one of the 
first city planners in the history of man - Hippodamus. As an architect, 
sociologist and city planner Hippodamus realised that a city was more than a 
collection of houses, streets, markets and temples and he propagated a social 
order to match his city plans (Mumford, 1962). 
Greek literature was filled with praise of the polis from philosophers and 
poets. The city was convinced of its own glory through the rights of its citizens 
and indoctrinated its residents with this ideal. So much so that in Phaedrus, 
Socrates announces that the stars, the tones, and the trees could not teach 
him anything. Believing he could learn all that mattered only from Plato's 'men 
in the city centre' (Plato, 2005). Athenian life was not meant to be lived in 
privacy – this would have undermined the polis. Instead life was supposed to 
be lived in the agora, or the large square where citizens gathered to gossip 
and discuss politics: 'a polis within the polis' (Hansen, 2006). In order to 
maintain this delicate balance of socialisation and size, the polis had to be 
scaled to this human dimension. Aristotle describes this phenomenon as one 
where the ideal city should be taken in at a 'single view' (Boochkin, 1986). 
Dreamers of an ideal city were plenty including Le Corbusier, Howard, and 
Wright. While Utopias were written about (and sometimes even implemented 
in somewhat failed experiments) no one ideal city emerged29. Much on this 
                                                          
29
 'Utopia' comes from the Greek α-τόπος (a-topos) meaning 'not a place'. 
Chapter 1: Introduction  |  47 
 
 
 
'ideal' city form has been debated, however, Kevin Lynch notes, across the 
board this city has a centre at its heart (Lynch, 1959).  
 
The City Centre 
 
Centres by nature, says Lynch, traditionally exhibit mixed-use functions with 
internal specialisation (for worship, commerce, politics) and transitions of 
different zones and various urban forms between the specialised areas 
(Lynch, 1964, p392). In Europe and the Middle East, these centres have 
always been associated with the more historic parts of the city. Thinkers about 
centres have included August Losch, whose 'central place theory' in the 
1950s was one of the earliest attempts at explaining the importance of centres 
through economic forces. It is these very economic forces that have 
encouraged the metamorphosis of downtowns into Central Business Districts 
(CBDs) as outlined by Victor Gruen (the architect responsible for the first 
shopping malls in the United States) who looks at the origins of the 
'downtown', interchangeable in many American cities with 'CBD', (Gruen et 
al., 1965) being replaced by the 'shopping mall'. Indeed the word 'downtown' 
was first used in New York, referring to the geographical area around Wall 
Street. It soon extended to the rest of the United States. Europe and the 
Middle East have more traditionally used the notion of City Centre (centre-
ville), though this distinction is often overlooked in the literature with 
interchangeable terms for city centre and downtown, especially as it relates to 
the Arab city.  
City centres have been slowly transformed into new "managerial centres" 
(Castells et al., 1997, p23) with examples such as La Defense in Paris, and 
some of these new business complexes have threatened "the traditional 
supremacy" of the CBDs (Baerwald, 1978, p308). Fast changing cities within 
the United States brought forth a new focus on downtowns and their 
revitalisation. Frieden and Sagalyn analyse the retail industry to look at 
developers and 'enterprising' mayors who found creative solutions to 
developing their downtowns in light of shrinking Federal subsidies (Frieden 
48 
 
and Sagalyn, 1991). This 'modernist' planning paradigm (Sandercock, 1998 
cited in Yacobi et al., 2005) present in Arab cities - as it was elsewhere - was 
based on "rationality, scientific method and faith in a state directed future" for 
what planners knew to be in the public interest (Yacobi et al., 2005, p506).  
The concept of the centre or heart of the city is always central to the literature 
on normative city form. However, with the emergence of new commercial and 
managerial uses, the traditional function of the downtown as a 'polis' has been 
disintegrating. The romance associated with the image of city centres as 
melting pots is one that has been exploited by large urban projects and their 
proponents. Beirut's city centre for instance was known as a mediating space 
(Larkin, 2010), and after the Civil War the image of the Lebanese rising from 
the ashes as a united people in the heart of the city was the framework under 
which Solidere SAL marketed its plans (Kousis et al., 2011)30.  
 
Functional Theories: The Neoliberal City  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the most relevant literature is that which looks 
at the functional effects of neoliberalist trends upon city form31. Many have, 
within this trend, mapped the ideological conflict between "municipal 
socialism" and "urban entrepreneurialism" (Parkinson, 1989, p421). The urban 
entrepreneurialism has come in several forms. In the Entrepreneurial City, 
Hall and Hubbard look at shifting urban policies to prioritise 'pro-growth' local 
development (Hall and Hubbard, 1998). David Harvey puts public-private 
                                                          
30
 When mapping out urban theory, from the start of the twentieth century, there have been three major 
schools of urban studies. The first of these was the Berlin School, Weber examined the relationship 
between urban places and the status of law (where rights and place were tied to cities); Simmel looked 
to the city as a point of reflection of sociology; Benjamin looked to the city as a site for thinking about 
narrative cultural practices and imaging. The second major school of thought was the Chicago School 
(prior to WWI). The school looked at the spatialisation of social and economic difference, and how these 
differences are imposed on natural geography. The third school was the Paris School (1950s-1970s). 
The major players included Henri Lefebvre who looked at trying to create democratic socialism where 
the city served as a space of production. Guy Debord, Michel de Certeau and Michel Foucault were also 
major thinkers in this school. All three schools focused on space rather than built form (geography over 
architecture).  
31
 Neoliberalism was coined in 1938 by Alexander Rüstow, though it has since undergone a change of 
meaning. While literature on neoliberalism existed prior to the 1970s, the literature with the most direct 
consequence on cities began with the Thatcher-Reagan era. Much literature available focuses on critical 
reviews of the Thatcher Government's urban policies (Parkinson, 1989), closely looking at the 
centralisation and privatisation of urban policy, while others have looked at examples in the United 
States (Frieden and Sagalyn, 1991).  
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partnerships at the centre of 'urban entrepreneurialism' looking at how 
external sources of funding, direct investments and new employment sources 
are at the centre of city policy interpreted as large-scale consolidated projects 
at the city level (Harvey, 1989, p7). 
Harvey's seminal work, Social Justice and the City, published in 1973, helped 
redefine the relationship between urban studies and capitalism. Harvey 
proposed that "urbanism, the city, and all related phenomena, were 
epiphenomena to the processes of capital" (Harvey cited in Thompson, 2005, 
p22) critiquing some of the most influential theorists of the time, such as Henri 
Lefebvre who argued in the Urban Revolution that the urban sphere was able 
to stand independent of capitalism. Henri Lefebvre's work in the 1960s and 
1970s looked at the spreading of urbanisation and implications of "spatial 
justice". Lefebvre also described "representational space" which overlays 
physical space (Lefebvre, 1974) and represents the ideology, which in turn 
influences urban development. Other criticisms of Lefebvre have included his 
student Manuel Castells in a structuralist critique recognising the changing 
nature of cities; and who along with thinkers like Harvey have looked at how 
capital accumulation is the underlying force driving urbanisation (this is 
discussed more in the section on public sphere and public space). 
The transformation of cities due to capital accumulation has been a base 
concept for a whole host of research. Saskia Sassen (2001) coined the term 
'global cities' to distinguish the modern leading cities from the past 'world 
cities'. The truly 'global cities' were in a sense 'nodes' in the globalisation 
network (Castells, 1996). Newman and Thornley (2005) have looked at the 
importance of political ideology in the city as an important part of its role in the 
globalisation process. The city, as such, has taken on new roles and 
characteristics. Coordination of economic activities takes place at a much 
larger scale and amongst activities concentrated in privileged areas 
(Bourdeau-Lepage and Huriot, 2004).  
This concept of the 'Network Society' was developed by Manuel Castells in 
1996 (Castells, 1996), and the global cities became those "by which centres 
of production and consumption of advanced services, and their ancillary local 
societies, are connected in a global network" (Castells, 1996, p386). This city, 
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according to Castells, was arguably a 'dual' city which opposed the matching 
of the cosmopolitan to the localism and so made an ever growing distinction 
between the global space of flows and the more locally interpreted sense of 
place. This increased connectivity has been identified by others as "a 
dromocratic order of great invasions" (Virilion, 2006, p113). 
For Harvey (2008) the struggle regarding the hegemony of financial capital 
should be centred around the 'right' to the city since the accumulation of 
capital ultimately finds itself involved in the creative destruction of urban 
environments. These new global cities are independent from traditional 
government structure (Smith, 2005). They are assessed internationally, and 
ranked according to new global metrics. In addition the ranks of cities in the 
transnational business connections are set by global cities, which top the list 
(Malkawi, 2011). This is very important for Amman and Beirut as they 
compete globally to attract investments.  
Within this ranking, cities of historic importance (such as Cairo, Damascus, or 
Baghdad) or of religious importance (Mecca, Medina) shadow others in terms 
of economic status. The discourse ignores criteria such as national standing 
and cultural functions, positioning economy as the primary measure of city 
status. Cities that do not determine success by this measure have fallen 
behind the others, compared internationally (Robinson, 2002). Within this 
literature, places in the form of cities begin to be identified by performance 
(Callon and Muniesa, 2005; Sidaway, 2007) and calculations of profit (Ong, 
2000 cited in Parker, 2009).  
Becoming a 'global city' is certainly not simply a matter of size (Smith, 2005). 
Arab cities in this sense are made out to be 'gateway' cities (Beaverstock et 
al., 2000) - cities that want to be global, but in reality attract very limited 
attention on the transnational investment front. As such the debate was 
refocused and, within the global city frame, the increasing competition 
between cities has meant that they have become commodities themselves 
(Fainstein and Judd, 1999a). This trend has specifically affected cities across 
the Arab World by making them "obliged" (Daher, 2006, p53) to create the 
business conditions and tourism facilities sufficient to attract people to live, 
invest and be entertained. However, in creating this new image for investors, 
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local communities are sometimes excluded (Daher, 2007d). To cities in the 
intense competition to attract international investments, the lack of a modern 
downtown has meant lowering investment potential amongst multi-national 
companies in cities (Swyngedouw, 2002), and so a new focus has emerged 
on projects within the city centre32.  
These large-scale projects give rise to a phenomenon that is referred to by 
Saskia Sassen as the "quartering of urban space" resulting in a "fragmented 
city" and a "patchwork of discrete spaces with increasingly sharp boundaries" 
(cited in Elsheshtawy, 2004, p18). Within Arab cities, Jamila Bargach has 
described these neoliberal imprints as "ruptures" within the city. She goes on 
to describe how citizen needs are ignored within these major projects that 
"primarily serve global capital" (Bargach, 2011, p17). Against this backdrop of 
globalisation, urban governance also remains problematic, with lack of policy 
options and development tools at the city government level (World Bank, 
2007). 
Literature has undertaken certain examinations of "emerging islands of 
excessive consumption" (Daher, 2011, p53) creating elite zones with 
international real-estate companies and construction consultancies capable of 
providing high-quality services looking at neoliberal urban structures in 
projects such as Solidere in Beirut, Abdali in Amman (Summer, 2005; Daher 
2007a), Dreamland in Cairo (Adham, 2004), Financial Harbour in Manama 
(Ben Hamouche, 2011), and Mecca through the Jabal Omar Project. Adham‘s 
work on Cairo (2004) describes these projects as neoliberal urban 
restructurings copying developments in the West such that it gives an "oriental 
vision of the occident" (Adham, 2004, p157). 
This 'Western' planning has become a serious issue for planners and urban 
designers (Saliba, 1997a). Guy Debord describes some places as "too 
unreal," too much of a "representation" lacking "authenticity and lived 
                                                          
32
 Swyngedouw (2002) in his work Neoliberal Urbanization in Europe: Large-Scale Urban Development 
Projects and the New Urban Policy looked at major projects across Europe. In his view, the neoliberal 
new economic policy of deregulation, privatisation, flexiblisation of the labour market and spatial 
decentralisation have fed into a new urban policy based on new urban coalitions, shift from social to 
economic policy, new state entrepreneurialism, selective deregulation, city marketing, territorially 
targeted social policy, and producing urban rent. These new urban policies have led to partnerships, 
privatisation of public funds, increased real estate developments focused on flagship projects that are 
spatially targeted and localised. 
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experience", where what we see is a commodity, and the spectacle is ―capital 
accumulated to the point where it becomes image‖ (Debord, 1995, p24). 
Michael Sorkin, critiquing planned urban developments, describes the 
"spectacle city" as a "new realm...of simulations, television city, the city as a 
theme park. This is nowhere more visible than in its architecture, in buildings 
that rely for their authority on images drawn from history, from a spuriously 
appropriated past that substitutes for a more exigent and examined present" 
(Sorkin, 1992, p.xii-xiii). 
Alongside this emerging dialogue of islands within cities has come another 
perspective focused more on global interactions forming the tourist city. The 
two go almost hand-in-hand linking the need for upgrades of large projects not 
only as a tool for capital accumulation, but also as one to attract the global 
elite through tourism. Authors such as Hall (1996) have discussed the shift in 
city centre functions towards leisure and tourism in many parts of the world. 
He argues that the "primary justification for the redevelopment of inner city 
areas for tourism is the perceived economic benefits of tourism" (Hall, 1996, 
p155). Within this viewpoint the urban core as a whole is evaluated in the 
context of being a tourism resource. Hall (1996) goes one step further to 
describe the "creation of a 'bourgeois playground' in the name of economic 
progress" (Hall, 1996, p159), which would understandably create tension in 
urban policy-making.  
The playgrounds are used to package, and brand, cities as marketing 
products. Within this context, cities all over the region compete for the inward 
business and tourism investment - with consequences of how these cities are 
transformed, and how heritage and urban regeneration is conceived (Daher, 
2007b). These transformations have given rise to struggles over space and 
between stakeholders (Tyler, 2000). Fainstein and Judd (1999b) call these 
areas "tourist bubbles" that are isolated from surrounding areas of decay. At 
their most extreme tourist destinations become "wholly de-attached from their 
social context" (Fainstein and Gladstone, 1999, p27). Sheller and Urry (2004) 
look at the "places to play" further. The tourism generated by these large 
urban projects is set to transform places and also have a significant impact on 
the creation of virtual realities, "powerful and ubiquitous global brands or logos 
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that increasingly feature tourist sites/sights as key components of the global 
culture that their brand speaks to and enhances" (Sheller and Urry, 2004, p4). 
Tyler (2000) looks at the creation of 'Fantasy City' where the city is turned into 
a spectacle. The effect of such socio-economic transformation on the creation 
of open space produces a privatised public space based on a very tight 
definition of the public (Crawford, 1995). Junemo‘s (2004) work on Dubai 
looks at the socio-economic, spatial, and demographic transformations that 
take place. Junemo believes that the Dubai-phenomenon is explained by 
postmodern theory where people are concerned with images on the surface 
rather than deeper meanings. This has been shown to be the case in other 
literature on decision theory, outlined below. 
 
Decision Theories: The Corporate City Planner 
 
In The Evangelistic Bureaucrat, British Councillor Jon Gower Davies of 
Newcastle in commenting on an urban renewal project observes: "The impact 
of planning on this society...is most onerous and least advantageous to those 
who are relatively powerless or relatively poor. Planning is, in its effect on the 
socio-economic structure, a highly regressive form of indirect taxation" 
(Davies, 1972, p2). The power of planners was not something new in the 
literature, especially considering post-war planning and urban renewal issues 
in the United States. Designs of many urbanists are simply aesthetic dreams 
(Goodman, 1947) that do not live up to the political and social systems they 
pretend to create. The city thus becomes a reflection of its planners, ultimately 
a subset of its population, leading many in the literature to look at big plans 
and ask: 'whose city?' (Sassen, 1998). According to Saskia Sassen, the city 
emerged as a site for new claims in a new constitution of citizenship (Sassen, 
1998). Sassen claims global capital has been used as an organisational 
commodity for the city, denationalising urban space through the formation of 
new claims by transnational actors.  
In his book on Transnational Urbanism, Michael Smith argues that the sort of 
transnational investors we are seeing give rise to "transnational urbanism...a 
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socio-spatial agency of transnational social, economic and political networks" 
(Smith, 2001, 116). Planning has become a pacifying device for investors as 
seen in this literature relevant to RECHCOs. In addition, municipal 
governments are often overtaken by events occurring in spheres beyond their 
control (Borja and Castells, 1997, p8). Local autonomy has been articulated 
through the negotiation of the city with companies and institutions that operate 
in the supra-local spheres (Borja and Castells, 1997, p14). 
A growing trend in this literature has also seen increasing concern for the 
need to examine global cities from 'below' looking at the lives of the excluded 
(Robinson, 2002). There have been many critiques to the concept of world 
cities offered as models for others to follow. Looking at cities from 'above' and 
'below' has been a common trend amongst more practice-oriented writers. A 
critique by Janet Abu-Lughod (2001), who wrote extensively on Middle 
Eastern cities, reflects how globalisation should be framed in its proper 
historical context.  
Pat Crooke, an urban observer, looks at the uncontrolled nature of cities as a 
reflection that cities grow on both the 'official' level and the informal or 
'unofficial' level with a popular economy that bypasses the official institutional 
channels (Ward, 1973). To help control the unofficial city, the 'planner' 
emerged and was granted what some call a perverse power, for "now as 
engineer and architect once drew, people have to walk and live" (Goodman et 
al., 1960, p3). Swarbrooke (2000) describes how in certain developed 
countries public protest against the use of public resources is common, 
especially as it relates to the support of tourism developments and flagship 
projects. Within developing countries it is clear that this has not been the case 
so far, although full participation requires that the assets of the poor, their 
position in the cycle of production, and consumption more generally, be 
brought into formal circuits of market regulation and exchange (De Soto, 
2000). Public participation remains one of the most important aspects of 
sustainable city plans. 
The public's participation in city plans is nearly the only defence against the 
exploitation of the rights of the poor. Urban transformation to cities has 
included repeated urban restructuring through "creative destruction" (Harvey, 
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2008, p9). This almost automatically includes a class dimension, as it is 
usually the underprivileged most negatively affected. Examples include 
Robert Moses taking "an axe to the Bronx", and Haussman in Paris framed as 
the first "neoliberal planner" focusing on investments (cited in Harvey, 2008, 
p10). The literature reflects the importance of these policies by describing a 
situation where if urban space is a consequence of social effects rather than 
the propagator of social influences, then "the city‘s built environment becomes 
a text, through which social rules and power relations become legible" 
(Rotenberg, 2001, p8). Moreover, because many cities have identities that 
make their residents 'proud' (Bell, 2012) - a cornerstone of civicism - any 
change to this identity becomes of paramount importance to study. This very 
civicism, in fact, is an important part of the resistance against "globalisation's 
homogenising tendencies" (Bainer, 2001, p 176). To this end, one casual 
observer, Teller (2004) writing the Rough Guide to Jordan points out at how 
these tendencies have made some parts of Arab cities "indistinguishable from 
upscale neighbourhoods of American or European cities," especially the 
commercial districts (Teller, 2004, p77).  
The streamlined feel of the city has been part and package of a phenomenon 
of integration designed to enable Arab countries to enter the developed world, 
and has mainly been carried out on the economic level. The neoliberalisation 
in the creation of urban public spaces distributes images, spectacles, and 
models and has led to a dilution of the local differences and circulations of 
"corporate urban forms and images" (Daher, 2011, p49). Al-Sayyad (2001) 
goes one step further to suggest a "transfer of design and political control 
from local governments and citizens to large corporations and the design 
professionals they hire" (Al-Sayyad, 2001, p12). Specifically, these 
corporations have focused on projects within city centres. However, the 
spaces they create are sometimes viewed as empty (McDonogh, 1993). 
Within the framework of economic liberalisation and privatisation, state 
enterprises and investment are leading and influencing urban policies (Ley, 
2004). This transformation, assisted by actors such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the World Economic Forum (WEF), and other similar 
organisations, has had a significant impact on cities as a whole and how, and 
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for whom, urban investment projects are developed (Parker, 2009). Gray 
(2002) has examined the link between economic liberalisation and tourism 
and examined tourism as a foreign exchange earner that mitigates the other 
financial hardships caused by liberalisation.  
Examining the neoliberal trends within the city, authors like Swyngedouw et 
al. (2002) look at how conservative liberalism seeks to move state 
interventions towards 'marshalling' state resources into the social, physical 
and geographical structures. These structures, through their investors, 
support and subsidise new forms of capital accumulation through fixed 
territorial structures allowing for the accelerated and facilitated forms of 
capital. As such, the human agent is a component that is often undervalued in 
this discourse. Ley (2004) identifies the importance of the transnational 
capitalists while attempting to bring the issue of 'human agency' to a 
globalised discourse that "has frequently been satisfied with speaking of a 
space of networks and flows devoid of knowledgeable human agents" (Daher, 
2011, p61). While theoretically this path of literature is exhaustive in material, 
empirically, these human agents are understudied in the literature as we see 
through the review of the work on UDCs in the UK, and RECHCOs in the Arab 
city in general.  
 
Public Space and the Public Sphere  
 
An in-depth examination of the relationship between the public sphere and 
public space is not the intention of this thesis, it is only important in so far as 
to frame the empirical impact of RECHCOs on modern space in the Arab city 
through its impacts on citizens. As this section of the review will show, 
understanding public space is important for understanding politics and the 
public sphere. The Arab World has very limited empirical studies tying the 
fields together and so this thesis will be an early attempt to touch upon the 
effects of RECHCOs in this regard, especially as related to social and political 
impacts.  
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Public space33 has occupied an important ideological position in democratic 
societies (Mitchell, 1995). Urban public space can be traced back to the 
Greek agora and its function as "the place of citizenship, an open space 
where public affairs and legal disputes were conducted" (Hartley, 1992, p29). 
The ancient Greek polis with its agora is often thought of as the prototype for 
the public sphere and public space. Politics, commerce, and spectacle were 
"juxtaposed and intermingled in the public space of the agora" (Mitchell, 2003, 
p131). It provided a meeting place for strangers, whether citizens, buyers, or 
sellers, and the ideal of public space in the agora encouraged nearly 
unmediated interaction. However, some of the idealised definitions of public 
space as relating to the agora represent a more normative ideal for public 
space than an empirical description of the ways that public spaces have 
functioned in actual democracies (Fraser 1990).  
Both the literatures on public space and the public sphere are internally 
diverse, though they have not really come together (Low and Smith, 2006)34. 
We have seen the public sphere literature become increasingly inclusive 
through repeated challenges by 'counter-publics' (Fraser, 1990); and the 
public space following a different trajectory of increased exclusivity (Mitchell, 
2003). The history of the public sphere is clearly demarked in the text but 
there is also an equally clear geography initially. While the 1980s saw much 
literature looking at the importance of space in structuring social relations and 
politics (sometimes earlier with what Henri Lefebvre (1974) calls the 
production of social space), public space in the 1990s diminished from 
                                                          
33
 In terms of public space, in addition to Young's definition (1990), the phrase seems to be used in 
several broad ways. The first definition is conventional in nature (public grounds and streets): anywhere 
that has officially been designated for public use. Madanipour (1999) defined public space as those 
areas within towns, cities and the countryside that are physically accessible to everyone, and where 
strangers and citizens can enter easily. Some used the concept of public space to mean any place that 
people use when not at work or at home (Shonfield 1998), while others have expanded the concept into 
‗cyberspace‘ (Crang 2000; Holmes 1997). The second definition of public space is that space that is not 
officially designated public space, nor is it a place for struggle, rather it is the everyday and material 
arena (Mitchell, 2003) for daily life. Public space, according to theorists such as Fraser (1990), Hartley 
(1992), Howell (1993) is the material location where social interactions and political activities for 
members of the public take place. The final definition is what Lefebvre would term "space of 
representation" spaces are public where there is the presence of struggle (Mitchell 2003, p35). This is 
similar to the way Rancière (Todd, 2013) uses the term.  
34
 Low and Smith (2006) note the weakness of public space literature in translating from political and 
cultural theories into the materiality of public space. The public space literature reflects discussions of 
the making and remaking of the public in light of the state and related institutions, and modes of 
communication and power. The weakness of the public sphere literature that produced public spaces 
"naturalise the very assumptions interrogated by the public sphere theorists and provide an 
extraordinary palimpsest for detailed scrutiny" (Low and Smith, 2006, p6).  
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literature as we read about the "transcendence of place" (Coleman 1993), and 
cities "without a place" (Gieryn, 2000).The twentieth century thus witnessed 
what some have called a "lost geography" (Smith, 2003, p28).  
 
A Lost Geography in the Public Sphere 
 
The public sphere has developed a considerable literature concerning it 
(Fraser, 1990; Habermas, 1962)35. The literature emphasises the various 
institutions, practices and ideas that contribute to the generation of the 'public' 
and public opinion, often placed in the larger context of the state and social 
relations. Habermas' account of the liberal model of the bourgeois public 
sphere shows a 'space of democracy' that all citizens have the right to inhabit 
and where all public discourse takes place, where inequalities are put aside to 
determine the 'common good' (Crawford, 1995); in practice, however, 
exclusions are inevitable (Fraser, 1990). Fraser responds to Habermas in part 
by looking at multiple publics to suggest that there is no one physical space 
that can be the space of democracy, and that multiple sites are needed for 
public expression.  
As such within this literature, the public sphere is rarely if ever spatialised. 
Arendt for instance notes in The Human Condition (1998) that the agora 
should not be thought of as a particular place, but rather a concept that may 
arise anywhere where people unite for a cause. For Habermas the ideal 
public sphere is universal and as such spatially undifferentiated (Hartley 1992 
and Howell, 1993); Fraser leaves some room open for spatialisation 
especially in the transnationality of the public sphere though there is little 
additional literature on this (Low and Smith, 2013, p5). Madanipour (2003) 
                                                          
35
 The public sphere across the literature, is "a network for communicating information and points of 
view" (Habermas 1992, p360) and lies between the state and society. The public sphere is described by 
Habermas as the sphere of private people coming together as a public (Habermas, 1962). The public 
sphere is thought of here as a discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss 
matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common judgment (Hauser, 1998). The public 
sphere is the space where people come together as citizens and articulate autonomous views. Civil 
society, by extension reflects the organised expression of these views. The public sphere and civil 
society are the link between the state and its citizens; and without an effective civil society that is 
capable of structuring citizen debates over "diverse ideas and conflicting interests" the gap between the 
state and its subjects will widen (Castells, 2008, p78).  
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notes that the public sphere is a despatialised concept where space is not a 
necessary ingredient. Public deliberations have the same impact regardless of 
geography, argues this set of literature. Thus the public sphere remains 
despatialised and the public space literature is not well connected to thinking 
on the public sphere (with exceptions such as Mitchell, 2003). Some writers 
dismiss the ability to create space conducive to the public sphere entirely 
(Mann, 1993). 
Simultaneously there is an expansive literature (by architects, geographers, 
planners, anthropologists, urbanists, amongst others) that has delved into 
discussions of public space. Their work tends to be explicitly spatial and looks 
at the way in which social, political, economic and cultural processes make 
specific public places and landscapes and how these geographies then feed 
back into social and political relations (Low and Smith, 2013, p5). This is not 
to say that there have been no efforts to connect reflections about space 
directly to politics (Howarth, 2006). In For Space, Doreen Massey indicates 
the "fact that space has so often been excluded from, or inadequately 
conceptualised in relation to, and has thereby debilitated our conceptions of, 
politics and the political" (Massey, 2005, p18). Margaret Kohn's Radical 
Space (2003) puts the spotlight on spatial concerns within democratic theory 
by looking at empirical evidence of mobilisations within Western Europe. 
Hardt and Negri (2004) in Multitude put space, territorialisation, and 
deterritorialisation at the heart of their analyses.  
Mitchell (2003) in The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public 
Space argues that public space plays a role more essential to politics than 
can be conveyed by despatialised concepts such as public sphere. Yet others 
like Low and Smith (2006) discuss how physical space has been the keystone 
to the development of the public sphere. The positive interaction between 
citizens, civil society, and the state communicating through the public sphere 
is essential to a healthy society (Low and Smith, 2006). More recently starting 
around the early 2000s, research on urban politics has been marked by 
serious efforts at framing urban spaces as sites for democratic use. This is 
very evident in the literature on The Right to the City (Dikeҫ and Gilbert, 2002) 
and The Just City (Fainstein, 2010); and linking the work to urban democracy 
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(Amin and Thrift, 2002), the 'good city' (Amin, 2006), the 'emancipator city' 
(Lees, 2000) and Seeking Spatial Justice (Soja, 2010).  
James Holston has described what brings the public sphere to public space 
as "spaces of insurgent citizenship" (Holston, 1999, p155). These sites where 
'citizenship' takes place accompany the processes of change that transform 
societies. Rights to the public sphere have been won through constant 
struggle, whereby the ideal public space is designed for a representative 
public to meet and claim representation (Hartley 1992 cited in Mitchell, 2003). 
In struggles for inclusion (especially ideological ones) authors note that the 
interactions and distinctions between the public sphere and public space can 
assume considerable importance (Mitchell, 2003). While the public sphere is 
immaterial, public space is material – an actual site and ground from where 
political activity can flow. So in the "context of real public spaces" alternative 
movements may arise (Howell 1993, p318). Public spaces are becoming in 
capital cities around the world "small hidden islands of freedom", islands of 
opposition surrounded by "Foucault's carceral archipelago" (Howell 1993, 
p313). In these islands the fight for space is often physical as was seen in the 
RECHCO cases. 
 
The Privatisation of Public Space 
 
Since the early 1990s the 'end of public space' (Sorkin, 1992) has become 
common in the literature. The various different means of the privatisation of 
public space has almost created a world where "designed diversity" has 
replaced the free interaction of strangers (Sorkin, 1992, p121). Commentators 
such as Garreau (1991) noted that this has meant that public spaces have 
become almost reserved for commodified recreation and spectacle. 
Following the neoliberal economic trends and events such as the London 
Docklands, the literature from the mid-1990s has consistently reflected a trend 
of increased privatisation of the public realm. Authors such as Biddulph 
explain the history of public space slowly becoming increasingly privatised as 
commercial districts slowly become more elite in consumption (shopping malls 
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for instance) and highly managed to exclude "undesirables" (Biddulph, 1993, 
p39). Within this privatisation, the Department of the Environment (DOE) and 
the Urban and Economic Development Group (URBED) (1994) suggest that 
functions of town centres, in addition to retail, will drift away. In the US, 
Kayden et al. (2000) and Banerjee (2001) documented and researched the 
privately owned public spaces of New York and surveyed the ways in which 
public spaces are being systematically privatised. Dependence on the 
automobile (Jacobs, 1961) has all but eliminated street life and public 
interaction.  
The question of who has the 'right to the city', as termed by Lefebvre, has 
been distorted by the privatisation of public space described (with plentiful 
empirical examples) in the literature marking somewhat of an "end of public 
space" (Mitchell and Staeheli, 2007 cited in Low and Smith, 2013, p11). 
Mitchell and Staeheli tie this debate into that of property rights (one of the 
major issues that are impacted by the RECHCOs). They argue that the 
redefinition of property rights, in combination with a changing public regime, 
has "become highly visible in the exclusionary landscapes of the recolonised 
city" (Low and Smith, 2006, p12). The rights of some are put over others and 
in some cases the state itself obscures traditions associated with private 
property rights. This set of literature helps guide the thinking on Solidere and 
Abdali and their use and privileges as related to property rights.  
The securitisation of public space (see Giuliani and Bratton, 1994) has meant 
that public space has lost some of its flexibility. In terms of the literature on 
public space, the early 2000s were an especially important time, with a clamp 
down on privacy in the United States. The Arab Spring more than a decade 
later saw additional protests and public policy that led to additional clamp 
downs on ability of public expression. The privatisation of public space and 
the diminishment of the public sphere are by no means inevitable. Given the 
obvious importance of the relationship of public space to the public sphere in 
the literature, and the lack of empirical evidence linking the two in Arab cities, 
a gap is clear to which the case studies described in this thesis will be able to 
contribute.  
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About the Arab City in Literature 
 
This section aims to take trends in the literature and bring it down to a certain 
region and geography. Almost unanimously, the literature agrees that the 
future Arab states will be urbanised (Bakshi, 2009). Almost 60% of local 
populations now live in cities and absolute population totals have risen 
(Moghadam, 2000 and Stewart, 2002). The Arab city (one with both linguistic 
and cultural similarities) has been recorded with several distinct historical 
stages.  
Early works on Arab cities have noted the replacement of realms such as the 
Ottoman Empire within Jordan and Lebanon had consequences on the 
transformation of nationhood and citizenship (Anderson, 1983). With these 
changing dynamics, the new Arab city will have to create an infrastructure that 
will enable it to deal with the social, cultural and psychological changes that 
come along with the rapid inclusion of urbanisation and globalisation (Suarez-
Orozco and Qin-Hilliard, 2004). The Arab city, as explained by Haim Yacobi in 
Rethinking Cities in the Middle East: Political Economy, Planning, and the 
Lived Space, has experienced four very clear stages of development during 
the globalisation period: 
 The first 'phase' begins with the Ottoman Empire and the early 
globalisation; looking at the 1860s and the emulation of the Arab cities 
(and others across the world) of Haussmann's model of city planning in 
Paris - in short 'Europeanising' cities (Mitchell, 1988 cited in Yacobi et. 
al. 2005). It was during this period that major souqs, or marketplaces, 
were built as major Islamic waqfs, or endowments. Though the waqf 
was meant to secure the souqs as endowments for the public benefit, 
often the administrators were very influential as they were in control of 
an important part of the economy, and also were known to take 
advantage of their posts for private gain (Van Leeuwen, 1999).  The 
RECHCOs can therefore in one sense be seen in part as a 
manifestation of the waqf souqs, influenced by global trends, albeit 
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implemented within a contemporary legal and governance framework 
and with analytically independent impacts on a modern society.       
 The second stage of this development was the post-colonial stage - 
with the rise of national planning after the Second World War, and the 
exaggerated interest of the state in urban planning. The new Middle 
Eastern city plans of the 1950s and 1960s focused on the capital cities 
and created public monuments, as a way of cementing and providing 
identity for the newly formed states.  
 The third stage was that of the oil boom in economic reforms from 
1974-1984, roughly. The oil money (through direct sales in the oil-
producing states) and remittances (in the non-oil-producing states) 
produced massive urban transformations resulting in large expansions 
in the number of city dwellers.  
 The next stage of development has included 'privatisation' in urban 
development where the state pulled back from interference in planning 
and development. This stage has seen private entrepreneurs (often 
supported by cronyism), as well as the renovation of old cities and 
colonial centres through gentrification, and the exit of existing residents 
for those of higher-income. Globalised structures - distinct from the 
urban fabric surrounding them - have become noticeable in the cities' 
commercial environments. This era has also seen a rise in urban 
informality.  
It is of note, however, that further to the categorisations described by Yacobi, 
there are in existence much older trade routes, ports and cities within the 
Middle East, with ruins and ties to ancient cultures still visibly present, albeit 
rarely described in the literature. In addition, the categories that are 
mentioned have been built on limited available literature. As such, within the 
literature on cities, many have noted that not enough attention has been given 
to Arab cities (Malkawi, 2011). Others still have lamented the "sad reflection 
on the state of Arab scholarship" (Elsheshtawy, 2011, p7); especially, it 
seems, by Arab researchers. Similarly, there has been considerable research 
examining neoliberal urban projects and tourism ventures in the metropolitan 
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context of the West, but substantially less attention has been given to these 
developments in the region (Mehrez, 2010).  
This is not to say that there has been no work completed on the modern Arab 
city. Writings have included Jumeno (2004) and Marchal (2005) with works 
looking at the multi-dimensional nature of Arab cities reflecting how their 
problems are very similar to other major world cities. Critical perspectives on 
the Gulf's socioeconomic, spatial and demographic transformations have 
included work by the anthropologist Ahmed Kanna (2008), and it is the case, 
many point out, that spaces within the Arab cities are not unlike others in 
terms of acting as repositories of memories (Elsheshtawy, 2011, p10). 
Other works on contemporary Arab cities include Diane Singerman and Paul 
Ammar's writings on Cairo, which explore politics, culture, and space in a new 
Middle East (Singerman and Ammar, 2006). Additional works focused on 
Cairo include writings by Al Sayyad, Beirman and Rabbat (2005). These 
however remain isolated works, with an in-depth cohesive analysis of the 
urbanisation of a modern Arab World still missing. Professor Michael Dumper, 
writing prior to the Arab Spring, in his introduction to the Cities of the Middle 
East and North Africa: A Historical Encyclopaedia has identified four main 
phases in the evolution of the dialogue on Arab literature (Dumper, 2007): 
 Early empirical (architectural and spatial) studies focusing on the 
colonial rule periods in the region have been contrasted with the 
Weberian European model, and criticised for their almost exclusive use 
of orientalist concepts for developing a model for the Islamic MENA-city 
in contrast to the rational and dynamic European-city (Dumper, 2007).  
 The second phase of the debate examined the region's people and 
their interactions, looking at 'Islamic' institutions, where researchers 
focused on the Ottoman texts and legal institutions. The major criticism 
was that the extrapolations of this work remained too general unable to 
properly describe the diverse geographic nature of cities. 
 The debate's third phase involved the use of the term 'Islamic' to group 
the study of cities within the regions (about the 1960s). Brown (1976), 
Eickelman (1974), and Abu-Lughod (1987, 1989, 1996) as cited in 
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Dumper (2007) were amongst those notable scholars launching this 
debate, while others have gone further with their rejection of the notion 
of an 'Islamic city' entirely.  
 The fourth phase has mostly focused on the anti-orientalist critique, 
which has now been widely accepted by mainstream academia, 
ensuring that the 'template' upon which European cities are understood 
is not the cookie cutter with which we also only superficially understand 
Middle Eastern cities.  
Within this fourth phase, while attention in academia has gradually moved 
away from discussions of the 'Islamic' or 'Oriental' city under which the region 
was studied, there is still a long way to go in research that is not based on 
'comparative' literature (Shechter et al., 2005) contrasting cities instead of 
examining each in its own right. There has also been the noting of other 
criticisms. Within the studies of Arab cities, it is rare to find a complete review 
from a city's birth to the present day (Stanley, 2007). However, this review, 
tracking a city's trajectory, is desperately important. John Friedman stresses 
the need to look at the whole history and networks of city, rather than the city 
as an isolated unit (Friedman, 2002 cited in Dumper, 2007).  
Literature on Arab cities has also tended to take a more 'bounded perspective' 
manner, meaning that particular cities (Beirut and Tyre amongst others cited 
in Yacobi et al., 2005) have not taken into account the cities as part of the 
economic and political world system. New literature has emerged looking 
more deeply at the Arab city as part of a network (Stanley, 2005) and a 
historical one at that (Abu-Lughod, 2001). Elsheshtawy (2004) demonstrates 
that while the literature on Arab cities covers the impact of colonialism on the 
spatial structure of Arab cities in detail, there is a gap when it comes to 
analysing the features and influence of globalisation. This is especially the 
case when analysing the linkages between the Arab cities and others around 
the world. The case studies work towards illustrating the network through an 
empirical study.  
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The Fast Changing Arab City 
 
Starting in the 2000s a systematic change was seen in the Arab World which 
was the emergence of a new set of Arab business-oriented elites who were 
eligible to be both investors and targets of new "up-to-date" spaces (Barthel, 
2010, p133). Studies on cities globally have looked closely at the urban 
landscape as a medium through which ideological discourses are captured 
(Summer, 2006). These discourses change not only the city itself, but also the 
construct of the nation it is in. In a paper on the relationship between the 
development of capital cities and state making, the researcher says: "the 
spatial dynamics of the country seem to confirm the idea that consolidation in 
the capital city is of prime importance for national state making" (Höckel, 
2007, p14). A collection of works within The Evolving Arab City completed in 
2008, and updated in 2011, seem to agree that the new symbols of power in 
the Arab World consist of modern architecture and elite projects rather than 
"tribes with flags" (Elsheshtawy, 2011, p21). A report by UN-Habitat on the 
state of the world's cities (UN-Habitat, 2011) reflects the large divide in the 
Arab World and the degree that it affects sustainability at the social and 
cultural levels.  
Rentier state cities within the Gulf such as Abu Dhabi are known as "sudden 
cities, instant cities." (Elsheshtawy, 2011, p258) The connections are 
described as sudden transformations from nomads to urban entities. A strong 
need has been felt to invest the sudden windfall of oil in massive urban 
projects, rising up out of the desert almost artificially. For the Arab World this 
has translated to excess Gulf liquidity fuelling real estate projects within the 
cities as well as multi-national real estate investments (Daher, 2008). The 
emerging planning environments have "seemingly created a split city" (Yacobi 
et al. 2005, p503) with an 'old' and a 'modern' split in new city life. The link 
between the cities has been studied using new conceptualisations of the Arab 
World by academics such as Bruce Stanley; rethinking the modern Arab 
World in terms of city-level networks, in contrast to the traditional city-state 
and inter-state relations (Yacobi et al., 2005). It is clear that within the Arab 
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World alternatives do need to emerge to empower local and disadvantaged 
communities (Burgess, 1991 cited in Yacobi et al. 2005).  
These debates have also seen a growing awareness for conservation within 
the cities, with concern for the loss of historic and traditional structures. These 
have come to be seen as knowledge sources. This conservation is not value 
free (Dumper, 2007), however, and the identification of heritage is carried out 
by educated professionals and elites who may have their own western 
conceptions of the ideal city. With fast changing cities within the Arab World, 
and urban society and politics flourishing, the literature on cities gives us a 
solid base on which to begin. The new cities experience the trauma of 
migration, integration, unemployment and subsequent tensions (Dumper, 
2007), making new projects even more important to explore. The new projects 
come as a series of private efforts that the government hopes will minimise 
risk and promise high returns (Marroushi and Ford, 2006). 
The sense of alienation within the cities is further aggravated by western 
planning and design techniques (Dumper, 2007). Shami (1996) describes how 
relocation frequently accompanies urban modernisation and is linked to 
mobility. Elsheshtawy (2004, p8) looks at how "these protected enclaves of 
the rich" will strain the relations and expand the gap between rich and poor. 
Some neoliberal trends have taken Arab cities so far that some authors view a 
complete loss of Arab history and identity, with Adonis quoted as saying: "I 
would have to say that we Arabs are in a phase of extinction, in the sense that 
we have no creative presence in the world...We have become extinct" 
(Adonis, 2006, cited in Elsheshtawy, 2011, p1). On more recent scholarship, 
Nasser Rabat (2011) looked at the history of public squares in Arab cities 
starting with the Maydan introduced in the pre-modern period. Although the 
Maydan doubled as an open-air marketplace and was used as a site for public 
protest, it was always the privileged space of the rulers and was never truly 
considered a civic space as related to the city and its citizens. The new form 
of public space, the plaza or the square, started appearing in the late 19th 
century.  
The new squares, however, came accompanied by the notion of "citadinity" 
embedded in their "idealised genealogy" (Rabbat, 2012, p4). Not shaped by 
68 
 
political struggles that marked the evolution of squares in European cities, 
these new plazas and squares assumed "civic meanings" to the city citizens, 
with protestors using them to demonstrate for independence when clashing 
with colonial forces. To this end, squares in various Arab cities—such as 
Beirut, Damascus, Tripoli, Algiers, and Aden—acquired the very revealing 
name of Maydan al-shuhada or Sahat al-shuhada (Martyr's Square in Beirut 
now part of Solidere) to commemorate the martyrs of independence (Rabbat, 
2012). 
While Arab political life began to turn inward, in addition to the plaza, 
historically Rabbat (2012) notes that the mosque has also served as political 
public space in Arab cities. Similar to the agora, the mosque provided a space 
(especially on Friday) where the adult male population exercised political 
rights. The Arab Spring of 2011 revived both spaces with new forms of civil 
protest, and the two spaces began to work in tandem (Rabbat, 2012). The 
public space has thus emerged as an important new topic of discussion in the 
Arab World (though not discussed sufficiently in the theoretical literature). 
Both the mosque and the public square have begun to feature as factors in a 
new civil order, regaining their civil roles. The public square especially has 
become essential to contemporary Arab life, though in some cases was 
imported and manipulated (Rabbat, 2012). 
 
Real Estate Projects in Literature: UDC Focus 
 
Neoliberalism at the economic level was inevitably translated into concrete 
projects at the city scale. The Urban Development Corporations in the UK 
(though publically owned, and with significantly more public restrictions) were 
amongst these first examples - as distant, and less extreme, parents of the 
Solidere SAL and Abdali Investment and Development cases. Most of the 
literature to be found describing large urban mega-projects, that are similar in 
nature to the Real Estate and Construction Holding Companies, relates to the 
Urban Development Corporations found in the United Kingdom. Literature 
describing the origins, ethos, and objectives underlying British UDCs is widely 
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available (Batley, 1989; Lawless, 1989; O'Toole, 1996; Smith, 1991; Thornley, 
1991). Despite the fact that the UDCs remain analytically independent from 
the RECHCOs, they serve as one form of historical tool to benchmark against.  
The UDCs were part of a changing system of local governance, influenced by 
certain political and institutional responses to economic restructuring and 
neoliberal central government policy agenda (Imrie and Thomas, 1999b). The 
available literature that gives an account of the policies, programs and effects 
shows the UDC programs as one of the most controversial urban policy 
programs (Imrie and Thomas, 1999b). In some cases the UDC was seen as 
evidence that the London Docklands were booming, though its sustainability 
was still in question. Other reports found that benefits accrued directly to 
property owners and were not well distributed amongst the local population 
(DCC, 1988, p37). The literature shows that the distribution of short-term 
benefits of expenditure, especially in cases such as the London Docklands 
Development Corporation (LDDC), was skewed away from the poorer 
populations of these Urban Development Areas (UDAs). Brownhill (1990) 
describes how "the haste to maximise private investment led to developers 
receiving substantial public subsidies," (cited in Imrie and Thomas, 1992, 
p89). Harding (1992) in a wide review of regeneration strategies showed that 
property-led strategies "in the 1980s appeared to ignore local needs" 
(Harding, 1992, p225). 
Swyngedouw et al. (2002) researched thirteen large-scale urban development 
projects in Europe finding that most of the projects accentuate socioeconomic 
polarisation through price increases and social displacements. Public budgets 
have also changed and are redirected from more social objectives to 
investments in the urban built environment and labour market restructuring. In 
addition, these projects are generally poorly integrated into the wider urban 
processes, or planning systems. As a result, the impact on their city remains 
largely ambiguous.  
In trying to think of how mega-projects such as UDCs relate to other cities and 
their plans, Daniels et al. (1993) in what Castells calls one of the most 
exhaustive studies on the topic says: "the expansion of services in the 
international market has brought to the global urban system a higher degree 
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of flexibility...As the experience of Canary Wharf shows, the results of large-
scale city planning and development projects in the cities have become 
hostage to external international factors over which there is little control" 
(Daniels, 1993 cited in Borja and Castells, 1997, p21). In other words, once 
UDCs are built in cities even the cities' own determination over these projects 
is limited. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
 
Starting from the literature on Amman and Beirut, the conclusion will plot a 
path forward. The literature on Beirut relating to Solidere is extensive. It 
reflects different viewpoints, and provides sufficient details to be able to piece 
together a comprehensive case study and understand the public's reaction to 
the RECHCO (Abu Fadil, 1992; Adwan, 2005; Beyhum, 1992; Held, 1994; 
Khalaf, 1987; Makdisi, 1997a; Meadows, 1994; Robinson, 1993). A lot of the 
research that exists on Solidere in particular looks at the ways in which the 
project links to Beirut's past (Kousis et al., 2011). This research has run 
alongside a national debate, dividing the criticism regarding Solidere into two 
broad segments: the criticism regarding the type of transformation that took 
place over the designated urban space, and criticism regarding the public 
discourse and the representation of national identity which emerged as a 
result (Larkin, 2009). Similar debates, though less established, can also be 
heard regarding Abdali in Amman, though they have not been formalised in 
the literature. 
However, there is very little literature to be found on modern Amman. Abdali 
has only a few cursory articles written about it. These minor articles to date on 
Abdali make mapping the process, or impacts, very difficult without extensive 
field interviews prompting the need for a survey as detailed in Section 1.2 
outlining the methodology. Some of these articles also contain contradictory 
information, or in some cases misinformation. None of the literature 
specifically undertakes a comprehensive evaluation of the project and few, if 
any, authors recommend a framework for the future. Many of the articles on 
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both Abdali and Solidere are not much more than "opinion" pieces, which 
while useful at getting a certain indication of people's thoughts, are not reliable 
sources of information. While much of the literature depends on interviews, 
there has been no broad public opinion base related to RECHCOs. While not 
an objective in and of itself, the thesis will also develop two detailed case 
studies of experiences in Amman and Beirut, providing documentation for 
future reference.  
With a focus on opinions relating to the RECHCOs and the transformation of 
space the collective impacts, especially in terms of economy have not been 
tallied for either Solidere or Abdali (or similar Arab projects) anywhere in the 
literature. In Solidere, the strife of the property owners and the legal 
procedures related to the valuation have been documented, however there is 
no working tally of the negative financial impact and there is no combination of 
social, economic and political impact anywhere. In Abdali no one has 
investigated the matter thus far, nor placed it in the context of an overall 
RECHCO impact assessment. This thesis for the first time groups these case 
studies and assigns them a collective name 'Real Estate Construction and 
Holding Companies' and distinguishes them from other mega-projects.  
As related to Solidere, the evaluations undertaken have been quite qualitative 
in nature discussing specific impacts rather than a general assessment, with 
very limited indicators gathered on the quantitative side (employment, tourism 
and investment gains). Certainly nothing has been written to this effect on 
Abdali, which makes both comparison and abstraction to a model to 
cohesively assess the RECHCOs in the Arab World difficult - a gap this thesis 
will work to fill. In terms of the impact of mega-projects on city citizens (from a 
social, economic and political perspective) the theoretical and empirical 
literature is limited as illustrated above, especially when it comes to actual 
cases within Arab cities, and linking these to global trends. To this end, the 
methodology described in Section 1.2 will split the thesis into the three main 
pillars of social, political and economic, dedicating a chapter to each in order 
to further explore the impacts of RECHCOs on the Arab city. The five major 
themes of RECHCOs as they are related to the city centre and its role within 
the city; contested and segregated space; heritage and memory; participation 
72 
 
and citizenship; and urban governance and policy will run as threads through 
the cases and the Conclusion Chapter will provide additional insight on each. 
Recent literature has noted that as these sorts of large projects begin to be 
employed as mainstream development models in the Arab World, further 
research into their effects on the balance between secular and Islamic legal 
systems, the handling of marginalised groups, and under what legal and 
administrative government conditions it is safe to resort to such a venture, is 
necessary (Nasr, 2008). And this is where the thesis starts. 
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2. Case Studies 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The Case Studies Chapter is the natural starting point for the thesis, mapping 
out the political, economic and social processes that led to the RECHCOs' 
creation and acting as a segue between the introduction and the in-depth 
"impact" Chapters. One of the major gaps in the literature presented was that 
nowhere has the Abdali case been described even partially, and this Chapter 
will fill that gap. A comprehensive mapping of the political and macroeconomic 
backgrounds that allowed for the RECHCOs in both Lebanon and Jordan 
similarly does not exist in the literature. Documenting this background is 
instrumental to understanding the impact of the RECHCOs on cities as it 
demonstrates the multi-faceted events that incrementally built up to a situation 
where the only solution marketed was a mega-project to be implemented on 
the centres of nations' capitals. 
The Case Studies, while serving a descriptive purpose to familiarise the 
reader with the RECHCOs, put in place the building blocks upon which later 
Chapters will refer when considering the larger political, economic and social 
impacts. The Case Studies are also central to the overarching argument this 
thesis makes regarding RECHCOs as mega-projects implemented by 
transnational investors, without grass-root public support, in city centres by 
indicating quite strongly that the RECHCOs to a large extent are the product 
of individuals' agendas rather than those of institutions. The vast difference in 
the economic and political background in both Jordan and Lebanon that led 
up to the RECHCOs is important to note as later Chapters will show how 
similar the effects of RECHCOs are on cities despite these large variations. 
The background sections on Lebanon and Jordan provide insight into the 
historical factors that helped force the creation of the RECHCO and begin to 
address the promoted narrative that RECHCOs were the inevitable and only 
choice. The RECHCOs through the series of events presented in the cases 
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can be interpreted as the product of the emergence of a neoliberal 'new 
guard' in Jordan and Lebanon. This Chapter is split into four sections. The first 
is related to the economic, political and social conditions within Jordan that led 
to the incorporation of Abdali Investment and Development PSC and the 
creation of the Abdali project. The second looks more directly at Abdali itself 
and the components of its Master Plan. The third considers the emergence of 
Lebanon out of its Civil War and looks at what issues compelled the creation 
of Solidere. The final section takes a much closer look at the Solidere project.  
The Jordan and Lebanon background sections were difficult to create as they 
depended highly on piecing together fragmented primary and secondary data 
from a variety of sources that fit together to form a picture of what conditions 
at the macro-level allowed for the creation of the RECHCO. In both Jordan 
and Lebanon, the Central Bank, Department of Statistics and Ministry of 
Finance were turned to to provide statistical evidence that would indicate and 
support the economic need that governments argued would prompt the 
creation of the RECHCOs. Secondary data in the form of political commentary 
in newspapers and articles relating to the two countries was gathered to 
support a narrative at the political level of the key agencies and individuals 
that were the primary proponents of the RECHCOs. 
For the Case Studies themselves, in-depth archival research was done 
through newspapers, magazines, and public documents available through the 
Departments of Land and the Courts. For Solidere there were also several 
secondary sources of specific parts of the case available in the literature. This 
information was then put together to tell a holistic story and provide the 
narrative of the RECHCOs. In the case of Abdali, the thesis pieces together 
the Case Study for the first time anywhere in the literature. The archival work 
and interviews required to obtain the required information was quite extensive. 
In the case of Solidere SAL, the RECHCO has been written about in the 
literature in the past. The unique contribution when considering the Case 
Study as written here is that it brings together the social, political and 
economic components and links to an extensive background about Lebanon 
to reflect how the macro-level issues might impact the micro-level issues in 
Solidere. 
Chapter 2: Case Studies  |  75 
 
 
 
By tracing the background and history of both Solidere and Abdali at the 
country and company levels, the Case Studies Chapter will begin to examine 
analytically the narrative perpetrated by government that RECHCOs are 
vehicles born of an institutionally transparent process and created for the sole 
purpose of socioeconomic public benefit. The two background sections and 
Case Studies detailing Abdali and Solidere's establishment show the very 
different background and stark variation in context between Jordan and 
Lebanon. Despite the differences leading up to their establishment, the two 
RECHCOs themselves show extreme similarities in terms of residents' 
perceptions and longer-term impacts on the city. The Chapter will begin by 
looking at the Solidere case, with the background on Lebanon. 
 
2.2 An Emerging Lebanon from a Tragic Civil War 
 
As a city emerging from a devastating Civil War, Beirut did not have the public 
sector institutions or resources to manage rebuilding a world class city centre. 
This section traces the Lebanese socio-political and economic background 
that allowed Solidere to be framed as the inevitable and only choice for the 
country moving forward with reconstruction.  
 
Beirut Representing the Paris of the Middle East 
 
For five thousand years, ancient settlements have been present on the Beirut 
peninsula. As Lebanon's main coastal city, Beirut lies on the Mediterranean 
rim bordering both mountains and sea, and is connected across trade routes, 
linking East and West as a commercial gateway for several thousand years. 
Its deep-water port served as host to much maritime trade in the region. From 
the mid-19th century up to the very eve of the outbreak of the Civil War, Beirut 
flourished and experienced relatively uninterrupted growth (Gavin and Maluf, 
1996). With beaches, nightlife, a happening city centre, Beirut was often 
referred to as the 'Paris of the Middle East'. Tourism was one of Beirut's main 
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economic drivers. Beirut's scenic mountains and Mediterranean Sea and 
proximity to Arabia made it popular with Gulf tourists. It was known for its café 
trottoirs catered to tourists and the region's 'intelligentsia' (Gavin and Maluf, 
1996). Beirut, with its distinguished universities attracted students from across 
the Arab World. With a booming population36, it also drew an inflow of wealth 
after the discovery of oil in the Gulf.  
Beirut was dominant in financial, cultural and commercial life in the Levant, 
"undisputed" in importance (Sennett, 1993, p11). Its Banking Street served as 
headquarters to financial institutions across the Arab World. In the decade 
building up to 1975, the Lebanese economy was characterised by low inflation 
and high levels of economic growth and a large balance-of-payments surplus 
making it one of the region's strongest countries (Sena et al., 1995). Prior to 
the War, Lebanon had been classified as a middle-income country with a per 
capita income equivalent to Portugal. Its income level was double that of 
Jordan (Economist, 1996). Throughout the twentieth century, Beirut was able 
to absorb several waves of immigrants (including Armenians, Syrians and 
Kurds), which increased both the size of the population and its diversity 
(Khalaf and Khoury, 1993). One of the largest groups has been the 
Palestinian immigrants. The soul of Beirut was its centre al-madinah or al-
balad meaning simply the city. Frequented as a focal point for employment, 
just over a third of the workforce in Beirut was within its limits. The growth of 
the city followed a radial pattern around its centre, which became a 
geographic, in addition to commercial, hub.  
However, with Beirut's rapid growth, the Central District soon became 
overcrowded with a subpar infrastructure. Other popular commercial areas 
began to emerge in Hamra, Raouche, Mar Elias and elsewhere. The centre, 
despite this, maintained a clear centrality and dominance over the 
metropolitan area as the ―government, retail, and regional banking centre,‖ the 
―microcosm of the country‘s religious affiliations,‖ and the ―focus of the hotel 
sector and city nightlife‖ (Gavin and Maluf, 1996, p7). The Central District 
served more than a purely emotional purpose. It was a historic centre in one 
                                                          
36
 From 1965 to 1975 Beirut's population had grown 66% to total 551,000 residents. At the onset of the 
Civil War, Beirut estimated its population at 1.2 million (about 45% of the country's total). Out of the total 
Lebanese population approximately 350 thousand were of Palestinian origin (Held, 1994). 
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of the eastern Mediterranean's leading urban settlements (Beyhum, 1992a, 
p16). The old souqs and traditional buildings in the district were neighboured 
by luxury hotels and stores. Businessmen, shoppers and tourists converged 
on the centre daily (World Bank, 1983, p139).  
 
Figure ‎2-1: Beirut's Old City Centre 
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From the BCD's destruction emerged five essential functions for the city 
centre blocked by war. It was firstly home to the Lebanese government, with 
the Parliament and many ministries37. Additionally, it was also home to 
commercial functions with just over a quarter of the total land area in 1974 
(26%) dedicated to offices. The city centre was also home to retail and 
commercial activity with its souqs and luxury stores. It was host to tourism, 
recreational and other cultural activities located along the seashore. Finally, 
the BCD was home to large residential communities, with a third of its land-
area zoned for housing just before the outbreak of the War. One of every 
forty-two individuals residing in the Greater Beirut area prior to 1975 lived in 
the BCD, and one of every sixteen individuals residing within the municipal 
                                                          
23
 Though originally government offices and ministries were concentrated in the BCD many gradually 
moved out to other districts of Beirut and its outskirts leaving the Ministry of Finance, the Serail (Prime 
Ministry Headquarters), the Parliament and the Beirut Municipality offices in the BCD. 
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area of Beirut, lived in the city centre (Directeur Generale de l‘Urbanism, 
1973). 
Around the beginning of the twentieth century, neighbourhoods in Beirut 
began to take on a specific ethnic or religious identity, with Christians settling 
to the East of the city centre and Muslims to the West. With a "thriving urban 
merchant class" from across religions, the centre still remained a mixed 
community reflective of Lebanon's multifaceted society (Khalaf, 1993a, p21). 
Thomas Friedman in From Beirut to Jerusalem describes the Beirut city 
centre as one huge urban Mixmaster that took the various Lebanese 
communities from their mountains and villages and attempted to homogenise 
them into one cosmopolitan nation during the Golden Age of Beirut in the 
1950s and 1960s (Friedman, 1990); a sentiment of nostalgia that became 
commonplace to seize upon during reconstruction (Misk 1999).  
 
A Centre Haunted by War 
 
Economic prosperity hid the religious and political tensions. In the summer of 
1975 these tensions became charged enough with internal and external 
pressures that the Civil War erupted. This war destroyed much of Beirut's 
urban core and changed the Lebanese balance of power (Fisk 1991, Hourani 
1991). The Civil War effectively caused a collapse of state institutions, and 
divided Beirut into east and west. The city was split along what became 
known as the Green Line separating it almost through its centre. 170 
thousand people were killed during the War (Economist, 1996). 184 thousand 
were wounded, 13 thousand were handicapped, 13 thousand kidnapped and 
17 thousand disappeared completely (Adwan, 2005). With massive economic 
problems, employment reached 28% of pre-war levels. About 300 thousand 
homes were damaged. Hospital capacity dropped to 30% of its original levels 
(Adwan, 2005).  
Over the War's sixteen years, Lebanon saw the destruction of property and 
infrastructure and also the severe undermining of the state public institutions. 
The years of War had a very high cost on Beirut. The army was split over 
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religious lines; Parliament disintegrated, and the judiciary fell to the control of 
political or military power holders (Adwan, 2005). The damage to the city was 
extensive and estimated at about USD 25 billion (Robison, 1993). The airport, 
electrical grid, sewer system and telephone lines were destroyed. Brain Drain 
was a major problem. Numbers of expatriate Lebanese ranged from 500-800 
thousand persons (Economist, 1996). Before the War began in 1975, Beirut's 
population totalled about 1.5 million. With most of the Civil War fought in the 
streets of Beirut (Meadows, 1994), by 1992 Beirut's population had dropped to 
about 300 thousand (Held, 1994). The old city centre was built around 
Martyrs' Square divided through by the Green Line, which was most damaged 
by the War (Beyhum, 1992a). The population slowly shifted into "single 
community ghettos" (Beyhum, 1992a, p44). One of the worst aspects of the 
destruction was loss of common places, or areas that had previously been 
shared by members of all sects. Mostly to be found in the older areas of the 
city, the areas helped groups come together for business and social 
opportunities. The 'old souq' was destroyed as were the more upscale districts 
such as Hamra. The tourism industry had suffered greatly.  
At the time, the dominant image of Beirut was that of buildings "reduced to 
bombed-out shells riddled with bullet holes" (Stewart, 1996, p 487). Despite 
memories of the Civil War in the consciousness of the Lebanese, the nation 
tried to move forward and looked to create a new economic role for itself 
within the Arab World. The physical and economic reconstruction of Beirut 
held "enormous implications for the future of Lebanon" (Stewart, 1996, p 487). 
As such, Beirut was to be rebuilt: both through physical infrastructure and 
social harmony (Stewart, 1996) to create a new economic reality for itself in 
the Arab World.  
The sixteen years of Civil War left the once economically vibrant centre at a 
standstill. The area was no longer visited by tourists and pedestrians, outlets 
and shops in the area moved away, and what remained was little more than a 
"wasteland" which was known "only to wild dogs, rats and snakes" (Makdisi, 
1997, p662). The famous St. George Hotel, Hilton, and the Holiday Inn which 
had once been frequented by Beirut's rich and famous before the War, were 
fighting grounds for factions and were in ruins. The area was almost entirely 
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free of all permanent inhabitants, and the centre had only squatters within it. 
The centre, during the War became a buffer zone dividing East Christian 
Beirut from West Muslim Beirut, and since it was not under the direct 
influence of any religious sub-group prior to the War it was "naturally destined 
to become their battlefield" (Salaam, 1995, p15), with military barricades set 
up, and many of the vacant buildings closed off. The centre of Beirut was 
bordered by sand and stone walls blocking off major roads. Thomas Friedman 
claimed if there was a no-man's land during the fifteen months extending from 
June 1975 until September 1976, it was represented by the Central District 
(Friedman, 1990). Organised crime was apparent throughout Riyad al-Solh 
Street. Any visitor to Beirut's Central District in early 1990, after cessation of 
the hostilities, would have seen the "destruction, desolation and decay in the 
midst of a living city" (Khalaf, 1993b, p79). 
 
Rebuilding the Centre as a National Priority 
 
The 1989 Taef Agreement had finally brought the Civil War to a close, signed 
in the Saudi Arabian City of Taef. In the early 1990s, following the stop of 
hostilities, visitors saw scenes of "destruction, desolation and decay in the 
midst of a living city" (Khalaf, 1993b, p79). Many areas were still inaccessible, 
buildings grew more dilapidated, and the area was "impassable from debris 
and overgrown vegetation, which supported wildlife" (Cooke, 2002, p12). 
From 1975-1976 a preliminary planning experience was carried out, which 
soon made it very clear that the administration was simply too feeble to 
undertake any sort of reconstruction task. The Elias Sarkis regime therefore 
created the Council for Development and Reconstruction38 (CDR) that was 
established under Decree No. 5 of the 31st of January 1977. The CDR by law 
was equipped with an administratively independent status and was directly 
accountable to the Cabinet39. Its primary mission was to ―act as a 
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 Established under Decree No. 5 of the 31
st
 of January 1977, the CDR enjoyed an administratively 
independent status and was directly accountable to the Cabinet. 
39
 In February 1983, the CDR prepared a revised reconstruction plan. To support its large role, other 
institutions and measures were put into place. In September 1983, the Higher Commission of Urban 
Planning (HCUP) was established under Decree No. 69 on September 9
th
, 1983. The Commission was 
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reinforcement to the ailing administration, not to replace it‖ (Saliba, 2000, p1), 
so it only laid down a general plan for development and secured the needed 
financing for major projects (Salaam, 1993). It stopped short of getting 
involved in the execution of reconstruction projects, with the exception of 
cases where other government agencies were "too inept or sluggish" (Saliba, 
2000, p1).  
At the end of the Civil War a newly appointed Lebanese Cabinet asked CDR 
to begin with a redevelopment plan for Beirut. The public report which was 
released by the Cabinet focused on the Beirut Central District as the actual 
birthplace of Beirut and indeed the centre saw buildings dating back to the 
Byzantine, Mamluk, Ottoman, and French Colonial periods. In fact, the 
Cabinet's decision to begin Beirut's reconstruction with the Central District 
emerged as a "must-do action for symbolic and socio-economic reasons" 
(Gavin and Maluf, 1996, p21). Its planned reconstruction was "mandatory" as 
the centre was "the symbol of reconstruction for the whole country" (Gavin 
and Maluf, 1996, p21). Both in the media and in the collective imagination (De 
Cauter, 2011) of Beirut's residents, the BCD represented the entire city, and 
its "fate implicate[d], metonymically, the entire country‖ (Gavin and Maluf, 
1996, p22). Reconstruction in Lebanon was tied to reconstruction in the BCD. 
This decision seemed inline with the hearts and minds of many within 
Lebanon. Elias Hrawi was quoted in Le Monde on the 5th of July 1990 as 
saying that Beirut's population had many great expectations (Bapt, 1990) as 
the heart of the capital was a symbol of the peaceful coexistence of the 
different denominational groups of the pre-war era (The Business Year, 
2012). Once the outburst of violence in 1990 had died down, attention 
focused once again on Lebanon‘s heavily damaged city centre. Under the 
Taef Agreement's guidance, Hrawi‘s government immediately began an 
intensive program of reconstruction. However, serious problems hindered 
progress. The phase after the Taef Agreement in 1990 is widely associated 
with the neoliberalisation of the country, during which heavy investments were 
made in the deployment of the public infrastructure, and public debts grew. As 
                                                                                                                                                                      
charged with giving its opinions on urban plans and regulations, and the amendment of legislation 
related to urban planning and construction. 
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elsewhere, privatisation became one of the government's key policies (Favier, 
2001). 
Beirut‘s city centre had suffered destruction on a massive scale as the fighting 
site for factions during the war, that to many it was no longer simply a matter 
of restoring the urban fabric to a previous condition, but rather, undertaking a 
completely new exercise of rebuilding. The redevelopment of the centre would 
involve the restoration of over 4.4 million sqm of urban space which was 
spread over a land area of 1.1 million sqm. One estimate in 1989 was that 
40% of existing roads and buildings were beyond repair (CDR, 1993).  
 
Problems Haunt the Reconstruction of the Centre 
 
The task of redevelopment was an extremely hard one for the national 
government. As early as 1977, discussions concerning the reconstruction of 
the city centre were taking place in the Parliament and Cabinet. It soon 
became apparent that the rebuilding initiative would not, by any means, be a 
straightforward process. Through discussions in Parliament and the Cabinet, 
it became clear that the government was unable to continue implementation 
of a reconstruction process hindered by several issues: 
 Financial Problems: The public debt in Lebanon increased nearly 52% 
in 1984, 23% more than the estimated GDP that year. Commercial 
banks had shown extreme reluctance to subscribing to the new 
treasury bills so most borrowing was done directly from the Bank of 
Lebanon. The borrowing doubled from 1983 to 1984. Domestic 
government borrowing with its serious negative macroeconomic and 
'crowding-out'40 effects was considered an unstable source of funding 
to pay for reconstruction (Baz, 1998, p169). 
 Fragmentation of Property: Islamic inheritance laws, along with those 
practiced in Lebanon meant a gradual fragmentation of ownership. 
Buildings that had originally been owned by a single investor were 
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 Crowding out refers to when government spending or borrowing, leaves the private sector unable to 
spend or borrow effectively 'crowding them out'. 
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generations later owned by countless grandchildren, with individual – 
and sometimes conflicting – perspectives of what was to be done with 
the property. The coordination of resources amongst various 
stakeholders to rebuild was almost impossible. Hundreds of proprietors 
and tenants claimed individual lots. One famous example of a lot in the 
souq saw 4,750 people with ownership and tenancy right in 1975. 
Broadcast on a television documentary, the film showed the inability of 
the thousands of owners to coordinate to redevelop the lot. The 
argument between them got so heated that chairs were thrown and 
some of the attendees were injured. In 1990 a tab of current active 
owners showed that there were over 40,000 within the BCD alone 
(estimates in 1995 put this number at closer to 250,000). Individual 
buildings had within them several thousand title-holders. As a 
consequence of this fragmentation, 50% of the plots within the Central 
District were less than 250 sqm in size, and so well below any area 
required (and that would be feasible) for redevelopment. Investors 
were also unlikely to want to be attracted to purchases or schemes 
involving such large numbers of people. Any plan relating to the centre 
would have to cope with this restriction. Ossama Kabbani, in his work 
The Reconstruction of Beirut, described these entangled property 
rights among tenants and landlords, ―a Gordian knot of claims and 
counter claims‖ (Kabbani, 1992, p 15). 
 Rental Laws: Complications arose from the delicate relationship 
between tenants and landlords. The rental laws that existed at the time 
in Lebanon (and in many other places around the Arab World) favoured 
renters with almost negligible allowance given for annual increase in 
rent – so rents even in light of massive inflation could remain steady for 
decades. No landlord could terminate a commercial or residential lease 
without paying a substantial fee (50% of the capital value of the leased 
space) in addition to the fact that rental leases could be inherited 
across generations. Under the rental law framework that existed there 
was little incentive for owners to rebuild and rehabilitate their 
properties. The revenues they would then accrue from rent would not 
come close to the cost of redevelopment at the pre-1975 rates. The 
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rental laws remained in effect throughout the War even with severely 
damaged buildings. Only when buildings were completely destroyed 
could the contract be broken. This disincentive to rebuild meant that 
private owners would be unlikely to rehabilitate their property41. 
 International Aid: Almost no aid was channelled into Lebanon due to 
regional politics forcing the government to resort to borrowing instead 
(Leenders, 1999 and Adwan, 2005). In the early 1990s, prospects for 
Lebanon to receive aid from the oil-rich countries seemed unpromising. 
The availability of aid to Lebanon necessary for reconstruction works 
was considered distant and meagre (Middle East Economic 
Consultants (MEEC), 1985). Oil revenues were tight, and with the 
advent of the Gulf War, Arab attention was focused on Iraq. Any 
available official grant assistance, loans on favourable terms, or 
commodity assistance - often distributed by the Islamic Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the United Nations, the European 
Economic Community, and other multilateral Arab agencies - would 
come with wider stipulations of reform. In spite of those pledges of 
assistance that were gleaned from the international community, the 
actual amounts received were far less than originally dedicated. The 
CDR reported that in 1985 less than 40% of the USD 3.1 billion 
promised in grants and loans since 1977 was received. Out of the USD 
2 billion promised over 5 years by the Arab states in the "Tunis Pledge" 
in 1979, only USD 0.4 billion was actually collected42.  
 National Economic Problems: Lebanon's economic problems, with 
sustained damages of USD 19 billion, a third of the population below 
the poverty line, inflation at 92%, and production down by 50%, along 
with a falling GDP combined to make the situation a difficult one for the 
government (Hassan, 1991). The Council for Development and 
Reconstruction reports showed hesitancy amongst investors to invest 
while politics remained unsettled; and while hundreds of thousands of 
Lebanese citizens left during the War, only 55,000 had returned by 
                                                          
41
 Demolition crews sometimes hired out their services to building owners who had damaged buildings. 
In some cases it became more financially feasible to destroy the building entirely to be free of the old 
rental rates, than to rehabilitate and be forced to rent out at pre-war prices. 
42
 The major Arab donors had linked their support to a satisfactory political settlement in Lebanon. 
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1991, an estimated 6% of the total (Abu Fadil 1992). The concern was 
"that the outside world will lose its enthusiasm for Lebanon. The 
country balances its books only by attracting capital inflows - and these 
could move elsewhere at the merest hit of political and social trouble" 
(Economist, 1996, p15). 
 Squatters: A squatter population and displaced families occupied 
almost every devastated building in the BCD. This population was 
estimated to be in excess of 30,000, living in largely unsafe structures 
throughout the city centre. A substantial relocation program was 
necessary before reconstruction could continue. The government‘s 
promise to support the re-housing project was going to put a significant 
strain on financial resources (CDR, 1993). 
 Overall Condition of Property: During the War, major components of 
basic infrastructure were obliterated. Half of the 450 thousand phone 
lines were destroyed. Only 35% of the previous power was available. 
80% of all water reserves were polluted. Only half of public schools 
were operational. Two thirds of the urban fabric around the city's public 
spaces was in ruin. The dumping of city's domestic waste ruined the 
shoreline and what remained of the centre were ―destroyed buildings 
and the detritus of war‖ (Salaam, 1995, p29). The water, sewage, 
electricity and road networks required complete rehabilitation. 
Infrastructure costs were estimated at USD 1.5 billion – an exceptional 
price tag for a government emerging from a devastating war to bear 
given the other pressing demands on it. Overall, early reconstruction 
costs for the Central District amounted to half the annual Gross 
National Product. These were figures that domestic funds could scarce 
afford. The government's financial situation had deteriorated 
substantially. So much so that it was determined early on that 75% of 
the funds required for reconstruction had to be obtained from external 
sources.  
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Emerging Solutions Focus on the Private Sector Reform 
 
Despite these issues, rebuilding the centre was identified as a top 
reconstruction priority. Planners warned the government, any plan to rebuild 
the centre would be ambitious at the very least, for "at stake [was] the rebirth 
of the centre of a capital city after its destruction by war" (Gavin and Maluf, 
1996, p13). A legitimate concern amongst the slim minority debated at the 
time was whether the redevelopment initiative would even work, and urged 
that given the other pressing needs at the time the risk factor would have to 
be evaluated closely. The overwhelming narrative at the time was the 
pressing need to rebuild. Though the extent of real representation and public 
support was unclear, deliberations in Parliament and the Cabinet, focused on 
how to achieve the reconstruction, as its need was taken as a given. The 
dialogue relating to reconstruction within the weakened state centred on three 
options which arose from the various discussions at the end of the War in 
1990: 
 Option One: Complete Government Financing: Debated only briefly in 
Parliament, and though popular in post-war Europe (and Marshall Plan 
aid), this option was proposed such that the government would fully 
sponsor the reconstruction efforts and make capital available to the 
individual property owners to redevelop their plots through loans. Extreme 
land fragmentation was thought to make this option unfeasible. In addition 
to the government‘s inability to gather the necessary financing (CDR, 
1993) there was limited institutional capacity to be able to complete the 
process. Other pressing social, political and infrastructural needs beyond 
the BCD made this option unlikely (CDR, 1993). 
 Option Two: Government Eminent Domain: This approach included the 
government putting up significant capital to buy out problem areas within 
the centre through expropriation and to rehabilitate them with public 
funds. With limited government funding and institutional capacity at the 
time, this approach was unpopular. In addition, Lebanon, over and above 
other Arab countries, had a long history of limited government 
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involvement – coupled with higher private sector participation. The 
Parliament which was composed largely of private businessmen was 
hesitant to pass any law increasing government power and involvement. 
Public debates were scornful towards large government involvement. 
 Option Three: Private Real Estate Company (Gakenheimer et al., 199343): 
Parliament and the Cabinet rhetoric seemed to indicate in their 
discussions ―only one remaining option‖, as stated by Elias Hrawi in Al-
Hayat, November 2nd 1990. Encouraged by the private studies 
commissioned, and the existence of private finances, the option involved 
creating a private company to undertake the reconstruction44. As initially 
suggested by a study commissioned from the Middle East Economic 
Consultants, the company would be privately funded and granted the right 
of eminent domain over the city centre as the only viable option (MEEC, 
1985). The proponents of this plan argued that while the government was 
not in a position to do so, the private sector would be able to tap into 
international finances – free of any fiscal restraints (Hassan, 1991). The 
private sector would also have the institutional know-how and experience 
to develop the centre. The private sector was often relied upon during the 
Civil War to fill in the gaps in basic government services that emerged and 
was "known and respected‖ (Khalaf, 1993, p25).  
The government insisted that the third option of creating a RECHCO solution 
ensured ―absolute equality of treatment‖45 of all property right holders inside 
the BCD, irrespective of the status of the property, or of the use prescribed to 
it. Losses to individual plots due to reconstruction efforts could be distributed 
over the project as a universal cost. There was also a certain level of 
excitement regarding the potential of the private sector solution to solve the 
redevelopment constraints on the public sector (Beyhum, 1992a). The model 
was put forward to be emulated in other areas. Parliamentarians talked about 
other RECHCOs in areas outside the BCD as well. In addition to Parliament, 
the Council for Development and Reconstruction also pushed for the third 
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 Gakenheimer referred to Solidere as a real estate holding company. 
44
 This private company is referred to in this thesis as a Real Estate and Construction Holding Company 
or RECHCO. 
45
 Elias Hrawi in interview in Al-Hayat, the 2
nd
 of November 1990. 
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option of a privately operating Real Estate Construction and Holding 
Company. They strongly believed that the strategy would ―insulate the 
reconstruction of the BCD from political polarisation and traditional 
governmental inefficiencies in order to provide proper leadership and attract 
funds" (Solidere, 1994, p7). The company would save direct government 
spending on the project (as in Option One), and would bypass the institutional 
reforms (required for Option Two). The state (and CDR) also did not have the 
capacity to implement the project and so its form as a commercial company 
was encouraged. However, the massive private-private transfer of land that 
would take place for the first time in Lebanese history as a result of the 
expropriations into Solidere SAL was not adequately debated. 
On the 17th of September 1994, a major sign that Lebanon had finally 
emerged from the Civil War was a Fairuz46 concert in the centre of Beirut. The 
concert was "highly emotional" and took place in Martyrs' Square within the 
city centre (Muir, 1994, p10). The mixture of Muslims and Christians at the 
concert brought hope back to the reconstruction. The concert was sponsored 
by a company that still had no physical presence - a single powerful Real 
Estate and Construction Holding Company - now branded and incorporated, 
by the name 'Solidere'. And so Option Three started to become a reality. 
 
2.3 Solidere, the Rebuilding of Beirut's Centre  
 
Solidere SAL in terms of financial magnitude and political connections was 
one of the greatest private enterprises ever seen in Lebanon. Its impact on 
Beirut's politics and urban aesthetics was clear. This section aims to trace the 
company's history to better understand its motivations and past in order to 
provide a platform to assess its current and future impact. The 'new 
downtown' of Solidere packaged itself as a representation of the occident, the 
modern, the clean and the structured. As such, the Solidere project raised 
controversy in Beirut. Critics noted that the 'imported' ideas (Beyhum, 1995) 
                                                          
46
 Nouhad Wadi Haddad (born the 21
st
 of November 1935), known as Fairuz, is a Lebanese singer who 
is among the most widely admired and deeply respected in the Arab World.  
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did not share the same sort of historical context, a theme explored in detail in 
later Chapters. This Case Study will map the process that the company 
embarked on to help plan and implement the reconstruction of the centre.  
 
Solidere: "Beirut Reborn" 
 
To many, the Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of 
the Beirut Central District, or Solidere SAL was the saviour of the city's 
Central District. One commentator noted "one fine day people suddenly 
stopped talking about Beirut and Lebanon. It was in the fall of 1990...then, 
beginning in the mid-1990s Beirut and Lebanon began to be talked about 
again, this time in the pages of travel magazines" (Kassir, 2003, p523). The 
company is said to have recreated the city centre from a 'wasteland' 
destroyed by the war to a bustling world class area frequented by tourists, 
residents, businessmen and families. The story of Solidere's project - spread 
over 1.8 million sqm of land in the centre initially, and continuously expanding 
(launching the Beirut Souqs in October 2009 for instance, with an additional 
163 thousand sqm of commercial floor space, and housing dynamic 
international brands such as Armani, Fendi, Tommy Hilfiger, and Timberland) 
- is an intriguing one. 
 
Figure ‎2-2: Modern Solidere 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons 
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The story of Solidere's creation begins at the conclusion of the Lebanese Civil 
War when the Lebanese government opted for the 'third option' plan of 
allowing a private company to oversee the reconstruction of the downtown. In 
October 1990, a new director was appointed to the Council for Development 
and Reconstruction with influence from Rafiq Hariri. Rafiq Hariri was a 
Lebanese national, also holding Saudi citizenship, who made his fortune in 
Saudi Arabia, with assets estimated at somewhere between USD 3-4 billion in 
the early 1990s (Walden, 1994). Rafiq Hariri also played a substantial 
philanthropic role in Lebanese society (building hospitals and providing 
scholarships in his name). As a former Saudi diplomatic representative, he 
had played a role in the Taef Agreement conclusions and was slowly 
becoming known in the Lebanese political field. 
 
Centre's Plans Hinged on Individual Efforts and Private Influence 
 
Soon after his appointment, the new CDR director Fadel El-Shalaq47 issued a 
formal request to the government which was approved to oversee the 
completion of a new series of Master Plans for reconstructing central Beirut 
issued by Dar al-Handasah - a leading architecture firm within the Arab World 
with strong connections to El-Shalaq. In the official transaction it was noted 
that Rafiq Hariri would pay privately for all the Dar al-Handasah services on 
behalf of the CDR. In addition, Dar al-Handasah appointed the former Minister 
of Public Works and Transportation, the architect Henri Eddé to head the 
design team of the project. The plan was disclosed to the public in the 
summer of 1991 for review48. 
                                                          
47
 Fadel El-Shalaq's close relationship with Rafiq Hariri will be explored more in Chapter Four. 
48
 It is important to note that this was not the first Master Plan undertaken. Two major planning efforts 
were made in Beirut and its outskirts. The first was the Master Plan of 1978 prepared for the Municipality 
of Beirut by the Atelier Parisien d‘Urbanisme (APUR) and issued under Article No. 1163 on the 15
th
 of 
April 1978. The second was the Urban Master Plan for Beirut and its outskirts, or the Institut 
d‘Amnagement et d‘Urbanisme de l‘Ile-de-France (IAURIF) Plan of 1983. The APUR Plan marked the 
first serious public sector attempt at rebuilding the city centre and was a culmination of an effort by the 
CDR and the APUR. As part of this initiative a committee was created, headed by the engineer Marty El-
Namar, and was charged with overseeing the conclusion of the redevelopment studies. Soon after its 
completion, the plan was approved and went partially into effect. The plan‘s emphasis was on the 
preservation of historical buildings and revival of commercial activity. This first reconstruction plan was 
focused on ensuring the complete reintegration of the centre into the rest of the city‘s urban fabric 
(Saliba, 2000). Since the damage done to Beirut‘s Central District by 1977 was not extensive, the 1977 
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In his book Out of the Middle East - the Emergence of an Arab Global 
Business, Kamal Al-Shair - director of the regional Dar al-Handasah 
engineering house - describes how the Dar al-Handasah plan was launched 
as an informal and haphazard event (Shair, 2006, p219):  
Early in 1991, I was awakened one morning at two o'clock by 
the insistent ringing of the telephone beside my bed. It was my 
cook, with an urgent message: "Mr Hariri is on the line and 
wants to speak with you now." Rafiq Hariri was a dynamic 
individual who was widely expected to take office as Lebanon's 
prime minister as the country prepared for the challenge of 
post-war reconstruction. He had decided it was time to begin on 
the serious reconstruction of Lebanon, and he needed my help 
to do it, he told me. Hariri was in no doubt about what the 
priorities should be. We had to focus on those parts of the 
reconstruction plan that would regenerate the economy. I 
agreed with him completely about this.  
 
And so Dar al-Handasah went to work, a contract based on personal 
connections, and an impending sense of urgency. Henri Eddé was the Dar al-
Handasah senior architect assigned to the task under Rafiq Hariri's influence 
and guidance for the creation of a sensational and modern centre. Any 
solution was paramount to returning stability in Lebanon. It would have to 
―inform the future and cherish the past‖ in addition to being able to ―reconnect 
a once-divided city‖ (Gavin and Maluf, 1996, p13). The appropriate action was 
critical to the future of Lebanon, and so the initial Master Plans were 
completed. 
Eddé's plans once publicised were denounced as outrageous (Beyhum, 
1992a). The plans required the demolition of what little remained of the city 
centre. Protests about the plan, the extent of the demolition and the launch of 
the company began in July 1991. Eddé's plan included an artificial island to 
house a "World Trade Centre" and an 80m wide boulevard to run down the 
centre of the project; a 'rival' to the Champs Elysees in Paris. Opposition grew 
to form a protest group demanding alternatives.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
plan was able to adopt a more preservatory approach to maintain the city‘s existing urban fabric than 
some of the later plans. The cost of reconstruction, based on public development reports, was 
manageable, and it was financially feasible for many independent property holders to restore their 
holdings on their own (Tabet, 1993).  
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Figure ‎2-3: An Impression of the New Image for the City Centre.  
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Figure ‎2-4: Wide Boulevards and Tall Buildings.  
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Reform of Plans and Launch of the Private Company 
 
About fifteen academics and planning professionals united to try to oppose 
the plan and quickly became to be seen by the public as credible and 
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independent experts. The main criticism was that the plan made the centre 
look like an isolated ―island of modernity‖ (Tabet, 1993, p95) and lacked 
meaningful links to the surrounding areas (Davie, 1996). The group 
succeeded in starting a large public debate surrounding the design of the plan 
which bared no resemblance to the old city centre, alongside the extensive 
demolition it called for. The public outcry was large enough for Dar al-
Handasah to review the plan. The amended version was marketed as a fair 
compromise. Georges Corm the Lebanese economist and former Minister of 
Finance, was quoted in Al-Hayat in November 1991 as saying that the 
adapted plan was advertised for its "involvement of the public" and "inclusion 
of the eminent criticism", though largely only urban design aspects had 
changed with little additional public participation.   
The revised plan was never fully approved through public processes, and was 
submitted straight to the government. It was, however, studied by the 
"Engineers' Union" which presented its findings to Parliament on the 24th of 
September 1991 and suggested that the CDR appoint an independent expert 
committee - in addition to the CDR itself, along with Dar al-Handasah - to 
rethink the plans (Beyhum, Salaam and Tabet, 1996, p18). No response to 
this report was received. The plan produced was very distant to the general 
planning traditions of preservation that existed after the War and felt alien to 
Beirut‘s population. The plan recommended the demolition of well over 80% of 
the existing buildings in the Central District (although according to a variety of 
sources only 20% were damaged ―beyond recovery‖ by the War) (Salaam, 
1996).  
Though the plan was debated publically, it was done so informally and 
unofficially. Legally in December 1991 "amid accusations that Members of 
Parliament (MPs) were bribed to pass the legislation" (Adwan, 2005, p5) and 
under ―influences, and heavy pressures,‖ (Beyhum, Salaam and Tabet, 1996, 
p19) President Elias Hrawi and Omar Karami signed Law No. 117 of 1991 into 
existence which would allow for the creation of a private company to take over 
the rebuilding of the city centre. It became a privately owned company in 1994 
and was later listed on the Beirut Stock Exchange. Op-eds in Al-Nahar and Al-
Hayat newspapers implied that with Rafiq Hariri's background in construction 
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and investments in Saudi Oger and Oger Liban, both leading contractors, 
there should be a spirit of optimism for the plan's success.  
An essential part of the law would be the absorption of all properties within the 
centre into the company through a process of expropriation. In return, 
property owners received shares in Solidere SAL (Martin 1993). Landholders 
received 65% of the total number of Solidere SAL shares with an estimated 
USD 1.2 billion in value. Solidere SAL's remaining shares of USD 650 million 
were sold publically to generate additional cash. In various formats, Rafiq 
Hariri through various sources controlled 19% of Solidere's shares at the 
company's launch, as will be explored in Chapter Four (Walden, 1994). The 
objective was to create a modern day Beirut that would attract potential Arab 
investors who would help regenerate the Lebanese economy (Corm, 1996).  
Though many denounced Law No. 117 as "unconstitutional" (Beyhum, 1992a, 
p87), its implementation went forward. The major aspect of the law that was in 
debate was the compulsory and collective transfer of all properties within the 
Beirut Central District to the firm that would become the sole owner of the 
properties. This expropriation process was controversial for two main reasons: 
the first was that it would require property owners to receive shares in the 
company instead of cash compensation; the second was that it forced 
property transfer between two private owners of which the original owner was 
forced to cede property. One Lebanese architect and planner Assem Salaam, 
the former head of the Order of Engineers and Architects, described that, 
―entrusting Beirut‘s Central Business District redevelopment to the CDR is a 
typical example of the dangers inherent in the state‘s abdication of its role in 
orienting and controlling one of the most sensitive reconstruction development 
projects in the country‖ (Salaam, 1996, p198). Many saw the project as 
dissolving distinctions between the private and public sectors or "allowing for 
the colonisation of the former by the latter" (Makdisi, 1997a, p693)49. 
 
 
                                                          
49
 In the days following the approval of Law No. 117, and laying the groundwork for the company's 
formation, the Cabinet in Decree No. 2236 dated the 19
th
 of February 1992 delineated the geographical 
boundaries of the BCD and provided a roster of all properties falling within these borders.  
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Figure ‎2-5: The Beirut Central District as Sketched in Early Plans.  
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In April 1992, demolishing within the BCD zone began directed by the CDR, in 
an 'alleged' attempt to stabilise the area from the danger of condemned 
buildings and to preserve public security (Haddad, 1998). Despite Law No. 
117, at this point no Master Plan had been officially approved for the area, 
and the CDR was seen by many to be acting beyond its mandate50. Property 
owners within the BCD began to complain that their buildings were being 
demolished with high-explosive demolition charges on no legal grounds. Many 
at the time also complained that the explosives and bulldozers were stronger 
than necessary causing building collapses that damaged several other 
neighbouring buildings that were in turn declared hazardous to public safety 
and demolished (Beyhum, 1992a, p19). 
Assem Salaam, in a newspaper opinion piece observed that ―more buildings 
were destroyed by bulldozers than the War itself‖ (Makdisi, 1997a, p674)51. It 
was the case that more irreparable damage had been inflicted on the centre 
by those ―who claim[ed] to be interested in salvaging and rebuilding it‖ 
(Makdisi, 1997a, p674) than during the preceding fifteen years of shelling and 
                                                          
50
 More details regarding Hariri's involvement in this and other historic demolition will be discussed in 
Chapter Three. 
51
 By 1993 when the Dar al-Handasah plan was properly ratified, about 80% of the structures in the city 
centre had been damaged beyond repair primarily as a result of the demolition and clearing works. 
Incidentally this was the same proportion of clearing suggested by the 1986 Dar al-Handasah plan.  
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house-to-house combat52. Many intellectuals felt that the destruction and 
demolition that took place between 1990 and 1994 was an unhealthy form of 
erasing the past (Haugbolle, 2011). In May 1992 a conference was organised 
to debate the aesthetic, cultural, and social significance of the reconstruction 
effort and to denounce the demolition. With a set of strong recommendations 
to rethink the plan, the conference called for an extensive debate. Property 
rights and values remained at the heart of objections. This debate however, 
was overshadowed by the electoral campaigning beginning that summer. 
Rafiq Hariri, who had originated Solidere's idea, had been slowly working his 
way into the Lebanese federal government system. It was on the 13th of 
August 1992 while the public watched the upcoming elections - in which Rafiq 
Hariri was running - with great attentiveness that the Cabinet, in a special 
session53 voted decisively on the basic structure to create the Lebanese 
Company for the Redevelopment and Construction for the city centre to be 
known widely already by its French acronym Solidere (Solidere, 2002a).  
The Higher Urban Planning Commission, whose purpose included reviews of 
urban plans, denounced the Master Plan54 and called for a complete 
rethinking of the plan and the implementation vehicle, in spite of this, the 
'Articles of Incorporation'55 were approved. In the absence of 23 Members of 
Parliament, and with only six voting against the plan it passed56. One MP 
Saleem Sa‘ada when voicing his objection quoted a verse from the Qur‘an: 
―And eat not up your property among yourselves in vanity, nor seek by it to 
gain the hearing of the judges that ye may knowingly devour a portion of the 
property of others wrongfully‖ (Pickthall, 1992). MP Elias al-Mashrou reported 
that the plan was 'Massikh' or 'Foolish'. 
Solidere SAL's 'Articles of Incorporation', initially fixed the company's duration 
at twenty-five years. This duration was amended and extended to seventy-five 
years in 1998, in order to enable the company ―to fully realise its objectives 
                                                          
52
 Najah Wakim, the founder and president of the Lebanese group, the People's Movement, has actually 
argued that much of the fighting in the downtown during the War was paid for in order to ensure as 
much damage as possible to the area. 
 
53
On the 14
th
 of July 1992. 
54
 On the 17
th
 of July 1992. 
55
 Decree No. 2537 dated 22
nd
 of July 1992. 
56
 None of the six MP‘s who did vote against incorporating Solidere SAL ever returned to hold office 
again. 
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and to satisfy the interests of its shareholders‖ (Solidere, 2001a, p9). Solidere 
SAL was immediately faced with a host of litigation by the original property 
right holders. Many citizens and property owners submitted requests to the 
Council of State to repeal the decrees approving Solidere SAL's 
establishment57. The government was in a state of reconstitution right after 
the War and following the parliamentary elections in the summer of 1992 the 
last of the transitional government resigned to be replaced by a new 
Parliament and Rafiq Hariri, the newly appointed Prime Minister and billionaire 
engineering 'tycoon' (Newsweek Staff, 1994). Indeed, Rafiq Hariri's power 
was not reduced by the election boycott. One of the last acts of the previous 
government right before it resigned prior to the elections was in fact to give 
formal approval to the Dar al-Handasah Master Plan on the 15th of October 
1992. And so, it was in this atmosphere of national anxiety (Lebnani, 2010) 
with the outcome of the elections and a distracted public that the Master Plan 
was approved with little ―debate over its merits‖ (Eddé, 1997, p132). Solidere's 
plan had no opportunity for legislative recourse once it was approved.  
 
A Master Plan Pushed Through by an Individual  
 
Many saw Rafiq Hariri coming to power as a turning point (Iskandar, 2006) for 
Lebanon. As a large player in the Lebanese economy his net wealth was the 
equivalent of the country's GNP. Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was a Saudi 
national with family roots from Sidon (Tueni, 1992). Rafiq Hariri took office in 
1992 and became the largest shareholder in Solidere SAL, owning 7% of the 
company. The rapid rise to power of Rafiq Hariri and his years of rule 
beginning in November 1992 represented what scholars agree was a 
                                                          
57
 Specifically the decrees protested were: Decree No. 2236 dated the 19
th
 of February 1992 and 
Decree No. 2237 dated the 19
th
 of February 1992. In each of the cases brought forth by these owners, 
the plaintiff received a notice from Solidere that read: "Although the outcome of such proceedings 
cannot be predicted with certainty, legal Counsel to the Board of Founders advises that the decrees in 
question are in conformity with applicable laws and therefore such proceedings are unlikely to succeed." 
On the 9
th
 of July 1992 one of the original property owners in the centre brought a case to the Lebanese 
High Court of Justice. A decision came down from Judge Azzat Ayoubi ordering the cessation of Decree 
No. 2236, associated with defining the boundaries of Solidere and the plots it included, as well as the 
cessation of Decree No. 2237 that included specification of the extent of the company‘s involvement. 
The decision however, was short-lived and was the last after Hariri came to office in 1992 that could be 
interpreted as anti-Solidere in nature. 
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dramatic intensification of market forces in the national economic and political 
organisation (Makdisi, 1997). Rafiq Hariri's ascent saw market forces in 
Lebanon intensified through political intervention that began supporting 
exclusive economic projects for a certain political elite (Verdeil, 2002). Rafiq 
Hariri was committed to ease the work of local and foreign investors and he 
looked to the built environment as the main framework in which investments 
could come.  
Even before he assumed power, Rafiq Hariri was quickly able to place one of 
his employees in the top position at the state-run CDR (El-Shalaq as 
previously mentioned). As Prime Minister he placed his men in most of the 
relevant state institutions for reconstruction establishing a practical decision-
making monopoly (Eddé, 1997). The process of the post-war reconstruction 
has been described as one of self-enrichment for members of the 
government, and those in opposition were quickly replaced. The plans opened 
"the floodgates of privatisation, its members, as individuals, [took] advantage 
of the very same market liberalisations that they mandate[d]‖ (Makdisi, 1997a, 
p694). The Lebanese Parliament included thirty-five millionaires and three 
billionaires. 
On the 5th of August 1992, the CDR as directed by Law No. 117, published an 
invitation in the Lebanese media to form Solidere SAL's Founding Board in a 
period scheduled to end almost a month and a half later. The CDR selected 
from amongst those applications received. The successful candidates were 
chosen from those whose solvency could be established by bank guarantees 
acceptable to the CDR. The Board of Founders formed on the 23rd of 
December 1992, included one representative from the State, six 
representatives from the property rights owners (including lawyers, legal 
consultants and representatives of the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Islamic, 
and Greek Catholic Waqf), as well as five representatives from the 
prospective cash investors. Nasser Chammaa was the Secretary General of 
the Board of Founders and the Representative of the Hariri Group (today he is 
the Chairman and CEO of Solidere SAL). The representatives on the board 
were not free of criticism. Some saw them as a ―collection of private interests 
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and powerful individuals who gathered together as Solidere‘s Board of 
Founders in 1992‖ (Makdisi, 1997a, p672). 
The Board of Founders was to prepare a detailed plan to be submitted for 
approval to the authorities, along with a phasing plan. In addition, the 
company was also to be run by a Board of Directors - of which at least two-
thirds would be Lebanese nationals with the shareholders represented in 
proportion to their contributions. Further to the original plan, by the 21st of 
October 1993 the CDR had completed and endorsed a detailed zoning plan 
for the project58. 
 
Figure ‎2-6: Beirut Central District Detailed Plan.  
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58
 This was later approved by the Cabinet along with its amendments by Decree No. 4830 on the 17
th
 of 
March, 1994. 
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For this detailed plan, the CDR and Dar al-Handasah conducted several 
information meetings but they were descriptive sessions that gathered limited 
input back. Critics often called upon the CDR to endorse more progressive 
planning agendas including participatory 'citizen forums' though this never 
materialised. The CDR in its defence released statements outlining the 
process of approval, showing that the Master Plan would in fact require both 
municipal approval as well as the approval of al-Tanzeem al-Madani (the 
Planning Directorate) before it could be submitted to Cabinet for official 
endorsement. So in one sense the CDR argued, the public would be 
represented.  
Solidere's Detailed Master Plan was headed by the Harvard-educated 
Ossama Kabbani who wanted to create a ―lively and attractive urban core in 
Beirut, balancing office space, residential area, commercial and retail zones, 
parks, promenades, beach facilities and two yacht clubs" (Makdisi, 1997a, 
p679). The Master Plan split overall land area in the city centre into 
'development' and 'public' areas. The public areas were designated for roads 
and open space. The development area consisted of any retained buildings 
and open space. The total land area of the Central District was approximately 
1.8 million sqm, of which were 610 sqm of reclaimed land. The total built-up 
area capacity of the Central District was set by the Master Plan at 4.69 million 
sqm, of which 1.45 million was reclaimed land. 
Phase I of the project extended from 1996 – 1999, concentrated on the 
development of the traditional BCD. Phase II of the project beginning in 2000, 
focused primarily on expanding the development to the peripheral areas of the 
BCD and onto the reclaimed land. In these two phases Solidere also 
developed land plots to sell to other developers, at about 571 thousand sqm 
for new development in the traditional BCD boundaries and an additional 260 
thousand sqm from the reclaimed land. 
Along with the completion of the Master Plan, Solidere soon after formally 
established a legal entity with offices on the 5th of May 1994, with shares fully 
subscribed to, presenting itself as a ―healing agency, designed to help central 
Beirut recover‖ (Makdisi, 1997a, p675). Throughout the entire period of 
debate regarding the Master Plans, the property owners whose plots were 
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expropriated into the company remained sidelined, with feelings of under-
compensation. Their complaints, moreover, could only be heard through a 
Solidere SAL-led and managed appeals process. Courts either rejected the 
cases completely, or overwhelmingly sided with the Solidere project. 
 
A New City Centre Emerges, Solidere: Places for Life 
 
Despite this Solidere grew, and new 'downtown' Beirut, in the eyes of many, 
flourished. Any viewer of CNN in 2011 would have seen an ad for 'Solidere: 
Places to Live'. Solidere's success was indeed applauded. Its quick 
redevelopment of Beirut's city centre, and its attraction of investors, created 
what can almost be considered as a new understanding of land tenure within 
the Levant region. 'Construction capability' was labelled as one of Lebanon's 
most valuable export commodities. A report in Insight in 2002 (Exportable 
Expertise, 2002) clearly identified 'total management companies', such as 
Solidere SAL, as a significant Lebanese export. Many extolled Beirut's 
reconstruction. Ayman Trawi, a known Lebanese photographer, describes the 
transformation of the city centre as ―the doors of Beirut are flung...open once 
again, and the city is getting back all the signs of modern culture and 
civilisation that were missing for so long‖ (Trawi, 2003, p3). Others describing 
the Solidere project talk about a more wholesome vision of the city, in its 
historic glory, through rehabilitative reconstruction in its pre-war style of 
architecture (Khalaf and Khoury 1993; Sarkis and Rowe 1998). 
Local and foreign media were giving an unusual amount of attention to 
Solidere. With headlines featuring titles such as 'Lebanon up from the Ashes' 
(Meadows, 1994) and 'The Latest Explosion in Beirut is a Construction Boom' 
(Boustany, 1993) Solidere was featured in the Washington Post, The 
Economist, and New York Times regularly in quite extravagant stories 
featuring "the clear statement of faith by the Lebanese in the future of their 
country and its capital" (Kenaan, 1994, p2) through Solidere's efforts and its 
launch in what may have been the largest public share offering in the Middle 
East (Nicholson, 1994a). In one of the more flattering articles, Solidere was 
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given twelve hundred words by Mark Nicholson in his article a 'Glimmer of 
Confidence' which featured the hopes of Lebanon's Prime Minister for 
rebuilding. 
While to some, Solidere was rebuilding a nation, to others, replacing Beirut's 
traditional centre was "a collection of Pizza Huts, Safeways, McDonalds, Body 
Shops, Burger Kings, Starbucks, Benettons, KFCs, Baskin-Robbins, Gaps, 
Block Buster Videos, Tower Records and Banana Republics gathered 
together as a 'souq'" (Makdisi, 1997b, p24), in other words transforming the 
vibrant centre of the past into a generic shopping mall. Critics drafted 
alternative plans. Assem Salaam drafted an alternative strategy to reconstruct 
Beirut's city centre to restore its pre-war function as a bridge between the 
capital's different religious communities, and reconcile a city that emerged 
from 15-years of civil war divided along sectarian lines (Ohrstrom, 2007). The 
Solidere plan - accused the Order - ignored the two elements essential to a 
national reconciliation; preserving the common memory of the city and a tie to 
the past. In other words, Solidere "concretised the division of the city" 
(Ohrstrom, 2007, p1) by demolishing most of the physical memory and 
denying the original owners and tenants the right to return to the centre to live 
and work. 
In the case of Solidere, while the production of the centre's urban space had 
been driven by the private sector, it was also closely linked to the political 
regime. To win the public's sympathy, Solidere SAL worked to play on feelings 
of nostalgia. Solidere SAL tried to associate with a reborn and reconciled 
Lebanese identity on the premise of reviving a 'new old' in terms of 
atmosphere and architecture to receive legitimacy (Kousis, Selwyn and Clark, 
2011), branding itself as the modern image of Beirut. This link to the 
perception of 'Lebanon' and the 'Lebanese identity' has left a lasting 
impression on many. Many writers deemed Solidere responsible for the 
"dismantling of Beirut's past and for the erasure of its residents' memories" 
(Sawalha, 2010, p30). 
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Figure ‎2-7: Advertisement Criticising Solidere as Removing Beirut's "Heart".  
Text below reads: "Beirut: Woe to a people whose heart is ripped out and do 
not rebel" [translation my own]. 
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Solidere SAL was not satisfied with rehabilitating Beirut's centre alone and 
decided to expand internationally to compete with other projects globally59. In 
a similar fashion, Solidere SAL's managers described why they believed they 
would be successful, commenting "the brand name of Solidere is of great 
importance for these projects...Solidere's corporate reputation and brand 
name appeal were the motivating factors" (Schellen, 2007, p2) behind its 
success. Philip Khoury, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology historian, 
declared in his overview of Solidere that "investment in Solidere more closely 
represents a wager on a country than an investment in a company" (Khoury, 
                                                          
59
 Solidere SAL thus announced the creation of an international unit - Solidere International - to focus on 
fully-integrated real estate projects in the MENA region, headquartered in Dubai, UAE with USD 700 
million in capital, the majority of which was raised in Egypt. The Lebanese parent company is set to 
retain 37.2% of the 11 million shares and management control. In November 2006 the shareholders of 
Beirut approved the company's move into international markets. Solidere International refused to 
disclose the identity of its shareholders (Schellen, 2007). 
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1995b, p8). It is as such that the Solidere story is best framed as one of long-
lasting and massive impact with reverberations across Lebanon. The story of 
Abdali in Jordan was simply framed by policymakers as one which would 
have a lasting effect on the country. 
 
2.4 Jordan's Neoliberalism and the New Setting for Abdali 
 
The period of 1999-2004 marked the period from King Abdullah's accession to 
the throne to the incorporation of Abdali Investment and Development PSC. It 
was in late 2001 that the idea of a modern city centre in the Abdali site first 
emerged; an idea that tied strongly into a new vision for Amman. An emerging 
'new guard' within the Jordanian public sector propagated agendas of 
privatisation and liberalisation, relying on the private sector to be the main 
engine for growth; where economic progress was seen as a precursor for 
political reform. In the rapidly expanding city with limited government 
resources and stressed infrastructure, there seemed to be little alternative to 
'mega-projects' within the capital. This background section aims to outline the 
Jordanian political and economic contexts that built up to the decision to go 
forward with the Abdali project.  
 
The Emergence of the New Guard Creating New Political Realities in 
Jordan 
 
A week before King Hussein's death on the 7th of February 1999, following a 
rule of 47 years, the King announced that his eldest son, Prince Abdullah 
would succeed him as crown prince. The decision caused a stir. Some 
thought Abdullah to be a 'playboy' (Gale, 2001), others thought the King's 
brother - Prince Hassan bin Talal who had served as crown prince for 34 
years - the wiser choice. As it was, Prince Abdullah, who had served as 
Commander of the Jordanian Special Forces, ascended to the throne and 
with him brought new ideas, connections, and a new world view. 
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When King Abdullah II inherited the throne in 199960, Jordan was politically 
stable (Bank and Schlumberger, 2004). A peace treaty had been signed with 
Israel five years earlier. However, economically, the Kingdom was in trouble. 
Jordan's economic crisis, which had started a decade earlier - caused by 
overspending by successive governments, in addition to a shortage of Arab 
economic aid - and the Kingdom's perceived political position during the first 
Gulf War, opposing the occupation of Kuwait and the deployment of foreign 
troops, culminated in a situation where traditional Arab aid (along with US aid) 
was lost, until about 1997 (Muasher, 2011).  
With the young Monarch's age close to that of his population there was 
widespread hope that reforms were coming, however under the 
circumstances inherited, Abdullah II spent most of his energies dealing with 
the country's "stark economic conditions" (Muasher, 2011, p5). When 
Abdullah acceded to the throne in 1999, the new King did not have a "well 
established and uncontested primus supra non-pares (first above non-equals) 
amongst the national elites" (Bank and Schlumberger, 2004, p51). Indeed, he 
had to create new loyalties. King Abdullah worked to appoint his own men to 
the positions of power within the country (King Abdullah II of Jordan, 2011). 
As such, "a new generation of technocrats and entrepreneurs - armed with 
Anglo-Saxon MBAs and PhDs - began to make their mark" (Parker, 2009, 
p112).  
The promotion of a 'new guard' to pursue King Abdullah II's agenda had been 
an obvious part of the independent policies pursued by the new king (Bank 
and Schlumberger, 2004, p54). The new members already had proven track 
records of succeeding in the international market. They were familiar with the 
terminology that would appeal to international donors and were "personal 
friends and acquaintances of the ruler and therefore enjoyed the king's trust, 
and were flexible enough to undertake political decision-making" (Bank and 
Schlumberger, 2004, p54). First on the agenda was helping promote Jordan's 
image as a modern country. These new elites were drawn from Jordan's 
existing wealthy families, and soon realised that "their fortunes were best 
                                                          
60
 The King in Jordan is considered the ultimate authority as the constitutional head of government, 
holding large power both domestically and internationally (King Abdullah II, 2013a).  
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served by leveraging state power to engage in wider networks of 
accumulation and influence. They provided the backbone of new, quasi-
formalised economic decision-making bodies, and took part in the new 
agencies and governance networks being supported by USAID61 and other 
donors" (Parker, 2009, p112). 
The King's most trusted advisors were a 'handpicked' group of political elite, 
often coinciding with the business elite, in the Economic Consultative Council 
(ECC) of which the King was the sole determiner (Hammerstein, 2010). In a 
sense the ECC thus became an extension of the continuing privileged status 
amongst a certain Jordanian class (Hammerstein, 2010). The 'new guard' 
were not only loyal to the King's initiatives but were seen to have ability over 
and above the 'old guard', as a way to ensure reform (Bank and 
Schlumberger, 2004). These economic reforms supported an agenda to 
promote Jordan's image as a modern country. While the ECC did make 
headway in terms of economic changes, it did very little on the political front. 
The ECC was dominated by people with strong economic backgrounds, and 
so were extremely driven by modern economic trends. Almost all political 
decisions were made from an economic perspective, considering how to 
increase Jordan's internationalisation and exports and with a strong focus on 
privatisation (Muasher, 2011, p23). 
King Abdullah's first Letter of Designation appointed AbdulRauf al-Rawabdeh 
as Prime Minister with a strong urging to "promote democracy" and improve 
"national unity" (King Abdullah II, 1999, p1). However, the efforts (as those of 
the ECC) remained largely economic, though with significant and lasting 
impact - Jordan acceded to the World Trade Organisation in 1999, a Free 
Trade Agreement was signed with the United States in 2000 (the fourth of its 
kind in the world and the first with any Arab country), and a Free Trade 
Agreement with the European Union in 2002. Against this backdrop, and 
partly in protest for the extremely limited political reform, two-thirds of the 
lower house signed a petition to dismiss al-Rawabdeh's government (Ryan 
and Schwedler, 2004). 
                                                          
61
 USAID is the United States Agency for International Development.  
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Despite economic advances, political reform remained stagnant. Much 
analysis has considered the reasons behind the political reform process, 
though instigated from above, moving very slowly. Some critics have put the 
blame largely on a 'rentier' elite62 that fought not to lose any of its enormous 
privileges. Any directives that were seen to undermine or threaten the current 
status quo, with the potential to create a new system, were delayed, and by 
many accounts "derailed" (Muasher, 2011, p23). During this time the Intifada63 
that broke out in 2000 created ripples of perceived regional instability and 
reduced external tourism, trade and investments significantly in Jordan, 
showing just how vulnerable the Jordanian economy was (Kardoosh, 2005).  
In June 2000 (until August 2003), Ali Abu Ragheb was appointed Prime 
Minister and headed three successive governments. Abu Ragheb - also an 
'East Bank politician' (Observations of a Jordanian, 2011) was younger and 
more politically and economically liberal than al-Rawabdeh. In June 2001, 
during Abu Ragheb's tenure, on the recommendations of government and the 
intelligence services, the King dismissed Parliament (Denoeux et al., 2003). 
Elections were scheduled, but consistently delayed, until the Spring of 2003 
citing tensions regionally as the reason. It was during this lull of Parliament 
when there was a "general sense among the Jordanian public that financial 
and administrative corruption [was] prevalent in the civil service at the highest 
and lowest levels" (Bank and Schlumberger, 2004, p51) that the Abdali project 
was born. With Parliament dissolved, a loophole in the constitution was 
exploited, which allowed the government in extenuating circumstances to 
pass laws in the absence of Parliament. As such, 211 provisional 'temporary' 
laws were passed64. 
 
                                                          
62
 The rentier state is one in which the government is the principal recipient of the external "rent" in the 
economy (income not associated with a productive activity). There are two different styles of rentier 
state economy to be found. The first is based on the type of rent accruing to the state: (1) pure rentier 
state economies, (oil revenue based); and (2) induced rentier state economies, including Jordan (aid 
and remittances) (Knowles, 2005, p11). The rentier elite are a subset of the population that benefit 
disproportionately by receiving additional rent allocations from the state. 
63
 The Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the first Intifada 
lasted from 1987 to 1993, and the second began in 2000. 
64
 Article 94, Paragraph A, gives the Cabinet, with the King's approval, the power to issue temporary 
laws in the absence of Parliament on matters requiring necessary measures when no delay can be 
tolerated. 
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Jordan's Drive to Globalisation and a Private Sector Economy  
 
Economic reforms meant that by 1999 there had been a gradual reduction of 
high fiscal imbalances, and the implementation of a structural reform agenda. 
These reforms aimed to build a "new Jordanian model that is resilient to 
external factors and that accommodates the evolving global trends" (MOP, 
2001b, p1). The model aimed to transform Jordan from a primary-driven 
economy, to an investment-driven and knowledge-based one. The private 
sector was framed as the "main engine of growth and the driving force of the 
economy" (MOP, 2001b, p1) and alongside civil society, the government 
considered it an essential partner to "reach a national consensus on the path 
that Jordan [was] to take to realise its developmental objectives" (MOP, 
2001b, p1). 
Starting in 2000, Jordan began to see a rise in economic activity reflected in 
growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP/capita (CBJ, 2011). The 
construction sector was amongst the leaders in contributions to GDP with 
rates reaching almost double that of the economy, especially in the period 
leading up to 2004 (CBJ, 2011). The economy also transformed to become 
more service-oriented with a renewed focus on real estate65, banking, tourism 
and the Information Technology sector. The economic reforms were strongly 
on the agenda "to put bread on the table,‖ as King Abdullah often said (King 
Abdullah II of Jordan, 2011). Many initiatives were launched to this effect, 
including the Aqaba Special Economic Zone66.  
It was during this time that the government also presented comprehensive 
reform plans such as the Social and Economic Transformation Plan (SETP) 
(Tarawneh, 2008) released in November 2001 with Dr. Bassem Awadallah as 
its major advocator67. This plan was designed to stimulate private investment 
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 The real estate sector is an interesting one to take note of as it is also easily interpreted in the frame 
of the rentier state with a 10% property transfer tax levied on the total market value of the property at 
each point of sale and ownership transfer, and government collecting substantial fees for no real service 
rendered. 
66
 The Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority is the financially and administratively autonomous 
institution responsible for the management, regulation, and the development of the Aqaba Special 
Economic Zone, the designated Free Trade Area with investment incentives in the South of Jordan. 
67
 Bassem Awadallah was considered King Abdullah II's right-hand man. He is a Georgetown and 
London School of Economics graduate, who remains a controversial figure in Jordan. 
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and improve public services alongside administrative reform (MOP, 2001a). In 
conjunction with the plan, several large-scale initiatives were also launched 
during this period to help articulate Jordan's vision of economic and political 
reform including the Jordan-First initiative in 2002. The initiative was headed 
by a committee of government officials, parliamentary members, and other 
private sector leaders. It did not include members of the opposition. 
Responding to the dissatisfaction of Jordanians with the focus on the private 
sector and the speed of economic liberation and reforms, King Abdullah II 
described "the speed with which the government has to act in order to attract 
investments can take society by surprise and cause a lot of talk. This is the 
way the world works. Countries that cater to speed will win and others that let 
cumbersome bureaucracy get in the way will lose" (Ruwashdeh, 2008, p1). 
The first few years of King Abdullah's reign witnessed a decline in 
international aid (Knowles, 2005, p11)68. Yusuf Mansur, former head of the 
government's think tank the Jordan Agency for Enterprise and Investment 
Development remarks that with a government that was burdened by current 
expenditures, debt and natural resource shortages, and in an era where the 
private sector was being turned to as the cure-all, Jordan saw a renewed 
push towards the creation of "Public-Private Partnerships" and the 
"privatisation" of government (Mansur, 2013). As part of the economic 
rhetoric, the government slowly began withdrawing from the economy. The 
private sector was looked to as an alternative, and was especially rooted in 
the improvement of relations with the Gulf following King Hussein's death 
(King Abdullah II of Jordan, 2008). In the first few years of King Abdullah's 
reign, the proportion of private sector spending as a percentage contribution 
to gross capital formation increased. In addition, both World Bank and 
                                                          
68
 It is important to note here that there was a decrease in all measures of the induced rentier economy 
during the first three years before increasing in 2002; when the United States began the War on Terror. 
Despite the slight increase of aid in 2002 following the United States' invasion of Iraq, international aid 
fell steadily, reaching a record low in 2007 at only 2.5% of GNP, and 7.1% of government expenditure - 
an all time low. The world economic crisis pushed levels still lower and was the primary reason behind 
the continued decrease in aid. 
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International Monetary Fund 'conditionalities'69 have tried to stress the need to 
limit the size of the public sector in the economy. 
These economic reforms included the heavy privatisation of state assets, and 
trade liberalisation, but were not subjected to serious debate from the 
Parliament and received very little buy-in and were criticised (strongly almost 
over a decade later). As Marwan Muasher, Jordan's ambassador to Israel, the 
United States, and Jordanian Foreign Minister, points out, many were 
convinced that the state was selling assets to the private sector, and reducing 
the privileges that were traditionally awarded to the 'old guard' (such as 
employment opportunities in the government run enterprises for their tribes 
and supporters) (Muasher, 2011). Yet others found that these privileges were 
simply being transferred to an alternative new elite. The end of 2002 was also 
witness to recurrent riots in the south of Jordan in the city of Maan which 
many saw as the result of mounting tensions (Muasher, 2011). The early 
2000s saw an economic boom that focused heavily on the real estate sector. 
This, in conjunction with the new focus on the private sector, the emergence 
of a new guard and the series of economic reforms tied to international 
organisations brought forth a different sort of economy. 
 
New Economy Focused on the Real Estate Sector 
 
By 2004, Amman was found to host 38% of Jordan's population and almost all 
inhabitants living in permanent homes; and the population steadied at about 
2.5 million (Department of Statistics, 2004)70. Amman's main shopping centre 
has in the past been the city centre area, offering one of the city's limited 
                                                          
69
 Conditionalities are the use of conditions attached to the provision of benefits such as a loan, debt 
relief or bilateral aid. These conditions are typically imposed by international financial institutions or 
regional organisations and are intended to improve economic conditions within the recipient country 
70
 Amman's population began at about 10,500 people in 1930 (Kadhim and Rajjal, 1988). In 1952, at the 
time of Amman's first census, the city's population was 250,000 - of which 29% were living in tents, and 
8% in natural caves (Abu Dayyeh, 2004). Two abrupt migration waves in 1948 and 1967 ballooned 
Amman's population, and resulted in five refugee camps across the city. Amman further expanded after 
the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, the first Gulf War in 1991 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to large 
influxes of refugees into Jordan. The 1994 census found a population increase of 54.6% over 1979's 
levels. Amman has traditionally been a city of seven-hills founded by Muslim refugees from the 
Caucasus at the turn of the 20
th
 century (Oxford Business Group, 2007, p150). While Amman's growth 
rate steadied at 3% over the past decade, 2013 saw large influxes of Syrian refugees. 
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stretches of flat land for pedestrian shopping. Along with other central and 
eastern areas, popularity dropped as western Amman real estate emerged as 
the "consumer good par excellence" (Daher, 2011, p273) with higher income-
families moving to the west of the city, and analysts wrote that along with 
other locations in the east of the city "downtown Amman ha[d] little to offer 
and more upscale retail is situated in west Amman and increasingly within 
shopping malls" (Oxford Business Group, 2007, p151). In addition, older real 
estate was rarely refurbished or maintained as strict rental laws meant that, 
similar to Lebanon, annual rent increases were extremely limited and rental 
contracts could not be broken without stiff penalties.  In addition the contracts 
were inheritable across generations of families71. The older areas of the city 
grew dilapidated as newer neighbourhoods emerged. 
The 1999-2004 period saw massive growth in Jordan's real estate sector. The 
Mayor at the time, Nidal Hadid saw an unprecedented population and urban 
growth rate. On the infrastructure-level the early to mid 2000s brought the 
rapid development and construction of traffic intersections and tunnels and 
bridges in an attempt to control traffic. Hadid, of Eastern-Jordanian descent, 
was even dubbed the "Mayor of tunnels and bridges" (Parker, 2009, p112). 
Across Amman various enclosed construction sites were created, "spruced up 
with billboards that provide a glimpse of the glittering future in store for the 
site" (Parker, 2009, p110). These projects were "carved by flows of oil wealth" 
(Parker, 2009, p110) and critiqued as one-off opportunities rather than a 
systematic flow of foreign investment. 
 
  
                                                          
71
 The Landlord and Tenants Law No. 11 of 1994 was amended in 2010 with a new draft presented to 
Parliament which allowed landlords for the first time to revise their rent upwards free of rent controls, 
making real estate investments more appealing (Abzakh, 2008 and Freij, 2012). The Landlord and 
Tenants Law and its final amendments were finally approved in Parliament in 2014. 
112 
 
Figure ‎2-8: Map of Amman Showing the Abdali District as Central  
 
Source: Map author's own, GIS data from Greater Amman Municipality, 2012 
 
By 2003, Jordan - and specifically Amman - was experiencing a real estate 
bubble. At that time announced projects had investments pledged at over 
USD 30 billion (United States Dollar). In light of this flood of investments, and 
taken as a sign of "Amman becoming modern" (Post, 2013) obsessed with the 
"Dubisation" of the city (Post, 2013) a newly appointed city council began their 
efforts to make Amman "a showcase for efforts at modernising government in 
Jordan" (Parker, 2009, p112). Alongside donor support (from institutions such 
as the USAID) Amman's goal was to be refashioned as a global destination 
city. The council was 50% elected and 50% appointed by the Prime Minister, 
along with an appointed Mayor. The move at the time was seen as trying to 
undermine the influence of Islamists within the council - while bringing on 
board a more "elite" and internationally oriented voice (Post, 2013). Both 
residentially, and commercially, the real estate market trends have started to 
transform Amman. The 2003 United States-led invasion of Iraq forced many 
Iraqis to flee to Jordan. Some arrived, quite literally, with "suitcases full of 
money" (Mansur, 2013), which they used to buy homes in Amman‘s affluent 
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western section. Price increases of up to 400% were recorded and real estate 
trading increased by upwards of 74% in 2004 alone. 
The attacks of September 11th 2001 in the United States also had impact as 
"not only did the attacks reshape Gulf investors vacationing patterns but they 
have also forced investors to look closer to home to invest their excess 
liquidity" (Global Investment House, 2008, p10). The government's efforts at 
privatisation and economic liberalisation further boosted the role of the private 
sector and prompted a further boom in the real estate market (Oxford 
Business Group, 2007, p150). Emerging credit facilities by banks also helped 
fuel the growing demand for real estate and construction (CBJ, 2012). The 
Amman market was awash with cash and seemingly everyone wanted to 
invest in land, including many foreign investors. One prominent report from 
the banking sector remarks that well over 1,200 new construction companies 
were established in the three years after 2004 (ABC Investments, 2007).  
 
Future Real Estate Planning Driven by the Private Sector and the Army 
 
King Abdullah II began his career within the army gaining experience working 
his way up the ranks. By May 1998, he was promoted to the rank of Major 
General. The Army for King Abdullah was seen as his power base - his 
unique edge that would provide him with legitimacy. It might have been for 
this reason that the army was often called upon to fulfil other ambitions and 
duties, and slowly, it began to have a role in development. In 2002 as part of 
the army framework 'Mawared' (National Resources Investment and 
Development Corporation) was created as a financially and administratively 
independent state-owned corporation that was the army's investment arm and 
would invest in strategic projects around Jordan. Mawared was self-
proclaimed to lead "Jordan's drive towards urban regeneration and inner city 
development" (Mawared, 2010, p1). The company soon became Jordan's 
largest real estate developer, with "commitment[s] towards generating 
investment opportunities for the private sector, creating job opportunities, and 
stimulating economic growth" (Mawared, 2010, p1). It was run and managed 
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by one of the ultra "new guard" Akram Abu Hamdan as its Chairman and 
CEO, with strong influences from the then Minister of Planning, Dr. Bassem 
Awadallah.  
Mawared was marketed, with government backing, as the ideal partner for the 
private sector to enter into large real estate projects. The establishment of 
new regulating (and implementing) bodies such as Mawared was one 
reflection of the Jordanian state's concentration on economic prosperity. As it 
says on its opening webpage, Mawared offers "vacant, fully-serviced single-
owned sites that are ready for development, and facilitates the smooth 
processing of official dealings with all the relevant authorities" (Mawared, 
2010). In addition, Mawared offers developers various "flexible partnership 
formulas in all...real estate development projects" (Mawared, 2010). Its 
influence was to be seen in projects all across Jordan, and included Jordan's 
major real estate projects such as the Living Wall in Amman, O-Beach in the 
Dead Sea, and King Abdullah Bin Abdul Azziz City in Zarqa, amongst 
others72. Following up on the directions of the Royal Court - the administrative 
link between the King and Central Government - in collaboration with 
international partners, Mawared proposed the development of Abdali as a 
cornerstone of these projects within the city of Amman. 
Excited by the concept of an investment such as Abdali, investors (mainly 
from the region) had been "scrambling to get a piece of the pie" (Robertson, 
2007, p46). As a state-owned, financially independent company, Mawared 
was able to offer unique advantages that other corporations could not in the 
form of access to huge tracks of land in prime locations with the infrastructure 
in place. Being state-owned also made Mawared an attractive partner for the 
private sector offering "fast and smooth processing of official dealings with 
relevant authorities‖ (Robertson, 2007, p46). Underneath the rhetoric of 
Mawared was a public (state) subsidy for private real-estate development for 
very select urban business regional elites from Lebanon, Jordan, and the 
Gulf. And, Mawared made an impact. So much so that it has seemed to some 
of the urban critics that the creation of "public space" within Amman had been 
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 It is important to note that all these projects, with the exception of Abdali are either bankrupt or on 
hold. 
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"orchestrated by partnerships between multinational corporations and the 
state through the establishment of new regulating bodies, such as...Mawared" 
(Daher, 2007b, p273). To these critics, what was seen as neoliberal corporate 
visions was reinforced by the State concentrating on economic prosperity and 
encouragement of international investment in the country and was the start of 
"urban geographies of inequality and exclusion and spatial and social 
displacement of second-class citizens, functions, histories, in favour of first-
class tourism developments and real-estate ventures" (Daher, 2007b, p 273). 
 
Problems Emerge with the New Real Estate Economy 
 
Despite the major trends of growth that took place from the late 90's onwards, 
several significant issues of economic importance remained pertinent for 
Jordan. The first of these issues was the decreasing real income of 
households (Department of Statistics, 2002). Rural-to-urban migration was 
another major phenomenon. The percentage of citizens living in urban areas 
more or less doubled to 72% between 1952 and 2004 (UNDP, 2004). This 
caused added pressure on housing, basic amenities, and demand for food - 
alongside rising inequalities in living standards. Jordan's high budget deficit 
was (and remains) one of the most significant problems in the Kingdom 
(Mansur and Al Husami, 2009)73. A water and potential food crisis were also 
thought to be possible with decreasing agriculture (UNRC, 2008). Amman is 
particularly struck by these issues as the highest populated governorate in 
Jordan and with the highest proportion of total poor.  
The new reforms meant, despite relative gains in wealth on average, 
equitable distribution of this wealth had fallen74. The drop in poverty that was 
achieved was not as high as hoped for, and the gap between rich and poor 
continued to increase. However, on most other basic indicators such as infant 
mortality, maternal health, and universal enrolment in education, 
improvements have been seen. One of the major problems affecting the 
                                                          
73
 The deficit began at a level of about USD 198 million in 1999 steadily growing to USD 250 million in 
2002 and reaching USD 1,378 million in 2005 (CBJ, 2011). 
74
 Jordan's GINI coefficient dropped from 36.4 in 1997 to 39.7 in 2007 (CIA, 2012). 
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government's ability to manage financial resources was the strong 
government dependency on grants and aid (Mansur, 2008). Since the early 
1950s, Jordan had been receiving foreign aid in the form of grants or loans, 
the majority of which went towards balancing the budget. Between 1999-2004 
Jordan received USD 4.8 billion in aid - or USD 149 per person per year (CBJ, 
2012). The precarious aid situation, as a rentier state, very much affected 
government policy towards maximising aid impacts.  
Jordan's government has traditionally used the public sector as a means of 
employment, and tool for rentierism - buying loyalties through helping provide 
jobs for those of mainly Eastern-Jordanian background (Zahran, 2012). 
Despite the structural reforms that took place, Jordan displayed features of a 
'semi-rentier' state (Hübschen, 2011, p124). The state continued (and aimed 
to continue) to provide patronage and distribute jobs (and sometimes even 
land and money) in exchange for loyalty (Bank and Schlumberger, 2004, 
p51). This was done directly through government hiring, as well as through 
increased support of the private sector and army. This made it the case that 
the majority of the government budget was (and is) allocated to current 
expenditures (National Agenda Committee, 2006)75. The public sector 
therefore came to be seen by the new generation of reformists to be 
somewhat of a burden on the country. 
With Jordan's rising food and energy prices, and growing inequality - further 
complicated by the global financial crisis - many Jordanians were feeling the 
pressures of more modern life in the Kingdom. State policies had gradually 
moved away from 'regional politics'76 and elaborate social agendas77 at the 
start of King Abdullah II's reign into "neoliberal agendas of privatisation and a 
state where most vital assets and sectors had been rented or sold to the 
outside"78 (Daher, 2011, p281). Amongst the realisation of these policies was 
the Abdali project which reflected a shift towards growth through a focus on 
partnerships with the private sector as the hero of development hailing "'real-
                                                          
75
 The Jordanian National Agenda defined the current expenditures at about 80% of total government 
budget which goes towards salaries and retirement benefits, 10% to capital expenditures, and the 
remainder for debt servicing (National Agenda Committee, 2006).  
76
 For example, Arab Nationalism and unity. 
77
 For example, in agriculture, health care, and education subsidies. 
78
 For example, water, telecommunication, and power were privatised. 
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estate development' as its new religion" (Daher, 2012). Others have noted 
that "the Kingdom‘s prestige projects that started at the height of the credit 
bubble have become the biggest scars on our cities‘ landscapes" (Jo 
Magazine Staff, 2011, p17). 
Social tensions were rising, eventually culminating in Jordan's own version of 
the Arab Spring; tensions that were seen to be "pulling social cohesion apart 
at the seam" (Muasher, 2011, p 17). Corruption became the leading issue with 
a major effect on Jordan with the new guard accused by the Jordanian street 
of co-opting transparency and thriving from the Kingdom's coffers (Satkowski, 
2012). Rumours of corruption circulated - especially concerning the sale of 
state-owned lands; specifically those concerned with Mawared, prompting 
Jordan's ranking on international scales to fall (Transparency International, 
2012)79. Dissenters were dubbed "anti-Jordanian" (Thesis Survey, 2012). 
Mawared's projects began to be criticised publically heavily, including that of 
Abdali, set to create "Amman's New Downtown". 
 
2.5 Abdali, Amman's New Downtown 
 
King Abdullah's policy shift towards globalisation and privatisation, coupled 
with the rise of the new guard and a host of new aggressive (Bank and 
Schlumberger, 2004) state entities, was the backdrop against which Abdali 
was launched. The Abdali case as written in this Chapter aims to tell the story 
of the largest building works project in the history of Jordan, at the time of its 
announcement; a project that was set to drastically affect perceptions and 
functions of space within the city, "creating a new strange way" of interacting 
with Amman's downtown (Thesis Survey, 2012). The story to be told sets the 
frame within which Abdali was marketed as a project promoting the "public 
benefit" (Post, 2013). It is against this backdrop that Abdali's impact on space 
within the city given its breadth and magnitude will be evaluated from the 
public's perspective in later Chapters. Abdali's story is not documented 
                                                          
79
 Both Akram Abu Hamdan the Chairman and CEO of Mawared and the Mayor of Amman at the time 
Omar Maani were jailed on charges of corruption, though not directly related to the Abdali project. Mayor 
Maani was later released with no conviction on record. 
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anywhere in the literature, and one of the contributions of this thesis will be to 
chronicle the case's history as a first step towards understanding its impact. 
The political strategies associated with Abdali's approval and planning 
appeared to some to be "manipulative" (Thesis Survey, 2012), and resulted in 
people feeling "disengaged" from their city (Thesis Survey, 2012).  
 
Abdali Creates a New Imprint on the City 
 
Mid-2006, a strange sight would face drivers coming through the Shmeisani 
area of Amman towards the Ministry of Interior Roundabout: signs on 
buildings stating clearly "This Building is Not for Sale" and more famously an 
aggressive sign in bold red print: "We Are Here to Stay!" (See Figure 2-9). 
This bout of signage did not stop the bulldozers, and eventually all who had 
once stood against selling their lands and buildings to the new Abdali 
Investment and Development company were bought out to clear the area for 
Amman's 'new' downtown. In place of the surrounding neighbourhood now 
stands a spaghetti string of highways essential to reduce traffic and a cooling 
and heating station buried in the midst of the 2-3 storey neighbourhood 
bordering the Abdali towers (See Figure 2-15). 
The existing city centre in Amman had been a place of ―gathering‖, ―worship‖, 
―shopping‖ and ―debate‖ (Thesis Survey, 2012). With wide pavements and a 
vibrant street life, it one of Amman's key commercial districts. The centre had 
to be physically descended to by way of stairways in the era before cars. 
Today, crowded with traffic, most sensible Amman residents go down by Taxi 
or Servis80 in order to save themselves the parking hassle. The old centre was 
just that – old; "just a little bit worn, and a little bit undermanaged" (Post, 
2013). While still advertised in tourist guides as the original 'heart of Amman' 
(see Dakkak Tours, 2012 as an example), with limited municipal funding 
directed to the centre it slowly dilapidated. Rental laws preventing rent 
increases made capital adjustments on buildings unattractive to building 
owners, and certainly Amman's traditional city centre does not reflect the 
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 A type of sharing taxi in Jordan on fixed routes for a set fee. 
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hype, sophistication and technology of a modern Central Business District 
(Thesis Survey, 2012). Further west in the more affluent part of the city is the 
Abdali District, adjacent to the banking district of Shmeisani, and home to 
such landmark buildings as the Parliament and King Abdullah Mosque. Here, 
the Abdali regeneration project aimed to create a Central Business District, as 
a mixed-use development, complete with both high-end residential and retail 
elements. Ambitiously, the project hopes to relocate the ―heart‖ of the city 
from what is today, the rather run-down centre, to Abdali once completed 
(Post, 2013).  
 
Figure ‎2-9: Part of Talal Abu Ghazaleh's Headquarters 
 
Source: Picture author's own, 2006 
 
The idea to regenerate a downtown area for Amman came up in 2002 
between the late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and King Abdullah II through 
Mawared as discussed in the previous section. The army involving itself in 
real estate development projects for investment purposes across Jordan, 
owned a piece of land that is geographically located near the centre of 
Amman and at perfect proximity to all the major hotels, banks, businesses, 
residential areas and the civic centre of Amman that incorporates the Justice 
Palace, the Court and the renowned King Abdullah Mosque.  
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Later that year, on the 3rd of June 2002, King Abdullah II met with a delegation 
representing the Saudi Oger Company81, which had already signed a 
memorandum of understanding with Mawared on the development of the 
Abdali site in the centre of Amman. Abdali Investment and Development (AID) 
was created as the investment vehicle - a private shareholding company 
(PSC) - initially, a private-public partnership between Mawared, an investment 
company owned by the Jordanian military, and Oger Jordan, a subsidiary of 
construction giant Saudi Oger82. During this meeting, His Majesty was briefed 
by Ali Kologhassi - a consultant working for Saudi Oger's General Director 
Sheikh Saad Hariri (Rafiq Hariri's eldest son) on the development of Abdali. At 
the time, one of the main draws of the project was that it included the 
establishment of an 'American University' and 'Congress Palace'83, in addition 
to trade and entertainment centres and internet complex. The meeting, 
according to the Royal Court's press release shortly thereafter was one where 
"His Majesty expressed full support to the project...[and]...pointed out the 
necessity to attract essential investors for the project, particularly, 
establishment of proper and actual partnership with a remarkable American 
University, and focusing on specialisations that correspond with the demand 
in the Jordanian market‖ (Royal Hashemite Court, 2002, p1). Abdali it 
seemed, embodied the spirit of modernity and progress that King Abdullah‘s 
new economic agenda called for (Hariri, 2007).  
On 23rd of November 2003, a year and a half after their initial meeting, the 
King visited Mawared. The King was presented with a vision of an Abdali 
'Urban Regeneration Project' (as it was then named); at that time a 340 
thousand sqm site planned to be a source of attraction for foreign investment 
and an employment generator (Executive Magazine, 2008). It was also at this 
time that Mawared and Saudi Oger began to be marketed as an idealised 
model of a Public-Private Partnership (see Executive Magazine, 2008 as an 
example) that would serve the general public, planning to create "an 
                                                          
81
 Saudi Oger was a construction company incorporated in 1978 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, owned by the 
Hariri family, who were heavily involved in the Solidere project with joint board members. 
82
 In November 2005, however, Kuwait Projects Company (KIPCO), through its Jordanian branch, 
United Real Estate Company (URC-Jordan), came in as a third partner. With its additional investments 
in the project, KIPCO Group's total investment amounted to USD 400 million. URC-Jordan bought 
12.5% of AID's shares, which left Saudi Oger and Mawared with 43.8% each respectively. AID remained 
responsible for implementing the project's Master Plan and infrastructure.  
83
 Neither the American University of Beirut or 'Congress Palace' would come to materialise. 
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integrated development, the project will accommodate a variety of land 
usages, including serviced offices and apartments, shops, restaurants, 
sidewalks cafes, movies theatres, public plazas, gardens walkways, water 
features and other public amenities" (Royal Hashemite Court, 2003).  
The formula was as follows: Mawared provided the land, Sheikh Baha Hariri 
(Rafiq Hariri's eldest born son) provided the finances and through his 
company Saudi Oger the know-how; and together they created the company 
AID in 2004. According to the official narrative, Saudi Oger was essential to 
the success of the project as an experienced and renowned investor. Saudi 
Oger's know-how and professionalism were a large selling point; and served 
as the main explanation justifying their selection as the recipient of large 
public subsidies as the investor of choice on the Abdali project site area. The 
public had little reaction to the selection of the investor that was taken to be a 
fait accompli by many and not open for questioning (Thesis Survey, 2012).  
Rising high above Amman, the Abdali project is seen by many to be stunning. 
A construction project that was to create a 'new downtown', a towering 
example of modernisation, the welcoming of Jordan to a new-era, an 
emulation of the successful and liquid Gulf economies, amongst other things. 
In an interview Baha Hariri (Director of Saudi Oger and Chairman of the 
Abdali Investment and Development PSC) explained the project "will 
endeavour to create out of Amman's new downtown, Abdali, which will 
redefine urban living in the city" (Al-Hindi, 2007, p19). 
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Figure ‎2-10: Image of Abdali in the Future 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎2-11: Image of Abdali's Current State 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons 
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Figure ‎2-12: Abdali Advertisement Reading "Amman's New Downtown"  
 
Source: Picture author's own, 2014 
 
Abdali's two phases were expected to expand the overall land area to 447 
thousand sqm and the investment value to well over USD 3 billion, catering to 
what seemed like strong demands from investors to service the project and 
accommodate predictions of the 40 thousand residents and 50 thousand 
visitors expected daily. Early on in the project - with optimistic outlooks - the 
completion of Phase I was expected in 2010, and Phase II in 201384. Leading 
architects and their firms from around the world were called in to build towers 
as part of the iconic effort to put Abdali on the global map of mega-projects 
(Norman Foster (UK), Architecture Studios (France), Norr (Canada), etc.). 
 
                                                          
84
 This seems highly unlikely with the new completion date set well into 2015. The Abdali website 
(www.abdali.jo) as of the 1
st
 of January 2014 had not been updated. 
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Table ‎2-1: Phase I of Abdali Project 
Built Up Area % SQM  Percent 
Residential  180,000 18  
Offices 490,000 49  
Retail  260,000 26  
Hotels 70,000 7  
Total Built Up Area 1,000,000 
Land 300,000 
Estimated Project Cost USD 1.5 billion 
Total Abdali Parcels 51 
    Sold to Investors 45 
    Abdali Owned (Boulevard and CMP) 6 
Commencement of work: Q2-2005 
Completion of work Q4-2009 
Source: Abdali, 2012 
 
Table ‎2-2: Phase II of Abdali Project 
Description  Value 
Total Gross Land Area 146,729 sqm 
Road Network Area 52,754 sqm 
Private Parcels 63,975 sqm 
Public Park Area 30,000 sqm 
Built Up Area 700,000 sqm 
Source: Abdali, 2012 
 
As such, the massive Abdali downtown85 development in Amman was 
launched in June 2003 with the goal of creating a vibrant central business and 
residential district to catapult the city into the 21st century. Even the media at 
the time was on board with this vision. On the 13th of August 2008, AID 
organised the largest ever media tour of the Abdali 'new downtown' site for 
local press. Members of the media were ―visibly impressed‖ (Abdali, 2008a, 
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 Formally known as the Abdali Urban Regeneration Project. 
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p3) as they toured Phase I of the 'new downtown'. With ―cranes, trucks, 
workers, action…it looks like the downtown is already alive‖ (Abdali, 2008a, 
p3). Indeed, it was the case that the Abdali project constituted a significant 
percentage of the built-up area in Amman, reflecting its importance in the city. 
 
Figure ‎2-13: Total Licensed Area in Amman in 2010 
 
Source: Data selected and graphed from Central Bank of Jordan, 2011 
 
The Abdali project was designed to drastically change the face of Amman, a 
predominantly 'horizontal' city with low-rise sparse buildings. The 
development will introduce the first cluster of high rises, among which is the 
country‘s tallest tower, the 220-meter-high headquarters of the Capital Bank 
of Jordan. A 350-meter-long pedestrian shopping boulevard will connect the 
towers to the 'Central Market' mall and residential parts of the project86. Job 
opportunities and enhanced investments were the underlying promise that 
went hand-in-hand with Abdali's success (Executive Magazine, 2008). To 
some this project signified that "at last Amman was becoming a developed 
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 This 25% represented the Mall and Boulevard, which were to be developed by URC-Jordan (the 
Kuwaiti investment portion) and AID collectively (Executive Magazine, 2007). AID owns 60% of the 
Boulevard and URC-Jordan owns 40%, and in the mall it is the opposite: URC-Jordan owns 60% and 
AID owns 40%. Both were to be developed together.  
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city" (Thesis Survey, 2012). To others it reflected a Real Estate Construction 
and Holding Company model that represented little more than the 
corporatisation of urban forms and linkages, and ultimately diluted heritage 
and a unique sense of place (Thesis Survey, 2012). 
Saudi Oger's partnership was later transferred to a new company, Horizon in 
2008, when Baha Hariri separated from his family's business and created his 
own real estate and investment vehicle 'Horizon' from Monaco. Little to no 
attention was paid to this transfer of assets of a national project to a newly 
established and yet unknown company. This was despite the fact that the 
initial selection of an investor had depended highly upon Saudi Oger's 
qualifications. It was also a little advertised or covered fact in local media. 
Most of the public was completely unaware of the institutional change (Thesis 
Survey, 2012) and those that were aware were not involved in any process 
that might have been used to solicit their opinions.  
 
A Narrative Focused on the Public Benefit 
 
The Abdali narrative promoted by the government was one of a leading 
project working towards the public benefit by furthering the investment and 
tourism climate of Jordan, bringing jobs and modernity to the capital. So much 
so was the project marketed and pushed by the highest political levels that 
retroactively a decision was taken on the 1st of January 2009 by the Jordanian 
Council of Ministers relaxing regulations and deeming that AID and the 
companies investing in Abdali would benefit from several exemptions 
including general sales tax and custom duties, as well as exemptions for the 
non-Jordanians working on the project. The perception of the project being for 
the 'public benefit' was taken so far that AID was given the right to benefit 
from laws in place to serve only public projects and initiatives. AID was in 
effect granted (through the Greater Amman Municipality) the privilege of 
eminent domain (the right to appropriate land). A series of expropriations took 
place transferring privately held land and buildings in the area from local 
residents and businesses to the AID to expand the project site. With AID's 
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investors directly benefiting from the transfer, many found this to be an 
usurpation of the expropriation law by the GAM for a clearly private benefit 
and it was one of the main criticisms surrounding the Abdali project (this will 
be explored in detail in Chapter Three). 
In what was seen as the lively Abdali District neighbourhood, property owners 
were forced to sell out and leave their historic neighbourhood as new "Gulf 
money" entered to invest (Thesis Survey, 2012). It is also of note that the area 
surrounding Abdali was not only residential. It was also a vibrant commercial 
neighbourhood. It was home to 152 families, including institutions such as the 
popular community college – Al-Quds - which had accommodated 3,000 
students in addition to 250 employees, and the Abu-Setta Investment Group 
which included 150 employees (Al-Dustour, 2005). 
 
Figure ‎2-14: Abdali Overpass Being Built 
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Figure ‎2-15: Abdali Overpass  
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Perceived Property Rights Violations Counter Abdali's Public Benefit 
Claims 
 
One of the Abdali District's largest original property owners was the Talal Abu 
Ghazaleh Institute (TAGI), a leading company in Jordan with over 260 offices 
and representative offices around the world, which was in the process of 
building their regional headquarters. Their construction was halted, and their 
building threatened with demolition. The group covered its headquarters in 
tarps warning with attached signs that they refused the expropriation. In 
reaction, five hundred employees and their families at TAGI's complex 
insisted on a sit-in to no avail. AID was given the rights to the plots and 
demolished the building to incorporate the new land area into its boundaries. 
Abu Ghazaleh attacked the decision in the press and in the courts arguing 
that his land was transferred from one private owner to another and that he as 
a private investor had as much ability to generate economic benefits as AID. 
The group even considered moving their headquarters out of Jordan. The 
local and national government stood with AID. An external auditor Moore 
Stephens predicted that TAGI had accumulated losses of USD 11.8 million 
between June 2005 - June 2007, as part of the freezing of the lots and 
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inability to complete construction. Other critics of the process were similarly 
sidelined, ignored and criticised.  
To some the story of the Abdali project is one of violated property rights. To 
others, Abdali's success was phenomenal. Within Abdali itself, the Boulevard 
was seen as "Amman‘s answer to the Champs-Elysees in Paris or London‘s 
Oxford Street" though with "a life and character uniquely its own" (Abdali, 
2009a, p8). Its appealing edge was to attract consumers, as its plans featured 
the sole 'high street' in Amman, which would be characterised by international 
brand names similar to those found in Dubai and Beirut. 
Despite the issues with expropriations, the Abdali project continued onwards. 
It seemed to many that the story of the urban regeneration project was "a 
story of firsts" which would "drastically change living and working in Amman‖ 
(Executive Magazine, 2007b, p16). Some viewed this change unfavourably, 
feeling that "we have forgotten about the old centre" (Thesis Survey, 2012). 
The project's General Manager at the time, Jamal Itani commented that 
―Abdali will create the city‘s first central business district, in the sense of a 
homogenous area...Abdali will become the first retail hub in the city‖ 
(Executive Magazine, 2007b, p16). Mawared, pleased with the Abdali real 
estate investment branched out beyond Jordan's borders to grow 
internationally, in much the same way as Solidere SAL87. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
The four major sections of this Chapter went over the Jordanian and 
Lebanese context that allowed for the creation of the RECHCOs. The Case 
Studies outlined for the first time a comprehensive storyline for their creation 
in the two locations of Amman and Beirut. One of this thesis' working 
hypotheses is that RECHCOs are not the objective "inevitable" institutions 
                                                          
87
 In May 2007 Mawared launched its USD 1 billion holding company in Luxemburg as a platform to 
"invest in...projects outside of the country‖ (Robertson, 2006, p4). Initially, Mawared explained it would 
focus on projects in the high potential segments of the MENA market potentially in partnership with other 
Arab investors. Mawared International would also invite Arab and regional investors to contribute as 
shareholders and in 2007 was in discussions regarding mixed-use development projects in Abu Dhabi, 
Bahrain, Morocco and Turkey. Akram Abu Hamdan, explained: "we are cashing in on our expertise as 
Mawared the brand" (Robertson, 2006, p4). 
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they claim to be, and rather are the product of individual efforts rather than 
institutionalised processes for the benefit of individuals. To this end, the 
Chapter was able to review the large role of individuals in the process, 
working within their own agendas that were not publicised through dialogue at 
the national level. Though treated and marketed as being for the public 
benefit, the RECHCOs were established by a set of transnational investors 
that viewed the project as a private real estate opportunity, and this will be 
discussed further in the next Chapter.  
As a result of the RECHCOs being such an individual effort, the processes by 
which the RECHCOs were approved were not typical of the institutional 
setting of the countries, and instead were ad-hoc, and did not involve public 
scrutiny. This will be explored further in Chapter Three. This was especially 
the case as both Case Studies used the public benefit tool of expropriation 
with massive public backlash. The Case Studies fit into part of a larger 
phenomenon, whereby starting in the 2000s a systematic change was seen in 
the Arab World which was the emergence of a new set of Arab business-
oriented elites who were eligible to be both investors and targets of new 'up-
to-date' spaces (Barthel, 2010). These places as shown through the Case 
Studies were both created for the use, and financial windfall of this elite, with 
luxury stores and high-end offices and residences. 
Within Jordan for instance, Bank and Schlumberger (2004) look at King 
Abdullah II's new economic team reflecting the emergence of a new guard 
responsible for embedding international changes onto national policies. This 
is also associated with new forms of urban governance which are less 
democratic and characterised by more "elite-driven priorities" (Swyngedouw 
et al., 2002, p542). The backgrounds of this Chapter, especially for Jordan, 
reflected the strong urge to attract international capital to create a 'modern 
city'. Similarly, in Beirut there was an elite driven process working towards re-
establishing Beirut as a leading city. Bringing global capital into projects such 
as the RECHCOs in Abdali and Solidere created a "new Arab metropolis" and 
so "unburdened by history they are free to create a new identity and in turn 
serve as a model for the rest of the Arab World" (Elsheshtawy, 2008, p2). 
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As is reflected in other places in the world the 'marketecture' boasted by 
Abdali and Solidere, described in the cases, reflects somewhat of a race 
amongst these projects to sign major architects to symbolise the city's place in 
cultural capitalism through iconic buildings. This phenomenon was part of a 
larger trend that changed the conditions of urban production - starting from 
the 1990s - with several major effects including additional urban planning 
privatisation (in development and management functions), internationalisation 
of financial organisations and expertise (Souami and Verdeil, 2006), and the 
expansion of partnerships. Elsheshtawy (2004) confirms that while certain 
globalisation processes come from abroad, through multinational 
organisations for instance, these processes are activated and pursued by 
local actors. Swyngedouw et al. (2002) describe how such large neoliberal 
urban restructuring projects are incorporated into local settings or "glocalised". 
The projects that are being built reflect this change and try to ‗‗create a social 
reality that [neoliberal discourse] suggests already exists‘‘ (Lemke, 2000, 
p59). The related agencies "leverage state power to defend 'market 
requirements' against the claims of deliberative citizenship" (Parker, 2009, 
p111). In this sense, Amman's Abdali account is in-line with other literature on 
neoliberal state practice (Peck 2005). While touched upon in this Chapter, 
subsequent Chapters will explore how the RECHCOs' "neoliberal moment" 
(Daher, 2007b, p270) has different manifestations and as part of excessive 
privatisation in some forms translated into the marginalisation of local 
populations, discussed in detail in the next Chapter.  
The new era of privatisation saw Abdali and Solidere's massive Master Plans 
bypassing any form of public participation. While the projects received public 
funds and government support, and were marketed heavily as being for the 
public benefit, certain segments of the public including landowners, those 
interested in preserving their city's heritage, and those with fond memories of 
the historic centres, opposed the project. Municipalities that had previously 
run and managed cities saw their roles marginalised by new bodies such as 
Solidere SAL in Beirut, and Mawared in Amman. Without the institutional 
legitimacy, the process of approval and implementation was marred by 
corruption (explored more in Chapter Three).  
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The Chapter also put in place the building blocks to build the argument that 
the RECHCOs were massive public undertakings with long-lasting effects. 
Solidere and Abdali as described above represent mega-projects in the sense 
that they were widely staged, given importance at the public sector level, with 
large and lasting impacts on the urban fabric. These projects are unique 
instances of private initiatives supported by the public sector, not typical of 
other large projects or national initiatives. In addition, with expropriation at 
their core alongside other public subsidies, RECHCOs are not typical of other 
mega-project experiences. 
Both Lebanon and Jordan's backgrounds serve to show the extremely 
different macroeconomic and political situations that the two RECHCOs were 
implemented in. Later Chapters will describe how, in spite of these major 
differences the impacts on the cities of Amman and Beirut are similar, so 
some basic generalities about RECHCOs can start to be drawn. The next 
Chapters will begin to discuss in more detail the social, economic and political 
dimensions of the RECHCOs. Where the Case Studies provide the historical 
perspective of the RECHCOs, the coming Chapters will look to the future 
exploring the specific aspects of the RECHCOs' impact on citizens within 
cities. 
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3. RECHCOs and their Social Impact 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter will look at the RECHCOs from a social perspective to examine 
their impact on a city's citizens. As discussed in the Literature Review in 
Chapter One, across a range of scholarship, spaces turned places are 
regarded as having a strong influence on social life and organisation within 
the city (see works by Castells 2000, Harvey 1989, Harvey 2008, and 
Lefebvre 1974 amongst others). Empirically, there are two types of social 
impact that were identified in the Thesis Survey as recurring themes; one 
related to heritage the other to exclusion. Due to the RECHCOs people felt 
their heritage being undermined. They also felt excluded from the new space 
created by the RECHCOs. In the Solidere literature these two themes are also 
identifiable – though not always labelled analytically as such, and so the 
issues will form the main pillars of this chapter. The previous Chapter outlined 
the Case Studies that gave an overview of the RECHCO's background, and 
this Chapter will build upon that looking more closely at the detailed social 
impacts. The Chapter will discuss how RECHCOs are not merely tools for 
economic prosperity as framed by governments promoting them, rather they 
touch upon the very nature of the relationship between a citizen and their city, 
affecting the way that residents perceive themselves as members of the city 
community. This will start to fill in one of the missing gaps noted in the 
Literature Review, which is the lack of empirical evidence regarding urban 
projects within Arab cities, and the link between this and existing theoretical 
frameworks on the development of cities.  
The main challenge of this Chapter will be to argue that the RECHCOs have a 
significant and largely negative effect on the social aspects of citizens within 
cities as massive projects affecting physical space in a way that alters urban 
heritage and interactions within the city prompting a loss of community identity 
and by creating high-end 'elite islands' where not everybody feels welcome. 
This Chapter will try to answer a series of questions across its main sections. 
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The first section deals with the link between RECHCOs and heritage88 in the 
city. The section looks at the extent to which RECHCOs affect existing urban 
fabric within the city by destroying or developing it from physical and 
functional aspects of traditional uses, and the impacts on citizens. The second 
section considers to what extent RECHCOs cause divisions within the city by 
creating exclusive spaces. Together, these sections will make up the basic 
pillars that will allow us to assess the RECHCO's social impacts on the city 
from the citizens' perspective. For Amman, a large proportion of the analysis 
will be based on interviews with policymakers, the thesis survey conducted 
and a sweep of media archives. In Beirut, a thorough review of the available 
literature will be used in addition to archival research of media coverage and a 
series of street interviews. Combined with the literature available, this Chapter 
will be the first contribution – made on the social front - to the argument this 
thesis will make that RECHCOs do not live up to their promised narrative of 
development and so, without the application of certain conditions, should not 
be governments' choice of tool for progress.  
 
3.2 RECHCOs and City Heritage 
 
The Importance of Heritage in Cities 
 
The literature pronounces the link between heritage and the experiences of 
citizens very strongly. Aldo Rossi observes, ―the history of the city is always 
inseparable from its geography; without both we cannot understand…the 
physical sign of this ‗human thing‘‖ (Rossi, 1966, p97). Pierre Nora helps us 
think of sites such as centres as "settings in which memory is part of everyday 
experience‖ (Nora, 1998, p2). This becomes even more important when 
reading the work of Mohammad Tahan in writing about Arab heritage. He 
believes that much of the turbulence now felt in the region is a consequence 
of Arab thought in crisis, and has argued extensively that heritage is not a 
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 Heritage can be affected in a variety of different ways – physically through a building's design and 
landuse functionality and through impacting social norms and the areas' residents –and RECHCOs 
affect both as shall be demonstrated. 
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problem of the past, but rather it is the problem of the present through which 
Arabs pursue the future; making the destruction of heritage within our cities 
very much a problem of our moment (Tahan, 1993). The glory of city centres 
extolled in Greek literature, and discussed in Chapter One's Literature 
Review, has not been forgotten and the "men in the city centre" (Plato, 2005) 
have continued to be what defines citizenship in the modern city. As shown, 
the public space of the "polis" is where the city meets, discusses, forgives, 
objects, and heals. 
In Beirut, the centre's reconstruction had considerable significance not only for 
the economic future of the country, but also for its domestic policy. The 
condition of the Central District was so much equated with the image of Beirut 
that, in writing about the reconstruction of the city centre, Angus Gavin, the 
head of urban design at Solidere SAL, titled his work 'Beirut Reborn' 
[emphasis added] (Gavin and Maluf, 1996). Similarly, in a survey carried out 
on over 1,500 people, conducted in Amman mid-2012, well over 99% of those 
surveyed were familiar with the Abdali project reflective of its massive impact 
on the city; and almost all of those interviewed were able to give strong 
opinions regarding it. This is expected as the physical urban environment 
plays a large role in our lives. Sharon Zukin in Space and Symbols in an Age 
of Decline describes how effects of "visual artefacts of material culture and 
political economy reinforce - or comment on - social structure" (Zukin, 1996, 
p44). In other words, what we build becomes who we are, and defines our 
society embodied in Henri Lefebvre's "representational space" (Lefebvre, 
1974), a consideration for city centres in Amman and Beirut.  
 
Beirut's City Centre as the Beating Heart of the City 
 
Saree Makdisi in Laying Claim to Beirut, notes that "the city centre is a 
surface that will be inscribed in the coming years in ways that will help to 
determine the unfolding narrative of Lebanon's national identity" (Makdisi, 
1997, p664). Beirut's centre was both the geographical and cultural heart of 
the Lebanese nation (Haugbolle, 2011). Its reconstruction was therefore seen 
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to be the benchmark for which the entire reconstruction process would be 
measured, and its success would play a "special role" in the reintegration of a 
"once and future" country [emphasis added] (Hourani, 2011, p138).  
As one editorial in the business monthly Al-Iqtisad wal-Amal put it, Beirut's 
centre is "the heart of the capital, and is the heart of all Lebanon...the heart 
that beats day and night, pumping through the veins of the nation the vital flow 
and constant interaction" (Real Estate Agency, 1992, p42). After the Civil War 
the image of the Lebanese rising from the ashes as a united people was the 
framework under which Solidere SAL marketed its plans. The centre 
represented a throbbing heart for a generation of Beiruti's that had 
experienced the Civil War. It also represented the far past, with discoveries 
made by archaeologists and United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) marking one of the world's largest 
excavation sites (Sandes, 2010). As part of its heritage plan, Solidere SAL 
participated in financing the dig and the preservation, and its Master Plan 
designated space for an open archaeological area (Rowe, 1998).   
In Lebanon, the centre remained a focus of the reconstruction efforts, as 
mentioned in the Case Studies. The Lebanese population, claimed Gavin, 
longed for "a complete return to normalcy in Lebanon and the reunification of 
the city of Beirut along the pre-1975 lines, in the sense that the Central 
Commercial District would become once more, and geographically at least, 
the heart of a bustling metropolis" (Beyhum, 1992a, p61). The actual process 
by which the Master Plan was developed and approved will be explored in 
Chapter Four. It seemed that the project to rebuild and develop the Central 
District was destined to form an essential part of the full-scale reconstruction 
program in Lebanon. It was, in the hearts and minds of the people, a 
―keystone‖ of the overall reconstruction plans. The press remained positive 
that reconstruction would mark economic recovery for the rest of Beirut, and 
Lebanon as well.  
In 1991, new Master Plans for the reconstruction of Beirut's centre were 
issued by Dar al-Handasah, as discussed in the Case Study of Chapter Two. 
These plans led by Henri Eddé called for an almost total demolition of the 
remainder of the centre. One critic at the time accused the plans of creating "a 
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city without history" (Hourani, 2011, p143), and, in the face of the public 
debate, the plans were redrafted. As noted in the Case Study, in 1992, 
buildings that might have been rehabilitated – and neighbouring buildings - 
were brought down by high-explosive demolition charges producing a 
verifiable "fait accompli" (Makdisi, 1997b, p25) of a destroyed centre 
(Beyhum, 1992a).  
Solidere‘s Master Plan proposed increasing the density of the downtown 
fourfold now that it had been cleared and its structures levelled. Effectively, 
many critics of the venture argued, a devastating blow had been dealt to the 
memory of this two thousand year old city (Scott, 2008), only to be replaced 
by a ―mirage‖ of a new city (Makdisi, 1997b, p23). These efforts to clear the 
surface and "purify it of all historical associations in the form of its buildings" 
(Makdisi, 1997b, p25) were identified by the public to have been done "to 
render it pure space, pure commodity, pure real estate" (Makdisi, 1997b, p25). 
To pretend to protect this memory, argued preservatory groups, by 
maintaining a few monuments while ―obliterating the context onto which they 
were inscribed‖ would only lessen their true worth (Rowe and Sarkis, 1998, 
p132). 
Solidere's opponents were willing by any means to stop the demolition - and 
even tried to block the bulldozers with their own bodies89. Beirut's residents, 
despite protests, were unable to stop Solidere and newspapers published 
their accounts and memories, helping transform their private nostalgia into 
"acts of collective remembering" (Sawalha, 2010, p30). The demolition 
affected Beirutis not only at the individual level, but also at the community 
level, as the interviews reflected, both residents and non-residents went to the 
centre to meet friends, chat, and shop as part of a community.  
Each of the religious communities claimed a strong attachment to the city's 
history. For the Sunnis, Shiites, the Greek Orthodox, and the Maronites, the 
archaeological excavations showed physical proofs of their past. Despite this, 
the area was flattened and prepared for new high-rise buildings. It became 
clear that Solidere's plans often went head-to-head with the need for 
                                                          
89
 The inability of the city dwellers to stop Solidere's "calculated destruction" (Sawalha, 2010, p30) is 
well documented.  
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archaeological preservation- in the historic Bab Idriss area, for instance, a 
34,000 underground car garage was planned. As the sole decision maker the 
company was empowered to decide upon matters relating to heritage 
singlehandedly, a concept explored further in Chapter Four. Solidere's 
destruction of heritage translated into communities losing memories of their 
identity within their city. 
Amongst critics there was a concern voiced that Solidere's approach was not 
inclusive of the design opportunities that emerged from the archaeological 
artefacts within the centre and did not incorporate the finds into its Master 
Plan. Critics urged Solidere SAL to integrate the finds and museums into the 
downtown rather than shipping them to the national museum (Kabbani, 1992). 
This was to no avail. Solidere's plans were criticised for using financial criteria 
to decide on the preservation of buildings rather than historic significance. The 
BCD had a wide spectrum of buildings that represented different period styles 
from the Ottoman to the Colonial to the Early Modern, worth preserving. In 
reaction the BCD project designers chose, on their prerogative, what they felt 
was worth saving and modelled the centre after that specific generic style. 
Critics noted this might be "a reflection of the planners' ignorance of the 
historic responsibility with which they are entrusted" (Kabbani, 1992, p46). In 
response to critics Solidere formed a committee to identify "historically 
valuable" buildings, and so 265 buildings and monuments were designated 
(Solutions Group, 1997) in light of them being symbols of Beirut's architectural 
heritage that "imbue the new city centre with symbolic and aesthetic 
references to the past" (Percy, 1995, p4).  
The designated buildings were allowed to be redeveloped and refurbished by 
their former owners, however, in order to recuperate their buildings, owners 
would have to pay a 12% surcharge on the estimated value of the lot, and 
prepare the buildings within a two-year time frame subjected to an 
architectural brief by Solidere SAL to preserve a cohesive image for the 
centre. The 12% was often beyond their financial reach (Solh, 2013). The 
difficult nature of the recuperation by owners made it all the more likely that 
they give up their plots to Solidere SAL, and that the original residents and 
their functions evacuate the centre entirely. Solidere's ultimate 30-year Master 
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Plan, lasting from 1994 to 2024, incorporated 1.9 million sqm of which 219 
thousand sqm were included from Beirut's original "heroic" urban fabric 
(Larkin, 2009, p6). The appeal to the past includes restored Ottoman buildings 
upon detailed mosques and churches, though in a piecemeal and artificial 
manner90. Others have seen the clearing as purifying the centre of "all 
historical associations in the form of its buildings; to render it pure space, pure 
commodity, pure real estate" (Makdisi, 1997b, p25). Once done, people felt 
the centre was no longer a reflection of the people of Beirut, it was no longer 
"ours [theirs]" (Beirut Interviews, 2013). 
When it came to social aspects, Maha Yahya (2005) has looked at the 
'emptying' of the Centre (Yahya, 2005 cited in Daher, 2007c) and the exodus 
of four thousand of the previous residents. This exodus and the change of 
ownership patterns meant that the city's "social memory" (Daher, 2007c, 
p278) shifted and with it the experiences of users and tourists. The eviction of 
the populations and complete elimination of the social fabric meant 
undermining the physical fabric so that the city would become "a dead city, an 
empty field open to the speculative ambitions of developers‖ (Salaam, 1998a, 
p132). Solidere's designs attempted to recreate the past, in a manner that 
would give visitors the "impression" that the neighbourhood was "built up over 
time" (Summer, 1995, p92) though in reality it was both devoid of its original 
local population and physical history.  
From the interviews it seemed that this was a process that took a heavier toll 
on the women of the community, as the members of the neighbourhood that 
had woven the strongest bonds of friendship. The emptying of Beirut's centre, 
similar to Amman's Abdali site, meant that not only were families and citizens 
shaken by an expropriation process, there was also the destruction of a 
community that resided and worked in the downtowns that were removed. 
This community took with it their family ties, their daily routines, and their 
memories of space. The urban renewal processes in the United States, for 
instance, saw critics noting that eviction on short-notice created life crises for 
'urban villagers' or city dwellers who needed the security of a supportive 
                                                          
90
 For instance, Souq Sursock and Ayyas were almost completely demolished, and the southern end of 
Burj Square wiped out, and Wadi Abu Jmil destroyed in part. Other equally impacted areas by the War 
were in fact preserved, amongst them Foch-Allenby and Etoile/Maard Saifi. 
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neighbourhood as Herbert Gans described them (Gans, 1962). In describing 
the urban renewal experienced in Boston, authors have noted that any forced 
relocation to distant housing is almost a denial of the urban life that not only 
relates to the physical characteristics of an area but also the marginalisation 
of residents' material and social resources, as well as their identity (O'Conner, 
1995). 
 
Amman: A Centre in the Valley 
 
Amman's experience as it relates to the theme of heritage differs slightly from 
Beirut's. Instead of direct demolishment, Amman's historic centre found itself 
a victim of disinterest. The physical development of Amman was dominated 
by its unique topography of hills and valleys91 to which the human settlement 
patterns adapted. The modern development of the city began in the well-
irrigated areas at the confluence of the wadis, which evolved into the original 
downtown Amman area. Residential development expanded outwards from 
there onto the neighbouring hilltops, and their names became those of the 
jabals they originally developed on - Jabal Amman, Jabal Weibdeh, Jabal 
Hussein, etc. Amman's historic centre served as Amman's Central Business 
District, and included a mixed-use pattern of the city's religious institutions, 
residential neighbourhoods, government offices and commerce. The centre 
linked the eastern and western residential areas of the City and provided a 
common meeting ground for all of its socio-economic groups and ethnicities. 
However, with newer commercial areas opening to the west, the Old 
Downtown no longer plays the largest dominant role in commerce and 
governments, but its markets, squares, ruins and places of worship continue 
to cater to a wide range of tourists and visitors.  
The 1950s saw Amman's centre become a stage for political activity. Over the 
years its political significance has decreased, but it has remained a site of 
important political activity. Money came into Amman from the Gulf, through 
grants, investments and remittances, and the increase in wealth created new 
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 Jabals or hills and wadis or valleys as they are known in Amman. 
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neighbourhoods towards the west of the city, though the main protests for the 
Arab Spring still took place there. In late 2002 a real estate boom began in 
Jordan. The Abdali project was launched as part of this boom, as described in 
Chapter Two. With a total built-up area of 1.5 million sqm, the Abdali project 
was set to create its high-density modern 'new downtown' to the west of 
Amman's original centre. There was no doubt in people's minds - as became 
apparent through a series of street interviews - that the Abdali project would 
"change the face of Amman forever" putting a "vertical in the horizontal". The 
development would include Amman's tallest tower and a 350-meter-long 
pedestrian shopping boulevard (Abdali, 2009a).  
In Jordan's Executive Magazine, Jamil Itani, Abdali's CEO from Lebanon 
proclaimed, "An interesting characteristic of urban Amman is that it has no 
genuine central districts. The traditional heart of the city is the downtown area 
near the King Hussein Mosque and Roman amphitheatre. Yet this is a rather 
rundown—and heavily congested—area, with no international retail" 
(Executive Magazine, 2007a, p2). His ambitions for the Abdali project are for it 
to be something "new"; something that will change Amman to "definitely alter 
the lifestyle of the Jordanians, indeed the city‘s identity...the new downtown" 
(Executive Magazine, 2007a, p2). This statement presents AID's viewpoint 
very clearly, that there is a 'public' need and calling for a 'new downtown' that 
fits into the RECHCO's perspective of what a downtown should entail and 
include. However, it is one not completely accepted by the majority of 
Amman's residents.  
In a survey carried out in Amman in 2012, the majority of respondents made 
note that they were not in favour of giving out public money to sponsor Abdali 
as a 'new downtown', since they believed that Amman's centre was adequate 
and did not need to be relocated. Amongst the comments, received as part of 
the survey, were that the Abdali project was "private and so could not be a 
centre"; and "I go to the current centre for all my shopping needs, I do not 
have enough money to shop in West Amman;" or "I remember going to the 
centre after school every day to watch movies and see my friends as a child"; 
or that "the centre is one of the few places I go to get in touch with being an 
Ammani" (Thesis Survey, 2012). Abdali's critics noted that the project had 
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turned its back on Amman's old downtown (Daher, 2008). Funding from the 
municipality, in the form of millions of Jordanian Dinars, was rerouted to the 
'new downtown'; upgrading infrastructure and for marketing expenses. Abdali 
with its crisp tower buildings and international shopping experience was seen 
as the modern alternative to a decaying city centre by many policy makers92.  
To many looking at the evolving skylines of Amman, and the sophisticated 
tourist structures of Beirut, what we are actually talking about is the creation of 
new heritage. The French journalist Francoise Sueret, who addressed this in 
Le Monde, says that Beirut has a "tradition of destructive construction", tied to 
a "political will to modernise" to an economic will to join the world economy 
and to a personal will of rulers to "access history" (Saliba, 2000, p2). 
However, when joining the world economy armed with a globalised political 
elite, one must not forget the people living in the cities that will feel the effects 
of the internationalisation. Heritage within the city is meaningful to its citizens. 
Though they may be fascinated with the modern, and clean, citizens do not 
see this fascination as being at the expense of their history. Nowhere is this 
better seen than in the survey responses by Amman's citizens to the survey 
question then asking whether they would choose to fund the Abdali project or 
a selection of different things across the city. The vast majority would opt to 
fund the current centre (which is outranked, but only slightly, by the municipal 
tax rebate option). In fact, carried on further statistically, 94% of those 
responding to the survey noted that they would prefer their 'tax Dinars' went 
towards rehabilitating the current centre rather than on a form of sponsorship 
for the Abdali Project (Thesis Survey, 2012). 
 
  
                                                          
92
 Bernard Frieden and Lynne Sagalyn have outlined this phenomenon in the United States exploring 
some of the local government campaigns to rebuild downtowns across the United States. Indeed, the 
researchers note that for more than 30 years, starting around the 1950s, big-city mayors and their allies 
struggled to rehabilitate city centres (Frieden and Sagalyn, 1991). These centres underwent 
sophisticated marketing mechanisms to help bring them closer to the higher-income populations they 
were to serve. 
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Table ‎3-1: Responses to the Question: "Make the following choices by 
checking which of the two options you would choose from in each line" 
 
I would 
prefer 
sponsoring 
the given 
statement 
I would 
prefer 
sponsoring 
the Abdali 
project 
Provide a rebate from the municipality on 
taxes 
97% 3% 
Rehabilitate the current downtown 94% 6% 
Upgrade water network within the city 88% 12% 
Provide more government training initiatives 
to support jobs 
85% 15% 
Create a new park similar to the King Hussein 
Park 
84% 16% 
Support loan guarantee programs 80% 20% 
Upgrade roads and pavements in various 
residential neighbourhoods within Amman 
78% 22% 
Upgrade sewer network within the city 73% 27% 
Create funds for entrepreneurship 79% 21% 
Create a fund to support tourism based 
initiatives 69% 31% 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
The City as a Spectacle...Reimagining the Old 
 
Guy Debord in The Society of Spectacle, and others described in the 
Literature Review look at the changing urban world as a false one. In this 
commodified world, each interaction is carefully planned (Zukin, 1991). Market 
and design considerations replace the natural interactions of "engaged 
peoples" in determining the shape of new urban spaces (Crilley 1993, p137). 
Diversity, which is contrived, creates 'marketable' landscapes, as opposed to 
uncontrolled social interaction which creates 'places', though these places 
may not maximise investment values (Mitchell, 1995, p119). The 
'disneyfication' of space consequently implies increasing alienation of people 
from unmediated social interaction, and increasing control by influential 
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economic and social actors over the production and use of space - "the idea 
of pure imageability, oblivious to the real needs and traditions of those who 
inhabit it‖ (Sorkin, 1992, pxii). The result is a commodified image produced by 
Solidere and Abdali, hailed as the 'new downtowns' by the RECHCOs 
themselves, the media, and local government. Yet, something lacks in 
authenticity. In Amman and Beirut we see RECHCOs furthering the neoliberal 
ideology described in Chapter One and supported at the governmental level. 
Abdali has been called, many positive names in the press, a 'modern city' and 
'Amman's new heart' (Obeidat, 2009). At the governmental level Abdali has 
been applauded by a complete erasure of the memory of an "old downtown" 
and its replacement with a "new heart" simply by the government at the 
central and local levels stating it to be so and adopting that as their narrative 
(Post, 2013). Local officials believed that Abdali received its vision from HM 
King Abdullah II, and so from the highest levels the vision of a modern 
Amman meant simultaneously removing the memories of an old, traditional 
past. The leaders in government in Jordan supported Abdali; whether 
Ministers or the Mayor of Amman, they sang praises93. The perception of the 
Mayor, however, from a top-down perspective is one that cuts through what 
people on the street, and frequenters of the centre, feel and notice. In the 
survey conducted, 81% of respondents said that they were 'not proud' to have 
Abdali as a part of their city. When gauging overall impressions of the project, 
70% gave a score of less than '5' out of '10' and very few, if any, respondents 
were neutral about the answers at only 3% shown in Figure 3-1. 
: 
 
  
                                                          
93
 The Abdali project drew comments from several Jordanian leaders. The former Central Bank of 
Jordan‘s (CBJ) governor and Minister of Finance, Dr. Umayya Toukan claimed that the "Abdali 
downtown reflects a far reaching vision. A vision that aspires to make our investment climate in Jordan a 
competitive and inviting one" (Abdali, 2009a, p6). Mayor at the time, and later AID Board Member, Omar 
Maani described the project as having a "major impact on the city of Amman" in addition to being "an 
urban space for the people of Amman to meet and engage in social activities.... furthermore, the new 
arenas of the project and the quality of service that we all anticipate will be a benchmark for the city" 
(Abdali, 2009a, p6). 
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Figure ‎3-1: Responses to the Question "On a scale of 1-10, with 1 being the 
worst and 10 the best, what are your overall impressions of the Abdali 
project?" 
 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
It was also the case that residents who had lived in the area for more time, as 
measured by the survey were more likely to disapprove of the project (Thesis 
Survey, 2012). In comments these citizens indicated they would not frequent 
the downtown as a place for healing, community and reform, Abdali was an 
antagonistic space forced upon them from above, undermining that thing 
which forms communities in cities. The apparent dissatisfaction on the street 
is either unknown or ineffective at influencing Abdali and its architects. 
Roueïda Ayache, of Architecture-Studio Paris, talks of Abdali as propelling a 
modern Amman whereby "Abdali will provide Amman with several landmarks 
that will form its future skyline and help in the orientation within Amman 
Circles. Abdali is expected to build Amman contemporary architectural 
heritage and to put the Jordanian capital on the world map of the most 
enjoyable cities of the 21st century‖ (Abdali, 2009a, p6) - and Abdali was 
successful in attracting big international names in architecture94.  
                                                          
94
 These included Norman Foster (UK), Architecture Studios (France) and Norr (Canada); along with 
other top local Jordanian architectural firms.  
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Throughout the Abdali project it is clear that world leaders in architecture and 
construction were involved, from the Heights and Lofts luxury towers of 
Damac (Abdali, 2008a) to Claudio Nardi's Vertex Tower, the projects 
described "exude a stunningly distinctive flair while perfectly complementing 
the overall vision that will become Abdali" (Abdali, 2007, p5) 95. Furthermore, it 
seemed that the entire design concept of Abdali was physically disengaging to 
Amman's residents, used to low-density development over sprawling hills. 
Amman's residents seem to like its sprawled nature with 76% in the survey 
conducted indicating that they do not wish developers and investors to build 
towers96. Of these, 65% indicate it will "ruin the way the city looks" (Thesis 
Survey, 2012)97 and that they "don't know the new Amman" (Thesis Survey, 
2012). 
The physical changes undertaken by RECHCOs were also reflected in major 
changes in the functionality of the city centres, as part of changes in the 
heritage. In Beirut, those functions that had historically made the centre a 
throbbing heart in the community (embodied within a bus station, cinemas and 
a marketplace) were commodified and brought back as profit-making 
components. The Solidere project in Beirut in its strive for financial success 
"divorc[ed] the city from its social memory" (Daher, 2007c, p276). The Abdali 
project, similarly, will present "fierce competition" (Daher, 2007c, p277) to the 
existing downtown which seemed to be suffering from a lack of economic 
vitality. 
The introduction to Beirut's 1994 Planning Report (Hourani, 2011) describing 
Solidere, laid out the project's objectives as opposing forces between heritage 
and the needs of market-driven globalisation, adopting the mythology of the 
                                                          
95
 In 2008, Damac also announced La Residence by Ivana Trump, a USD 150 million 27 storey 
residential venture in the centre of Beirut.  
96
 Historically in Amman, high-density buildings were almost never allowed, with the law insisting on a 
four-storey maximum height. In 2005, Law No. 21 was adjusted to put conditions in place for 
constructing high-rise buildings up to a maximum of 90m. The Abdali project was to receive an 
exemption from this law - receiving a building regulation allowing for the construction of a skyscraper of 
any height. The Abdali District is one of the highest in Amman in terms of topology at about 900 meters 
above sea level. Towers constructed onsite will mean an elongation in the topography of the city.  
97
 The gap between architects and the people they plan for has been examined in the literature. 
Sociologist William Michelson in 1966, at the peak of emergence of plans for new downtowns in the 
United States, undertook a survey of potential residents. He searched his sample to see how many 
people in it matched the full profile that planners hoped to attract to downtown living. His conclusion was 
that the plans that were emerging did not match people's wishes. He titled his article, "Most People 
Don't Want What Architects Want" (Michelson, 1968). 
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'merchant republic' to reconcile them (Hourani, 2011). The report reads that 
the main challenge is "to integrate what remains of a rich city heritage to the 
new city fabric...[to create]... a vibrant city centre...to compete and occupy the 
place it deserves amongst Capital cities in the Middle East Region" (Dar al-
Handasah 1994, p iv). The authors continue that in a situation where Beirut is 
in competition with other cities in the Arab World, "the creation...of a unique 
cultural and historic identity will have special significance" (Dar al-Handasah 
1994, p13). Solidere SAL had taken an aggressive approach to its branding, 
presenting itself as "the protector of the city's past and the guarantor of its 
heritage" (Sawalha, 2010, p36). Hence the creation of one of Solidere's earlier 
slogans: 'Beirut, an Ancient City of the Future'. With the 'rebirth' of the centre 
of a capital city at stake after its destruction by war, "the pattern of 
development that it engender[ed] was necessary to inform the future and 
cherish the past" (Gavin and Maluf, 1996, p13).  
Indeed the creation of a new historic identity meant that there were in fact two 
very different spatial and geographical imaginations in the works98. Residents 
were unnerved through the creation of a memory gap. Some have even called 
the downtown 'Faransa' which means 'France' in Arabic (Haugbolle, 2011, 
p84). Critics of Solidere often decry its demolishment of the older structures 
within the centre. Solidere's own rebuilding of the centre in the architectural 
style of the past was also seen by many to defy the purpose of what it means 
to be an organic neighbourhood within the city99.  
'Solidere's Beirut' as some critics called it has been criticised as being a mere 
real-estate development project where "history and heritage are merely 
themes incorporated" (Daher, 2008, p49). Solidere has incited communities of 
Beiruti's to voice their attachment vocally to sites such as the 'downtown'. 
Fatwas100 have even been issued by the Sunni community (Sawalha, 2010) 
against both Solidere and the government. In an interview the leader of the 
Sunni religious party the Islamic Group - Sheikh Ahmed - explained: 
"Solidere's only concern is to bulldoze buildings that survived two decades of 
                                                          
98
 See Derek Gregory's Geographical Imaginations (1994) for further discussion of this concept. 
99
 Solidere SAL's handling of the "souqs" is one example of this, where the building's style has been 
preserved but its functionality and clientele changed, as will be described later.  
100
 A Fatwa is a ruling on a point of Islamic law given by a recognized authority. 
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war and to replace them with glass towers and sell them to non-Lebanese rich 
investors. Go to downtown Beirut, and see for yourself. Solidere has 
demolished the houses and all the old popular souqs and left us, the people of 
the city, with bitterness and grief" (Sawalha, 2010, p38).  
The RECHCOs themselves seemed blind to this concern of the destruction of 
the past to produce a future filled with the 'new' and launched aggressive 
branding campaigns to represent themselves as forces propelling cities 
towards a better future. The branding on which the mother companies of 
Solidere and Abdali embarked, tried to disengage the two projects from a 
dismally portrayed past by focusing on modern symbolism and references. 
The branding used gives a lot of insight into the RECHCOs' visions when 
comparing the images they use and their focus on drawing historical 
significance and the familiar into their advertising efforts. 
 
Branding Beirut an Ancient City for the Future 
 
In trying to defend itself, Solidere SAL started on an active campaign of 
'attack'. The company praised itself as a keeper of heritage. A Solidere 
strategist - Jean-Paul Lebas - was quoted in Le Monde as saying: "We have 
been accused of the destruction of the architectural patrimony of Beirut; that's 
false, and, more to the point it's not in our interest. Like the archaeology, it 
forms part of the marketing [program] of Solidere" (Makdisi, 1997a, p681). 
Even when preserving the past, Solidere SAL had framed its reasons to 
conform to its profit-making framework. In other words, heritage was useful 
when it was of commercial value. 
The image and descriptions of the city's destruction were constantly called 
upon by Solidere SAL in its publications. Beirut Reborn is filled with images of 
a centre that had almost died (Gavin and Maluf, 1996) and its new image of 
the future. Solidere SAL's mission, as it was framed, was how to revive it 
(Gavin and Maluf, 1996). With Solidere presented as the resuscitator of a 
fallen city, it brands itself as a force of public good - helping us forget that it is 
in fact a profit-making company. In its officially sponsored material, Solidere 
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SAL makes little to no reference to its pre-history or to previous plans for 
reconstruction in the centre of Beirut. Its booklets note that it represents 
Lebanon's largest urban development project of the 1990s (Makdisi, 1997a). 
Its only reference to the city centre's recent history is to note that it is "located 
at the historical and geographical core of the city, the vibrant financial, 
commercial and administrative hub of the country, the Beirut Central District 
came under fire from all sides throughout most of the sixteen years of fighting" 
(Solidere, 1995a, p3 cited in Makdisi, 1997a, p675).  
The company positioned itself to be a healing agency, to help the centre 
overcome its "afflictions" (Makdisi, 1997a, p675), similar to Amman where AID 
placed itself as an agency helping to create that which Amman lacked in its 
view, a new downtown. Solidere SAL makes no mention of previous 
reconstruction history, because officially this history does not seem to exist to 
the company (think of its demolition) but also because of Solidere SAL's 
"peculiar and contradictory relationship to history" (Makdisi, 1997a, p675). 
Solidere SAL's massive advertising campaign not only included posters all 
over Beirut and Lebanon, but also foreign newspapers and magazines. An ad 
in the New York Times in 1993 proclaiming, "we've invested in the future of an 
ancient city" is one example (Makdisi, 1997a)101. Solidere SAL's language of 
aggressive reconstruction helped shape the vocabulary of Beirut's inhabitants. 
The media used phrases like 'bulldozer' and 'steamroller' when describing 
Rafiq Hariri, as well as the Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri. Rafiq Hariri 
consistently described Beirut as a "big construction site" and named his 
coalition in Parliament the "Group of Development and Construction" who 
would be "Rebuilding Humans and Stones." The symbolism of politics 
became that of the ability to build (Sawalha, 2010, p44). 
Around April 1997, the Graduate School of Design at Harvard in collaboration 
with Solidere SAL organised a conference entitled Projecting Beirut. The 
posters were images of a destroyed Beirut in black-and-white sharply 
contrasted with the new colourful and lively Solidere project as the new 
downtown (Sawalha, 2010). The choice given to Beirut's citizens was then 
                                                          
101
 This media attention was supported by advertising such as large-scale glossy information booklets, 
maps and images.  This advertising was sponsored personally by Solidere SAL's Board of Founders 
before the company's incorporation was complete.  
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framed as the old, dilapidated and boring versus the exciting life of the 
modern, bright and optimistic; a dichotomy that would later extend to the 
supporters and critics of the Solidere project itself. Indeed, Solidere actively 
engages in the reformation of Beirut's history for its own purposes. Solidere 
attempts to create what Yael Zerubavel explains is a new "master 
commemorative narrative of the city and nation" (Hayek, 2011, p127), a 
storyline that group members can subscribe to, not necessarily required to be 
historically truthful, but rather to have a popular appeal - a concept we see 
mirrored in Abdali. This storyline highlights certain aspects of Beirut's history 
such as Lebanon's features of being a 'merchant republic', as previously 
mentioned, and ignores others. 
Within the frame of popular appeal, the design team led by Ossama Kabbani 
tried to make sure that Solidere would not look and feel like a foreign body 
within Beirut, though within the financial framework of the project itself this 
seemed impossible (Hourani, 2011). The case of the Beirut Souqs is very 
much at point here. In 1994 an International Ideas Competition was launched 
for the construction of the souqs, which at that point had been completely 
eradicated. In Solidere SAL's own literature we are told "the clearing of the old 
souqs, which accomplished the clearing and demolition of building and sites in 
the BCD mandated by the Master Plan, paved the way for reconstruction of 
that district over an area of 60,000 sqm" (Makdisi, 1997b, p22)102. Several 
designs respectful of the history of the souqs and sensitive to its integration 
into surrounding areas were developed.  
Despite initial approval for the plan by Solidere SAL, the plans were changed 
as the project developed to reflect commercial reality. Solidere SAL became 
very concerned with real estate aspects such as marketing and leasing. Other 
                                                          
102
 As part of the Ideas Competition, the packet distributed to the competitors included photographs of 
Beirut's architecture and written recollections of the area from writers and poets, amongst other 
intellectuals, as well as an explanation of Solidere SAL's philosophy for the Souq as "an image, a 
memory, a place that honours tradition" (Hourani, 2011, p148). Solidere SAL appointed a panel of local 
architects and urbanists to judge the 350 submissions received from around the world. The proposals 
were housed in a major public exhibition, and the panellists evaluated each entry with foreign 
consultants. The consultants included Benjamin Thompson and Associates, known for New York's 
South Street Seaport and Boston's Faneuil Hall. Though there was no official winner announced, Jad 
Tabet, a long-time critic of Solidere himself, worked on one of the finalist plans intending it "feels and 
works like other parts of the BCD" and connects with and extends "the fine grain of the adjacent historic 
core of the city" (Tabet and Benjamin Thompson & Associates, 1995, p14-15). Tabet, in his design, 
envisioned the Souqs becoming an area where pre-war merchants could return.  
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questions of historical tenancy and heritage became secondary to market 
realities. Solidere's economists argued that economic reality could not be 
sacrificed for "dreams" including the disruptions that might be caused by the 
"traditional Lebanese shopkeeper" (Hourani, 2011, p155). One of Solidere 
SAL's analysts explained this viewpoint quite clearly: "Look, you don't want 
those guys coming out and putting their stuff on hangers hanging everywhere 
around the doors of their shops and them yelling to buy this or that. It is 
chaos. No. We cannot go back to that...We have no room for that. We want 
the professionals" (Hourani, 2011, p155). The idea being one of no return to a 
disruptive and messy past, but rather to a 'professional' and tidy future; albeit 
an adopted future, and a future that does not necessarily correspond to the 
vision of the local population for their centre103.  
The Beirut Souqs were set to incorporate department stores, retail stores, 
supermarkets, offices, exhibitions and parking facilities, with a total built-up 
area of 130 thousand sqm. However, while named the 'Souqs' those 
characteristics which in fact make up a souq are far forgotten. Solidere SAL's 
publications and language are nostalgic in what they promise in terms of a 
souq, however, this is a souq in name alone. Souqs being a place of haggling, 
crowds, local produce, noise and sensation, and the product of a long 
historical process (Hourani, 2011), does not coincide with the plan for the 
Beirut Souqs which include international brand names, and are quite formal 
and sterile in nature. Solidere SAL's marketing of the Souqs makes use of the 
language and memory of the character of a traditional market with its 
customers, while creating what at most is a postmodern outdoor mall.  
Saree Makdisi goes on to point out that something "strange" happens to 
history when traditional souqs can be confused with a shopping mall. Soon, 
Makdisi continues "the generations of Lebanon will remember only the new 
Souq as the old one disappeared prior to 1975.... the streets of Beirut within 
the city centre have been witness to a proliferation of global consumer culture 
outlets, replacing traditional "Beiruti" outlets such as the Faysal Restaurant" 
(Makdisi, 1997b, p24). Despite this, Solidere SAL strongly maintained that the 
                                                          
103
 As noted earlier, Solidere SAL's 1995 information booklet explains that the Souq project is an 
attempt to "recapture a lifestyle formerly identified within the city centre and re-create a marketplace 
where merchants prosper and all enjoy spending long hours" (Solidere, 1995a, p25).  
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new Souqs indeed paid "homage" (Hourani, 2011, p136) to Beirut's history, 
built on its most famous nineteenth-century markets. This was to be done in 
their own commodified manner. According to Solidere SAL's experts, the 
Souqs would house international brands such as Armani, Guess, Tommy 
Hilfiger and Timberland, to "consecrate [the] Beirut city centre as a global 
retail district" (Solidere, 2009, p4). In this sense, despite claiming to be an 
'ancient' city for the future, the branding meant Solidere's centre was in fact 
isolated from the memories of Beirut's past. Beiruti's no longer call the centre 
'the city' or 'al-madinah', now it is simply 'al-Solidere'. As mentioned in the 
literature, and found through street interviews, the older names of Bab Idriss, 
Souq Ayyass, Khatayan and Khan Antoun Bey, have disappeared from 
popular vernacular, success for a company, a loss for community memory 
and people's perceptions of their city (Beirut Interviews, 2013). 
 
Branding Abdali as Amman's New Downtown 
 
Trying to find something to link it to the past, and as such to Amman's 
residents, early on in its creation, Mawared104, began a search for an 
"appropriate symbol" (Mawared, 2007) to represent the company as its logo. 
This search ended with the identification of the Terebinth105 tree as one 
strongly tied to Bedouin and Islamic traditions. A common story is that the 
Prophet Mohammad and his grandfather Abd al-Muttaleb sat beneath its 
shade on their trade routes. Though not a common tree to Jordan by any 
means (and far more likely to be found in Syria and Palestine) Mawared's 
leadership insisted that its vision and objectives were embodied in the tree, 
and conveyed to their team how essential it was that they locate such a tree 
within Jordan's geographic boundaries106 (Mawared, 2007). Mawared also 
created a folklore surrounding the tree, revealing and publicising in its 
newsletter a little-known Bedouin tradition of tying coloured strings on the 
                                                          
104
 Mawared is the Jordanian Army's investment arm, and the keystone partner in AID. 
105
 The Terebinth tree (Pistacia Palaestina) is a tree or shrub common in the Levant region. 
106
 According to Mawared's company history, a team was launched to search for this tree in Jordan and 
first identified it in Dibeen "till it became clear that it was an oak tree rather than a Terebinth" (Mawared, 
2007, p1, translation my own). So the search continued until the Mawared team found one such tree 
near the Safawi district in Azraq.  
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branch of the Terebinth tree before disappearing into the desert for months, 
later returning to the tree to tie the strings onto their wrists and ankles for 
good luck. 
AID could not claim to protect Amman's heritage or past, and so it created the 
perception of deep historical links and a mission that was sponsored by 
Jordan's nature (in the form of a historical tree), that made Jordan its modern 
self. Again, in a similar manner to the Solidere case, the theme of trying to tie 
the past to the present is brought about, drawing on people's nostalgia of the 
past to market a new and aggressive future. This narrative echoes the 
analysis of Joseph Massad in Colonial Effects (2001) where he notes that "the 
1970s was the decade to assert Bedouin culture as the basis for 
Jordanianness internally" (Massad, 2001, p74) whereby he describes "the 
architects of Jordan's "Bedouin" identity" (Massad, 2001, p158) creating 
folklore and traditions thought to be suited to a modern Jordan. 
 
Figure ‎3-2: Abdali billboard advertisement in Amman designed by Leo 
Burnett 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons 
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Across its advertising efforts, Mawared constantly tried to link backwards into 
the past, and introduce new components of a colourful and bright future107 
(see Figure 3-2). The above picture shows one such instance. The old 
traditional bricks used for homes, coupled with the 'new' Lego blocks that 
indicate, along with the slogan, 'construction development in your country is 
for you and your children's children' [translation my own]. However, in the 
advertisement, the 'new' is reflected by the modern, colourful and artificial, 
almost feeding into criticisms of neoliberal architecture of 'Lego'ing society 
and its architecture quite literally (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003). While 
people tended to hear positive messages about Amman and Beirut (as seen 
in Figure ‎3-3), this did not seem to change their impressions of the project to a 
large degree. This branding did not translate into large degrees of positive 
public opinion, though most had heard of Abdali positively as seen in this did 
not alter reactions to the project (as seen in Figure 3-1). 
 
Figure ‎3-3: Responses to the Question "Rate the things you heard or read 
about the Abdali Project" 
 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
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 Mawared spared no expense for this branding. Leo Burnett - a top ten worldwide advertising 
company – was commissioned to lead the campaign.  
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RECHCOs and City Memories 
 
Cities are "repositories of memories" (Elsheshtawy, 2008, p10) with both 
physical and social ramifications. Spaces in cities are inscribed with meaning 
by their users, and when these spaces are demolished the meaning that used 
to tie citizens to their cities is also undermined. Without this, as Saree Makdisi 
explains in Laying Claim to Beirut, the space in the city centre is one that can 
be regarded as a "blankness or, instead, as a haunted space: a place of 
memories, ghosts" (Makdisi, 1997a, p664). Similar voices identified the 
demolition of Solidere's early years as an "unhealthy expurgation of the past" 
(Haugbolle, 2010, p84). The destruction was presented as a means of starting 
a new and clean Chapter of Lebanon's history (Hanssen and Genberg, 2002). 
The physical heritage was equated by spectators to be synonymous with their 
"memory" of the city, with one noting that Solidere "demolished 85% of the 
city's memory" in the context of the buildings destroyed (Ohrstrom, 2007, p1). 
This is felt around the world. In describing Orleans' destruction in France, Jon 
Calame in his essay on post-war reconstruction notes that architecture 
embodies a community and that urban fabric becomes inseparable from their 
social value (Calame, 2005)108. To this end, Solidere ignored the way Beirut's 
residents seemed to be part of, and live, within the city. Two opposing 
representations of the city come into conflict, described by Madani Safar 
Zitoun (2010) about Algeria, on the one hand a metropolis vying for economic 
entry onto the world scene, and on the other the everyday lives of the city's 
residents and their social and spatial experiences. These two representations 
not only exclude, but are sometimes unaware, of each other.  
The Solidere project was framed to play a "therapeutic role by founding the 
city on a sort of salvation-like amnesia that would protect it against the old 
ghosts which caused its destruction" (Tabet, 2002, p68). This selective 
memory was set to wipe the slate clean and transform the past to provide an 
unburdened future ideal for real estate speculation. Other critics analysed 
                                                          
108
 Calame's essay similarly looks at Coventry as a case study that brought many disappointments, as 
pre-war residents felt their disorientation deepened and lamented the loss of familiar structures that did 
not fit modernised zoning requirements or aesthetic criteria (Calame, 2005, p23). 
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Solidere slightly differently, finding that it called upon a nostalgia from the 
1950s and 1960s to market its potential (Misk, 1999). Despite this attempt to 
highlight nostalgia, there was a certain historical purification that attempted to 
wipe out the past for a clear neoliberal future. As written in Al-Safir, "This pile 
of rubble buried beneath it our childhood cries and the dreams of many 
Beirutis" (Sawalha, 2010, p30). 
In almost the same language, the Lebanese novelist and journalist, Elias 
Khoury, had warned that Beirut was gradually destroying itself and suffered 
from "frightening amnesia". He described a city centre that was "an empty 
space, a placeless space, and a hole in the memory" (Sawalha, 2010, p30). 
Other intellectuals were concerned that Solidere's designs had no emotional 
or spatial attachment to their residents, while others concerned themselves 
with the preservation of certain buildings and monuments. Jad Tabet - a 
Lebanese architect - talked about preservation as a vehicle to allowing the 
past and future to interact. He warned of the 'Tabula Rasa' method that would 
erase memories completely. The blank slate has created an 'emptiness' 
(McDonogh, 1993) that continuously undermines representation of the centre 
as a vibrant community. These counter-memories present this reconstructed 
city "as a non-city, as an empty site lacking all the elements that would make 
it a true urban space" (Hayek, 2011, p168). 
City residents witnessed and published their nostalgic accounts in 
newspapers. Solidere's 'rewriting' of history and its monopoly over the centre 
allowed it to frame its role as representing the past and carving out its own 
memories to replace the collective memories of the old Beirut centre. 
Intellectuals, journalists, and filmmakers objected to what they saw as 
'violations' of cultural memory and history (Cooke, 2002). Cooke has noted, 
―the new Downtown has been made to absorb the history of the War and in 
the process has emptied it of meaning" (Cooke, 2002, p12). 
The muting of memory was a conscious strategy on the part of Solidere SAL 
and because of the centre's former importance in the life of Beirutis as a 
"mediating space for the Lebanese" (Haugbolle, 2011, p83) the reconstruction 
process itself was accused of undermining what it meant to be a Beirut and 
Lebanese. In the Gemmayze district in 2010, nearby to Solidere, hundreds 
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filled the streets, holding candles and waving signs to protest the destruction 
of the historic French colonial and Ottoman-era buildings one sign read 'Our 
History is not for Sale' and another read, 'Beirut is not Dubai' (Ackerman, 
2010).  
Pierre Nora, the French historian, in Realms of Memory explains that as 
memory is threatened, attachment to place increases. He explains: ―Places 
become important even as the vast funds of memories among which we used 
to live on terms of intimacy are depleted, only to be replaced by a 
reconstructed history‖ (Nora, 1998, p6). This is especially important for 
Lebanon where the history of urban space is constantly reconstructed. In 
Hoda Barakat's novel Harith al-Miyah, the novel's protagonist Nikola comes 
out of the city's destroyed centre - his home from the start of the Civil War 
goes through a new and unfamiliar downtown towards the sea. He walks 
towards a Fairuz concert (similar to that sponsored and celebrated by 
Solidere SAL in the centre at the launch of its campaign), but instead of 
seeing the horizon he is used to, he sees a "sea of empty chairs, arranged in 
lines that made up large squares, like block formations of infantry. In parallel 
lines, they all faced the shore‖ (Barakat, 1998, p175). The singer looks like 
Fairuz, but it isn't her. A singer, who should be the symbol of Lebanon and 
nationalism, is a fake, a mere look-alike. In fact nothing in the story is what it 
seems, and even the sea is a plastic one. Nikola nevertheless sits down but 
the concert never actually starts. Similarly, while Solidere created what looks 
like a monumental celebration of nationalism, it was not real, while it looked 
like it should be, something was off and instead the citizen of Beirut was left 
uncomfortable. Nikola in the novel sits waiting for a concert that never starts.  
With 85% of the historic Central District destroyed it is hard to imagine how 
identity to the traditional centre might have been restored. As psychologist 
Eric Erikson observed, ―when the landscape goes, it destroys the past for 
those who are left: people have no sense of belonging anywhere‖ (Erikson, 
1976, p33). Samir Khalaf also noted that people ―lose the sense of control 
over their lives, their freedom and independence, their mooring to place and 
locality and, more damaging, a sense of who they are" (Khalaf, 2002, p244). 
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Other critics looked at Solidere's complete obsession with preserving the 
appearance of authenticity and history, rather than history itself. "The 
spectacle here has assumed for itself, and hence has eliminated, the very 
function of time; it has taken on tasks and duties of history" (Makdisi, 2006, 
p212). This history must be cleared not only of pain, but any other emotion as 
well - a "prosthetic" history of sorts (Makdisi, 2006, p212). In this new history 
new feelings are manufactured to accompany the new history of spectacles. 
Similar to the phrases used to describe Rafiq Hariri as part of the 
reconstruction effort, the new vernacular of Solidere was highlighted in the 
1996 parliamentary election material, showing the centrality of the company 
and its reconstruction efforts integrated into the identity and politics of 
Lebanon. As seen in the 1996 election campaign of Mohamad Kabbani, 
whose campaign slogan included the narrative that: "He is concerned about 
bulldozing our ruins and history in the name of reconstruction. He is the one 
who stepped in front of the bulldozers to protect the history of Beirut" 
(Sawalha, 2010). The danger of erasing the past and celebrating only niche 
nostalgia, erasing any messy political and social problems, is that the lessons 
of forgiveness and tolerance are also erased. Lessons that brought the 
downtown together into a cohesive society are undermined and "unlearned" 
(Makdisi, 1997b, p30). In the case of Lebanon forgetting the lessons of the 
Civil War was thought to be nothing short of suicidal (Makdisi, 1997b) where 
lasting peace would never be achieved without transpired participation in 
politics (Höckel, 2007). This concept of the RECHCO creating certain 
fractures in society is developed further in the next section. 
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3.3 RECHCOs and Exclusions and Divisions within the City 
 
Living the "Good Life" in the City109 
 
City centres have long symbolised cities and groups living within them 
(Mumford, 1961). Projects across the world working to revitalise centres, 
actually work towards reinvigorating communities (Frieden and Sagalyn, 
1991). The aim of this section is to look at RECHCOs through the lens of 
division and cohesion within a given society110 dealing with aspects of the 
RECHCO and its relationship with society moving forward. The working 
hypothesis in this section is that a privately motivated development and 
reconstruction process, coupled with the destruction of heritage, in the centres 
will only in some sense "hasten cultural degradation‖ (El-Khoury, 1998, p262) 
and collapse the new downtowns as meaningful places for the city's residents. 
In the previous section the physical heritage and its associated memories in 
the centre were examined. The branding of RECHCOs was shown to focus on 
heritage and historical preservation offered the RECHCOs a chance to root 
themselves locally, through niche, nostalgic memories, in addition to aspiring 
global visions that were conceived of in the form of high-rise landscapes - 
foreign bodies within the city.  
Both the Master Plans of Solidere and Abdali were set such that the physical 
and economic reconstruction would hold enormous implications for Lebanon 
and Jordan. It was also the case that one of the greatest challenges faced by 
Lebanon during reconstruction was how to merge the different factions of the 
multi-religious society and create a sense of national unity alongside 
increased economic prosperity (Stewart, 1996). However, it was of note that 
reconstruction also had the potential to increase tensions, rather than diffuse 
them between the different groups and re-incite arguments between 
Lebanon's citizens (Stewart, 1996). In the case of Amman, the Abdali project 
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 The term the 'good life' as it refers to living in cities is used by Paden (2001, p24). 
110
 A group is said to be in a state of cohesion when its members possess bonds linking them to one 
another and to the group as a whole. Cohesion can be broken down into four main components: social 
relations, task relations, perceived unity, and emotions (Forsyth, 2010). 
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was seen to turn its back on Amman‘s original downtown, which is only about 
1.5 kilometres away from the Abdali site, and expected to lead to "urban 
geographies of inequality" (Daher, 2007c, p273) and exclusion as well as 
spatial and social displacement. This section will look at the RECHCOs' social 
impacts moving forward, that of exclusion in the city caused by the projects 
actively geared towards excluding certain segments of society.  
By creating 'islands' of exclusive and prestigious real estate the RECHCOs, 
as will be explored in this section, develop 'spectacles' (Fainstein and Judd, 
1999b) designed to include and target only a specific slice of the city's 
citizens. Within the narrative developed by the RECHCOs and its branding, 
while much is discussed presented portraying the city as a place for work and 
business with a focus on economic prosperity, much less is said about the city 
as a place for social justice and diversity of citizenship. This frames the 
question of whether the very nature of the RECHCO is, from the start, geared 
towards increasing divisiveness amongst communities. On this matter, Robert 
Rotenberg describing the nineteenth-century colonial metropolis notes, "if 
urban space is regarded as the product of, rather than the producer of social 
effects, the city‘s built environment becomes a text, through which social rules 
and power relations become legible" (Rotenberg, 2001, p8). 
 
Features of Past Societal Divisions 
 
Both the Beirut and Amman downtowns had geographical as well as 
emotional significance for the residents of the city, allowing for greater 
degrees of social inclusion. The locations can be seen in Figure 3-4. 
. 
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Figure ‎3-4: Maps of Beirut and Amman showing Central Location of 
Downtown  
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons 
 
 
 
 
 
Amman 
 
Amman is a city that is divided quite strongly along socioeconomic status and 
culture into distinctive 'eastern' and 'western' districts. The city's east became 
known for lower-income groups, and the west was home to Jordan's more 
affluent. West and South Amman were in fact the areas that saw the largest 
explosions in terms of sales and prices, though the city despite this remained 
mostly horizontal, with low-rise buildings, and villas, sprawling over the hills 
(ABC Investments, 2007). Even as the separation between the East and West 
grew, and multi-million dinar villas sprung up in the suburbs of Abdoun, with 
informal settlements mushrooming in the east, the city centre continuously 
brought rich and poor alike to its markets, coffee-shops and mosques111.  
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 Ham and Greenway in their Lonely Planet guide describe how "residents talk openly of two 
Ammans...Eastern Amman (which includes Downtown) is home to the urbanised poor: it is conservative, 
more Islamic in its sympathies, and has vast Palestinian refugee camps on its fringe. Western Amman is 
a world apart, with leafy residential districts, trendy cafes and bars, impressive art galleries, and young 
men and women walking openly arm in arm‖ (Ham and Greenway, 2003, p98). Omar Razzaz, former 
director of Jordan's Social Security Organisation, also talks of the "two Amman's" (Razzaz, 1996) that 
are part of the phenomenon slowly erasing a unifying identity. Seteney Shami describing Amman in a 
revealing article titled "Amman is not a City" (Shami, 2007) says "it is therefore not surprising that the 
162 
 
While the earliest immigrants settled in the valley around the Roman 
amphitheatre, an area that remains the city's 'geographical heart', rapid 
population increases meant the city expanded in every direction. Historically, 
Amman's city centre was always connected to surrounding neighbourhoods 
through a series of steps bringing people from all over the city down into the 
'plate' of Amman112. The diversity of Amman was brought together in the 
melting pot of the centre. However, the city began to be marked by socio-
spatial polarisation between upper and lower-income neighbourhoods (Abu 
Dayyeh, 2004).  
 
Figure ‎3-5: Population Density by Census Block, Amman113 
 
Source: Map author's own with data from Department of Statistics, 2004  
                                                                                                                                                                      
inhabitants of Amman do not easily identify themselves as 'Ammani'" (Shami, 2007, p215). Amman's 
historic centre remained a commercial "melting pot" (Thesis Survey, 2012), with stores of all types and 
prices located in its many market alleyways. 
112
 Sahin Amman directly translating into the 'plate' of Amman [translation my own] is the flat almost 
circular area at the centre of the city in the wadi or 'valley' that grew to become the centre.  
113
 The difference in population density is apparent between the darker shaded blocks, at higher density, 
and the lighter shaded blocks, at lower density, across the centre of the city in an almost curved line 
distinguishing the East of Amman from the West. 
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Amman's city centre had already been undergoing a series of activities 
degrading its historical status. The movement of many governmental, health 
and commercial uses into the west of Amman created neighbourhoods of 
single-use functions such as a banking sector in Shemisani, and a health 
district in Jabal Amman. Tight rent controls (outlined in Chapter Two) meant 
that owners did not often wish to invest in the upgrades of their buildings (as 
was the case in Beirut and Solidere too). With its booming real estate market, 
Amman underwent a series of infrastructure network upgrades, including 
highways, tunnels and bridges focused in the west of the city as the centre 
suffered. 
Within the new vision for Amman as a modern city (outlined more fully in 
Chapter One) there certainly appears to be systematic replacements of the 
existing historic, civic and public sites with newer options westward, Abdali 
being the biggest example of this. One scholar, Christopher Parker, sees this 
as an intensification of socioeconomic and social polarisation between the 
east and the west of the city, as well as between the elite and isolated areas 
and the rest of the city. Seteny Shami of the Social Science Research 
Council, located in New York, further describes how there have been constant 
struggles amongst members of society over space within Amman, and how 
this has often been appropriated by or delegated to the state, which became 
the site of the dominant struggles in the urban process. This was a process 
that saw the Jordanian state creating itself at the expense of the city and 
urbanism. She continues that the "historical contingency that is Amman, 
therefore, has to be understood in a particular context of economy, state-
building and cultural production" (Shami, 2007, p230). 
 
Beirut 
 
Beirut's Civil War tells a very different story to Amman. For a city where death 
and hatred amongst the population lasted 15 years, the reconstruction 
process would mark the biggest attempt to heal its divide. Throughout the 
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twentieth century, Beirut absorbed several waves of immigrants increasing 
both the population's size and diversity (Khalaf and Khoury, 1993). As detailed 
in the Case Studies, in the summer of 1975, charged with religious and 
political tensions, a civil war erupted destroying much of Beirut's urban core 
changing the balance of power (Fisk, 1991). The Civil War effectively divided 
Beirut into East and West split along what became known as the Green Line. 
The Green Line running by the centre of the city divided Christian East Beirut 
from Muslim West Beirut creating a fracture so that questions of identity 
became the key issue in the reconstruction process. With the centre as a 
meeting ground across religions and income levels Beirut's division was 
mostly along religious rather than socioeconomic lines. At the time of the Civil 
War, the city was divided along sectarian lines with the southern suburbs 
housing most of the displaced Shiites (McCarney and Stren, 2003). 
 
Exclusionary Features in the RECHCO 
 
Both Abdali and Solidere have several different manifestations of segregation 
in terms of features that make them exclusionary, these features are physical 
(in terms of aesthetics), socioeconomic (in terms of affordability and comfort), 
and functional (in terms of usage).  
 
Physical Segregation 
 
The first type of segregation experienced by Solidere and Abdali was the 
physical isolation from the remainder of the city. The aesthetic interruption 
within the urban fabric, created a new perceived space for the centre. Within 
Beirut, critics have pointed out that Solidere SAL worked hard to clearly 
demark the BCD from the surrounding areas (Saliba, 1997b). One of the main 
criticisms cited in relation to the Solidere Master Plan includes the fact that it 
does not properly address the relationship between the Central District and 
the rest of the city. The planning approach of Solidere SAL was fully based on 
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recreating a vibrant and economically viable centre. This approach presented 
an analytically independent logic to the approach planners might use for 
planning any other neighbourhood within a city, with a conscientious strategy 
to absorb and promote the relationship between it and its surroundings and 
hold public meetings. Within the planning of Solidere, there has been no 
space for such an analysis to be taken, and the planners on the project did 
not receive systematic briefs of the surroundings. This type of analysis was 
certainly the case in Amman as well, with a stark contrast between the Abdali 
walled off from its surroundings and the lower-density run-down buildings 
along its edge.  
Even physically, the Solidere project in Beirut, and likewise Abdali in Amman, 
emphasises internal connections, rather than seamless associations to the 
rest of the city. In Amman, the high-density Abdali stands tall in contrast to the 
surrounding buildings, which are just a little bit run down and housed with 
'mom and pop' stores. In the case of Beirut, the layout of the Master Plan 
places emphasis on the relationship of the downtown to the airport, rather 
than strengthening historic ties. Aesthetically, perceived space114 is what 
gives the first impression of a project. Initially in the case of Beirut, some 
critics accused the "mini-Manhattan" as being mostly "profit-driven 
postmodern kitsch" (Hourani, 2011, p143). In fact due to a public outcry 
against initial plans, that residents noted would isolate the centre, the CDR 
forced Dar al-Handasah to scrap the scheme in favour of a new Master Plan 
(Tabet, 1993). At Solidere's border thousands of buildings, and the residents 
within them, were completely untouched by the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation, with no comprehensive strategy or plan to include and upgrade 
them. For these residents bordering the upscale Solidere project, with its 
modern infrastructure, the questions of when the investments would reach 
them and their properties was surely important (Beirut Interviews, 2013).  
Both Solidere and Abdali physically plan infrastructure to provide a barrier 
between them and their surroundings that urbanists believe will have "adverse 
results on the growth and continuity of the city fabric" (Kabbani, 1992, p32). 
Critics observed that the Solidere Boulevard follows the track of the 
                                                          
114
 See Literature Review on Lefebvre (1974). 
166 
 
demarcation line that separated Beirut during the War, and wondered at the 
constant reminder of the divided city. A new circumferential ring road 
surrounding the BCD to divert bypassing traffic through the centre was set in 
open trench configuration. Planners feared that the open trench system would 
introduce a physical barrier to the rest of the city and discontinue street life 
and pedestrian connections to the waterfront. Similarly the ramps did not 
favour pedestrian crossings and dehumanised the entrance into the BCD. The 
infrastructure barriers were considered a further isolationist measure, to the 
extent that "some observers questioned the symbolic relationship between 
isolating and privatising the BCD from the rest of the city, as a physically 
defined territory for the rich and powerful" (Kabbani, 1992, p34). 
Khouri described this phenomenon as: "Now if you go to the Green Line, you 
would still find destroyed buildings. [Solidere] didn't think about rebuilding 
Beirut, they thought about taking the part of downtown Beirut that is near the 
sea, destroying it, and building this small, closed enclave for the big 
bourgeoisie." (Khouri, 2000 cited in Calame and Charlesworth, 2009, p187). 
Specifically, the waterfront of Solidere caused issues. Public land at the 
waterfront was exchanged for infrastructure in a move that was presented as 
a beneficial win-win for everybody. However, this effectively privatised the 
waterfront, which became higher density sacrificing open space and a 
connecting faҫade of the city for more private uses. This leads into the second 
type of segregation, which is one related to income. 
 
Exclusions along Lines of Wealth 
 
The second type of segregation is that of the centre, not merely physically or 
aesthetically, but by wealth. Abdali has been accused by critics of intensifying 
the socioeconomic and spatial polarisation not simply between the east and 
west of the capital but also between the new "elitist urban island‖ and the rest 
of the city (Daher, 2007c, p276). The distinctions between those 'with' and 
those 'without' in the city is not a new concept, Pierre Bourdieu discussed it as 
early as 1984. Jumeno (2004) in his work on Playfulness in Complex Times in 
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Dubai looked mainly at the socioeconomic, spatial, and demographic 
transformation that made the people of Dubai mostly concerned with 
superficial images rather than deeper meanings, such that each buyer was 
involved in the 'play'. In Amman and Beirut these places of 'play' are 
materialised in gated communities or exclusive zones that are guarded and 
closed off to all except those invited, creating, as Bourdieu analysed, a city 
with two types of citizens - those with access and those without. 
The duality between the city centre and the rest of the capital will be 
reinforced in ordinary people's minds because images of luxury will continue 
to overwhelm popular imaginations in surrounding neighbourhoods. The 
inauguration of the first buildings will showcase signs of uncontrolled wealth 
that are insulting to the rest of the city. This real estate promotion will 
dominate one area of the city, while deterioration will probably become more 
strongly felt in other areas (Beyhum, 1994, p108). Both theoretically and 
empirically the case holds true. In the survey conducted in Amman, a question 
asking specifically about which services Abdali is seen to provide to different 
categories including 'all Jordanians', a 'certain subset of Jordanians' or 'does 
not provide', the majority of respondents view it as providing services to a 
subset of Jordanians, and specifically a fifth do not see it providing improved 
infrastructure for Amman, such as sports facilities, playgrounds or cultural 
facilities (see Table 3-2) - these percentages were slightly higher amongst 
female respondents with children, and in several instances a follow-up 
complaint was heard that Abdali was not designed for "their children to play" 
(Thesis Survey, 2012).  
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Table ‎3-2: Responses to the Question: "Which of the following features does 
Abdali provide?" 
 Provides to 
all 
Jordanians 
Provides to a 
certain 
subset of 
Jordanians 
Does Not 
Provide 
Shopping spaces 17% 75% 8% 
Pedestrian plazas 19% 70% 11% 
High quality residences 9% 83% 8% 
High quality office space and 
business hub 
6% 88% 6% 
Public green space and parks 13% 72% 15% 
Public community and youth 
play areas and facilities  
11% 72% 17% 
Improved infrastructure for 
Amman 
3% 78% 19% 
Sports facilities 5% 75% 20% 
Playgrounds for children 7% 73% 20% 
Cultural centres 3% 77% 20% 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
Further, almost three quarters of those surveyed, at 73%, would not consider 
buying an apartment in Abdali. Of those who would not buy an apartment, 
78% indicated that it was too expensive to do so, and an additional 56% 
indicated that they did not believe that the project was designed for 
Jordanians (Thesis Survey, 2012). Opponents of the 'island' scheme in 
Lebanon have voiced their feeling that creating more wealthy and isolated 
ghettos in the city will not be in the interest of the public. In fact, critics have 
mentioned that one aspect of the Civil War was socioeconomic with luxurious 
buildings and locations targeted by the disenfranchised who felt that the 
system was discriminating against them. By framing the BCD under the 
"reconstruction" of Lebanon marketing it to be for the benefit of all as an 
"island of the rich", planners would be "repeating the same mistake once 
again" (Kabbani, 1992, p42).  
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Common themes across the Arab World's cities have emerged which look at 
the "imposed binary distinctions" (Elsheshtawy, 2008, p10), as is the case 
with the divisions created by Solidere and Abdali. Marko Milivojevic (1995) 
writing in Middle East International has noted that "it has often been pointed 
out that Solidere's vision of a new Beirut will turn it into what it once was, 
namely the main business centre and plugged into the rich of the nearby Arab 
World, an objective that seemingly has little to offer the city's poor" 
(Milivojevic, 1995, p14). This was shown through the project's attitudes to 
issues such as the functionality of the RECHCO sites. 
 
Segregation through Functionality 
 
The third type of segregation between the RECHCOs and the rest of the city 
is based on the functions that are to be found within the RECHCO. Downtown 
Beirut has been called an "amalgam of such de-contextualised history-as-
culture-cum-kitsch overridden with international luxury consumer goods" 
(Haugbolle, 2011, p86). Urban theorists have long questioned the neoliberal 
model where "city space becomes an arena for market orientated economic 
growth and elite consumption practices, thus stripping the public sphere of its 
social and political dimension" (Larkin, 2009, p7)115.  
Feelings of exclusion had functional impacts; within both Abdali's plan and 
Solidere's plan, public transportation has not been a priority. Indeed, the 
positioning of Abdali saw the relocation of Amman's main bus transportation 
terminal. Solidere has seen the construction of private garages for tens of 
thousands of private vehicles as a step towards its infrastructure 
improvement. However, public transportation is the great equaliser in terms of 
physical access across and around the city. It is the case that the relocation of 
public transportation that was within Abdali caused some disturbances. Of the 
                                                          
115
 Roberta Brandes Gratz and Norman Mintz, the authors of Cities Back from the Edge: New Life for 
Downtown, think about what experiencing downtown entails and lament the encroachment of malls into 
street culture in cities. They write that, malls have no 'streets' (Brandes Gratz and Mintz, 2000, p89). 
Rather, what malls include are limited pedestrian passages connected by parking lots and store 
entrances, leading only to other places within the mall. In contrast to this, streets link all the mixed 
functions of a city compared to a mall, which artificially separates and divides activities (Brandes Gratz 
and Mintz, 2000), quite similar in style to the RECHCOs.  
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survey sample in Amman, 47% used the public transportation 'all the time' or 
'sometimes', and only 20% indicated 'never'. Of those who use public 
transportation 'all the time' or 'sometimes', the question of whether or not they 
were disappointed with the relocation of the terminal revealed results as 
follows, and can be contrasted with the general responses over the entire 
sample in Figure 3-6. The most adversely affected were therefore the most 
vulnerable in society, the lowest income levels that match those consistently 
using public transportation in Jordan. The disappointment levels at the 
relocation of the terminal were much higher with 'very disappointed' being 
ranked by 67% of the respondents who consistently use public transportation 
compared to 13% in the overall sample. Comments to this end made on the 
survey included: "Now I have to take two extra buses to get to work so that 
people with cars can get to their tower offices more easily" (Thesis Survey, 
2012). 
 
Figure ‎3-6: Responses to the Question: "Were you disappointed with the 
relocation of the public transportation terminal out of Abdali?" 
 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
13%
30%
33%
24%
Overall Perceptions of Disappointment at Relocation of Terminal
1= Yes very 2=A little bit
3=Not really 4=Not affected
67%
16%
8%
9%
Perceptions of Disappointment at those who Use Public Transportation "All the Time"
1= Yes very 2=A little bit
3=Not really 4=Not affected
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Further analysis was undertaken on functionality by looking at the Thesis 
Survey (2012) and asking respondents to prioritise needs. When ranking city 
features in need of upgrades within Amman itself it is clear that high-end 
office spaces, shopping areas, and residences rank the lowest on the scale 
compared to other needs such as sports facilities, playgrounds, pedestrian 
plazas and others116. This in itself gives the impression that the Abdali 
RECHCO was designed not with the general public in mind as a service for 
Amman - filling in a call for a 'new downtown' by a people requiring a centre 
as its narrative claimed - but rather designed out of commercial interests to 
maximise profit-seeking behaviour in isolation of the real needs of the city 
cities. 
 
Figure ‎3-7: Responses to the Question: "Out of the List of Features Below 
which Needs Upgrading in Amman? Please prioritise 1-7, 1 being of Highest 
Priority, and 7 of Lowest‖ 
 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
                                                          
116
 It is also of note that the scores within one‘s own district consistently receive higher priority than the 
rest of the city. 
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
H
ig
h
 q
u
al
it
y 
o
ff
ic
e 
sp
ac
e 
an
d
 
b
u
si
n
es
s 
h
u
b
Sh
o
p
p
in
g 
sp
ac
e
H
ig
h
 q
u
al
it
y 
re
si
d
en
ce
s
Sp
o
rt
s 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s
C
u
lt
u
ra
l c
en
tr
es
P
u
b
lic
 g
re
en
 s
p
ac
e 
an
d
 p
ar
ks
P
ed
es
tr
ia
n
 p
la
za
s
P
u
b
lic
 c
o
m
m
u
n
it
y 
an
d
 y
o
u
th
 
p
la
y 
ar
ea
s 
an
d
 f
ac
ili
ti
es
 
P
la
yg
ro
u
n
d
s 
fo
r 
ch
ild
re
n
Im
p
ro
ve
d
 in
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
P
ar
ki
n
g
Sc
o
re
Category
172 
 
Urbanists argue strongly that preserving the scale, character and 
socioeconomic mix around central public spaces is fundamental to both the 
memory of the city and its role as a melting pot (Kabbani, 1992). One of the 
criticisms that architects had regarding the Solidere project had to do with the 
previous simplicity of a public space frequented by Beirut's residents, and 
what they saw as the usurpation of the space by "monuments", observing a 
"similarity between the social and military background of Haussmann's 
monumental boulevards in Paris and the Beirut proposal" (Kabbani, 1992, 
p38). Solidere SAL's attitude was compared to Mussolini, who bulldozed 
medieval ruins to create a boulevard at the Colosseum in Rome. The 
accusation stemmed from the fact that it seemed as if the monumental feel of 
the downtown was intended to glorify the victory and "power of the private 
capital" (Kabbani, 1992, p38). What was supposed to be public space was 
seen as systematically privatised. This accusation of a design scheme 
reflecting a colonial attitude planning for a capitalist society is reported to have 
been completely refuted by El-Shalaq of the CDR who noted in response, "If 
you have a strong central power, the streets of the city are wide. They are 
straight. When political power collapses, they change into winding streets with 
dead ends" (Yahya, 2007, p248). So, in this sense, it appeared Solidere was 
a reflection of strong central political power - in the form of Rafiq Hariri, the 
prime minister and its primary investor. 
 
"Whose Needs does it Serve?"117 
 
There are two major themes that have emerged in literature regarding the 
neoliberal city planning initiatives. The first involves how city administrations 
have been used to market cities and create new inward investments, causing 
changes in the form, as well as the function, of cities. The second has been 
how this has led to struggles over space between stakeholders (Tyler, 2000), 
as we have seen take place in Abdali and Solidere. Neoliberal urban 
restructuring has been seen to create places of "excessive consumption for 
                                                          
117
 See Oc and Tiesdell (1991, p325) discussing Canary Wharf. 
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the chosen elite" (Daher, 2007c, p266) and has been framed as the plight of 
the poor in carving out their own spaces within cities118. 
This was especially the case as it related to the expropriation of land and the 
eviction of certain populations in the Abdali and Solidere projects. Certainly in 
the literature related to Solidere, and through field work there are plenty of 
stories to be heard regarding tenants evicted from their homes and the effects 
the expropriation had on their lives. In addition, the public sector support given 
to these projects has meant that a strong business case must be made for 
their existence, justifying both why they are given special treatment and direct 
public subsidies, while still being owned privately. When asked about the AID 
expropriations regarding land surrounding the project in the Thesis Survey 
(2012), 61% of Amman's residents had heard of them (of those 77% had 
heard about them in a negative context, and 23% in a positive context). In 
addition to this 47% of the sample set believed that the expropriations were 
'definitely not' in the public benefit, and an additional 38% believed them to be 
'mildly not'. This belief was again tied to income, with 87% of those indicating 
that the expropriations were 'slightly' or 'very much' in the public benefit from 
the top income bracket level of those surveyed. These percentages can be 
compared to the standard question on expropriation asked in the survey not 
specific to the Abdali case where 53% of the sample set indicated that 
expropriations are generally for the public benefit compared to 8% for the 
Abdali case, and 59% indicated that fair market prices are generally paid 
compared to 7% in the case of Abdali. 
 
  
                                                          
118
 Within the centre, Amal and Hezbollah stood in opposition to Solidere - and negotiated with the 
government strongly for the squatters' rights and their compensation. Both Solidere SAL and the 
squatters equally accused each other of undermining the position of the other and the 'due process' 
instilled by Solidere SAL for their own benefit. Solidere SAL was accused of usurping the rights of 
squatters and inappropriately evicting them. Amal and Hezbollah were accused by Solidere SAL for 
forging registrations and encouraging families to move to previously empty buildings marked for 
demolition amongst other tactics (Sawalha, 2010).  
174 
 
Figure ‎3-8: Responses to the Question "Do you believe that the Abdali 
Project expropriations are in the public benefit?" 
 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
The case in Amman regarding expropriation is also in point. Both local 
businesses and residents condemned the expropriation, citing emotional and 
physical damages (explored in the Case Studies of Chapter Two). In both 
cases, local residents and uses were displaced (in Amman the major public 
transportation node along with its surrounding commercial stalls was 
relocated to the north of the city). Instead of the original property owners and 
residents, who themselves lived and built the areas, new luxury housing and 
office projects were set to be inhabited by the "shapers of tomorrow" (Abdali, 
2012, p1) in both areas. These shapers of tomorrow, one Abdali promotional 
video notes will 'reap the rewards' of involvement - begging the question of 
what happens to those who cannot afford to be involved. 
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Chapter 3: The Social Impact of RECHCOs  |  175 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3-9: An Abdali advertisement for the "Perfect Residential Address" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the stock answer of both Abdali and Solidere is that the new downtowns 
are for everybody, the reality is a little different. The major direct beneficiaries 
fall into two main groups. The first to be discussed is the group of 'elite' 
residents and tenants of the new space, these are the 'distinguished' business 
and residential community those who 'deserve' the prestige of Abdali (see 
Figure 3-9). Within the framework of perceived space, the Thesis Survey 
(2012) conducted in Amman had the results seen in Table ‎3-3. The Survey 
indicated strongly that the majority of Jordanians perceive that 'higher-income 
Jordanians' and 'non-Jordanian' and 'Gulf tourists' are the main targets of the 
Abdali project within the city. When looking at the cross-tabulated results 
broken down by income level, it is interesting to note that as income levels 
rise, the more likely it is that the project will also be perceived as inclusive of 
'lower-income Jordanians'. Lower income levels increasingly saw the project 
as being solely for 'higher-income Jordanians' and 'Gulf Tourists'. 
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Table ‎3-3: Responses to the Question "Who will Abdali's customers be on a 
scale of 1-5, with 5 as most prevalent?" 
 1=None 2 3 4 5=Majority 
Lower-income Jordanians 79% 17% 3% 0% 1% 
Medium-income Jordanians 29% 52% 19% 1% 1% 
Higher-income Jordanians 6% 17% 49% 20% 8% 
Non-Jordanian Tourists 3% 12% 24% 46% 15% 
Gulf Tourists 4% 7% 16% 15% 58% 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
The 'new downtowns' are by their own admissions pristine environments, far 
from the disorder and chaos of hagglers, traditional shoppers, and political 
and religious populism (Post, 2013). These new spaces are regulated. Very 
similar to the mall-experience of the United States, where a seemingly public 
space is highly regulated by security guards monitoring behaviour, dress-
codes, vagabonds, activities such as peddling or begging, in what is actually a 
faҫade to a highly privatised space - Solidere behaves as no more than a 
private outdoor mall. Security guards ensure that undesirable street 
performers are kept to a minimum, and any "tramps or beggars" are readily 
evicted or not admitted (Beirut Interviews, 2013). Amman's private mall 
spaces have had other problems in the past with young men not being 
allowed to enter if unaccompanied by females. The survey results also 
showed this segment to be especially sceptical of the Abdali project and upset 
with its constitution.  
In fact, when asking about drinking a mere cup of coffee in Abdali, 72% of 
respondents said that they would not (Thesis Survey, 2012). This rings an 
eerie bell of one critic who has noted a Baha Hariri interview, who in response 
to the question of who Abdali is for replied that the public space in Abdali 
targets high society and that when low-income citizens visiting the space 
realise that a cup of coffee is worth about 10 JDs (about USD 14) they will 
leave (Daher, 2013). The average individual monthly income is 140 JDs (USD 
197) more or less in Amman (Department of Statistics, 2008). In being so 
much more expensive than the rest of Amman, Abdali revokes that which 
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made the city centre so popular. This theme of an elitist closed off centre will 
be explored more completely in the second section of this Chapter.  
 
Figure ‎3-10: Responses to the Question "Do you think that Abdali will be 
more expensive than the rest of Amman?" 
 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
The second major beneficiary group are the project's owners or investors, 
also not representative of the general public. The projects not only benefit 
their existing investors, but also focus on potential future investors. The 
promotional material focuses on attracting a certain niche by promoting 
exclusive functions for a new elite centre. The effect seen by some critics is 
the obvious "intent to restructure the social (class) fabric in the city" (Summer, 
2005, p96). In the Thesis Survey carried out, 40% of respondents assumed 
AID's investors were 'Investors from the Gulf' and only 3% were able to 
identify Mawared as a partner (see Figure 3-11). This indicated that 
Jordanians know very little about the commercial structure of the Abdali 
project, and the perceptions are skewed to the fact that the majority of 
investors are non-Jordanians. The promotional material produced by AID is 
particularly striking in this regard. Several examples of this, documented in 
Mawared's newsletters, included road shows throughout Germany in 2004, 
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releasing detailed documentation to Jordan's embassies, and participating 
heavily in conferences such as Cityscape in Dubai, amongst others. 
Information such as the project's institutional setup, major actors and 
stakeholders has been released easily to these investors - especially at the 
international scale, but are not readily accessible to the Ammani public.  
 
Figure ‎3-11: Responses to the Question "Who are Abdali's investors?" 
 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
There is a double danger to specifically including transnational investors in the 
project. The first is that these investors are not tied to the geography or 
location of the project as local residents are with memories, social ties and a 
sense of community. The second is that the investors rarely live within the 
country. They are a mobile class making their living experiences in the city 
just that little bit further from the typical Amman or Beirut resident. Baha Hariri, 
running his own real estate business from Monaco with long-term staff located 
there, is one example of this. Michael Smith, of the University of California, 
Davis, in his 2001 work on Transnational Urbanism argues that the 
transnational investor that the modern world has seen creates a sort of 
"transnational urbanism...a socio-spatial agency of transnational social, 
economic and political networks" (Smith, 2001, p116). Leslie Sklair, writing the 
23%
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same year, takes this further looking at the human agents behind the 
urbanism and noting a "transnational capitalist class, composed of corporate 
executives, globalising bureaucrats and politicians, globalising professionals, 
and consumerist elites" (Sklair, 2001, p4). The attitude towards reconstruction 
and development in Solidere and Abdali was one of little attachment to 
national territory, along with the hodgepodge of international rather than local 
experiences amongst the project's planners, and a cause for concern 
regarding the consequences of the reconstruction.  
Beirut's plan, as well as Amman's, focuses on the 'monumental' (as examined 
in the previous section), the large boulevards and the sweeping plazas, rather 
than the smaller, narrower and more intimate settings of the Arab World's 
traditional centres which aim to provide more intimate human connections and 
social exchanges - a centre as a tool for bringing people together. The 
literature on gentrification as a concept is also useful to consider here, as the 
notion of upgrading neighbourhoods, and the replacement of original 
residents with 'higher-income' families is not unknown within cities. Of the 
literature on it, there is a consensus that gentrification and the concept of 
holistic planning is known in theory and practice to be "most onerous and 
least advantageous to those who are relatively powerless or relatively poor. 
Planning is, in its effect on the socio-economic structure, a highly regressive 
form of indirect taxation" (Gower Davies, 1972, p2), with the ability to destroy 
heritage and undermine cohesion as previously explained. 
Though Abdali's expected impacts were measured by the Thesis Survey 
(2012) and its results discussed below, Solidere's impacts can be seen. Some 
critics have noted that the social dimension of the reconstruction was in fact 
the "most neglected aspect" (Kabbani, 1992, p49) of the planning initiative. 
Like the cases of urban renewal in the West, some of the more "disastrous 
social ramifications" (Kabbani, 1992, p49) are not visible until people are able 
to regroup and voice their opposition to the relocation. Bulldozing buildings 
leads to the fragmentation and destruction of the social fabric as well. Critics 
were strong in their stand that the socioeconomic mix that was common to the 
area prior to the War was in danger of being replaced by a homogenous 
group of both elite local Lebanese, and tourists and expatriates. The Beirut 
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centre saw high-end housing and hotels replace the mixed-income 
environment that previously existed. The role of the port (and with it the 
representation of the traditional mercantile middle class) has been 
suppressed and preference given to financial services and commerce 
preferred by the upper-class society and developed service sector. Others 
note that the middle class, known to be the main source of prosperity for 
Beirut from the 1940s up until the War, has been replaced by international 
business and financial groups (Gekas, 2009).  
Despite the fact that no urban space can force people to mix, certain spaces 
are much more conducive than others, with the ability to put people at ease 
with more favourable functions. For this reason a sensitive adaptation of the 
impacts of the physical and spatial reconstruction was called for to develop 
spaces to ensure people felt a sense of belonging to the new environment, 
though this was not heeded. Certainly, even press releases regarding the 
developments within Abdali - written in Arabic to appeal to the local Jordanian 
market - could not fully integrate regular Jordanian press, as certain projects 
had no Arabic name equivalent, and could not even be transliterated 
effectively. This included Damac's hundred million dollar project 'The Heights' 
and 'The Lofts' project highlighted in Mawared's No. 6 and No. 11 newsletters 
(Mawared, 2006a and Mawared, 2006b), see Figure 3-12.  
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Figure ‎3-12: Press Releases in the Mawared Newsletters, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While top residential sale prices in Amman rise up to about USD 1,400 per 
sqm, with the average being about USD 300, Damac's starting average prices 
were significantly higher, reaching USD 3,300 per sqm in some cases and 
with the penthouse priced at USD 4,000 per sqm. These buildings were sold 
out in no time purchased by speculators (much in the same fashion as real 
estate in Dubai). So much so that, shortly after announcing the project of 'The 
Heights' and selling out within months, Damac announced its intent to 
construct the 20-storey 'Business Heights'. It is clear that these projects cater 
to an exclusive luxury market that remains relatively unaffordable to the 
average Jordanian, given, for example, that Damac was offering the first 25 
purchasers of three bedroom apartments in 'The Heights'119 a free 2007 
Jaguar X type along with the purchase. 
Local Jordanian analysts wondered if there would possibly be "sufficient 
demand within Amman for such a significant amount of office and retail 
                                                          
119
 It is worth noting that 'The Heights' has no Arabic name equivalent, as none appeared necessary 
since this downtown is catered to those English speaking elite. 
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space" (Executive Magazine, 2007b, p15). Jamil Itani, the project's CEO, 
pointed to Jordan as an attractive place for Gulf investors "with Arab nations 
reluctant to invest in the West. And, last but not least, Jordan is close to Iraq‖ 
(Executive Magazine, 2007b, p15), at no point mentioning local demand - 
implicitly Abdali real estate would be purchased strongly by expatriate 
Jordanians or non-Jordanian investors, most likely not living there full-time 
and, as such, creating something of a ghost-town in place of an active and 
vibrant centre (Post, 2013). Both the Amman and Beirut projects, according to 
Itani, concern developments to be built around a central business district with 
the aim to offer a homogenous development in terms of working, shopping 
and living (Executive Magazine, 2007b). It is clear that the planners - within 
both projects - had intended the project to focus on a certain type of 
development, and attract a specific type of clientele. 
 
RECHCOs' Intentional Exclusions  
 
In both Beirut and Amman, the planners asserted their absolute intention 
behind the plan that "the new spatial configuration of the plan is to create a 
city centre where all Lebanese may meet once again" (Kabbani, 1992, p53). 
Solidere SAL's brochures show that its ambitions are to "rekindle the centre‘s 
role as a common arena and meeting point for all, and so help reconnect the 
city as a whole" (Solidere, 2004a, p30). The big question for both Abdali and 
Solidere was whether it was a studied intention to segregate and divide the 
city through their RECHCOs, or whether it was an inadvertent side effect. It 
certainly seems to be the case that there was a systematic effort on the part 
of these organisations to create a space catered to a certain consumer elite 
and attractive for the investments of a transnational capitalist class.  
It was clear to critics that the plan's spatial configuration "idealises the images 
of private capital power and its inclination for class segregation through 
creating islands" (Kabbani, 1992, p53). Looking at it from this perspective, the 
social reintegration, and trying to achieve harmonious coexistence between 
different classes in the post-war Lebanese era, was not addressed. Within this 
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setting, the future city centre of Beirut would be cut off and isolated from the 
rest of the city and the country precisely in class terms (Beyhum, 1992a).  
Controlled public space also controls a list of an eligible public, space where 
there are certain segments of the public who are excluded and deemed 
"undesirable" (Mitchell, 1995). Mitchell in his discussions on public space 
notes those excluded from these new spaces have their identity of members 
of the public put in doubt and so are "banished to a realm outside politics 
because they are banished from the gathering places of the city" (Mitchell, 
1995, p 120). Images of the public are narrowly allowed in this context, and a 
homogenised public for the space is slowly created.  This is the very public in 
the case of Abdali and Solidere that is the niche clientele targeted by the 
investors. 
Donald Haider terms the struggle cities face to attract business The Place 
Wars (Haider, 1992). The RECHCOs work hard to market their cities as 
attractive investment locations, and themselves as vehicles for attracting this 
investment. For this reason, one of Solidere SAL's main targets is ―to reinstate 
Beirut as a regional and international business centre‖ (Douaidy, 2003, p5). 
The Abdali project shows Amman as an "ideal" destination for business, and 
itself provides "smart" and "world-class" infrastructure for "an integrated 
business environment in one single package in a central location‖ (Mawared, 
2004, p2). 
Modern cities such as Beirut and Amman, forced to compete internationally, 
thus used RECHCOs as tools for guaranteeing successful integration into a 
global economy. The cities have become caught in a crisis, whereby the 
'symbolic' economy of modern capitalism must attract global portfolios of real 
estate investors (Zukin, 1996). This competition has reoriented the imagery of 
the city creating Lefebvre's 'representational space' (Lefebvre, 1974) so that 
the neoliberal discourse at the policy level is actually inscribed into the urban 
landscape. In this case, older images are put aside and instead a "new urban 
order" (Short and Kim, 1999, p97) is presented. The RECHCOs have helped 
reinvent Amman presenting it as more of a 'global city' inline with efficiency 
and connectivity. Places and populations are being distinguished according to 
market calculations (e.g. Ong, 2000), and styles of socioeconomic and 
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political performance (Callon and Muniesa, 2005; Sidaway, 2007). This was 
reflected strongly especially in Amman where policy geared to compete for 
inward investments and Beirut which fought to re-attain its global ranking. This 
policy serves primarily to create high-end residential, commercial and office 
sites catering to a global rather than local clientele, and this has major 
consequences on the transformation of the city. 
Reading the promotional materials of Solidere and Abdali, the cities of Beirut 
and Amman claim to be 'ancient cities for the future', 'business centres', and 
'world-class smart urban centres'. Their entire purpose - in an order where 
jobs and investments are required for cities to position themselves - is to 
attract investors. As it related to Beirut, the reconstruction process outlined in 
Chapter Two focused on the exchange of existing damage with a modern city 
centre, one that was inspired by global capitals to create a global modern 
Beirut such that it would undoubtedly replace the war-torn image of the city. 
Later, having witnessed the Solidere experience, of becoming a modern 
capital, Amman engaged in its own flagship project to create ―a new 
downtown for Amman" for a "lifestyle of global connectivity and cultural 
significance‖ (Royal Hashemite Court, 2003, p1). 
Both the Abdali and Solidere marketing brochures liken the projects to 
ventures in international cities such as London and New York. However, 
Western society is quite estranged from normal forms of Eastern centres, in 
both purpose and function. The outward "external relations" and need to copy 
was not coupled with any form of internal understanding or "internal 
consumption" (Short and Kim, 1999, p107). Within this internal consumption, it 
seems that there was a systematic effort to not include certain groups who are 
not 'invited to play'. In fact, "it is only global money and a chosen few who are 
granted this privilege. The rest of the world cannot join ‗the play,‘ entry to 
these global places of play is restricted to the majority of people and is only 
permitted through their involvement in the provision of services and 
infrastructure" (Daher, 2007b, p54). 
Receiving its rationalisation through economic liberalisation and privatisation, 
neoliberalism in planning comes through the extended use of multi-national 
corporations. To this end, Fainstein and Judd (1999b) have shown how urban 
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culture within cities is becoming a commodity, as outlined in the Literature 
Review. It is this commodity culture within which Abdali and Solidere were 
created, driven through by powerful transnational investors, as one of the 
most visible ways that the global capitalist class, comprising investors, 
politicians, planners and consumerist elites, are engaged. Exclusion becomes 
inevitable. The idea is that the RECHCO creates a competitive urban image 
through enormous real estate and infrastructure developments in downtown 
areas.  
It is clear for both Case Studies that tourism plays a major role - whereby a 
'staged' city is presented as a spectacle rather than a lived-in city. With cities 
competing for tourism, AID and Solidere SAL spend millions on billboards, 
videos, website, TV, and newspaper ads. This staged city loses authenticity, 
which creates considerable tension in the urban policy-making environment" 
(Hall, 1996). The Solidere and Abdali urban regeneration projects show how 
the 'global urban models' are emerging within Arab cities. This discourse has 
meant that cities are laboratories for policy experiments where the underlying 
philosophy has been market-oriented economic growth and isolated 
consumption practices.  
The Solidere project priced out most of the Lebanese who used to live and 
work there (Ackerman, 2010), and the mixed-income housing was replaced by 
luxury buildings where rich Gulf Arabs and investors were targeted. Angus 
Gavin in a Newsweek Article published in 2010 notes "Solidere has become a 
victim of its own success" (Ackerman, 2010, p1).  The article goes on to note 
that comments such as "Beirut is no longer for the Lebanese" have become 
common (Ackerman, 2010, p1). The structures of the Abdali and Solidere 
projects invite exclusion by their very nature; their raison d'être as investment 
attraction tools for the global market is illustrative of this point. The Abdali 
project was part of the "state's public discursive shift concentrating on 
economic prosperity and encouraging international investment in the country" 
(Daher, 2007c, p273). Citizens were considered secondary to tourists and 
investors when it came to the project's planning120. 
                                                          
120
 There are several other projects under construction in the city, though none with the magnitude of 
Abdali. Some of these new projects have been described as "spaces of inclusion and exclusion are 
186 
 
It is interesting to examine to what degree the public spaces created by the 
newly created RECHCO partnership actually intersect what theorists such as 
Habermas or Arendt term as the 'public sphere' compared to the extent to 
which they are actually private spaces for a specific transnational investor. 
Most critical urbanists see the consumer islands created as spaces that 
should be understood as a 'comodified' city rather than a city embracing the 
need to accommodate the public sphere. The spaces that are privately 
guarded and reserved for a certain elite are more a resource for attracting 
tourists and economic investments than for the residents of the city. So the 
question remains of "how public is public space, when it has been embedded 
in a context that raises such formidable social barriers that the masses of 
ordinary working people (…) would feel uncomfortable entering in?" (Lopate 
1989, p24, cited in Summer, 2005, p112). 'Let the Shopping Begin!' is the 
slogan on the billboards that surround the Abdali site.  
One of the Abdali highlights came forward during the international Retail City 
2007 presentation called "the Abdali Effect – Reinventing the Retail Sector in 
Amman," (Abdali, 2007, p7) so that a holistic picture of Amman's retail 
industry was given. The Abdali Boulevard as such was there to "literally re-
invent the retail sector, with global brands and an exciting outdoor experience" 
(Abdali, 2007, p7). By outwardly announcing the focus on the elite consumer, 
able to afford such a retail experience, Abdali de facto excludes all but the 
highest income of Jordanians and international tourists. Solidere SAL placed 
a focus on retail at the expense of other community spaces. While Law No. 
117 of 1991 requires at least 25% of Solidere‘s Master Plan be dedicated to 
open or green space, the spirit of the law is not strictly followed. Much of what 
is noted as green space are in fact inner-courtyards between buildings, 
unusable space around ramps, or landscaping in the form of trees lining the 
major roads. What was intended as open and accessible space for the public 
has been twisted and materialised as almost unusable space to maximise real 
estate. Similarly, an examination of the early plans in Abdali indicates that this 
is the case here too. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
causing severe cases of gentrification and social and physical displacement in the city" (Daher, 2011, 
p289), others have referred to them as the "holes" of Amman (Parker, 2009, p110).  
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Critics argue that the centrality of the planning process (outlined in Chapter 
Four) will favour those Lebanese who belong to a "certain class" (Kabbani, 
1992, p20). The land use and the type of proposed developments will not 
cater to the general public, but rather to the "upper middle-class, expatriates, 
tourists and foreigners" (Kabbani, 1992, p20). The fear amongst critics has 
been that creating a truly public space must be highly regulated if a private 
company is to control the area. This includes a mixture of uses and even 
percentages of buildings set aside for affordable rents and subsidised as part 
of the public-private partnership agreement. Critics generally felt that 
additional studies should be conducted to portion certain percentages to 
tenants from a variety of social groups.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
One activist group, Abrand, set out to challenge and repackage Lebanese 
heritage and tradition through a series of posters - one the Koussa Mehchi or 
'stuffed zucchini' transformed into Japanese Sushi with chopsticks. In other 
words, the typical Lebanese identity is lost and its cultural uniqueness 
obliterated as shown in Figure ‎3-13. And this is in essence the social impact of 
RECHCOs when negatively impacting both public space and heritage. Similar 
to the mere appearance of incorporating heritage in the advertisements 
above, Solidere twisted heritage and tradition to profit-motivated objectives 
(such as the Beirut Souqs). Beyhum, in his work, suggests the likely 
consequence is the appearance of a dual city in Beirut, with the boundary 
lines of the Solidere project marking the limit (Beyhum, 1992a). Certain critics 
have noted that the inauguration of the first buildings would begin to highlight 
the "signs of uncontrolled wealth that are insulting to the rest of the 
population" (Beyhum, 1992a, p108), and the deterioration within the rest of 
the city even more strongly felt. In Amman, the duality between the centre and 
the rest of the city was reinforced amongst residents as the images of luxury 
are advertised and contrasted with the surrounding quarters. 
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Figure ‎3-13: Two of Abrand's Advertisements in Lebanon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The city centre became the sole focus of the Lebanese reconstruction project, 
headed by Solidere SAL. So narrow was the scope of what it meant to rebuild 
the nation that the rest of Lebanon, and Beirut were almost to ―fade away and 
become vague externalities‖ to the centre (Makdisi, 1997a, p701). In fact, 
Solidere's logo was simply the word 'Beirut' in Arabic. The perception, as 
Makdisi notes, is almost that the city is the "company's fiefdom" (Makdisi, 
1997a, p701). Some critics (Beyhum, 1992a; Rowe and Sarkis, 1998) noted 
that where prior to the end of the Civil War there had been the Green Line, 
now there were other dividing lines between the centre and the rest of the city. 
Within the dislocation of poor craftsmen, butchers, and workers who used to 
inhabit the old city, "we have lost the melting pot" says Assem Salaam, who  
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helped found the Association for Protecting Natural Sites and Old Buildings in 
Lebanon in 1960, "now the city is divided" (Ackerman, 2010, p1). By ignoring 
the two most important elements of an urban plan aimed at national 
reconciliation - namely the preserving the "common memory of the city" and 
"a tie to the past," (by encouraging the return of original commercial and 
residential tenants), Solidere cemented the division of the city (Salaam quoted 
in Ackerman, 2010, p1). The same themes are seen in Amman where the rest 
of the city has little funding for upgraded infrastructure and where the original 
stalls and sellers were relocated out of the Abdali District. 
 
Figure ‎3-14: Beirut City Image 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons 
 
 
Manual Castells, in thinking of networks, looks at the duality of the city and the 
"urban expression of the process of increasing differentiation". He continues 
that, ―the dual city opposes, in traditional sociological terms, the 
cosmopolitanism of the new informational producers to the localism of the 
segmented sectors of restructured labour‖ (Castells, 1989, p277). Ultimately, 
where the global 'space of flows' tries to materialise at the local level there is a 
continuously growing distinction, so that the locally understood sense of place 
cannot be easily recognised (Borsdof and Hidalgo, 2008). Beirut's 'sense of 
place' that was the heritage within which Solidere was placed spatially was 
usurped by a different agenda, that of the global, of transnational investment, 
and the new competitive centre, which turned the centre into an 'island for the 
rich'121. In Beirut, intellectuals were clear that the socioeconomic mix 
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 "Island planning" has become a serious issue for planners and urban designers in general. Saskia 
Sassen looks at this in terms of the 'quartering' of urban space (Sassen, 2001), which will create a 
"patchwork of discrete spaces with increasingly sharp boundaries (gated business centres, leisure, 
tourism, or community spaces)" (Daher, 2008, p59). Fainstein and Judd (1999b) have looked at these in 
terms of being bounded districts isolated from any neighbouring decay, labelling them "tourist bubbles". 
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celebrated in the pre-war era in the BCD would be replaced "by a 
homogeneous group of high income locals, yuppies, tourists and well-off 
expatriates‖ (Kabbani, 1992, p49). In other words, the financial class and 
upper-service sector would undoubtedly replace the old organic society. 
Walking in Solidere, one sees that it is filled with tourists as well as local 
visitors. The ultimate question is which local residents specifically, and 
whether it is inclusive of the entire population. The downtown has become a 
commodity and a "playful spectacle", with tourists drawn to the "staged 
authenticity" where a contrived experience replaces the genuineness 
(Fainstein and Gladstone, 1999, p27) not integrated into their surrounding 
context. The Abdali project is set to similarly create a "downtown commodity". 
Its promotion as a high-end tourism project and affluent residential project for 
creating "a prestigious address living 'above' the city" (Daher, 2007c, p282) 
shows its direction in this regard. Of this, Rami Daher comments: "This 
pastiche replica would reduce the complexity of the real downtown experience 
with its details, years of evolution, and special dynamic into one Disneyfied 
moment with its kitsch postmodern fake building facades, yet chic, well-
proportioned, and pretentious corporate architecture" (Daher, 2007c, p282). 
Within these spectacle-downtowns it is not only the place itself that is a show, 
but its social life too. The place itself is packaged, and placed on the global 
market as a mere real estate commodity. An organic city centre defined by the 
public and its activities could never thus be reduced and sold, which 
automatically skews society within the border of the RECHCO. When authors 
such as Shami (2007) describe the city as products of people "who make 
space and place, discursively and materially; negotiating macro-level forces in 
culturally specific ways" (Shami, 2007, p218); a place where there is no 
negotiation can only therefore be outside of the city's walls - no longer a place 
where people can meet and make politics as imagined by the earliest Greek 
philosophers122.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Within these bubbles, as described in the Literature Review, components of heritage and historic 
architecture are matched with new facilities that invoke the new and contemporary rather than the 
historic (Fainstein and Judd, 1999b).  
122
 This is not to say that the projects have not had community outreach. Abdali was well known in 
Jordan for its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives, launching things like their "Abdali 
Innovation Awards" though this has not been widespread.  
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In an article in the Arab Al-Youm newspaper on the 29th of June 2009 entitled 
'Abdali Innovations', the journalist Hashem Khreisat "eloquently dispels the 
belief that Abdali is a foreign project, built and owned by foreigners on 
Jordanian soil, explaining that due to the size of the project and the 
contracting companies handling the job, it is easy to get the mistaken 
impression that this project is not destined for Jordanians. In reality, however, 
nothing can be further from the truth" (Abdali, 2009b, p13). He clearly explains 
how "some of the vital projects were in fact designed and are being built by 
Jordanian architectural know-how" (Abdali, 2009b, p13) yet not the values that 
embodied the centre that they wanted to emulate. While the full impact of jobs 
and investments will be explored in Chapter Five, even Khreisat's promotion 
of the project does not in any way indicate an array of activities that would be 
welcoming to Jordanians, in fact it has the odd echo of societies like the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) where those who build (construction workers) are 
forbidden from enjoying (Batty, 2013).  
In concluding this Chapter, in effect, there seem to be three major issues that 
made the RECHCO projects such as Solidere and Abdali extraordinary. The 
first is that physical heritage, and thus memories, of city residents was 
destroyed or sidelined which negatively impacted residents within the city. 
The second is that the original residents and tenants in the area were 
expelled which tore existing social fabric. The third is that the spatial 
configuration of the plans did not protect and encourage the diversity of the 
ethnic, religious and social classes that previously coexisted in the city 
through high-end functions and uses.  
On the first point, once the spatial organisation changes rapidly, as is the case 
in RECHCOs, citizenship changes as well, in manners that allow division to 
surface and cause discord. The memories associated with the spaces, in this 
sense, can be used as tools for collective nostalgia, especially as related to 
the physical heritage and its destruction. Though, as a caveat, it is important 
to note that the relationship between these spatial narratives and national 
identity cannot be reduced to a simple equivalence and that whatever vision 
ultimately takes shape will be the catchall for issues surrounding identity 
(Makdisi, 1997a, p664). On the second point, with the higher-end luxury 
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residences and offices, the original residents were steadily gentrified and left 
the area. Even as visitors they were only welcome if they could afford the 
commercial rates applied. 
On the third point, whatever the intent, such choices have indirectly created a 
security belt by isolating a certain elite and the lower strata of society from 
each other. Both the urban and political choices that have been made have 
encouraged fragmentation, so that space in the city has transformed from 
shared place to a place that must then be shared amongst those with private 
interests (as will be explored in the next Chapter). This results in what Edward 
Soja has called a city-full of "non-cityness" (Soja, 1992), which has much in 
the way of built environment but no sense of coherent place or a common 
civic life.  
In exclusively targeting the affluent, such projects contribute to the emergence 
of a model in contrast to the sustainable city and the 'just city', characterised 
by 'material equality, diversity and democracy' (Fainstein 2010, Marcuse et al. 
2000, Harvey 2010). Essentially based on social injustice, one can question 
the sustainability of cities that create schisms by focusing solely on the 
'beautiful city' desires of a rich minority. Kathrin Hӧckel takes this a little bit 
further in her paper on Beyond Beirut where she says that "the very fact that 
the reconstruction was concentrated in Beirut‘s Central District cater[ed] only 
to an elite part of society, while neglecting the peripheral regions of the 
country and its inhabitants, is the central reason for the failure to achieve a 
sustainable peace and a robust state" (Höckel, 2007, p2). Some critics went 
so far as to accuse Rafiq Hariri of having paid special attention to Beirut as 
the capital, due to its "Sunni constituency" during his tenure as Prime Minister 
(Adwan, 2005, p9). 
At the global scale, the institutionalisation of neoliberalism has seen the 
creation of investment arms, which privatises the entire planning process, and 
prevents political debate (explored to some extent in the Literature Review). 
The projects within this new global discourse have meant that "democracy 
becomes synonymous with free markets" (Giroux, 2005) leaving no place for 
issues of social equality, redistribution or even critical citizenship. The 
participation of citizens within the superficial Abdali and Solidere planning 
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process means that the frameworks are reduced to mere "commodification of 
their practices" (Summer, 2005, p119). The Solidere and Abdali experiences 
show that public space is hampered as spaces are controlled and too 
regularised.  
Studies exploring citizenship as a hegemonic process, that seem relevant 
here, look at how governments work to assemble identities, fix power relations 
and discipline space, and how this is encountered and contested through the 
"spatial practices of everyday life.... viewing dominant discourses and 
practices of citizenship as techniques of spatial organisation" in de Certeau's 
terms (De Certeau, 1984, pxiv). This is the base for Chapter Four, which will 
look more in depth at RECHCOs' impacts on the politics of citizens within 
cities.  
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4. RECHCOs and their Political Impact 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter Four looks at the political processes and impacts associated with 
RECHCOs, especially those distinguishing them from other mega-projects in 
the region. The Chapter will argue that with ineffective and inefficient 
government structures and systems in place, failures of policy, institutions and 
processes are a common phenomenon that allowed for the creation of the 
RECHCOs. In addition it will also argue that the uncommon procedures 
practiced by the RECHCOs have led to a negative impact on citizens and 
common 'doing business practices'123. The previous Chapter looked at the 
RECHCOs' social impacts, concluding that both on the fronts of heritage and 
social cohesion the RECHCO, despite certain positive attributes, has an 
overall negative impact. This Chapter now examines the second pillar, looking 
at the political impacts of RECHCOs, as such putting in place a separate set 
of arguments regarding how the RECHCO affects cities' citizens.  
The RECHCOs despite being a physical project affecting material space 
within the city, also fundamentally affect city politics, something that was well-
noted of urban projects in the Literature Review. Henri Lefebvre writes that "in 
addition to being a means of production, it [space] is also a means of control, 
and hence of domination, of power" (Lefebvre, 1974, p26). The public space 
loss noted in Chapter Three coincides with a change in the public sphere 
discussed in the Literature Review, and as such politics. The literature 
includes Sorkin's and Davis' "end of public space" and "the destruction of any 
truly democratic urban spaces" reflecting a "narrative of loss" (Sorkin, 1992 
and Davis, 1992 cited in Crawford, 1995, p4). Sennett's The Fall of Public 
Man (Sennett, 1992) is also representative of the feeling that once vital sites 
of democracy seem to have shrunk. The described narrative looks to what 
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 Doing business practices are the standard ways that companies and investors behave in the 
economy towards each other and the government.  
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critics see as a "current crisis of collective life, which places the very identities 
and institutions of citizenship and democracy in peril" (Crawford, 1995, p4).  
This Chapter is split into three main sections. In its first section, the Chapter 
will look specifically at the process that created the RECHCOs and examine 
opposition responses. The second section will focus on property rights and 
how they were impacted by the RECHCOs. The Chapter's conclusion will look 
at how the RECHCOs' creation changed common doing business practices in 
Beirut and Amman and undermined citizens' perceived relationship with their 
local and national government.  
The Chapter relies heavily on three different sources of information. The first 
are interviews of policymakers within Amman and Beirut that helped fill in the 
details of the approval processes described in the Chapter. The second was 
use of archives that existed within the Greater Amman Municipality, and the 
daily Arabic newspapers of both Beirut and Amman, which helped bring forth 
different perspectives and activities. The third was the Thesis Survey 
conducted in Amman, which yielded primary data relating to the political 
process and its impact. These three sources of information were then 
combined to be able to tell the story of the RECHCO approval process and its 
subsequent impact, thereby contributing to our understanding of how 
RECHCOs affect politics in the city as it relates to the city's citizens. 
 
4.2 Aspects of RECHCOs and the Political System 
 
The argument made by this section on the relationship between RECHCOs 
and the political system includes three major points. The first is that under 
normal circumstances, RECHCOs would never have been approved. The 
second is that a specific studied set of unusual circumstances were 
orchestrated and that led to their approval. The third is that citizens will 
inevitably feel devoid of power as a consequence, of the private process that 
causes RECHCO approvals124. While the Arab World has had a history of 
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 Underlying these assumptions is the belief that citizens are ready to participate and share their 
political agendas with bureaucrats as long as they are offered appropriate opportunities. 
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inequitable urban policy (mentioned in the Literature Review) nonetheless, the 
process by which the RECHCOs are conceived of and approved in 
government has massive implications for public perceptions of transparency, 
and the acceptance of the RECHCOs as tools for changing cities positively. 
The process that is used is one through which many have felt 
disenfranchised, with citizens feeling that others have more 'right' in the city 
than they do (as discussed by Harvey, 2008). In an article published in Jordan 
on the 1st of February 2007, for instance - an opinion piece in one of the 
leading local newspapers, Al-Dustour - was a commentary questioning why 
foreign investors are placed above local investors within the Abdali project 
(Zubaidi, 2007a).  
To this end, the RECHCOs have taken extreme care to market themselves as 
having gone through rigorous public scrutiny - including public presentations 
with select investors as stakeholder participation for instance (Post, 2013). 
The concept of the Solidere plan was to build an "ostensible blend of public 
accountability combined with private efficiency, for example, the Master Plan 
was to be debated publicly" (Mayaram, 2009, p108). As explored further in 
this Chapter, Abdali Investment and Development advertised certain types of 
information extremely well - so much so that over 99% of those surveyed for 
this thesis had heard of the project - and it promoted its relationship with the 
GAM and Mawared (Thesis Survey, 2012). To many critics however, this self-
promotion was inadequate. The Abdali project has seemed to many in Jordan 
as "dark and opaque" (Hattar, 2007, p1), described as a repetition of the 
process of the reconstruction of the centre of Beirut. 
 
The Emergence of a Neoliberal Ideology for PPPs 
 
The RECHCOs may in fact be the physical manifestations of an international 
trend, in light of both the global phenomenon at the macro-level and the global 
context at the micro-level; both part of the hegemonic discourse that has 
transformed urban policies within local capitals as an accumulation of a long 
transnational investment process. It is inevitable that this analysis takes into 
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account that it "is entrenched in processes of globalisation" that may reshape 
the physical landscape and the urban politics surrounding it (Singerman, 
2009, p3), so the question of who the city is designed for emerges strongly 
alongside how each sort of citizen participates in the process, and shake the 
conventional social contract which has linked rulers to the ruled for many 
decades in the Arab World, and which many see as "finally unravelling" 
(Razzaz, 2012, p1). 
Projects such as the RECHCOs are built to recreate the international (some 
claim neoliberal125) discourse (Lemke, 2000). The agencies involved 
"leverage state power to defend 'market requirements' against the claims of 
deliberative citizenship" (Parker, 2009, p111). State agencies have become 
much more "entrepreneurial" within these new systems (Post, 2013). Rather 
than acting as an "external source of regulation" (Parker, 2009, p114) they 
view the private sector as a close partner. They work to reduce transaction 
costs for investors, who they see as able to pick from numerous locations 
around the world. The notion of increasing "competitiveness" occupied the 
pro-growth reform movements in both Jordan and Lebanon126. In other words 
what they try to create to attract investors is a system where "purely private 
risk is removed from the private investor and is then redistributed across the 
public at large" (Parker, 2009, p115).  
Starting with King Abdullah II's accession to the throne, Jordan has been a 
very clear example of a nation implementing a privatisation agenda 
(telecommunications, energy, water). The 'Solidere phenomenon' (Daher, 
2011), which materialised in the form of Abdali, is one physical manifestation 
of this transformation. In Beirut a similar mantra was heard, with proponents 
of Solidere arguing that only the private sector could "insulate the 
reconstruction of the BCD from political polarisation and traditional 
government inefficiencies," (Hourani, 2011, p141) and only the private sector, 
driven by such priorities, could "provide proper leadership and attract funds" 
(Hourani, 2011, p141) and thereby ensure that Beirut rapidly claim its place 
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Adham, 2004; Al-Hamarneh, 2010; Barthel, 2010; Daher, 2008; Daher, 2012; Elsheshtawy, 2008; 
Kanna, 2010; Parker, 2009 
126
 The Jordanian government established the Competitiveness Unit to track economic progress as 
related to international indicators at the Ministry of Planning in 1997.  
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atop the emerging hierarchy of Arab cities" (Kabbani 1996, p66). Major 
opponents to the scheme hold the criticism of a neoliberal agenda very dear 
under the basic premise that the private sector, even in ideal circumstances, 
responds primarily to contributing shareholders rather than the stakeholders – 
local citizens. The idea for the Abdali downtown in Amman, as outlined in 
Chapter One, was established between Rafiq Hariri and King Abdullah II as 
an extension to Solidere's 'success' within Amman127.  
Rafiq Hariri of Lebanon and King Abdullah of Jordan actively engaged in this 
strategy to put their countries and capitals 'on the map' in terms of 
competitiveness. In King Abdullah's case the matter evolved into creating 
'entrepreneurial' organisations for Jordan to progress, which generally 
involved public sector institutions being granted a new found financial and 
administrative independence hiring a certain transnational western-educated 
elite (Mansur, 2013). These entrepreneurial organisations operated to the 
sides of the typical bureaucracy, reported directly to the Royal Court and 
could be easily directed and manipulated. In a similar fashion Rafiq Hariri in 
Lebanon "ran the country as if it were his private business" (Solh, 2013). 
Mawared, for many, represented a new direction on the official front, unique in 
its administrative and financial discretion. These sorts of institutions were 
thought to be able to grow their projects quickly and easily. Mawared128 
showed new government direction to give national economic support for 
private sector development, and the Abdali case is undoubtedly one where 
"state authority becomes entwined with private agency" (Parker, 2009, p116). 
The entire concept and political process was able to be designed away from 
communities in the case of both Solidere and Abdali for a number of reasons.  
                                                          
127
 The measures of success as developed by the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness 
Report include indicators such as 'intensity of global competition', 'extent of market dominance', 
'effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy', 'extent and effect of taxation', 'number of procedures required to 
start a business' (World Economic Forum, 2013). These indicators put the onus very much on private 
sector entrepreneurship. Sklair (2001) looks at this as a phenomenon as globalising politicians creating 
the conditions for diverting state support and resources towards the major corporations within their 
borders to promote competitiveness.  
128
 As mentioned in Chapter Two, the state-owned Mawared entered into equal partnership with Oger 
Jordan - a subsidiary of the Hariri owned Saudi Oger - to create the Abdali Investment and Development 
designated with the aim of being a private land development company. Mawared as described on its 
website is committed to ‗‗generating considerable investment opportunities for the private sector, 
creating job opportunities, and stimulating economic growth‘‘ (Mawared, 2010, p1). Mawared also 
advertises itself as "the ideal partner for the private sector" and offers "flexible partnership formulas" to 
facilitate "the smooth processing of official dealings" (Mawared, 2010, p1).  
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Weak Local Government  
 
Beirut's Local Government  
 
The end of the Civil War showed the Lebanese state in a need of being 
(re)built from nothing. Emerging from a 15-year war in 1990, Lebanon 
ultimately found itself as a "country virtually without a state" (One Humanity, 
2011, p1). There were two major institutions that arose after the Civil War as 
being responsible for reconstruction (Stewart, 1996). The first was the Council 
for Reconstruction and Development, which was a government entity, set up 
in 1977 and reframed in the 1990s which was responsible for reconstruction 
outside the BCD. The second, decidedly was Solidere SAL, other government 
entities had little influence. Beirut's municipality however was barely 
functioning - and had no Mayor. Out of the twenty-four members on its board 
only four were still alive, and no new members had been appointed. One of 
the last acts of the previous government right before it resigned prior to the 
elections was to give formal approval to the Dar al-Handasah Master Plan on 
the 15th of October 1992. And so, it was in this atmosphere of 'national 
anxiety' (Lebnani, 2010) with the outcome of the elections and a distracted 
public that the Master Plan was approved with little "debate over its merits" 
(Eddé, 1997, p132). Elias Sarkis worked to equip the CDR with all the 
necessary tools to bypass all routine and normal regulations which were 
known to encumber other governmental agencies. This was in a similar 
manner to Mawared which in part was to help avoid cumbersome 
bureaucracy bothering investors, where it was thought "in order for this project 
to succeed, the investors together with the State realised that it could not be 
facilitated through regular governmental bodies" (Daher, 2008, p. 50). 
The CDR by 1990 had become one of the key institutions in construction and 
redevelopment within the Beirut Central District. With none of the regular 
bureaucratic constraints, the agency was expected to undertake 
reconstruction with a certain 'private-sector' efficiency. The CDR was 
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therefore designed to be an instrument to assist public institutions (Salaam, 
1993) and to cut through any red tape associated with public sector 
regulations in a timely manner. It was the CDR's independence and privileges 
that would begin to play a very large role in the decision to use a private 
company for the BCD. In Beirut, the CDR remained the main tool for 
implementation and infrastructure within the rehabilitation process. Rafiq 
Hariri, as the "self-appointed custodian" (Adwan, 2004, p10) of the 
reconstruction effort, had relatively complete control over the CDR129, and as 
such, through the entire chain of related services. In addition, the CDR's 
authorities did not remain static. Instead, its authority grew and it started to 
borrow, requesting Central Bank bonds that were outside of the regular 
budget. It also appeared that the CDR was 'outside' of most of the official 
accountability mechanisms (Leenders, 2002)130. The relationship between 
Solidere SAL and the municipality had been problematic from the start. The 
political positioning between "the country's powerful groups and individuals 
often used Solidere as a battleground" (Nasr and Verdeil, 2008, p16), and the 
municipality had no ability to control the company; though attempts were 
made to derail certain aspects of the project, and features such as the Beirut 
Souqs were stalled as a direct result of conflicts between Rafiq Hariri and 
some of his opponents in the various state and municipal institutions.  
Cutting through bureaucratic red tape appears to be a major theme in both the 
city cases. In fact, the RECHCOs themselves were designed in order to have 
an autonomous body able to work around government bureaucracy, to be 
competitive and efficient away from local processes perceived as 
cumbersome by the RECHCO. With the engagement of the private sector as 
the leader of development, government institutions took a backseat and the 
very functions that they aimed to protect were hijacked. As such, it is possible 
to understand Solidere and Abdali's story both as a profit-making effort by a 
set of private sector investors, and a gap in the democracy and durability of 
the existing local government institutions (in Lebanon's case, a result of over a 
                                                          
129
 This was manifested in a variety of ways, for instance the CDR relocated to a Hariri-owned building. 
Critics argued that "in Europe or the United States, a similar connection would have been regarded as a 
potential conflict of interest and a possible source of political embarrassment" (Kabbani, 1992, p15). 
130
 The Solidere experience has been criticized as part of the CDR's "distribution of state assets and 
institutions…to…collect profit in both political and financial currencies" from different parties and 
stakeholders (Adwan, 2005, p6). 
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decade of war; in Jordan's case a combination of lack of funding, expertise, 
and genuine democracy).  
To this end, it was easy to manipulate the required decision makers into 
approvals. The private sector actors involved went so far as to place "facts on 
the ground" before debates and discussions even began within the legislative 
bodies (Solh, 2013). Rafiq Hariri, for instance, and his team gathered the 
necessary funding to launch Solidere, as well as a finalised plan for the 
project. Rafiq Hariri's Oger Liban, with no official appointment, began 
reconstruction and independently commissioned a Master Plan from the Arab 
consultancy group Dar al-Handasah (Khoury, 1995a). In 1983, under the Dar 
al-Handasah plan the bulldozers entered the city centre and without any 
official clearance began clearing rubble from the War. These bulldozers 
seemed to be clearing "ordered spaces" (Beyhum, 1992a, p34) methodically. 
While it was unannounced, it was generally agreed that Rafiq Hariri was 
behind the clearing (Salaam, 1996)131. After an interruption due to the 
breakout of fighting, by 1993 when the Dar al-Handasah plan was properly 
ratified, about 80% of the structures in the city centre had been damaged 
beyond repair132. At this point however, no Master Plan had been officially 
approved for the area, and despite Law No. 117, the CDR was seen by many 
to be acting beyond its mandate. The almost silent acceptance of Oger 
Liban's actions served a dual purpose. The first was to indicate to Rafiq Hariri 
that an abandoned BCD avoided by property owners was not altogether 
noticeable by the general public. The second was that the government 
seemed willing enough to circumvent the regular bureaucratic paths of 
                                                          
131
 During the War the centre was deserted and had slowly become a notorious red light district, rarely 
visited by its original property owners. As such, the clearing was able to continue without drawing a lot of 
attention to itself, either from the media, or the owners of the lots being cleared. This demolition was 
carried out without the approval, authorisation, or interference of any official or governmental institutions. 
In 1984 another round of fighting forced the cessation of all activities in the centre, and the active 
shelling in the Central District caused even further damage. In April 1992, demolishing within the BCD 
zone began again directed by the CDR, in an "alleged" (Haddad, 1998) attempt of stabilising the area 
from the danger of condemned buildings and to preserve public security. 
132
 Mid-May 1992, the Civil Research Organisation held a large symposium at the Beirut Carlton Hotel 
titled "The Beirut of Memory; the Beirut of Sharing; the Beirut of the Future: The Politics of 
Reconstruction and the Public Interest". This symposium addressed the issue from a variety of angles 
and produced categorised recommendations as: 'administrative', 'legal', 'social', 'architectural', 'financial', 
and 'economic'. The symposium ended with the recommendation by participants that the "state honour 
its responsibility ensure democratic paths are followed and to maintain an open dialogue". The 
symposium also unanimously called for the stop of all demolition activities in the centre, to freeze the 
appraisal committees' work and requested that the government publicise the expropriation of the land. 
The 'public' the symposium stated had the right to approve the "politics of reconstruction" before any 
redevelopment plan was implemented (Solh, 2013). 
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authorisation for ensuring legality of projects within the BCD. The forceful 
private sector, coupled with weak municipal government institutions meant 
that the local government platform was completely sidelined. This is reflective 
in Amman's story as well. 
 
Amman's Local Government  
 
The Abdali RECHCO was able to push certain positions that were approved 
by feeble institutions at the local level and strongly driven by national central-
government priorities. In the case of Amman and Jordan, the major (partly) 
democratic institution charged to uphold planning regulations within Amman is 
the GAM, with its half-elected, half-appointed council; and a Mayor appointed 
by the Council of Ministers. The GAM as a first line of defence for Amman's 
citizens in the Capital, for instance, were we able to think of it as such, was 
bypassed. The Jordanian government early on in AID's structure and setup 
announced its full and irrevocable support for the Abdali project, financially 
subsidising the project through a series of upgrades in the surrounding area 
(Executive Magazine, 2007b). The Abdali Master Plan under royal directives 
was not questioned within the municipality. In fact, planners working on the 
Amman Master Plan later recall that all other high-density mixed use 
development sites required four months of debate, analysis and discussions 
at the technical and Amman City Council level and were presented to the 
public in open forums as well as specialised sessions with the unions, 
Chambers of Industry and Commerce and civil society. The exception was the 
Abdali project which was inserted as a "done deal" (Post, 2013), even though 
it did not fit the criteria outlined by the planners in terms of infrastructure, 
public space, and other requirements, and was excluded from all public 
debates.  
During Mayor Maani's era, the GAM worked to reinvent itself and redefine its 
relationship with the city in a role that went beyond services and utility 
provision. The focus was entrepreneurship, and the GAM expanded its role as 
an 'investment promoter' for the capital. This role was considered too limited, 
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and a more powerful institution was looked to in order to help empower 
investors further, in the form of Mawared for real estate ventures. In addition 
to this, with the GAM a new era of exclusive governance appeared to grant 
the Mayor decision-making powers that ignored traditional Council channels. 
With the backing of the military and Royal Court, when Mawared approached 
the GAM about Abdali, it did so from the top. One critic notes that the 
"boundary between regulator and investor and even public and private" is ill-
defined, "in Jordan's neoliberal urban restructuring, the boundary between 
'state' and 'civil society' is very blurred, transparency is non-existent, and 
public information is minimal" (Daher, 2008, p53). Though the GAM was a 
local democratic institute, the municipality was incited to play an additional 
role by using its official and legal mandate to help usher the Abdali project 
through. With directives from the Mayor to support Mawared and AID over any 
other investors, the GAM began to rescind from its role as a neutral observer, 
to act as a hefty lobbying agent to convince residents and businesses around 
Abdali to sell out to the company133.  
 
Cronyism and RECHCOs 
 
As part of their effort to maintain smooth and beneficial relations in 
government, the RECHCOs strategically positioned people of loyalty in 
Amman and Beirut on the boards of relevant corporations and institutions. 
Whether people of influence in politics or business, they were selected to help 
further the organisations' connections to government and facilitate approvals. 
The strategy put the power in the hands of the selected few while 
disenfranchising the traditional local democratic institutions. 
The AID Board had six members initially - three appointed by each partner. 
The representatives of Mawared were at the time: the Mayor of Amman, 
Khalid Wazani (head of the Social Security Organisation), and Akram Abu 
Hamdan (Mawared's Chairman and CEO). Saudi Oger appointed Baha Hariri, 
                                                          
133
 Other instances of the GAM pressuring residents to sell out to major investors will be explored more 
in Section 4.3. 
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in addition to Abdulaziz Nwaiser and Ali Kologhassi, both powerful Jordanian 
businessmen. Omar Maani - the Mayor of Amman - was appointed on the 18th 
of June 2006. Many criticising the decision, with TAGI amongst them, found it 
to suffer from a conflict of interest. It was also noted that the Mayor of Amman 
was charged with the right to sign on behalf of the company (AID) to buy and 
mortgage land and real estate within Basin 14 of the Abdali District; as well as 
order expropriations on behalf of the GAM (Talal Abu Ghazaleh International, 
2007a)134 and so in effect had the right to either purchase the land or force its 
sale.  
In Beirut, though advertised to the public, the process of final selection was 
not more transparent and the representatives on the board were not free of 
criticism. When Nasser Chammaa was made president of Solidere SAL in 
1994, he also received additional considerable decision-making power and 
influence (Summer, 2005). Some saw them as a "collection of private 
interests and powerful individuals who gathered together as Solidere SAL‘s 
Board of Founders in 1992" (Makdisi, 1997a, p672)135. The conflicts of interest 
seen in Amman were also observed in the case of Solidere. For example, at 
the negotiations of the agreement of Solidere's contract for infrastructure 
work, the parties involved were Solidere SAL's Board of Directors - where 
Rafiq Hariri was heavily represented as the largest shareholder on the one 
hand, and as Prime Minister on the other, along with the CDR - where the 
former director of Oger Liban sat. In other words, Rafiq Hariri negotiated 
contract terms with himself (Leenders, 2003, p321).  
 
Confusion of Public and Private Interests 
 
One of the major strategies employed by Rafiq Hariri was that the employees 
were placed in charge of critical state institutions such as the Central Bank, 
                                                          
134 
Mayor Omar Maani's wife Eng. Maisa Batayneh also sat on the AID Board for a period of time before 
being replaced. 
135
 The Board of Founders was to prepare a detailed plan to be submitted for approval to the authorities, 
along with a phasing plan. In addition, the company was also to be run by a Board of Directors - of 
which at least two-thirds would be Lebanese nationals with the shareholders represented in proportion 
to their contributions.  
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the Ministry of Finance and the governorship of Mount Lebanon. This strategy 
was labelled "colonisation" by Saree Makdisi (1997a, p613). The Council of 
Development and Reconstruction was amongst the most important of those, 
and was the key institution in charge of the reconstruction of the country 
under Rafiq Hariri's influence. The new and improved CDR offered the 
platform that Rafiq Hariri was waiting for and so he began infiltrating it - 
amongst other organisations that were involved to a large degree in the 
decision-making process of the Central District development. 
In 1991, there was debate over whether Rafiq Hariri himself should become 
president of the CDR (Leenders, 2003, p321). Fadel El-Shalaq instead, as 
noted in Chapter Two's Case Study, became its President. El-Shalaq was the 
founder of the Oger Liban branch owned by Rafiq Hariri in 1982, and became 
head of the charitable Hariri Foundation in 1984. Hashim Sarkis, in Territorial 
Claims, observes that this in effect meant "the main private organisation in the 
building industry [had] taken over the official planning advisory body. The 
agency that the government used to control private development [had] now 
reversed its role" (Sarkis, 1993, p114). Later on in 1996, El-Shalaq became a 
minister in the Cabinet. Nabil Jisr - who was another high-ranking officer in the 
Saudi Oger branch - replaced him136. 
Indeed, the development marked the start of "the state's abdication of its 
authority" (Makdisi, 1997a, p670) and the beginning of the 'Harirism' discourse 
which culminated in 1992 when Rafiq Hariri became Prime Minister. El-
Shalaq, despite being head of the CDR, still had a private office in Oger 
Liban, and his staff on the CDR were scheduled to move into new 
headquarters in the BCD, renovated at Rafiq Hariri's expense. As Verdeil 
points out, the Prime Minister's private office at Oger Liban was consulted on 
major decisions and often gave out technical expertise regarding different 
public projects. Oger International regularly undertook consultations within the 
CDR (Verdeil, 2002, p83). In this way, Rafiq Hariri was able to keep control of 
the "circuits of political decision-making" (Summer, 2005, p65) which allowed 
                                                          
136
 Other prominent personalities included Fouad Siniora, who was an Oger Liban employee and later 
became Minister of Finance, and Prime Minister. Starting in 1998, Beirut's Municipality was headed by 
Abdel Munim Ariss, who was another known Hariri ally. Hariri appointed his own Legal Counsel Minister 
of Justice, and gave his first-cousin's husband the role of head of the Higher Appraisal Committee as 
well as assigning him to the Higher Judicial Council. 
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him to push his project for the city centre through despite important public 
contestation. Agents within the public administrations and government were 
able to use public policies easily to further very specific private interests. Rafiq 
Hariri and Solidere were so tied together that when he was replaced by Hoss, 
in 1998, a major slowdown began reflected in the halting of major projects 
(Nizameddin, 2006). 
For AID, its persons of influence consisted of like-minded officials spread 
across Jordan's major planning and real estate sector who would promote 
King Abdullah II's vision for a modern Amman. Akram Abu Hamdan was a 
known friend of the Jordanian Royal Family. Ali Kolaghassi as a Saudi Oger 
executive, and involved with Jordan's largest real estate ventures (in Amman 
and Aqaba) was often found to be seated next to King Abdullah II at functions, 
and was received by him in the Royal Places on official presentations 
regarding the developments. Omar Maani and his wife Maisa were also close 
personal friends of the King and Queen. Placing allies into decisive positions 
within the existing administrative institutions meant that the Jordanian and 
Lebanese leadership could be sure of the loyalty of key institutions. 
 
Strong Investor Influences 
 
The reconstruction of the centre had captured Rafiq Hariri's attention starting 
in 1993, when his company Oger Liban took over the reconstruction project 
(mostly through the start of demolition work). At the Taef Agreement at the 
end of the War, Rafiq Hariri took up the initiative again and financed his plans 
with funds from Oger Liban, soliciting Dar al-Handasah to start the process. 
Rafiq Hariri's engagement and involvement in the project was quite large, in 
making subsequent plans (that were personally financed) and through raising 
the private funds required for the revitalisation of the centre (Verdeil, 2002, 
p83). The investors also worked hard to increase their control. Rafiq Hariri, 
who had originated the idea, had been slowly working his way into the 
Lebanese federal government system.  
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The state, after the War, was forced to start reconstituting itself and so 
following the summer of 1992 the last transitional government resigned and 
was soon replaced by a new Parliament and Rafiq Hariri as Prime Minister, 
though the elections were boycotted by large numbers of the population 
(Khazen, 1998). Soon after, amidst a comprehensive reconstruction Rafiq 
Hariri and President Hrawi both extended their mandated terms by an 
additional three years through changes in the constitution. As noted in the 
Case Studies of Chapter Two, the stories of Solidere and Beirut are very 
much stories of power, which actors have it in the city, and how they employ it 
to achieve their goals. Rafiq Hairi can be considered the key figure in the 
entire reconstruction of Beirut's City Centre.  
Once elected to office in 1992, his control over reconstruction intensified even 
further with a verifiable transfer of power. He was now able to use official 
government powers coupled with his extreme influence as an investor and 
was no longer limited to working behind the scenes. As such Rafiq Hariri 
became a name synonymous with "the truest catalyst behind the 
reconstruction of Lebanon" (Stewart, 1996, p496). Some observers estimate 
that Rafiq Hariri used personal funds upwards of USD 5 million 
redevelopment feasibility study (Partner, 1995). Rafiq Hariri became the 
largest shareholder in Solidere SAL, owning 7% of the company officially. 
Despite the fact that the Law No. 117 of 1991 openly sets a limit of 10% per 
individual, various sources put his total holdings in Solidere SAL at up to 19% 
through various third parties (Verdeil, 2002, p83). To preserve this investment, 
Rafiq Hariri through the reconstruction cycles was seen to act primarily as a 
rich businessman rather than a prime minister, which was needed to establish 
the state's power and legitimacy. This allowed other sub-state actors to build 
up constituents (Höckel, 2007), as will be later explored in more detail. 
Rafiq Hariri's large financial gains from reconstruction were not without their 
controversy - even within his own government. In 1994 Rafiq Hariri went so 
far as to resign from government after his Cabinet ministers questioned some 
of his real estate dealings and potential conflict of interest (New York Times, 
1994). However, soon after, he withdrew his resignation after mediating steps 
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by Syrian President Hafez al-Assad brought reconciliation between Rafiq 
Hariri and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (Jansen, 1995). 
With the placement of like-minded individuals - and friends - across all key 
government institutions, in the case of both Beirut and Amman, Solidere SAL 
and AID were able to easily influence and persuade outcomes to their 
advantage. In Beirut, high profile visits from Jacque Chirac and Kofi Annan 
tended to support Solidere (though it is worth noting that neither visit was 
directly linked to the project). In Jordan similar visits promoted the project 
trying to elevate it to levels of international acceptance137.  
The investors themselves were almost celebrities (Mansur, 2013).  The Abdali 
project was initiated between the late Rafiq Hariri and King Abdullah II in 
2002, and Baha Hariri his eldest son soon took over. Baha Hariri, with his 
close ties to King Abdullah, and ranked No. 432 on the 2007 Forbes 
Billionaire List was said to have a net worth of USD 2.2 billion. It was Baha 
Hariri rather than his institution - Saudi Oger that interested the highest 
decision-makers within AID. This became very clear when Baha Hariri split 
from the Hariri Group and established his own company Horizon in 2008, and 
operated this vehicle from Monaco, as explained in Section 2.5 on the Abdali 
Case Study. The personalities of the investors themselves were the only 
requirements it seemed for the Jordanian government138. 
The GAM facilitated Baha Hariri's almost celebrity status - indicating that he 
was the 'end-all' decision-maker as it related to matters of expropriation. A 
meeting between the Mayor and the landowners on the 16th of May 2007 saw 
the Mayor promising them a meeting with Baha Hariri to help them by 
convincing him to purchase the lands directly without resorting to 
expropriation. The strength of these investors was also seen in Rafiq Hariri's 
domination, as a single private actor (a Sunni Saudi-Lebanese) was only 
                                                          
137
 In Jordan, on numerous occasions, Mr. Mouhib Itani, CEO of AID at the time, emphasised that the 
project originated with a "generous gesture by His Majesty King Abdullah II to persist with the 
requirements of the age" (Albawaba, 2009, p1). The Abdali project similarly saw visits by HRH Prince 
Raad bin Zeid; the Ministers of Tourism and Antiquities, HRH Feras bin Raad, the Minister of 
Information and Communication Technology, as well as the Prime Ministers on several occasions, 
hosting ceremonies under their patronage. In a press release regarding the cornerstone of the Abdali 
Boulevard, the company noted that the ceremony was attended by the "most prominent" Jordanian and 
world personalities (Abdali, 2008c). On the 10
th
 of June 2014, King Abdullah II and Queen Rania 
attended the opening ceremony of the Abdali Boulevard. 
138
 Baha Hariri created Horizon as an international construction conglomerate specialised in investment 
and development of large scale real estate and construction projects. 
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possible in light of the marginalised state institutions that had been worn down 
by the War. The fact that these institutions were sidelined meant that Rafiq 
Hariri had the ability to take over tasks completely and could influence political 
decision-makers and as such achieve transfers of power in favour of planning 
proposals. Similarly, Baha Hariri's ability to manoeuvre so swiftly in Amman 
had much to do with his association with Mawared and the Royal Court. This 
special treatment of a select category of investors bred a certain level of 
resentment. The survey carried out in Amman found that most residents - at 
58% - do not believe that the GAM treats all investors equally (Thesis Survey, 
2012). Instead, some investors receive priority compared to others. 
 
Figure ‎4-1: Responses to the Question: "Do you believe the GAM treats the 
Abdali investors and other investors, including Amman's residents equally?" 
 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
New Management Staff and Planners 
 
The role of planners within both the Abdali and Solidere projects is very large, 
and their expertise and previous project experience contributes very strongly 
to the different economic, social and ideological project components. In 
Jordan, Abu Hamdan marked the ushering in of a new era of the promotion of 
3%
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21%
9%
1= Yes Equally
2 = Somewhat Equally
3 = Somewhat Unequally 
4 = Extremely Unequally
5 = Don't Know
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'digitals'139 - a new generation of technology minded foreign educated leaders 
within the government. These leaders slowly infiltrated the organisations they 
ran with new neoliberal ideas, weeding out any 'old guard' concepts, as was 
explored more fully in Chapter One.  
The private planners and consultants working on the plan were a "powerful 
transnational group" involved in the downtowns (Summer, 2005, p74). These 
specialists acted as think tanks to service the "private interests of the 
investors from behind the scenes" (Summer, 2005, p74). One of the first 
things that Akram Abu Hamdan undertook was to create the Urban Workshop, 
as an independent non-profit urban studies centre, which conducted master 
planning efforts. It is almost an investor 'strategy' in both Beirut and Amman to 
have planning and consulting offices entrusted fully with the project plans - 
sometimes appearing as 'third-party' outsider specialists who will give their 
objective and unbiased opinions. The role of the technicians was both 
professional and ideological. As became apparent through the work at the 
Urban Workshop, the specialists hired were responsible for creating 'best 
practices' which are modern, and globally competitive, in what planners see 
as being in-line with international progress and norms. As a means of 
objectivity, both projects also relied on the 'studies' undertaken by their 
designated experts140. The physical design of these new downtowns is the 
product of professional ideologies of the planners who are in positions that 
make them so powerful they realise professional visions and define what 
makes a competitive city as a result. Ossama Kabbani of Solidere SAL 
provides an understanding of his role as a planner to be in the service of 
investors stating that, "we are not planners for the sake of planning like public 
planners. We are doing planning from sound economic criteria, because 
Saudi Oger, if they would do the project, it has to be a feasible (profitable) 
project" (Summer, 2005, p79). 
The competitiveness of a city and the downtown that will be created is left 
almost entirely up to these 'transnational professionals'. It is also the case that 
                                                          
139 '
Digitals' was the nickname used for the group of foreign-educated technology savvy public sector 
employees newly appointed to high-level positions. 
140 
These include Dar al-Handasah Group (Shair and Partners), Middle East Economic Consultants, 
Urban Workshop, as examples.
 
Chapter 4: The Political Impact of RECHCOs  |  211 
 
 
 
the planning networks are linked to the capital investments. When comparing 
across both projects, it is of interest to note the combination of the same 
planners on both.  AID CEO Jamil Itani worked in Lebanon, and Saudi Oger is 
owned by the Hariri family and the company worked directly on Solidere. With 
such strong relations and matching in schools of thought, it is unsurprising 
that the plans so accurately reflect the investor ideology underlying them. The 
Hariri family's company Millennium Development strongly belongs to the 
Saudi Oger network. Ossama Kabbani was hired by Millennium Development 
to develop the Abdali Master Plan, and the architectural design of this plan 
was assigned to the Lebanese Arab Company for Engineering and 
Consultancy (LACECO) (Feltman, 2006) who were also involved with 
Solidere. Angus Gavin, from the London Docklands often called for inspiration 
from this project when designing for Solidere. Loyalties, especially ideological, 
are also built up over time. Ossama Kabbani was a Harvard-educated 
planner, fully sponsored with a scholarship by the Hariri Foundation, and 
worked for Solidere SAL since the revisions of the first Master Plans in 1993, 
and since 2001 he has consulted regularly for the Millennium Development 
group for large-scale urban redevelopment projects. In 2003, Kabbani moved 
from Solidere SAL to Millennium Development to head up a new role as Saudi 
Oger's lead expert for the Abdali project. Kabbani was initially highly critical of 
the reconstruction plans. Shortly after his critiques (Kabbani, 1992), Kabbani 
was invited to join Solidere SAL as the second man in the Urban Planning 
Department, and he was involved in the studies that modified Dar al-
Handasah's initial plans, which critics describe him approaching with a more 
pragmatic attitude.  
Divorced from local accountability to be found within the traditional municipal 
civil service, these planners educated abroad with international experience 
are the decision makers as it relates to the RECHCO plans. It was this lack of 
local accountability, weak local government and civil society, alongside the 
lack of real information the public had (discussed in Chapter Three) that in 
part explains the oppositions' response. In mid-July 1992, the Cabinet voted 
on the basic structure for Solidere SAL. As described in the Chapter Two 
Case Studies, opposition within the Parliament was minimal. The opposition 
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was a silenced minority as the plan passed, and none of the six objecting MPs 
returned for a second term. Other architects and planning professionals were 
also silenced by several different strategies. As relating to the Abdali project 
the opposition was far less organised than in Beirut's Solidere. Writers and 
critics wrote lone news articles; architects spoke out at exclusive symposiums. 
The residents themselves, while agreeing on principle, were unable to group 
their case with that of the more prominent Talal Abu Ghazaleh, and indeed 
many were easily subverted from the cause by financially lucrative offers from 
AID outweighing the alternative from the GAM. Out of the property owners, 
only the Talal Abu Ghazaleh Group took the case to court on the principle that 
the expropriation was wrong. The other smaller lot owners were unable to 
gather sufficient momentum to challenge the municipality, which did not play 
an independent enough role. Though they held several meetings, they were 
easily overpowered by the strategies used by the investors and the 
municipality. 
 
RECHCO Strategies Dealing with the Opposition 
 
Strategy One: The Alternative is Worse 
 
In the case of Amman, as outlined in Chapter One, projects like Abdali were 
framed as the only way forward for government. In Beirut, the option of the 
Real Estate Holding Company was framed as the sole choice, and quickly 
adopted within government. Solicited research at the time indicated that the 
company was the only viable solution (Middle East Economic Consultants, 
1985). In both the cases of Solidere and Abdali, the national government 
turned to the projects as the advertised solution for the need to create jobs, 
and attract investments and tourism. In both cases, the government "claimed 
no responsibility for a RECHCO-less economy" (Post, 2013) if such large 
projects were not allowed by the public. 
Solidere SAL adopted different tactics to deal with the critics to the Master 
Plan. In response to criticism, Solidere SAL reminded the public of the Dar al-
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Handasah plan and the revisions that were made to it. The original plan - as 
an example - included an 80m wide boulevard to rival the Champs Elysees in 
Paris (described in the Case Studies Chapter). Solidere SAL promoted the 
new Master Plan that was ratified by the government as highlighting "the 
intended reintegration of the Central District within the greater Beirut 
metropolitan area" (Makdisi, 1997a, p667). In contrast to the original Dar al-
Handasah plan, Solidere SAL‘s proposal would also include preserving 
buildings in the relatively small core area from the Grand Serail to Martyrs‘ 
Square. Critics were quick to comment that the 1991 Dar al-Handasah plan 
looked "deliberately like a red-herring" (Makdisi, 1997a, p679) so that the new 
Solidere plan would inspire praise and compliments when compared to what 
might have been. However, this new plan as described in the Case Studies 
received little public input. 
In the Abdali case, the threat of a 'much worse' alternative came across in a 
different way. The GAM used the threat of expropriation as a stick to 
encourage owners to sell-out directly. Owners were also bound to act by their 
financial situations, whereby those who sold out to the Abdali project early on 
would receive immediate cash compensation at a slightly higher value 
compared to those who waited for the threatened expropriation, or might be 
forced to fight for a more lucrative valuation through the courts.  
 
Strategy Two: Assimilation  
 
In the case of Beirut, opposition academics and planners were 'compensated' 
with opportunities to participate in the reconstruction project within an 
'embedding strategy'. While most experts declined this 'corrupting' co-
operation (Beyhum, 1992a) two prominent architects were won over and their 
approval for Solidere was highly publicised. Up until the 1996 elections the 
government contained some opposition critical to the project. The 1996 
elections saw all these oppositional figures losing their seats replaced with a 
much more passive Parliament (some described as being there purely for the 
pursuit of wealth). Slowly the opposition were systematically removed from 
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positions of power. Critics such as Leenders (2002) argue that Rafiq Hariri 
bribed unwilling Parliamentarians into accepting Law No. 117 by offering them 
free loans issued by banks in which he was a large shareholder and a pre-
subscription of Solidere SAL shares undervalued at the time. 
In Amman, the media141, alongside major government institutions such as the 
Jordan Investment Board, the Royal Court and the Social Security 
Organisation were all proponents of the Abdali project. The opposition (with 
the exception of Talal Abu Ghazaleh who had the funds for sufficient self-
promotion) were unable to receive equal representation. The media, with the 
government's support offered a 'you are for us or against us' perspective for 
the Abdali project, and opposition to Abdali was labelled as "unpatriotic" 
(Thesis Survey, 2012). In street interviews, a certain minority issued 
statements such as: "those opposing Abdali hate Jordan", "people are jealous 
of Abdali's success", and "we should rally around Abdali for the good of our 
country" (Thesis Survey, 2012). This was also the case for Solidere, where 
public participation was discouraged by the project's supporters. In Ayman 
Trawi‘s (2003) introduction to his picture book of the city centre, the opposition 
to this project are strongly denounced: "Under the banner of patriotism, they 
attacked its architectural, cultural and legal aspects, thus trying to keep Beirut 
in the age of darkness, its squares desolately empty and the threat of civil 
strife looming in its horizon" (Trawi, 2003, p2). 
In the cases of Amman, some of the tenants were 'bought out' of the 
neighbourhood property owner committees and offered large compensation 
packages. This was done often enough that committees effectively dissolved. 
In the Abdali District, meetings with Baha Hariri and promises of immediate 
and higher compensation than would be the case through expropriation found 
some owners ducking out early and agreeing to sell, weakening the overall 
resolve of the opposition. In the case of Solidere, a counter-committee of 
former owners and tenants were established with close links to Solidere SAL. 
                                                          
141 
In 2010, Freedom House downgraded Jordan‘s ranking to 'not free'. Amman‘s Centre for Defending 
Freedom of Journalists carried out a poll of 505 media professionals in 2009 and found that self-
censorship was practiced by 95% of respondents. State-owned media such as Jordan TV have always 
been subject to direct interference at the level of ministers or state security. The two major Arabic dailies 
are publicly-owned - Al-Rai and Ad-Dustour - of which the government owns 60% and 30% of shares 
respectively. 
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Maher Daouk - the symbolic chairman of the counter committee, and later a 
member of Solidere SAL's Board of Directors - was selected as the close 
cousin of the President of the Coalition of Rightful Owners of Downtown 
Beirut, Omar Daouk. Other members and spokesmen were threatened (for 
instance with investigations of suspected tax evasion). Single committee 
members not wanting to be targeted did not speak out publicly against the 
reconstruction project any longer.  
The mosques in the BCD were 'assimilated' in a different way and had been 
seen to 'sell out' their constituents to preserve their own land (Schmid, 2002). 
Economically, the religious foundations wished to maintain the highest rental 
income possible from their properties to preserve their causes. The inflation 
during the War, and the inability to break free from old lease agreements 
made the religious foundations susceptible to interference from Solidere SAL. 
With strong constituent backing, and land protected by waqf, Solidere SAL 
was forced to find a way to appease these institutions. The scattered and 
fragmented waqf estates in the BCD represented a huge obstacle, so Solidere 
SAL presented a strategy of 'land reallocation' (Schmid, 2002) to combine 
smaller plots, which would appeal financially to the mosques. They would 
receive alternative larger plots rather than through compensation by shares in 
the company. By agreeing to congregate their lands - and secure them with 
higher rents - Solidere SAL had effectively bought out the mosques' 
opposition, and so they did not lend a hand to opposing the project on behalf 
of their constituents in the area. The mosques therefore, did not corroborate 
Hezbollah's fatwa and remained silent as private lands were expropriated. No 
religious courts or proceedings were found in the expropriation process as the 
mosques stood strongly by Solidere SAL (Schmid, 2002)142. When it came to 
the Christian constituents, the religious foundations were offered positions on 
the company's Board of Directors and building contracts were often given to 
Greek-Orthodox or Maronite families with strong influences on decision 
makers (Schmid, 2002).  
                                                          
142
 The expropriation was done for the waqf through the concept of tabadul - a mechanism designed to 
deal with the inalienability of waqf being compatible with the needs of society. For tabadul, detailed rules 
concerning its application were developed to make sure that it remained an exceptional mechanism, did 
not induce any economic harm and that the perpetuity of the endowment (not asset) was maintained 
(Hoexter, 1997). 
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Strategy Three: Sidelining 
 
Part of sidelining the opposition involved responding to their concerns in ways 
that misrepresented the project. The Lawyer Mohammed Mughraby, as head 
of the Lebanese Lawyer's Association, indicates in his narrative regarding 
Solidere that there were certain key elements that were used to convince the 
Parliament to pass Law No. 117 (allowing for the creation Solidere SAL) that 
included marketing it in a manner that gave MPs at the time the impression 
that the company would strictly be an arm of government (Ohrstrom, 2007). 
This fed into one of the RECHCOs' main strategies, employed in both Amman 
and Beirut, which was simply ignoring the opposition by marginalisation. The 
Higher Urban Planning Commission denounced the Master Plan on the 17th of 
July 1992, however the plan was approved nonetheless - with no legitimate 
public approval process. The 'Engineers' Union' report, that was given to 
government on the 24th of September 1991, never received a response 
(Beyhum, Salaam and Tabet, 1996, p18). As the plan was being publically 
debated in unofficial forums, formally it built up official support in Parliament 
and the Cabinet, where official decrees and laws were being crafted. Similarly 
in the case of Abdali, there were simply moments that the government chose 
not to respond. For instance, despite letters being sent to all levels of 
government, including the Prime Ministry by property owners, residents, and 
Talal Abu Ghazaleh, no responses were received. TAGI sent well over 30 
written letters and a judicial warning to the GAM - all also unanswered. The 
Council of Ministers ignored official complaints by TAGI with no registered 
response and approved the expropriation143. 
 
  
                                                          
143
 Official Gazette No. 156 dated the 9
th
 of April 2007. 
Chapter 4: The Political Impact of RECHCOs  |  217 
 
 
 
Strategy Four: Removing Recourse 
 
The weakened government structure allowed Solidere SAL to accumulate 
large amounts of power. While Solidere SAL was progressing in terms of its 
incorporation, Rafiq Hariri was entering the Lebanese Federal Government 
strongly. The government was in a state of reconstitution right after the War 
and following the parliamentary elections in the summer of 1992, the last of 
the transitional governments resigned to be replaced by a new Parliament and 
newly appointed Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Rafiq Hariri's power was not 
reduced by the election boycott, and there were few within government willing 
to listen to the opposition's objections. In August, with the public focused on 
the first elections held since 1973 - and in which Rafiq Hariri was running - the 
Cabinet ratified the Master Plan. It was then approved on the 14th of October 
1992, which was the last session of the Council before its recess, leaving no 
further options for legislative recourse.  
The courts, generally the point of recourse for citizens, did not play an active 
role in this case. Strong court systems are an essential pillar of the citizens' 
right to due process144. In the cases of both Solidere and Abdali, weak courts 
were essential to the companies' ability to continue to bypass traditional 
approval procedures. As, mentioned in Chapter Two's Case Study, when 
incorporated, Solidere SAL had several different instances of litigation by 
original property owners to deal with. These owners wished primarily to repeal 
the decree outlining the limits of the BCD and the lots within it, and the 
process by which compensation would be decided. The cases were either not 
allowed to reach trial, or were dismissed. The courts themselves were filled 
with pro-Rafiq Hariri judges (Haddad, 1998)145. Those that brought forward 
criticisms or cases against Solidere SAL soon found themselves the subject of 
                                                          
144
 Strong is defined by three major characteristics: independence from political influences; impartiality 
and competence. Its quality depends on its ability to provide fair hearings, and its efficiency depends on 
it completing trials within a reasonable time (Wolff, 2007).  
145
 Further discussion of the judgments they issued related to property rights can be found in Section 
4.3. 
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aimed investigations; even lawyers extensively involved in the anti-Solidere 
cases were targeted146.  
Most of the court proceedings that were initiated by the opposition committees 
were immediately refused by the courts, or alternatively delayed for many 
years. On many occasions, Rafiq Hariri was also accused of bribery or using 
his strong influence as premier over the special courts. Often critics pointed to 
the fact that proceedings that were previously frozen were suddenly reopened 
after 1998. There was, however, sufficient momentum gained so that the 
process of Solidere SAL continuing on its mission was almost inevitable after 
Rafiq Hariri left office. As such, with the courts refusing to hear the arguments, 
in Beirut, the Solidere plan had no opportunity for legislative recourse once it 
was approved. Similarly, in Amman, the Higher Court of Justice refused to 
hear the case, in addition to lower court refusal to hear from the property 
owners, as will be explored more fully later.  
 
4.3 RECHCOs and Property Rights 
 
Section One of this Chapter looked at the overall process of approval for the 
RECHCOs and the strategies for dealing with opposition. This section will 
focus on the issue of property rights within the RECHCO cases to understand 
the set of circumstances that allowed for expropriation to be used as a 
development tool for the private company. This Section has several major 
goals. The first is to argue that the process of expropriation itself in the cases 
of the RECHCOs had certain fundamental issues relating to equity and 
fairness that must be addressed, and as such undermined property rights, 
including compensation. The second is to argue that on a philosophical level 
the process of expropriation inherently undermined certain citizen rights to 
                                                          
146
 One such example was Mohammad Mughraby who has often spoken out against Law No. 117, citing 
it as unconstitutional - violating Article 15 of the Lebanese Constitution that guarantees the protection of 
private property under law (Ohrstrom, 2007). Mughraby began to accept large numbers of cases b 
property owners against Solidere SAL pro-bono. Late 1995, attempts to discourage Mughraby began 
through threats and political pressure (COMBAR, 2012). Beirut's public prosecutor (COMBAR, 2012), 
Fawzi Abu Murad, wrote to the council of the Lawyers Association at Beirut asking for the permission to 
prosecute Dr. Mughraby for the crimes of "malicious prosecution and slander to the reputation of the 
Lebanese State, the justice system and the security services" (COMBAR, 2012).  
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benefit select investors, and as such gave rise to widespread perceptions of 
government failure at the local and national levels. 
Property in the region is especially important, and often thought of as the 
"means by which people gain power, not only at the local level, but at the 
national and international levels as well" (Nader, 1985, p5). Within the 
analysis of secular property rights in the Middle East, the literature identifies 
four separate idioms of the ways in which property law is used: property as an 
idiom of social relations; a means of control and centralisation; a means to 
gain personal power and achieve mobility; and a means of social engineering 
(Mayer, 1985). These idioms tie property into the citizenship experience and 
as such it becomes an especially important issue in Middle Eastern societies. 
The right of private property is, in literature, considered almost a natural, or 
inalienable human right. They are considered 'natural' not in the sense that 
individuals are born with them, but rather that 'force' of these rights is 
recognised as valid by moral and rational people apart from the provisions of 
laws (Waldron, 1990, p19). Property is not a two-way relationship between a 
person and a thing, but rather the legal relations are embodied as a 
relationship between people. Property rights are a fundamental measure for 
the experience of citizenship within the city and also heavily affect the terms 
of doing business in the city (Mansur, 2013). While property rights are seen as 
inalienable rights, their application is a direct public sector choice. The 
literature has long observed that, "the security of property rights, however, is 
not a natural occurrence; rather, it is an outcome of policy choices and social 
institutions" (Levine, 2005, p61). Indeed, the government must be both 
powerful enough to define and enforce property rights as well as abrogate 
those rights (North and Weingast, 1989). In both the cases of Abdali and 
Solidere traditional rules for expropriation were undermined.  
There are three basic principles of property ownership that should, in a state 
that values principles of private property, be available to the same individual 
(Mayer, 1985). They are the power of disposition, or being able to sell your 
property; the power of use, being able to employ your property as needed; 
and the power of exploitation, or using your land to its fullest advantage. 
Within this relationship, a private landowner has a claim right against other 
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private owners to protect their land. This right is only to be undermined by the 
eminent domain powers of government (Mayer, 1985). These rights are 
generally based on two principles. The first is that the land must be 
expropriated for the public benefit. The second is that the compensation for 
the land reflects fair market value, and is of immediate nature in cash value 
(Beyhum, 1992a and Mayer, 1985). 
Several aspects related to Solidere and Abdali directly affect basic 
understanding of property rights. In Solidere, the compulsory owner and 
occupant participation in the RECHCO, and the withdrawal of occupation and 
return rights was imposed on existing property owners and residents. Those 
who resided in the centre were obligated legally to vacate their dwellings; and 
received shares in Solidere SAL rather than a direct cash payment for fair 
market value. In addition, physical boundaries were dissolved and smaller lots 
combined into more developable parcels. In Lebanon, small private owners 
continued to oppose the scheme as an unconstitutional interference with 
private property rights, especially as they viewed the Solidere project as 
consistently undermining these rights (Rowe and Sarkis, 1998). Original 
property owners in the city centre genuinely felt that their democratic rights 
had been compromised. Some owners felt religious rights had been 
undermined and the new government did not give high regard to Islamic 
jurisprudence by incorporating waqf properties into the project and 
exchanging them with others (Qahf, 2000, p2). In Amman, the property 
owners discussed sit-ins blocking the major roads into the Abdali District in 
protest of the expropriation. This discontentment spread to Amman's residents 
as a whole. 89% of those responding to the Thesis Survey who had heard of 
the Abdali expropriations had heard of them in a negative light (Thesis 
Survey, 2012).  
Samir Khalaf in Lebanon's Predicament describes how post-independence, 
the Lebanese clung to domestic ownership, as was the case with most post-
colonial countries. The new Lebanese state remained suspicious of foreigners 
buying land in the country, and was also careful not to extend too far into the 
holdings of its population (Khalaf, 1987). Planning thus had a relatively 
antagonistic relationship with Lebanese society (Mayer, 1985). Planning, 
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intuitively, involves curbing certain freedoms, and the Lebanese have in 
general always "resisted such restrictions" and continued to "perceive any 
plan as an unwarranted infringement on the private use of property" (Khalaf, 
2001, p86). In Jordan, land has been tied to family heritage and tradition, 
ownership being almost a pillar of "Jordanianness" and citizenship (Massad, 
2001). 
To this end, the failure of large development projects to meet certain social 
goals can be attributed to lack of recognition by national and foreign 
development planners of the pluralistic nature of law and of property concepts 
in the Middle East (Nader, 1985, p20). They believe that many of the conflicts 
that occurred as a result of these area development schemes could have 
been avoided if planners had taken into account traditional legal institutions. 
The cases of Abdali and Solidere had several main complications that they 
had to deal with: 
1. The expropriation was undertaken by a 'private' not a 'public' entity 
which meant that essentially the government was forcing the transfer of 
private ownership from one private citizen (entity) to another. 
Opponents viewed this as unconstitutional  
2. In both the systems of Lebanon and Jordan land is highly prized as a 
form of financial autonomy and citizenship. 
3. The burden of proof in expropriation is on the appropriator to prove that 
the expropriation serves a larger public benefit. As Chapter Five will 
explore further, demonstrating that Solidere and Abdali are in fact in 
the public benefit  was not a straightforward task if done objectively. 
4. Eminent domain was rarely used in Lebanese law, and considered 
fundamentally unjust to property owners - depriving them of the 
commercial improvement of their property only to be used when 
absolutely necessary (Solh, 2013). In both the Jordanian and 
Lebanese cases the procedures for the government to expropriate for 
purely public projects such as roads is an arduous procedure involving 
deliberations. For a private company to be able to carry out these 
procedures including detailed discussions and negotiations with 
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communities would be a highly stringent burden. The property owners 
argued that they themselves were able to pay or borrow money to 
reconstitute their properties.  
5. Appraisal processes were not transparent and undervalued the 
properties (with property owners in Solidere given shares rather than 
cash compensation). 
6. The Solidere project forced property owners to associate with third 
parties.  
At its most extreme, Solidere was seen as a "revolutionary way of 
circumventing the public administration by selling a piece of the capital city to 
a company, mostly owned by public officials, instead of simply creating a 
parallel institution" (Adwan, 2005, p10). By doing so, the company made clear 
the view that the reconstruction process in and of itself was an extremely 
"lucrative investment" (Adwan, 2005, p10), and in the case of Amman's 
RECHCO it seemed, at the expense of basic rights of citizenship including the 
"sacred" (Thesis Survey, 2012) right of private property. 
In both the cases of Abdali and Solidere, in order to ensure that the 
expropriation was fully perceived to be in the 'public benefit', the need for the 
expropriated land had to appear urgent and necessary. In the case of 
Solidere, amongst the reasons given was the inability of landowners and 
tenants to rehabilitate their own properties, due to both financial restrictions, 
as well as their sheer numbers. By the time Henri Eddé published the plan in 
1991, estimates put the number of landowners at about 250,000 which is 
significantly higher than the 40,000 originally listed. Claimants ranged from 
individuals to large Western companies (Robison 1993). The tangled property 
rights of private owners, tenants and squatters within the city centre were 
extreme to the point where the government claimed paralysis as it related to 
redevelopment (Baz, 1998), though it is of note that this sort of expropriation 
was not implemented elsewhere in Lebanon. The project was framed as a 
legal solution to establish Solidere SAL as a joint-stock company where 
shares could be allotted in exchange for property rights (Kabbani, 1992). 
Solidere SAL and the government argued there was no means possible to 
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translate owner and tenant rights financially except through share options that 
would ease coordination, despite the fact that other war reconstruction 
experiences around Lebanon or internationally did not advise the process 
(Solh, 2013). In Amman, the need for expropriation was framed in a very 
different manner. It was setup as an urgent call for infrastructure development 
for new roads147. AID would go ahead and purchase the roads (through 
expropriation if needed) directly from the owners according to the new design 
of the Abdali District. It is of note that all alternative designs equally efficient in 
terms of traffic absorption were ignored (Darawi, 2006 and Talal Abu 
Ghazaleh International, 2007a)148.  
 
Interruptions to a Clear Process of Expropriation 
 
In Amman, the Zaamta neighbourhood within the Abdali District saw 
businesses and residents forced to move as owners were pressured into 
selling property to AID or having their real estate expropriated by the GAM, 
and transferred to AID for inclusion in the project (Thesis Survey, 2012). In 
early 2006, executives within the AID approached residents and business 
                                                          
147
 The Regional Committee within the Greater Amman Municipality in its decision No. 367 dated 30
th
 
May 2005 noted a need for extra roads for traffic purposes. This was seen by critics to be contrived as 
these roads which had previously been internal to the Abdali project were redesigned along the project's 
borders to maximise real estate development space, and new infrastructure required was placed at the 
outskirts. To pressure owners into selling, the GAM had certain plots rezoned to include them in the 
Abdali Master Plan by rerouting roads through them, thereby providing more development land for the 
Abdali District and preventing the owners themselves from having any use for the land. It could now 
argue a 'public benefit' infrastructure argument for the expropriation. The designs produced by the GAM 
were commissioned by the Lebanese company, LACECO whose representatives attended certain 
meetings at the GAM. LACECO was a company closely related to Solidere in Lebanon, it became clear 
to those attending the meetings that these external consultants were acting as an authority within GAM 
regarding planning (Post, 2013). There were at the time - even within the GAM - alternative routes 
described by engineers, explaining different potential impacts of tunnel and highway routes; some much 
more direct and straightforward than those proposed. The GAM did not heed this advice and went with 
the more complicated option (Post, 2013). Talal Abu Ghazaleh sponsored a study of alternative routes 
and published a description of the findings in several of the local papers providing evidence that they 
were of lower cost and higher effectiveness (Darawi, 2006), but to no avail. The new LACECO plan 
curved the two streets to include TAGI's land rather than putting it through Abdali's land, which to the 
TAGI representatives seemed purposeful to force TAGI to demolish their two buildings.  
148
 In June 2007 in a series of articles on Abdali, a popular Jordanian daily - Ad-Dustour - noted that 
similar expropriation cases, involving roads (such as the new 'Jordan Road') running through extremely 
dense areas were solved with community facilitation, with no instance of a property owner going to court 
to argue that the expropriation was not in the public benefit. The author noted that the lack of inclusive 
public dialogue in the Abdali case was a major factor for the higher levels of criticism (Saif, 2007). 
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owners in the area, including Talal Abu Ghazaleh International149, with the 
intent of purchasing their property as they expanded their project to the Phase 
II size given the surge in demand and investment in Phase I (Talal Abu 
Ghazaleh International, 2007a). They were also approached by the GAM‘s 
Mayor at the time – Omar Maani – who intended to persuade a sell-out to 
Abdali Investment and Development.  
This persuasion was not without some forms of coercion, and as the Mayor 
was met with resistance of owners unwilling to sell, the municipality employed 
several major strategies. The first major strategy was to place the plots that 
AID wanted to buy-out 'under study'; a tool with provisions within the 
municipality's law which gave the municipality the right to freeze development 
(construction), mortgages, sales and subdivisions of plots as an area was 
being planned150. In effect, this change meant that if owners did not sell out to 
AID, they would be prohibited from effectively exercising most of the major 
ownership functions on their properties. Among the plots placed under study 
were the Talal Abu Ghazaleh headquarters currently under construction and 
one of the major plots directly on the Abdali project's border. The GAM was 
aggressively negotiating sales. 
Nearing the end of 2006, at a loss for how to move forward and continue on 
the construction of its headquarters, TAGI wrote an official letter to the GAM 
to understand what the study was, its objectives, and when it was planned to 
end so that it would know what to do with the land – the GAM never 
responded. The 'under-study' tool was an effective one and did place massive 
pressure upon the residents and building owners151. As time went on, it 
became clear to property owners that the 'under study' position would be lifted 
and land sales permitted if it was to AID. No land sales were allowed to other 
parties. Local newspapers reported on this issue: the Al-Dustour, on the 1st of 
February 2007 ran an article questioning the GAM‘s decision of so easily 
                                                          
 
149
 The TAGI is more fully described in Chapter Two's Case Studies as a leading auditing, accounting 
and consulting business in the Middle East. 
150
 On the 5
th
 of June 2005, the GAM undertook to send an official warning to TAGI prohibiting them 
from using the plots or continuing to build.  
151
 An article in one of the Jordanian dailies, written at the time, based on a series of interviews with 
inhabitants looked at the large losses and delays they experienced, especially on the loans taken out by 
some owners (including TAGI at annual interest rates exceeding well over 7%); contracts with architects 
and builders by others (Sa'aydeh, 2007a). Furthermore, all vocational licenses on the designated plots 
were not renewed meaning that no commercial enterprise now had a legal license (Zubaidi, 2007b).  
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removing the 'under study' tag from one of the land-plots when an owner had 
sold his plot to AID (Zubaidi, 2007a).  
During this time period, the Mayor of Amman met with TAGI representatives 
several times to talk about the fate of their real estate. Each time an attempt 
was made to persuade TAGI to sell out their properties, and the Mayor told 
the TAGI group that if they did not sell he would be forced to expropriate 
(Talal Abu Ghazaleh International, 2007a). On the 10th of February 2006 
AID‘s Vice President152 firmly spoke out in the newspapers that if the Abdali 
District residents did not sell out to AID, the company would forcefully 
purchase the lands through expropriation by virtue of the GAM (Talal Abu 
Ghazaleh International, 2007b), speaking as if the company controlled the 
municipality's choices. This was especially important due to the fact that the 
GAM had recently come under large public pressure for not acting in the 
'public interest'153 as it related to expropriation. According to TAGI 
representatives, what made these meetings with the Mayor especially 
unnerving was that AID representatives were present at each of these 
meetings taking place mostly within the Mayor‘s office. Even with the pressure 
of putting the plots 'under study', the Mayor was unable to convince TAGI, and 
so at a meeting in his office with representatives of AID present, he told them 
that TAGI's buildings could not be excluded and would cost AID millions of 
JDs in losses (Talal Abu Ghazaleh International, 2007a). Therefore the Mayor 
explained, there was no other solution but for TAGI to sell out to AID. The 
Mayor also informed TAGI that he was empowered by the AID chairman to 
present a very lucrative and attractive financial offer. Otherwise, the Mayor 
informed TAGI if they did not sell he would expropriate (Sa‘aydeh, 2007b).  
While the first strategy was to freeze use of property by placing it 'under 
study', the second major strategy became trying to pressure owners to sell by 
threatening expropriation. For those other property owners unwilling to sell out 
                                                          
152
 This was done in a press release in Arab Al Youm 10/12/2006 (Darawi, 2006). 
153
 This was seen to be the case in the Jordan Gate incident, which set an unfortunate precedent for the 
GAM. Under the decade-old Mayor, Nidal Hadid, who was replaced in 2006, the GAM had involved itself 
in various initiatives under the directive of promoting investments. Amongst these was the Jordan Gate, 
which included two high-rise towers on the 'Sixth Circle' in Amman (Golden, 2006). The GAM had 
expropriated the land for the Jordan Gate from its original owners with the intent of creating a public 
park. It later used the land as an asset to enter into an equal partnership with the Bayan Holding 
Company which would undertake the construction of the tallest two towers in Amman (before the Abdali 
project was launched). No public park was established (Wardam, 2007). 
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to AID, the Mayor was clear that the properties would be expropriated. 
Expropriation carried with it the risk of under-valuation (with the municipality 
able to claim 25% of certain plots for public services such as streets without 
payments) as well as delayed payment times –as long as several years - 
which would leave residents in a stressful financial situation, whereby they 
would not have the financial means to replace the home that they were forced 
to vacate until several months later. Many residents as such sold their 
properties, however many more did hold out. The advantage, as Umm Wael – 
a resident of the Abdali District – mentioned in an interview conducted was 
that the amount was paid automatically, while the GAM amount was projected 
to take several months if not 'years' (Thesis Survey, 2012).  
Constitutionally, expropriation could only be undertaken for projects in the 
'public benefit'. AID had already been marketing the Abdali project as working 
for the overall benefit of Jordan. Abu Hamdan, the project's director, indicated 
strongly that the Abdali project should be given all the support needed as the 
project was "changing the face of Jordan" [translation my own] (Darawi, 2006, 
p25). As the owners steadily refused to sell, the GAM eventually decided to 
move to the extreme that the AID had threatened initially and expropriation 
became the tool of choice. Within 'Basin 14' of Amman's land area, 12,400 
sqm was the total land area to be expropriated. The Abdali project, in addition 
to forcing a host of streets and overpasses on the surrounding neighbourhood 
rather than internalising the infrastructure expansion inside the project, had 
also, much to the astonishment of local environmentalists received exclusive 
permission from the Ministry of Agriculture allowing it to uproot well over 750 
trees.  
The residents of the District were outraged at the GAM's expropriation of their 
lands, and threatened publically and in the press of protests closing down the 
main Abdali District road leading to their homes (Wardam, 2007). At a 
meeting held on a Saturday evening on the 12th of May 2007, the residents - 
in the presence of their Parliamentarians154, brainstormed putting together 
more aggressive actions to prevent the GAM from expropriating their lands 
and real estate holdings. The residents of the Abdali District grouped, and 
                                                          
154
 Mamdouh Abbadi, Odeh Qawas, Zuheir Abu Ragheb, and Marwan Sultan. 
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attended several meetings to decide what to do about the expropriation. The 
residents fully expected the "GAM might send police officers to extradite them 
from their homes" [translation my own] (Sa'aydeh, 2007c, p14) and banded 
together to write a letter to the Prime Minister. TAGI also sent an official plea 
letter to the Council of Ministers to urge them not to approve the expropriation. 
No response was received from the Prime Ministry to either letter. Interviews 
at the time showed residents in the area begging for the expropriations to end 
(Al-Rai, 2007). Many of the residents also noted that after the Expropriation 
Decision, the GAM approached them again to sell the lands directly to AID 
(Maani, 2007). Indeed, several area residents in the Central Weibdeh Basin 
attended a meeting with the Mayor of Amman soon after on the 16th of May 
2007 - six days before the Council of Ministers decision - and decided to 
suspend their protest (Raa‘i, 2007) where the Mayor promised to help them 
maximise their financial returns by selling directly to Baha Hariri. 
TAGI criticised the GAM for allowing AID to build on their lands, and noted 
that if the Council of Ministers allowed for the expropriation to move forward 
(Al-Dustour, 2007), they would appeal to the higher court. A Kuwaiti investor 
also made a public statement that AID had - even before owning the land - 
offered him TAGI's land to build upon – indicating it would not be used for 
infrastructure development as was being argued by the GAM (Al-Dustour, 
2007). The residents that did not sell out and instead proceeded with the 
expropriation process received an official letter155 ordering them to vacate 
their properties within 3 months of receipt of the letter in preparation for 
demolition, and to visit the expropriation department within the GAM to ask 
about compensation. TAGI along with the others received this notice. This 
decision looked to be especially demanding for the residents, as the time 
period allowed for residents to leave their homes ended on the 20th of 
September 2007 - coinciding exactly with the end of Ramadan, at the start of 
Eid al-Fitr a major Muslim celebration, making it an especially difficult time to 
ask families to relocate (Thesis Survey, 2012).  
It such became the case that from June 2005 to well over two years later 
TAGI had not been allowed use or exploit their land, with it being classified 
                                                          
155
 Dated the 20
th
 of June 2007. 
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'under study'. In effect, Abu Ghazaleh was arguing that effectively the 
municipality had facilitated a massive transfer of private ownership from one 
set of owners to another (Kayyali, 2008), as such causing him to incur high 
internal losses. Controversy reached its pinnacle on the 3rd of July of that 
year, as a large chunk of the expropriated property was sold to Abdali 
Investment and Development after being expropriated for roads by the GAM. 
This transfer is evident in the registration documentation at the Department of 
Land and Survey. TAGI filed its appeal to reverse the transfer in August 2007. 
The court reached its decision in March 2008. The legal battle concluded, and 
the court ruled that the expropriation decision taken by the Council of 
Ministers on TAGI‘s property was legally sound. TAGI was required to 
evacuate its premises. The Higher Court of Justice refused to hear the case 
on the 6th of March, 2008156.  
In Beirut, Solidere SAL was able, by Government Decree, to directly 
expropriate all the property of the Beirut Central Commercial District in 
exchange for company shares without the intermediary of the Beirut 
municipality. The constitutionality of this decree was challenged many times. 
However, the company continued to operate with almost state-like powers, 
and included many government officials as shareholders so that these 
arguments were never likely to affect the outcome (Adwan, 2005). The entire 
project, and concept, of such a large private real estate company was entirely 
unprecedented. It was a painfully new manoeuvre and involved a large 
private-to-private transfer that was previously unheard of in Lebanon. 
Pursuant to Law No. 117, ownership of all real estate properties in the BCD, 
and all leases and other rights in such properties were compulsorily 
extinguished and deemed by operation of law to be contributed in kind to 
Solidere SAL. All loans, mortgages and other encumbrances against such 
properties were discharged by operation of law (but attached to the values of 
the Class A shares distributed amongst property owners as compensation 
instead of cash), and the city centre was transferred to the private firm.  
                                                          
156 
TAGI also filed a criminal case against the Mayor of Amman for submitting a 'misleading' memo in 
which he stated that the GAM did not authorise the sale of land to AID  to the Prime Ministry. It will also 
file a civil suit against the GAM in the near future for reparations and compensation in the tens of 
millions as a result of the expropriation (Talal Abu Ghazaleh International, 2007a).  
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Property owners accused Solidere SAL of expropriating buildings that did not 
need repairs, and interpreting the Master Plan unjustly to expropriate more 
than required. Many tried to take Solidere SAL to court, though as discussed 
in the previous section, this was not always possible as at the time many 
courts refused to hear these lawsuits. However, more recently some have 
started to be heard. In one famous example, the Khayyat family filed a lawsuit 
against the Solidere SAL chairman Nasser Chammaa and his assistant, Zahi 
Naaman, accusing them of illegally seizing their building, demolishing it and 
annexing it to Solidere's area of operations (Haddad, 1998). Nothing has so 
far come of the case157. 
 
Appraisal Methods 
 
In order to complete its Master Plan, Solidere required the expropriation of all 
independently owned land-plots in the centre, and a way to value each 
owner's share contributions. The Appraisal Committees formed by Solidere 
SAL consisted of one judge, two engineers, one real estate appraisal expert 
and one economist. The Committees were commissioned to give opinions on 
land-values within the BCD158. One economist sitting on one such committee 
announced that, in his opinion, the actual present value of the land was zero, 
since there was no transaction, or sale, of land possible in the area until it had 
undergone massive reconstruction, indicating that the land therefore had no 
value. The Appraisal Committees began their work as required by Decree No. 
                                                          
157
 The lawsuit was turned down for over half a decade till a Beirut public prosecutor was granted 
permission by the premier's office to investigate the role of the CDR president in the centre's 
reconstruction in 1998. The family lawyer, Mohammed Mughraby believed that the departure of the 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri from office prompted the move. He notes that prior to this, "everywhere we 
turned on behalf of the Khayyat family and their tenants, we faced a dead-end because of the total bias 
of the police and the administration in support of Solidere against the legitimate interests of our clients." 
(Haddad, 1998). Solidere SAL's lawyer in all conflicts of such a nature has been Mr. Shaker Abu 
Suleiman, a member of Parliament and the Chairman of the House Committee on Justice and 
Administration (Mugraby, 1998).  
158
 The Primary Appraisal Committee included a judge of the tenth degree as president, and the other 
members were required to have at least five years of work experience. The Higher Appraisal Committee 
(after which there was no further recourse) had members of ten years of professional experience on it, 
and included a judge of the fifth degree. The Primary Committees were entrusted with assessing the 
overall value of the properties subject to a review by the Higher Committee. The Distribution 
Committees were charged with splitting the assessed value between each of the respective rights 
holders (landlords and tenants). Each beneficiary would then receive the appropriate number of shares 
in the company for the value of the land.  
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2237 by publishing an announcement in the Official Gazette and three local 
newspapers inviting all property right holders in the BCD, for a period of three 
months, to submit the real estate numbers of their respective properties, as 
well as requests, pleas, written remarks and supporting documents, and to 
provide an address to which notices could be served. It was to be during this 
time period that the Board of Founders determined which properties if any 
could be returned to their owners. The provision applied to buildings that were 
still standing, in a condition that did not preclude their intended use, and were 
real estate properties not covered by the reorganisation according to the plan 
and guiding layout of the Central District. 
The committees appraised the value of each of the properties. Each 
beneficiary would receive a number of shares in the new company equivalent 
to the appraised value of the property. The committees were permitted to act 
like courts, and so they applied certain procedural rules for the submission of 
demands and documents. All decisions could be appealed before the Higher 
Appraisal Committee, however this was the last recourse and no cases would 
be accepted through the traditional court systems. Many saw the 
empowerment of the committees with the legislative authority of regular courts 
of law as 'unsuitable' for what should be standard procedural nature (Beyhum, 
1992a). There was also a fear that the government had abandoned its role as 
public defender to a private corporation. The RECHCO bylaws supported this 
noting that even if the Higher Committee issued an unfavourable decision it 
could not be appealed even for reasons including 'abuse of power' no further 
contestation would be allowed (Solidere, 1994)159. 
Mughraby denounced the actions of these committees, and pointed out that 
they were distinct from courts in two ways. The first is that the committees 
based their actions on the literal interpretation rather than the comprehensive 
intended 'spirit' of the law. The second was that the judges were placed on the 
committees in their capacities as 'civilian experts' meaning that they were not 
required to uphold their judicial oath. Later, Mughraby accused at a national 
press conference that the special commissions headed by the judges 
                                                          
159
 Solidere SAL's bylaws asserted that the compensation decision of the superior committees was final 
and could not be further contested under the law (Solidere, 1994).  
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estimated appraisal values that were worth no more than 5% of the actual 
land value. In addition to the under-valuation experienced by certain property 
owners were the forcible evictions experienced. The 'Coalition of Rightful 
Owners of Downtown Beirut' claimed that from the start of operations, only 
100 of the original 5,000 families - a mere 2% - remained in the downtown. 
The number of businesses fell from over 15 thousand to 950, just about 6%. 
Those who refused compensation from Solidere SAL and vowed to stay were 
harassed - trash services were stopped, water and electricity cut off, some 
were physically evicted, and others threatened with physical harm (Haddad, 
1998)160. 
The Appraisal Committees submitted their appraisal of the properties in 
February 1993. The total value stood at USD 1.1 billion. The Middle East 
Economic Consultants (MEEC), who had been involved with the background 
research and documentation relating to the Solidere project, corroborated the 
appraisal of the property. Property owners were given a period of three 
months to object, ending May 1993. However the objections and criticisms 
were so large that in October, 1993 - in response to backlash from property 
owners – Solidere SAL's Board of Founders created a draft list of 159 
redeemable lots valued at USD 370 million. The property owners who wished 
to recuperate these properties were required to surrender corresponding 
amounts of shares in the company as well as an additional 10-12% of the 
property value for services. Somewhere between 100 thousand to 150 
thousand property rights holders originally held 50% of Solidere SAL's 
shares161, and private investors made up about 20 thousand individual cash 
contributions for the rest of the stock – eventually, of the property investors, 
5% had property that was returned from the company capital162. 
                                                          
160
 The evictions grew physical and more violent. On the 15
th
 of July 1998, Constantine Doumani, the 
husband of Victoria Khayyat, chained himself to the Khayyat Building in an effort to stop Solidere SAL 
from demolishing it. Police arrested him and the building was torn down. Doumani later told the press: 
"We were fighting the strong who were overpowering the weak" (Haddad, 1998, p1).  
161
 Solidere SAL was authorised to fund itself in two distinct ways. The company issued Type A and 
Type B shares. Cash subscriptions would be issued in the form of Type B shares that could be sold on 
the market - these would balance the appropriated land asset. The landowners would be compensated 
by receiving Type A shares (Solidere, 1994).  
162
 The relationship was criticised with examples of cases such as the Haddad family who accepted 
Solidere SAL stock options in exchange for their land. At the time, in 1992, their land was valued by 
Solidere SAL at USD 800 per sqm of built-up area. By 2007 the plot had reached upwards of USD 
20,000 - although at that time the family had still not recouped the nominal value of the property 
(Ohrstrom, 2007).  
232 
 
Unfortunately, between 1994 and 2005 Solidere SAL stock plummeted and 
many of the original owners sold out early, redeeming cash for their 
expropriated properties at a loss (Beirut Stock Exchange, 2013). 
As part of the appraisal there were many notable instances of corruption 
regarding the appraisal. Judges hired by the CDR were prompted to appraise 
at almost one-seventh of the property's original value by being paid between 
USD 1,000 - USD 4,000 per property evaluation. Seven committees headed 
by judges had accepted payments that totalled in the range of USD 350,000 
in the four years between 1993 and 1997 (Ohrstrom, 2007)163. So, property 
owners matched with defunct valuation and appeals processes were unable 
to sufficiently guarantee their right to fair market prices and immediate 
compensation, and due to the strict cash subscription schedule, Solidere SAL 
had vested interests to reduce the appraised values further164. 
In the Abdali District property owners also felt their properties were 
undervalued by the appraisal committees. The residents and other property 
owners, having heard of the upcoming and well-advertised 'new downtown', 
had no intention of selling for the regular market prices. Their properties were 
soon to be bordering a prestigious new downtown. Their demands shot up, 
and the initial prices to be found for land and buildings in the area soon 
trebled in value. 
 
  
                                                          
163 
In one documented case, the CDR sued Solidere SAL in 1999 for failing to compensate the state 
agency for the payments made to the judiciary on its behalf (Ohrstrom, 2007). The scandal was 
uncovered when the CDR, under orders from the Court of Accounts which could find no authority in the 
Lebanese budget for such spending, brought action against Solidere SAL before a Beirut court to 
recover the money (CGGL Staff, 1999). 
164
 At its Initial Public Offering, Solidere SAL raised USD 650 million. The first land sale in July 1995 was 
reported in the Al-Hayat Arab daily newspaper to be USD 950 per built-up sqm. Using this rate as an 
estimate for Solidere SAL's 4.5 million sqm means a rough figure for the company's worth of USD 4.275 
billion (Makdisi, 1997a). Solidere SAL's original value however, was set at USD 1.17 billion, which was 
significantly below (25%) of this rough estimate, hence leading to the conclusion that the properties 
were consistently undervalued properties. The reason behind this was Chapter VIII of Article No. 3 of 
Law No. 117 obliging Solidere SAL to setup a schedule to outline project phasing six months following 
its incorporation. This in effect meant that directly following the appraisal's completion - the company 
had exactly six months to allocate the cash subscriptions and provide the necessary liquidity (that must 
exactly balance the land value). This meant that the lower the appraisal value, the lower the amount of 
money that the company would have to raise.  
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Figure ‎4-2: Responses to the Question: "What happened to property prices in 
the area after Abdali was announced?" 
 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
Abu Hamdan of Mawared complained to the press that landowners in the area 
were making "ridiculous" demands (Darawi, 2006, p25). Government 
appointed committees were given the task of valuing the land. Most property 
owners felt that their properties were undervalued, and a significant number 
went to the courts (Mayaram, 2009). Similarly, within the Abdali case, property 
rights come into play with the expropriation of land for the purposes of 
development estimated by government committee165. The odd role of the 
municipality as both facilitator and regulator of sales caused sufficient distress 
amongst property owners that several of the landowners tried to sue the GAM 
for its interference had their cases refused to be heard by the courts (the 21st 
of December 2005). By April 2007 many of the residents had already sold 
properties to AID for fear of them being expropriated (Khitan, 2007). Many of 
course complained that the forced sell-outs to AID were at a compromised 
price, rather than the appropriate market price. Examples from interviews 
                                                          
165
 In more recent proceedings that took place after Omar Maani left the municipality and with looming 
corruption charges over the former Mayor that remained without conviction, the GAM agreed to pay 
more than USD 8.5 million to a local firm in compliance with a court ruling over a four-year-old dispute, 
including an interest rate of 9% over the time period that TAGI was not compensated (Talal Abu 
Ghazaleh International, 2007a). The smaller property owners, who could not afford similar court cases 
were not similarly compensated (Neimat, 2012).  
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given were sold at approximately USD 900 per sqm of built-up area166 (Thesis 
Survey, 2012).  
In a survey carried out in Amman a series of questions were asked related to 
expropriation. Of those respondents who had property expropriated, as 
mentioned in Section 3.3, when it came to the Abdali project specifically, 85% 
believed that the expropriation was not in the public benefit (Thesis Survey, 
2012). In looking at the market price, in general in Amman 59% of residents 
who have had property expropriated outside of the Abdali project believe that 
fair market price was paid. When it came to the Abdali project, of those who 
had property expropriated, the following results were noted showing that the 
overwhelming majority believed that the price paid for the property was unfair. 
Abdali, it seemed, was a different beast in terms of expropriation: 
 
Figure ‎4-3: Responses to the Question: "Was the Abdali Expropriated Price 
Paid Fair?" directed at those who had property expropriated 
 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
  
                                                          
166
 Prices
 
in the higher-end areas of Amman have been seen to reach USD 1,400 per sqm as noted in 
Chapter Three. 
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RECHCOs and the Public Benefit 
 
While the issue of appraisal and defining and achieving immediate fair market 
value was important, the link between public benefit and expropriation also 
gave rise to protest. Article No. 15 of the Lebanese Constitution specifies that 
private property is protected entirely by law and that expropriation is only 
permitted in cases where the public benefit is assured and fair market value 
offered for compensation. The same is true for Jordan's expropriation laws, as 
outlined in Article No. 11 of the Jordanian constitution. Lebanon's CDR 
commissioned a French Constitutional Law expert to analyse the 
constitutionality of the Law No. 117. The final report was clear that the law 
itself did not conflict with the Lebanese Constitution, however the report cited 
that "the potential abuse of its implementation could result in constitutional as 
well as legal conflicts" (Kabbani, 1992, p24). In Amman and Beirut a general 
feeling of unfairness was present. In the case of Amman for instance, the 
Talal Abu Ghazaleh firm was an entity producing jobs, investment potential 
and contributing to the economy as the Abdali project would. Other owners 
resided in their properties, a local college used its property to establish a 
Community College employing hundreds and servicing alongside it hundreds 
of students, the property owners did not understand how AID would surpass 
their efforts at being for the public benefit. 
Within the arguments presented, one Jordanian Member of Parliament - Odeh 
Qawas - was clear in his criticism that the actions against land owners and 
tenants living in the Abdali District, whose properties lie between Al-Quds 
College and the Talal Abu-Ghazaleh Group offices extending to the Armed 
Forces complex and which were acquired by the AID, were a "trespass on the 
rights of citizens and all standards of humanity" (Al-Dustour, 2005, p1)167. A 
previous Mayor of Amman and Member of Parliament, Mamdouh Abbadi, 
explained that through his own experience what was happening in Abdali was 
for a private rather than public good (Sa'aydeh, 2007c). Others were afraid 
                                                          
167
 In a memorandum addressed to each of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the Royal Hashemite Court 
and the Lower House Speaker, Qawas appealed for justice for the residents of the area and assistance 
in restoring their rights (Al-Dustour, 2005). 
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that the expropriation decision would have repercussions on investors‘ 
perceptions in Jordan.  
Within this frame of undermining other citizen's rights, the public benefit of a 
private company's real estate project was not clear to many. In addition, the 
mechanism through which the expropriation was being undertaken was murky 
as the municipality and AID were acting as almost one body. In Beirut many 
critics spoke out about this through discussions and literature. In Les Cahiers 
de L'Orient, Nabil Beyhum - a Lebanese urban sociologist - argued 
extensively that Solidere represented the ultimate 'confusion' of public and 
private interests which was symbolised by Rafiq Hariri and his governmental 
power (Beyhum, 1992a). Rafiq Hariri, in Beyhum's opinion usurped the public 
by private interests. The opponents and property owners - such as 
Constantine Doumani - complained extensively that the government was 
mainly catering to the company's needs with excessive leniency (COMBAR, 
2012). Moreover, it seemed, that with the government's haste to create 
Solidere SAL it gave only very vague outlines as to its purpose, and 
responsibility, especially towards the public. 
The law does not take a rigorous approach to defining public benefit. 
Violations of the 'public benefit' clause were not previously seen in Amman 
(Saif, 2007). In both Jordanian and Lebanese law there is no systematic 
definition for 'public benefit'. Generally under the definitions of public use that 
are considered appropriate, are inclusions for public safety, health, morality, 
peace, law and order, and public projects, such as highway and transit. 
However much is given for consideration of the spirit of the law. Even in the 
most benign of expropriation cases, such as those by public entities for a 
road, for instance, the owners of the properties often fight aggressively for 
what they consider the abduction of their private holdings. Often, the affected 
parties – as in both the cases of Lebanon and Jordan - take the government 
to court to preserve their titles.  
The public benefit also had different implications in Solidere as it related to the 
non-property right owners, the squatters. In the case of Abdali, there were no 
squatters present in the area, though there were long-term area residents. 
The issue of squatters is unique to Solidere and further complicates the 
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property rights concepts explored. Hezbollah - as the unofficial representative 
of the centre's squatters, amongst others - spoke out about Solidere SAL's 
expropriation citing Islamic Law that protects people from giving up property 
against their will (Schmid, 2002). Within the city centre, Amal and Hezbollah 
were very much in opposition to Solidere168. The relocation of squatters was 
long seen as a potentially divisive issue for Solidere (Hanssen and Genberg, 
2002)169. The Solidere reconstruction effort was witness to squatters who 
were forced to abandon their temporary homes and possessions as 
construction crews moved in for demolition. The squatters were mostly Shiites 
and were well supported by Hezbollah - the only 'real' threat it seemed to 
Rafiq Hariri's project (Höckel, 2007, p6). Essentially, Solidere SAL was 
ordered to pay large amounts of compensation to carry out its plans quickly 
and avoid (violent) clashes while evicting people from their homes (Höckel, 
2007). 
The refugee issue offered what was seen as a 'bargaining chip' for Solidere 
SAL, as the squatter issue gave them leverage with Hezbollah, Amal and the 
mosques (Schmid, 2002). The compensation and alternative accommodations 
given for the refugee families meant that perhaps Solidere SAL's waqf 
violations could be overlooked by the religious groups. Solidere SAL's plan 
was to go ahead with their notion that even religious protected land could be 
expropriated. While the official compensation rates for squatter families were 
set at between USD 8,000 - 12,000, in the city centre the rate rose to USD 
100,000 as Solidere SAL attempted to 'buy off' the religious opposition 
(Schmid, 2002). Solidere SAL turned this to their advantage and used it to 
engineer a certain 'political premium' (Ohrstrom, 2007) to help ensure Shiite 
community support for reconstruction. The cost of repatriating the almost 
4,000 Shiite refugees squatting in the building was estimated at USD 50-60 
million. Solidere SAL however, paid Amal USD 250 million to distribute as it 
saw fit (Ohrstrom, 2007).  
                                                          
168
 They were accused by Solidere SAL of forging registrations, and encouraging families to move to 
previously empty buildings marked for demolition amongst other tactics (Sawalha, 2001). 
169
 The Civil War found many Shiite refugees from the South of Lebanon and Eastern Beirut taking up 
accommodation in the Western part of the Capital. At the time of the ceasefire, more buildings near the 
Green Line were squatted by this group, which was supported by Hezbollah and Amal - the Shiite 
parties - and so they became rather powerful (Schmid, 2002). Hezbollah was already popular for fighting 
the Israeli occupation in Southern Lebanon at the time.
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
As illustrated in the strategies outlined above, the Solidere and Abdali model 
of development automatically discounted open discussions between different 
private and public groups, because doing so would alter and slow down 
decisions for investors reducing time value of money, leading to lower profit 
generating abilities. This section will discuss why the exclusive process was 
detrimental to the RECHCO experience, for while Rafiq Hariri employed 
certain strategies in the BCD project that were successful in the city centre, 
the tactics left a trail of embittered constituents that would haunt him in future 
projects, as shown below.  
 
RECHCOs Created a More Antagonistic Society 
 
When the Lebanese stopped believing in the credibility of the democratic 
process, they started moving towards a more violent and resistant approach 
in the form of guns over dialogue (Harb, 1998). This lack of involvement in the 
process of reconstruction was especially discouraging given the need for 
post-war Beirut to unite the various religious factions to work together. The 
elitist process also failed to truly address the needs of the poor (Makdisi, 
1997a). Lack of affordable housing was a problem that became urgent, as 
squatters were removed from the Central District (Whittington, 1994). Sheila 
Carapico writing on the case of Yemen within the Arab World notes that the 
suppression of civil society may ultimately lead to violence. She also 
demonstrates however, for her case study, that "democratic experiments" 
(Carapico, 1996, p316) are not likely to begin at the state's level and are far 
more likely to arise from civil society. Critics have noted that the sidestepping 
of a public consultation that appears to mainly benefit the elite would have 
negative repercussions. Meaning that, progressively, more aggression might 
be noted.  
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Moving back to the Introduction of Chapter One, the lack of civic engagement 
allowing for forms of agonistic citizenship have left citizens in Beirut and 
Amman with the inevitability of becoming antagonistic. When unheard and 
unable to change their governments through dialogue, citizens inevitably are 
forced to hijack space. Interests that are excluded from the political order 
become highly charged and politicised (Kalyvas, 2010). This move to resort to 
violence and physical demonstrations to portray presence are the result of a 
systematic disengagement of the public from the approval process, and the 
general perceptions of corruption. Late 2006 well into 2007, this was 
manifested in a tent sit-in in the Beirut Central District. Where at first the 
political power had moved the marginalised citizens and squatters out of the 
centre, the trend was reversed when hundreds of pro-Hezbollah activists from 
the South moved back to Beirut's Central District to stage a long-term sit-in. 
The sit-in prevented normal daily routine business within the centre, 
temporarily jeopardising its economic success170.  
 
Loss of Legitimacy in Political System 
 
The low legitimacy and credibility of the RECHCO approval process was 
amongst the most contentious factors for citizens (Thesis Survey, 2012). The 
weak institutional state structure was, as outlined above in the case of the 
RECHCOs, "exploited by individual actors to increase their power and 
influence...this has had the effect of tightening traditional patron-client 
relations" (Höckel, 2007, p13) and was concluded by sacrificing integrity and 
the stability of state institutions, which would potentially undermine long-term 
national development. The confidence of citizens in the institutions that did 
exist thus slowly faded as bureaucrats abused powers and tried to 
monopolise state resources.  
                                                          
170
 Hobbes (1651) outlines a view that citizens are not obliged to submit to the government in cases 
where the government is in fact too weak to act appropriately. For others when a government fails to 
secure natural rights (Locke, 1689) or satisfy the best interest of society, or what Rousseau (1763) calls 
the 'general will', citizens may withdraw their obligation to the social contract. Locke (1689) was the first 
to argue that individuals would in fact form a state that would provide a 'neutral judge' to its members, 
and that the contract was void in cases that this did not happen. A more agonistic society, allowing for 
more dialogue would be the ultimate goal. John Stuart Mill did much to advance the idea of government 
by 'discussion' (Mill, 1859). 
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The weak state's limited capacity to setup a planning central agency, for 
implementation and monitoring of reconstruction, after the Civil War allowed 
Rafiq Hariri as a private entrepreneur to initiate "his profit-oriented trickle-
down development strategy" (Höckel, 2007, p14). As a result of the 
systematic failures in the process in Beirut, which did not stop public abuses 
or create a comprehensive plan for reconstruction, state institutions lost 
legitimacy amongst its citizens, and reinforced their dependence on sectarian 
leaders instead (Hanf, 2003). The ordinary Lebanese citizen was slowly 
alienated from the centre, and the needs and interests of the worst off 
segments of society were not recognised or taken into consideration. 
Similarly, the average Ammani was neither part of Abdali's approval process, 
nor its target audience. The major parts of the population therefore felt 
extremely neglected by their government and withdrew support for its projects 
(Höckel, 2007). 
The reconstruction process in Beirut saw a state that remained weak and 
fragmented. In Amman, the citizen's elected representatives in the 
municipality and in Parliament could do nothing to stop the project. The 
mediocre performance of the state institutions meant it was unable to fight 
corruption and guarantee basic welfare provision for everybody to the extent 
that national integrity was secured. In Lebanon, this weakness allowed para-
state actors such as Hezbollah to take advantage establishing 'states-within-
the-state'. Rafiq Hariri's focus on the Beirut Central District reinforced his 
notions of decentralisation thereby weakening the central state and creating a 
more confrontational state (Höckel, 2007). The weakened institutions were 
unable to stand up to reconstruction politics and prevent resources from being 
utilised for personal and parochial gains. This perpetuated the instability, with 
new conflicts over assets and identity. The same may be held true for Amman 
where weakened institutions gave rise to a surge of corruption. 
Other authors have criticised the institutional framework surrounding the 
approval's process. Assem Salaam, a Lebanese architect, planner and former 
head of the Syndicate of Engineers, points out, "clearly, privatisation should 
never be a choice when the administration is weak and its institutions are 
ailing" (Salaam, 1996, p132). In its place, resource priority should be given to 
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reinforcing the state institutions capable of playing a role in the formulation of 
development policies and programs as well as ensuring optimal 
implementation (Salaam, 1996). In Amman the low legitimacy of the 
municipality acting as Abdali's advocator alienated residents who felt sidelined 
from the process when interviewed. 
 
Projects Marked by Lack of Public Participation: People feel left out 
 
Any public participation in the Solidere and Abdali approval process was 
limited and superficial, as described by the process above. The Thesis Survey 
undertaken in Amman reveals that the ordinary Ammani citizens are not even 
aware of the investors and stakeholders involved in the Abdali project, 
specifically Mawared (only 3% of Ammanis identified it as an investor) 
compared to 27% who were identified Baha Hariri (Thesis Survey, 2012). In 
the survey carried out, 71% of respondents felt that they should have been 
invited to a public meeting regarding Abdali to discuss it, and an additional 
77% indicated that they would participate had they been invited to do so 
(Thesis Survey, 2012)171. The choice of participation was the governments'. 
Instead, the planning politics created spaces that - though may be visited by 
the public - are not within the public sphere, as debate is not welcome in 
them. Communication with Amman and Beirut is invariably "from above, 
through the representation of future towns on fancy billboards and nicely 
designed brochures and information booklets that are presented to a limited 
public" (Summer, 2005, p120). So while the public knows of the existence of 
these projects, citizens cannot interfere. The result of this specific sort of 
freeze on public participation is to discourage local democracy. The 
institutional setup for these projects, almost at a default, undermines the 
capacity and potential for average citizens to participate in the planning 
process. At the same time, through favouritism and inclusion, transnational 
                                                          
171
 The UDC examples in the UK reflect the fact that while cooperation between the public and private 
sectors is admirable, the relative strengths of both must be taken into account to ensure the limitation of 
coercion in negotiations (Clayden, 1990). The community, in the form of the Docklands Boroughs, had a 
position of powerlessness (Oc and Tiesdell, 1991). They were only able to delay development through 
calls for public inquiries and other 'procrastination' measures (Oc and Tiesdell, 1991). 
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investors and economic elites are empowered instead (Swyngedouw et al., 
2002; Brenner and Theodore, 2002). In both Jordan and Lebanon it strongly 
appears to be the case that plans for projects such as Abdali are inherently 
developer driven in their politics, rather than community driven.  
It is of note in both cases that local government is usurped in the process, 
bypassed as the national government steps in to overshadow decisions and 
ensure that the project is pushed through by the highest levels (and later 
international markets). From the perspective of ordinary citizens, national 
government is far less accessible than their local city council, and so when the 
government closest to the people ignores the citizens, the impact is 
considered greatest (Post, 2013), and the projects categorised unfavourably. 
In the series of survey questions outlined below, Abdali appeared especially 
unpopular (Thesis Survey, 2012).  
 
Table ‎4-1: Responses to the Question: "Should we have more projects like 
Abdali?" 
Response Percentage 
1= Definitely 9% 
2=Maybe  14% 
3=Neutral 19% 
4=Not Really 32% 
5=Not at all 26% 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
Table ‎4-2: Responses to the Question: "If neutral or no (3, 4 or 5), which of 
the following would change your mind?" 
Response Percentage 
Restrictions and monitoring 34% 
Public participation  64% 
More building regulations 42% 
Other 27% 
Nothing 8% 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
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In talking about the future, residents were split on whether being denied a 
chance to participate this time made them want to participate even more, or 
give up participation entirely, so disenfranchising them from further 
participation in the process (Thesis Survey, 2012). Those under the age of 35 
were most likely to answer '5=a lot less' showing that the negative impact was 
mostly highly felt by the youth category. However the healthy large '1=a lot 
more' category was the greater issue. 
 
Figure ‎4-4: Responses to the Question: "Did the Abdali project in any way 
make you want to participate by voicing your opinion to do with development 
in the city more or less?" 
 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
The process by which the urban mega-projects were approved reflects how 
the existing political structures within Amman and Beirut were able to adjust 
resources to rebuild spaces based on the current ideologies of those with 
high-level positions in government. The process driven by a certain elite and 
transnational group begs the question of just who the projects are being 
designed for and what the consequences are on local democracy when the 
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average citizen is shut out of the process. On whether residents thought that 
they would be given a chance to participate in the future, most believed now 
that Abdali was approved they would have fewer opportunities to do so. 
 
Figure ‎4-5: Responses to the Question: "Do you think you will be given a 
chance to do this in the future?" 
 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
Ong (2006) generically outlines a technique of government premised on a 
hierarchy of social groups and entitlements to build or participate in particular 
processes of spatial production. This technique facilitates access to, and 
participation in, the production of space to certain groups over others. There is 
little local specificity however to which the entitlement is granted, and capital 
may thus trump other prerogatives, including citizenship. This is seen clearly 
in Amman and Beirut's RECHCOs where investors are placed in the process 
above citizens. 
 
  
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
1=a lot more 2=more 3=neutral 4=less 5=a lot less
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
Categories
Chapter 4: The Political Impact of RECHCOs  |  245 
 
 
 
Segregation 
 
Critics claimed the private sector has enjoyed almost exclusive leadership, 
whereby the state barely even had a monitoring role (Salaam 1998a, Corm 
1996), meaning that not all societal categories were included and cared for. 
Beyhum (1995) and Salaam (1998b) look at how the Solidere planning 
process has displaced certain groups - namely the poor - and instead put 
investors and contractors at the heart of the process. George Corm, the 
Lebanese economist and Minister of Finance, put it best when he said, 
"clearly, it is the Lebanese population, resident or emigrant, that is the missing 
element from the actual process of reconstruction" (Corm, 1996, p96). The 
sidestepping of a comprehensive consultation process with the public 
focusing on niche elite would inevitably have negative repercussions (Calame 
and Charlesworth, 2009). This resulted in a project where the discourse was 
based on exclusion. Nabil Beyhum argued, this project represents nothing 
less than a system of class segregation, whereby the future city centre of 
Beirut will be cut off and isolated from the rest of the city and the country 
precisely in class terms (Beyhum, 1992a).  
In the eyes of many the needs and interests of society's poorest segments 
were barely recognised. These were the main reasons why significant 
portions of the population felt neglected by the government. In its haste to 
create a regeneration vehicle, the government excluded participation from the 
Solidere project entirely (Sawalha, 2010), and the same is true of Abdali. The 
Solidere project had found that participation was shifted in Lebanon from the 
thriving pre-war merchant class of the majority to an exclusive minority 
corporate class (Saliba, 2007). Ultimately Solidere's failure to "cater to and 
integrate the city's periphery and hinterland led to a loss of government 
legitimacy and credibility among its citizens and weakened state control in the 
marginalised regions" (Höckel, 2007, p1). After losing their homes in the 
centre the citizens, now relocated to the Southern Suburbs, could simply not 
afford to live in Beirut anymore and withdrew support from Rafiq Hariri, turning 
to Hezbollah instead. Hezbollah easily created "territorial domination" and was 
able to establish "autonomous governance structures" parallel to the existing 
246 
 
state institutions (Höckel, 2007, p1). In Amman, residents turned to the 
streets, with sit-ins and cries of corruption, though the effect was much more 
minimal than the Arab Spring seen across the region. 
It was into this context that Rafiq Hariri proposed his new Elyssar project to 
government and Parliament to be a similar structure to Solidere SAL172 
(Shami, 2003, p67). The project was framed as infrastructure rehabilitation 
work through a private real estate company legitimised by the same law which 
established Solidere SAL, but was quickly derailed by the residents of the 
area. The lessons taught by the city centre were that the conventional means 
of appeal against injustice through the legislative system were not effective at 
preserving 'democratic rights', rather 'non-democratic means' were the more 
effective tool as revealed by Elyssar (Saliba, 2000). While Elyssar began as a 
private agency much the same as Solidere SAL it was forced to become 
public by outcries by (sometimes armed) community representatives for the 
area's constituents (Harb, 2001). The project allowed for the representation of 
resident interests in both the project's decision-making process and its 
implementation173. 
 
Major Investors Expect Similar Treatment: The Institutionalisation of 
Privilege and Changes to Doing Business 
 
One of the main arguments behind the lacking public participation process 
was the need to provide a 'good' business climate through catering to the 
                                                          
172
 The Elyssar project (Harb, 2001) planned to reorganise the south-western suburb of Beirut. The area 
was known for being inhabited by Shiite Muslims and for illegal housing and other commercial activities, 
where about 80 thousand of the 120 thousand strong population are considered illegal residents. The 
Elyssar project was set on 5.6 million sqm of land to develop coastal areas and allow for Beirut's 
expansion. The basic idea behind Elyssar was to relocate the illegal residents in new social housing 
units to free the coast for urban development through a new zoning plan.  
173
 As the project began to be formed, the neighbourhood committees began to mobilise themselves and 
to obtain information about the project, and what it meant for them as residents, although in part 
information, was monopolised by several key actors (Harb, 2001). The squatters that had been 
relocated from the BCD did not want to be affected again. Their response this time was much more 
violent and Law No. 246 of 1993 which created the framework for planning the Southern Suburb was 
soon rethought (Harb, 1998). The power struggle which followed brought with it modifications to the 
technique and process. The state, rather than a private company soon became the main actor in the 
new reorganised project. Amal and Hezbollah had joined forces in order to pressure the government into 
rethinking the Elyssar project setup (Harb, 2001). As such, it was decided that the rehabilitation would 
be undertaken by the owners and residents themselves without the interference of a third party.  
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demands of business interests and elites as a major goal for the Solidere and 
Abdali projects in Beirut and Amman. As outlined in Chapter One, this new 
business climate was essential as the cities competed on the international 
front for investments. A more attractive city for investors is one that caters to 
their need to bypass what they see as 'red-tape', and as such institutionally 
these are the changes that began to be implemented. An article that appeared 
in The Daily Star on the 27th of June, 2004 illustrates the competition logic that 
frames such projects. To this end, other cities appeared almost envious. One 
author writes that Beirut‘s centre has set the standard for international and 
regional businesses in the region, and with Amman revamping its commercial 
centre in the form of Abdali; "Damascus should start planning now for what it 
has to offer" (Husrieh, 2004, p1)174. 
As the Abdali and Solidere projects progressed, other transnational investors 
began to expect similar 'fast-tracked' treatment skirting the regular 
bureaucracy. And, the government was responsive. Special units staffed with 
western-educated technocrats were setup to service the elite investors. The 
GAM created the Special Projects Directorate, whose staff would follow-up on 
all permitting procedures - in essence it provided a One-Stop-Shop for 
investors. In addition it became widely known that the Royal Court was the 
best place to pursue support for projects by those select investors able to use 
their connections to bypass set processes. Through the Royal Court and 
directives from the Special Projects Directorate, investors were able to bypass 
the standard review procedures and committees established to ensure a 
certain degree of public scrutiny for mega-projects. Mawared itself was one 
such institution, created to facilitate large privately funded projects, with the 
weight of the public sector fully behind it. In Beirut, we see a similar situation, 
with the case of the Investment Development Authority Lebanon (IDAL) 
founded in 1994 with a One-Stop-Shop created in 2001 with the power to 
supersede authorities in issuing administrative permits and licenses at that 
one location (Krijnen, 2010). The IDAL was seen to clash with the existing 
practices of building permit applications (Krijnen, 2010)175. 
                                                          
174
 Written prior to the outbreak of violence in Syria. 
175
 In fact the related institutional authorities undertook to strike.  
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The fast-tracked process with little scrutiny gave rise to accusations of 
corruption. Without the ability of the RECHCO investors to setup a unique set 
of circumstances that would lead to their approval, the RECHCOs would not 
have been approved as quickly or been granted the extent of public sector 
support and subsidies they were. The Thesis Survey carried out in Amman 
reveals that most of Amman's citizens do not believe that the process of 
Abdali's approval was transparent. From comments it seemed like the very 
process gave rise to significant doubts regarding the equality of citizenship 
and stirred quite high degrees of anger related to their system of governance; 
only 11% of respondents regard the process as transparent (Thesis Survey, 
2012). Many cited 'Abdali' as one of the reasons for their marching in the over 
700 protests that took place in Amman in 2012 as construction began and 
towers rose (Thesis Survey, 2012).  
 
Figure ‎4-6: Responses to the Question: "Do you think the process of 
licensing Abdali was transparent?" 
 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
The entire process of Solidere and Abdali's creation was marked with 
increased amounts of individuality and clear instances of corruption given the 
limited public participation, and limited oversight. Assem Salaam argues that 
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"entrusting Beirut's Central Business District...redevelopment to the CDR is a 
typical example of the dangers inherent in the state's abdication of its role in 
orienting and controlling one of the most sensitive reconstruction development 
projects in the country" (Salaam, 1993, p198). Charles Adwan of the World 
Bank, in looking at Corruption in Reconstruction, writes that the precarious 
position of Solidere at the border between public and private gives it 
jurisdiction while "escaping the control and accountability of the public 
oversight agencies and mechanisms" (Adwan, 2005, p10). Solidere's "grey" 
status worked to nurture the confusion between public and private that existed 
in Lebanon leading to "flagrant" conflicts of interest and abuse of public office 
(Adwan, 2005, p10). The same can be said of the process that allowed for 
Abdali. 
While Solidere SAL and AID had assumed certain public privileges and 
responsibilities, they were private companies governed by certain commercial 
laws. At the time, even being a publicly listed private company did not include 
or impose any strict standards related to transparency, disclosure or 
protection of the minority shareholders and stakeholders. Solidere SAL 
therefore had control over its jurisdiction without being subject to public 
oversight and accountability. For AID, as a private company not publically 
listed, the requirements were even lower. Self-profiteering soon emerged 
strongly within the two cases. Within Abdali, for instance, one of the biggest 
contracts was the USD 300 million construction of the Boulevard that was 
given to Saudi Oger (a company owned by the Hariri family, also the 
RECHCO's main investors) (ArabianBusiness.com, 2007). 
In 2003, Theodor Hanf of the University of Bonn and the Sorbonne carried out 
a representative survey of the Lebanese's opinions concerning their political 
leaders (Hanf, 2003; Leenders, 2003). He found that this expansion of 
corruption contributed to the build up of public resentment and general 
discontent. An Al-Nahar poll in 1998 identified corruption as the nation's 
second highest priority problem after the Israeli occupation in the south176. 
Civil society movements began aggressively targeting corruption, and as such 
                                                          
176
 MP Najah Wakim documented corrupt deals and threats by government officials, the financial 
windfall of which were astronomical (Blanford, 2006).  
250 
 
the Lebanese Transparency Association was formed. International 
organisations177 grew to be involved, and by 1998, members of the same 
Cabinet were actively accusing each other of chronic corruption (Adwan, 
2005). In Amman, the residents' objections to Abdali meant that Mawared's 
file was transferred to the ACC resulting in its remaining projects being 
frozen178. 
In tracking an international corruption index starting about 2004 onwards, the 
index consistently indicates that corruption is on the rise in Jordan 
(Transparency International, 2012). This finally ended in a series of active 
public protests in 2011 and 2012 that manifested demands for the reduction of 
corruption across Jordan (with the number of strikes and protests counting in 
the thousands) (Shaoul, 2012). Mawared was not the only cause, but certainly 
a contributing one for ordinary citizens to demand that the preferential 
treatment reserved for investors be given to the general public as well. In 
Lebanon, other indicators from the public and in the literature indicate that 
corruption was highly perceived within the country (e.g. Khal, 2003). The 
reconstruction process can become extremely lucrative if abused and so is 
especially vulnerable to corruption. Adwan goes so far as to describe post-war 
Beirut as an organised political system of "keptocracy" (Adwan, 2005, p 15).  
 
  
                                                          
177
 The United States Agency for International Development launched large media awareness 
campaigns, and the United Nations launched a pilot integrity project through the Centre for International 
Crime Prevention and the National Integrity Steering Committee. The European Union and the World 
Bank exerted pressure on the government to improve institutional legislation. 
178
 As a result of continued public protests regarding corruption and political reform, amongst other 
major policy issues, in October 2010, the Prime Minister at the time, Samir Rifai referred a report on the 
financial and administrative performance of Mawared to the Anti-Corruption Commission. As previously 
mentioned, several key players involved in the process were jailed. In March 2011, the Government of 
Jordan dissolved all municipal councils in the country, and Omar Maani, as Mayor of Amman, was 
relieved of his duties. On the 13
th
 of December 2011, he was detained for "failure to perform his official 
duties" (AFP, 2011) and was later released on bail. Akram Abu Hamdan, the former CEO of Mawared, 
was also implicated in a corruption case (Neimat, 2011) 
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Figure ‎4-7: Jordan's Corruption Perception Index, 2001-2011 
 
Source: Data selected and graphed from Transparency International, 2012 
 
With the changes to doing business focused on a certain elite class, the 
citizens of the city began to react negatively to the lack of transparency and 
equality in the process. In a survey in Amman, only 33% of respondents 
indicated that the GAM treats 'Other investors and Amman's residents' equal 
to the 'Abdali investors', with the remaining two thirds of respondents believing 
that the treatment is unequal. When we look at the responses of those who 
have dealt directly with the GAM licensing process the percentage that 
believe the GAM treats all investors equally drops to just under 10%. 
 
Moving Forward 
 
Jon Calame (2005), writing on Post-war Reconstruction: Concerns, Models 
and Approaches notes that "when municipal authorities are severely weak or 
disorganised, active professionals must turn to other institutional frameworks" 
(Calame, 2005, p28). In the case of Beirut and Amman, the answer for these 
professionals might have been in the form of a surrogate - private investment. 
In other words, the city centre projects of each were not guided by local or 
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community agendas in the political sense, but rather by pure market forces 
with the economic 'invisible hand'. 
The state's limited institutional capacity with no central planning agency to be 
held accountable for the projects was, in Amman and Beirut, what allowed the 
private entrepreneurs in both cases to continue on 'profit-oriented' strategies 
with little oversight. The "vacuum left by the state being unable to adequately 
fulfil its basic functions" (Höckel, 2007, p13) meant that powerful transnational 
investors as well as other para-state actors such as Hezbollah moved in 
easily to fill the gap and usurp the process for their own benefit. In Lebanon, 
reconstruction after the War was inevitable. It required significant funding as 
well as a developed institutional capacity. In Jordan, projects such as Abdali 
were framed as the economic future. While the speed and efficiency of 
(re)construction was important, the lack of an integrative approach caused 
embitterment and perceptions of alienation from the space the RECHCO 
created. 
The example of Solidere in Lebanon is a clear case for how even when 
democratic institutions do exist they may yet give way to corruption in the 
event of insufficient public scrutiny and public ability to change and reform 
these institutions to serve the purposes of transparent and engaging 
rehabilitation. Adwan notes that the "extension of wartime elites into post-war 
politics seems to be a common post-war feature. Their abuse of power, 
capture of state institutions, and appropriation of public assets seems to be an 
additional common factor" (Adwan, 2005, p17). The results of the attempts at 
consensus building in Lebanon have been captured instead by "former 
warlords or well-connected millionaires" (Adwan, 2005, p17). 
Both Abdali and Solidere supporters argue that their 'need for speed' realises 
efficiency and economic returns (explored more in Chapter Five) that an 
inclusive and lengthy public negotiation process would not include. In effect, 
they are arguing that efficiency outweighs the need for legitimacy. The 
balance between legitimacy and economic growth may be more complicated 
than is realised. Transparent processes are required. As shown, the credibility 
of the process was essential to the perpetuation of peaceful dialogue. The two 
cases of Amman and Beirut frame economic recovery and construction as 
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being profit-motivated rather than community-related. As such, accountable to 
shareholders the responsiveness to the concerns and expectations of local 
residents was minimised in the RECHCOs. The civil society that existed 
attempted to intervene in the process, however the lack of systematic 
coordination and strategies employed by the RECHCOs for silencing the 
opposition explored here meant that these attempts were often ineffective. 
Frederick Cuny, writing more than two decades ago (Cuny, 1983), notes how 
this form of polarity most commonly generates distrust and discourages public 
participation, which then decreases the 'potency' of relief efforts. This type of 
warped process is found in Beirut and Amman, where the city residents are 
seen as beneficiaries to a pre-set scheme rather than clients to whom the 
scheme will be held accountable, though the extent to which they are actually 
economic beneficiaries will be explored in the next Chapter. As a result, this 
Chapter noted that the RECHCOs do have an impact on citizens' perceptions 
of, and involvement in, politics in the city, and that this impact is largely 
negative. RECHCOs are built devoid of meaningful public dialogue and input, 
and leave citizens disenfranchised. At the local level, people primarily turn to 
their municipal governments as the first order of democracy, and getting their 
voices heard. When "local" power is usurped to the national level and 
misdirected, the vacuum that remains leaves citizens with an uneasy feeling 
that they are battling for existence (Thesis Survey, 2012). Moving forward 
from this, the next Chapter will explore the third pillar of the economic impacts 
of RECHCOs on the cities' citizens and complete the picture of the social, 
political and economic impacts. 
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5. The Economic Impacts of RECHCOs  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Overview 
 
From inception to completion, as a basis for their public funding and support, 
RECHCOs depend on their ability to frame themselves as vehicles for the 
public benefit. The previous Chapters looking at the social and political 
impacts analysed the narrative used by governments to promote RECHCOs 
as development tools. This common justification is seen across the 'prestige 
model' of real estate development around the world (Loftman and Nevin, 
1995)179. In the cases of Solidere and Abdali, the RECHCOs promoted 
themselves as harbingers of modern urban planning and governance to 
secure physical regeneration in declining areas in addition to being economic 
stimulation for a depressed economy through putting Arab capitals on the 
"map of global cities" (Post, 2013). 
The Real Estate Construction and Holding Companies as 'development' tools 
of local governments easily portray a link between business interests and 
urban policy. As described in earlier Chapters, local authorities and public 
agencies respond to shifting investment patterns to attract additional 
entrepreneurialism to their areas (Harvey, 1987; Mayer, 1989). With places 
competing for investments they must create the 'right' business climate 
(Mansur, 2013). As an example, the LDDC had offered financial incentives to 
help attract businesses and commerce to the Docklands area (Page and 
Fidgeon, 1989). Local public agencies, supported by the national government, 
must be seen to be responsive to the needs of the business community – and 
this comes at the cost of exaggerated incentives, support of public funds, and 
                                                          
179
 Some of the earliest versions of large projects similar to RECHCOs are to be found in the UK. The 
London Docklands, for instance, was seen as a form of 'prestige model' that was implemented as part of 
an ideology of privatism that put the private sector at the centre of urban revival. The public sector was 
responsible for creating the "right" conditions – whether financial or policy based – that would ensure the 
Docklands' success (Barnekov et al., 1989; Loftman and Nevin, 1992).  
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other subsidies. The promotional literature associated with Amman and Beirut 
similarly strives to attract investors and shows the extent of incentives and 
benefits offered, in the form of tax exemptions and other lowered costs. The 
Lebanese and Jordanian governments in this context were concerned with 
"the harnessing and creation of growth" (Smyth, 1994, p34)180, and held the 
RECHCOs up as examples of development and increased economic 
opportunity. Solidere SAL's leaders, for example, explained that they were 
doing Beirut a "favour" by agreeing to undertake the reconstruction of the 
downtown area (Calame and Charlesworth, 2009, p188).  
David Harvey looks at public-private partnerships and locates them at the 
heart of 'urban entrepreneurialism' to show how external sources of funding, 
direct investments and new employment sources are at the centre of city 
policy (Harvey, 2008). In a paper on the relationship between the 
development of capital cities and state making, one researcher explains: "the 
spatial dynamics of the country seem to confirm the idea that consolidation in 
the capital city is of prime importance for national state making." (Höckel, 
2007, p14). The capital's centres were imperative to the nation as a whole, 
and were where the most important political and economic decisions were 
taken. 
Despite this, the extent of support offered to what are completely private 
companies, has been a point of criticism for many observers – as it has been 
extensive in nature. Some critics have noted that underneath the rhetoric of 
minimising the state's involvement and promoting private development, 
employed by the proponents of neoliberal urbanism in both Beirut and 
Amman, lies a public subsidy of a private real estate development – the 
development required direct costs from the government. Critics complained 
that the public cost related to reconstruction during a national crisis of such 
vast proportions should never have been "chained to [a] profit motive" 
(Calame and Charlesworth, 2009, p189). Critics writing about Solidere 
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 Similarly, within the UK, the government released a statement on 'Action for Cities' detailing their 
urban policy objectives and spending. The relationship with the private sector through real estate 
'prestige projects' was placed at the centre of policy (Berry, McGreal and Deddis, 1993) in order to 
remove constraints – whether physical or infrastructural – so that the development potential would 
"become realisable, and private capital would be attracted to invest in the area" (Oc and Tiesdell, 1991, 
p312). 
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similarly indicate that "the approach was a totally speculative one geared 
toward maximising the return on investments and not oriented for the people 
of Beirut themselves" (Ohrstrom, 2007, p1).  
The Case Studies outlined in Chapter Two looked closely at the narrative the 
RECHCOs used based on their existence as tools for development and 
expansion of the public good. Each of the companies responsible for Solidere 
and Abdali developed their own messages regarding investment, job creation 
and tourism gains as a basis to convince policy-makers of their usefulness 
and efficacy. The propagated benefits included the following aspects to 'sell' 
the plan: 
a) Job creation, both in the construction and post-construction phases. 
b) Investment attraction and creating a critical mass of highly desired 
investment with positive externalities spilling over into the whole 
economy. 
c) Tourism with expanded visitor numbers. 
d) City upgrades through improved aesthetics, healing a dying area that 
required regeneration, and expanding and upgrading existing public 
space. 
e) "Cleaning-up" as a motivation for regeneration with a promise to 
reduce crime. 
f) Public space and facilities expansion within the city. 
g) Modern infrastructure upgrades for a smart city. 
To this end, RECHCOs' proponents argued, this type of economic 
development could not be created by the private sector alone without some 
form of government support, as the projects ran the risk of not being 
financially viable as well as having insufficient means to cover capital 
expenditure (Calame and Charlesworth, 2009)181. Given cuts in public 
expenditure at local levels, local authorities seem to support large flagship 
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 The literature has aimed to evaluate the linkages between urban regeneration and the development 
in the investment process. The risk element in major development schemes (such as Canary Wharf) is 
high to both financiers and developers, and so more use of private-public partnerships is likely to be 
seen (Berry, McGreal and Deddis, 1993). Literature has shown the elevated risk of inner-city property 
investment, showing the motivation for using UDCs. 
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projects such as RECHCOs because there "seems little else that they can do 
to attract private and public sector resources for physical renewal projects and 
to prove that they still have a role to play in urban regeneration" (Bianchini 
and Evans, 1992, p. 247). 
This Chapter will serve as the third pillar in the impact study, which is the 
economic pillar, with the social and political impacts of RECHCOs having 
already been discussed, and this Chapter will strive to quantify the costs and 
benefits of RECHCOs to give a monetised value of their impact upon cities 
and city residents. Chapters Three and Four discussed some of the more 
intangible costs and benefits, including perceptions of city residents with 
regards to transparency, process, public space, accessibility and bringing the 
city together. This Chapter now aims to also look at some of the more tangible 
aspects including investment levels, jobs, and tourist gains amongst other 
things.  
Solidere and Abdali present two interesting cases in this regard. Solidere has 
been completed for 10 years with tangible results on the ground, and Abdali is 
still in the process of completion, and has strong public opinion relating to it. 
This Chapter attempts to synthesise the different opinions related to the 
RECHCOs in a rough exercise that will help guide us towards an answer on 
whether RECHCOs have a positive or negative economic impact by weighing 
the economic advantages and burdens. The literature, also, does not 
conclude the best mode of evaluation of these projects. In terms of costs, the 
burden is both direct and indirect. Direct costs have included tax incentives, 
expropriations, and infrastructure contributions amongst other issues. The 
indirect costs include the fact that RECHCOs have been thought to skew 
markets, crowd-out the private sector, and abuse monopoly power in order to 
secure sustainable economic gains based on a trickle-down effect182. 
The calculations presented will be based on published figures and related 
estimates from the government, NGOs and the companies themselves, and 
collected figures from interviews and the Chapter's goal is to provide a rough 
indication of the overall costs and benefits. In return for offering the promised 
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 Loftman and Nevin (1995), looking at the UK found that the evidence provided by policy makers and 
academics has indicated that publicly subsidised prestige projects provided little benefit to the poor and 
in some cases exacerbated their problems. 
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economic benefits, the RECHCOs were readily offered a package of 
incentives and financial support.  
 
Methodology 
 
In order to answer the overall question of whether RECHCOs should be 
promoted as positive development tools, an analysis covering all relevant 
'cost' and 'benefit' aspects is required. Within the literature available, Solidere 
has received some attention, but the work remains rudimentary and 
piecemeal with no quantitative tally of benefits such as job creation, 
investment generation or tourism attraction. Abdali has received no coverage 
in the literature as a very new project. Works from Europe, specifically the UK 
looking at the Urban Development Corporations, and other large public 
projects do help to guide potential evaluation processes. However, these 
works evaluate projects that are purely public - rather than privately - owned, 
which may be quite different to the Abdali case in Jordan and Solidere in 
Lebanon. 
With little to go by in the way of quantitative evidence it is suggested that, 
even historically, decisions regarding the initiation and nature of large real 
estate projects similar to RECHCOs tend to be based on political and 
professional insight, rather than hard evidence and appraisal (Falk, 1986, 
p151)183. In the case of Abdali and Solidere, this entailed massive financial 
costs that tend to be wholly underwritten or heavily subsidised by the public 
sector. In terms of the information required, accessing master plans and basic 
financial information is relatively easy, however detailed information regarding 
exact figures related to incentives and job creation and costing remains more 
difficult. This is true of other similar large projects worldwide (Imrie and 
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 One of the central criticisms that has been made regarding the introduction of the UDCs into Britain 
is that they were enthusiastically accepted by policy and decision makers without a critical and objective 
analysis of the associated 'successes' and a breakdown of the beneficiaries and losers (Barnekov et al., 
1989; Boyle and Meyer, 1990; Hambleton, 1990, 1991; Loftman and Nevin, 1992, 1994; Atkinson and 
Moon, 1994). The outset of the project did not strictly define those parameters that would conclude 
success for the project, such that some critics noted "the conflicting reactions to the LDDC's 
performance stem from an inadequate definition of regeneration its success literally being in the mind of 
the beholder" (Oc and Tiesdell, 1991, p320). In a sense this meant that there were no objective 
government quantitative (or qualitative) indicators that would define success.  
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Thomas, 1999a). Examples such as Canary Wharf were evaluated more 
qualitatively or measured against key quantitative indicators (Oc and Tiesdel, 
1991).  
The analysis for Abdali is based on a widespread survey184. Asked across 
Amman, by residents of different areas, weighted according to population 
density, a quick valuation of how much worth the city's residents place upon 
the Abdali project was ascertained through responses to a series of 
questions. This was then compared to the statistics tabulated on the project's 
overall costs and benefits. The logic chart in Figure 5-1 illustrates how the 
rationalisation of the project might be understood. Within this analysis, trying 
to determine an absolute quantification of various qualitative elements is 
difficult. However, putting a value to the various cost-benefit elements 
becomes meaningful as a rough measure to evaluate the RECHCO's success 
and their ability to deliver on the promises that were used as their justification. 
Trying to put a 'dollar' value on the different elements is therefore important. 
Amongst major critics there remains "clear merit in trying to evaluate inner city 
property investment opportunities in the language that institutional investors 
understand" (Berry et al., 1993, p255). For the purposes of the analysis of this 
Chapter only the major costs and benefits will be incorporated. 
 
  
                                                          
184
 From the UK, literature has shown the long-term use of stated preference surveys for public goods to 
assess willingness-to-pay which has been commonly used for almost thirty years (Azevedo et al., 2003). 
In 2009, the Department for Communities and Local Government began a series of studies on valuing 
the benefits of regeneration looking at potential costs and benefits (Department of Communities, 2010). 
Within this document, a stated preference survey as a non-market valuation approach was used. 
Similarly, stated preference for valuation has been propagated by Earnhart (2001). In 2009, De Souza, 
Wu and Westphal looked at 100 publicly assisted redevelopment brownfield projects in two US cities 
(De Souza et al., 2009), also using this approach. 
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Figure ‎5-1: Logic Chart  
 
Source: Adopted from Brennan et al. (1999)  
 
Issues with Methodology  
 
There are varied implications for the RECHCOs within the Middle East – while 
citizens experience the RECHCOs and can qualitatively talk about their 
experiences, measuring the effects quantitatively to reach to a fair 
assessment of the economic impacts is more difficult as the numbers do not 
readily exist. While some costs are very apparent such as the cost of taxation 
exemptions or public contributions to infrastructure, others are less clear. On 
the cost side are their implications on property rights, as landowners and 
investors lose confidence in a system where the sacred rights of eminent 
domain are used precariously for a private company framed as being for the 
'public benefit'. In both cases, the projects displaced local uses and residents. 
The Abdali project forced the displacement of Amman's major transportation 
terminal. This terminal was also home to hordes of informal vendors, and a 
buzzing life, as one sees surrounding major transportation nodes. The 
transportation terminal was relocated to the edge of Amman's city centre as 
an alternative. Other costs such as the monopolies of a "certain elite" in 
decision-making, the "prioritisation of certain communities over others" 
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(Thesis Survey, 2012) and the creation of exclusive space can try to be 
roughly quantified through people's stated preference financial questions 
(Thesis Survey, 2012). 
For Solidere, quantitative evaluations in terms of job creation do not exist 
(only Solidere SAL itself produces some estimates of job creation and 
investment statistics it seems). In addition, other impacts are less easy to 
calculate. Certainly in the cases of Solidere and Abdali, some impacts are 
visually very clear. Looking at the 'before' and 'after' images of the city centre, 
to many observers, the centre was transformed from a pile of rubble, 
devastation and refugees into a global downtown (Trawi, 2003). Especially 
when compared to the reconstruction efforts in the rest of Lebanon, many felt 
that "it was nothing short of remarkable" (Executive Magazine, 2011, p12). 
The urban planners involved in the project emphasise that they have created 
an economically viable downtown that will help drive the revitalisation of the 
entire city (Gavin and Maluf, 1996).  
The costs and benefits are very important for countries such as Jordan and 
Lebanon. The rentier social contract is deeply rooted in a dependent 
relationship on the State for the very basic needs of life, hence the powerful 
metaphor of the Tunisian scholar Larbi Sadiki, dimuqratiyyat al-khubz, or 
'democracy of bread' (Sadiki, 2010) which has sustained Arab regimes for a 
long time, but is also bringing about their demise as it becomes impossible to 
sustain and manage. The RECHCOs need to be understood in this 
perspective as part of the public sector's ability to provide jobs, increased 
economic activity and investment. The government's inability to continue to 
create public sector jobs, and subsidise food and fuel in the context of rising 
international price resulted in considerable fiscal pressures and gross 
economic distortions of incentives in the private sector.  
Across this Chapter, as a result, is a comparison of both qualitative and 
quantitative costs and benefits to decide if the overall RECHCO is a positive 
project. This is important to examine as it has longer term impacts on the 
rentier state that is at the heart of government in Jordan and Lebanon as 
explained in Chapter One. In effect, this Chapter's contribution to the overall 
argument is to put in place the final piece regarding RECHCOs' economic 
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impact, which along with the political and social will provide the reader with a 
complete picture going into the conclusion. 
 
5.2 RECHCOs' Promised Benefits 
 
RECHCOs promise many things as their platform and contribution towards 
the development of the city (promises echoed by local governments). Through 
promoting their ability to create jobs, investment, expanded numbers of 
tourists, or otherwise, the RECHCOs use economic justifications to lobby for 
additional benefits and in some cases it defines their entire raison d'être. In 
the case of Solidere and Abdali these promises were in the form of a modern 
world-class city centre (see Chapter Three for example). Prestige projects 
such as RECHCOs are often considered amongst the most "effective 
mechanisms for achieving the physical transformation of declining or 
previously neglected parts of urban areas" (Loftman and Nevin, 1995, p303). 
The proponents of large projects such as RECHCOs argue that they provide 
"high profile and visible symbolic evidence of success and renaissance which 
will arrest the spiral of decline in urban areas" (Loftman and Nevin, 1995, 
p303). To this end, these sorts of projects behave as visible symbols of 
change creating spaces used by location and national politicians to "bolster 
their own political status and reputations" (Keating, 1991, p159). Through this 
they seem to become important place-marketing tools to attract private 
investment.  
Prestige projects facilitate the physical restructuring of urban areas (for 
instance through introducing and promoting new land uses and infrastructure) 
to meet the new patterns and demands of production and consumption 
activities (Tavsanoglu and Healey, 1992). Thus prestige projects represent 
important tools in aiding cities, and deprived locations within them, to come to 
terms with the process of wider economic restructuring. This process of 
spatial restructuring, inline with the changing world economy is deemed 
essential to ensure the continuing economic survival of urban localities.  
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The symbolic high-profile nature of these projects is used by local authorities 
to promote their local districts, both nationally and internationally. It is also set 
to aid authorities in their process of creating new urban images (Bianchiniet 
al., 1992; Wilkinson, 1992; Loftman et al., 1994). As such, these projects have 
even been called an integral part of the marketing tools utilised by cities in 
defence of their position in the national and global hierarchy and to attract 
footloose private investment (Harvey, 1989; Hall, 1993). The flagship projects 
act as a large advertisement 'hoarding' where the implied message for the 
area is that this is the best place for others to spend and invest (Smyth, 1994, 
p21). The Beirut and Amman narratives do not differ significantly from this. In 
Solidere's case, Rafiq Hariri's vision of reconstruction was clear – to transform 
Beirut from a 'nowhere land' into a prosperous modern capital.  
Rafiq Hariri's major objective through Solidere was to restore economic 
confidence, powered by a trickle-down strategy on two fronts. The first was 
from Solidere SAL's investors to the lower-income residents of Beirut unable, 
or unwilling to participate in the project. Much of the optimism felt was based 
on the second pillar of the trickle-down effect that assumed the economic 
prosperity that was derived from the reconstruction of Beirut would spread 
across the country and so boost both the national and local economies. Rafiq 
Hariri perpetrated restoring economic confidence in the country and creating a 
safe, sanitised and politically neutral environment. Rafiq Hariri also attempted 
a symbolic move towards peace where the "brilliantly rebuilt city centre" was 
set to "overcome the memories of war and destruction" (Höckel, 2007, p5). In 
this sense, Rafiq Hariri assumed both economic prosperity and social 
reconciliation would bring about long-lasting stability and revert the Lebanese 
state's fragmentation, and promised that Solidere SAL was the ideal 
mechanism to achieve this. 
The Solidere project was set to generate economic prosperity through 
increased demand for skilled and unskilled labour, estimating it would provide 
upwards of 5,000 temporary, and 100,000 permanent, extra jobs185. The 
project would generate flows of capital from Lebanon in parallel with expected 
                                                          
185
 It is interesting to note that the statistics that were generated by Solidere SAL in 1995 have remained 
unchanged to date (see Gavin, 2010 as an example). 
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reductions in the budget deficit – and this would improve the Lebanese 
Pound's exchange value. The Solidere initiative imagined for Lebanon would 
help to reactivate both the financial market and the stock exchange to have 
positive effects on the public's expectations and consolidate confidence in the 
future Lebanese economy. The project's rapid development meant that by 
1999 there were 1.2 million sqm that were set to be completed, including an 
additional 2.1 million sqm by 2008 and a final 1.1 million sqm by 2018. A 
significant part of Solidere's value proposition was the knowledge that even if 
the government had sufficient finances to undertake reconstruction it was 
unlikely that the public sector would even be able to complete the project so 
efficiently. Solidere was promoted as the clearest message to be sent that the 
War was over and Beirut was recovering (Solidere, 2002c, p12). For these 
reasons it was offered the right of expropriation and a series of economic 
incentives and tax exemptions. Solidere SAL also had certain obligations 
towards the public. Article No. 61 in its bylaws included it being responsible 
for earmarking a certain percentage of funds received from cash subscriptions 
for restoring buildings186; drawing up a time schedule for the execution of the 
project; financing and ensuring the execution of the construction of roads, 
squares and parks at the expense of the state; and at the request of the CDR, 
financing the rehabilitation of the government and municipal buildings located 
in the area. 
Amman's Abdali project was based on similar promises of "glory" (Post, 
2013). Abdali accounts as one of the largest projects in Amman – the 
Jordanian capital – and in terms of its magnitude and impact on the various 
economic sectors and activities its developers envision it as having created a 
core hub which offers the highest levels of technology and a foundation for 
future business and investment opportunities (Trade Arabia, 2008). Abdali, 
amongst the wave of rising developments has received "admiration and 
encouragement from key influencers at both the public and private levels" 
(IFP, 2008, p1). In addition, Abdali is strongly and solidly positioned as the 
future business district of Jordan (IFP, 2008) and has had the official 
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 There was no specification of what the exact percentage should be, or how it would be spent. 
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endorsement by the Mayor of Amman, the government, and Jordan's royal 
family and elite187.  
The project was sold to the public with the expectation that it would be of 
extreme impact on Jordan from a socioeconomic perspective, related to 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Regarding jobs, the first phase alone is set to 
create over 10,000 sustainable job opportunities – expected to increase to a 
peak of 15,000 (Abdali, 2012). Abdali is expected to attract over 16,000 
visitors a day in the first three years, with studies estimating the number to 
rise to over 38,000 a day by 2020. AID claimed Abdali would to be able to 
attract approximately USD 1 billion from UAE investors, and an additional 
USD 500 million from Kuwaiti investors, and another USD 1 billion from Saudi 
investors (Abdali, 2012). The Abdali second phase extension was set to be 
similar to the first phase of the 'smart-city' to be developed by infrastructure 
that would enable the delivery of new cutting edge technologies. The 
downtown was set to be fully equipped with technologically advanced 
buildings.  
The second phase of Abdali ensured according to investors "the creation of 
superior road networks and traffic solutions" (The Star, 2007, p1). Abdali was 
intended to be an assortment of both public and private usages, which would 
encompass "alluring" urban spaces (Executive Magazine, 2008, p15) and 
would be comprised of 40,000 residents and overall about 90,000 visitors who 
would work and visit the area on a daily basis. The second phase was set to 
provide a network of pedestrian-friendly roads, gardens, central shopping 
facilities, entertainment centres, an American University campus, office 
complexes, a civic plaza around the proposed King Hussein Memorial Library, 
a performance arts centre, exclusive residential buildings, medical and legal 
quarters, and underground parking facilities (Mawared, 2004). The Abdali 
Boulevard was to consist of a pedestrian spine bordered by 12 buildings that 
offer 22,000 sqm of retail space to house 120 stores. The Abdali Boulevard 
feasibility study promised that its Boulevard project alone would generate 
enough business to comprise 10% of Jordan's Tourist spending (or USD 99 
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 Press releases can be seen consistently on the Abdali website accessible at: http://www.abdali.jo. 
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million annually)188. Foot traffic within Abdali expected to generate USD 20 
million in sales for the retail stores. The footcount is estimated at 16,000 
people daily. It is thought that over USD 7,000 will be generated annually per 
sqm for food and beverage operators189. In addition, the Abdali project 
promised to create public spaces, generate employment opportunities, 
encourage investment and tourism and help provide the city with vibrant 
spaces (Mansur, 2013). The same sort of message has been seen for 
Solidere in Beirut. 
It is argued by proponents of prestige developments that this physical 
transformation will have further spin-off benefits in terms of boosting civic 
pride and business confidence, making urban locations more attractive to 
private investment, and raising property values and development activity in 
adjoining areas (see for example Smyth, 1994). In terms of who benefits, the 
RECHCOs and other prestige projects argue that the entire city does so (see 
also Brooks, 1993; Lock, 1993, 1994; Smyth, 1994). Their argument is based 
on the fact that economic development can be presented as in the interests of 
the city as a whole, the ultimate non-zero-sum policy190. Even where it is 
recognised that development generates a pattern of winners and losers, it is 
argued that growth allow losers to be compensated so that everyone can 
benefit (Keating, 1991, p159) as per the trickle-down effect mentioned earlier, 
boosting both local and national economies (Verdeil, 2002, p54). 
For this reason many local and national governments turn to RECHCOs as 
important tools to help cities and the "deprived locations within them, to come 
to terms with the process of wider economic restructuring" which ensures the 
continued economic "survival" of the city (Loftman and Nevin, 1995, p304). In 
researching projects similar to RECHCOs in the United Kingdom, some 
authors note that as envisioned, projects of such prestige are set to provide 
benefits for "all city residents through the generation of wealth, jobs, an 
improved physical environment and new places to visit, admire and enjoy" 
                                                          
188
 The design of the Boulevard was implemented by LACECO to complement the foundations and 
concepts of Phase I of the Abdali project, which aimed to create a "thriving future city-centre in Amman" 
which would be an "architectural landmark" (IFP Group, 2007, p1).  
189
 A full breakdown of project is available at: http://www.abdali-boulevard.jo/. 
190
 A non–zero sum describes a situation whereby the interacting parties' aggregate gains and losses 
are either less than or more than zero. 
Chapter 5: The Economic Impact of RECHCOs  |  267 
 
 
 
[emphasis added] (Loftman and Nevin, 1995, p304). It is very much of interest 
to note that the critics of the project, as well as its supporters, argue that their 
points of view stem from their convictions in promoting the public interest. The 
initial Solidere plan was framed in a manner that provided it with public 
support by it being the 'only option' to restore a dying downtown. The public 
interest in this case was achieved through the massive privatisation scheme. 
By providing the land to Solidere SAL, the argument was that the proprietors, 
legal tenants, investors, and even the public sector eventually through 
increased economic activity, would benefit. 
 
5.3 Public Costs and Subsidies  
 
Some literature has in passing discussed the state subsidy of large-scale 
investment for the business elite in the region creating flagship projects (see 
Daher, 2011), though this has remained without details and only been 
completed on a qualitative level. No literature has to date tallied the exact 
amounts, and this Chapter will be a first attempt to do so for Amman and 
Beirut. Financial contribution from the state to Solidere and Abdali was 
considerable. The prime urban land made available for investment forms the 
greater part of the subsidy, but other forms of subsidy include: tax exemption, 
infrastructure provision, elimination of all barriers and red tape, in addition to 
special building regulations made possible for this particular kind of 
development. It is only in these development projects that high-rise buildings 
are permitted (neighbouring areas remain restrictive in terms of density), and 
this is another form of subsidy191. This is the case because the RECHCOs' 
framework suggests that in order to encourage development in city centres, 
risk should be removed from the private investor and redistributed across the 
                                                          
191
 These types of subsidies are not uncommon for large projects. The Canary Wharf office 
development, within the London Docklands Development Corporation area, had received a subsidy of 
USD 2.2 billion in tax exemptions by 1992, and the land was sold to the developers at a price well below 
market value at the time prior to construction (Docklands Consultative Committee, 1992). In Birmingham 
the City Council invested over USD 564.4 million in the International Convention Centre (ICC), National 
Indoor Arena (NIA) and the National Exhibition Centre (NEC) between 1986 and 1992. Similarly, 
Sheffield invested USD 244.0 million in sporting facilities during the 1980s, and during the early 1990s 
Central Government made around USD 124.5 million available to Manchester City Council to construct 
its Olympic Standard facilities, which was justified in terms of its contribution to urban regeneration in the 
city. 
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public at large (described in Chapter One). The public as such, become the 
stakeholders "whose return on investment is valorised as a public good" 
(Parker, 2009, p115). 
In the neoliberal economic climate, the execution of prestige projects is 
accompanied by a certain number of conflicts pitting small-scale landowners, 
the state and important investors against each other. Critics noted that it 
appears that segments of the city are for sale or reclaimed in order to 
concede a place for these colossal programmes (Bredeloup et al., 2008). 
Unmistakably, the main actor in this privatisation is the state. Since in such 
instances the state is the main landowner, the new context of speculation has 
serious implications for urban policies and priorities in urban planning (Choplin 
and Franck, 2010). The following section will examine what the RECHCO 
received in terms of public subsidies, and include details of the breakdown as 
one side of the balance. The figures will be tallied at the end of the section 
into an overall 'public' dollar balance for Solidere and Abdali in Beirut and 
Amman. 
 
Infrastructure 
 
The second phase of the Abdali project prompted the GAM to embark on the 
creation of what proponents claim are "superior road networks and traffic 
solutions around and within the development" (The Star, 2007, p1) required to 
accommodate the increased visitors and residents expected to frequent the 
site daily once the project is completely functional. Within the project 
boundaries the solutions will be developed by AID, while the GAM undertook 
all works outside the project's grounds – and as such facilitate easy and 
efficient traffic flow in the area. There are four intersections in the Abdali 
District that were developed around the project. The largest intersection was 
budgeted at USD 42 million, the remainder valued at USD 27 million 
collectively (GAM, 2013). 
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Figure ‎5-2: Aerial Photograph of Abdali Area Showing Four Intersections 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Thesis Survey (2012) investigating this matter, respondents were asked 
the question "who should pay for the infrastructure upgrades surrounding the 
Abdali project?" The survey results show clearly that most of Amman's 
residents (at over 90%) believe that Abdali's investors – as opposed to 
Amman's citizens – should pay for the infrastructure upgrades surrounding 
Abdali. While 76% of residents do not wish to sponsor the Abdali 
infrastructure directly themselves, only 9% do not wish the municipality to 
sponsor the infrastructure. This seems to be explained by there being a sub-
category of Amman's residents that does not perceive there to be any 
relationship between themselves and the municipality as their institutional 
representative and whose budget is comprised primarily of tax contributions 
from Amman's residents192. This sub-category is primarily made up of those 
residents whose families pay the least in taxes, or do not own properties – 
amongst the lowest two income brackets in Amman (Thesis Survey, 2012). It 
is also a category made up predominantly of females at 73%, also coinciding 
with the lowest categories in terms of wages and property ownership. 
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 This is an issue that was explored further in Chapter Four. 
270 
 
Figure ‎5-3: Responses to the Question: "Who should pay for the 
infrastructure upgrades surrounding the Abdali project?" 
 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
Table ‎5-1: Responses to the Question: "Who Should Pay for the 
Infrastructure Upgrades Surrounding the Abdali Project?" 
 Abdali 
Investors 
Municipality Amman's 
Citizens 
Strongly agree 72% 19% 7% 
Tend to agree 18% 29% 9% 
Neither 6% 39% 4% 
Tend to disagree 1% 4% 27% 
Strongly disagree 0% 5% 49% 
Don't know 3% 4% 4% 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
In the case of Solidere SAL, the company was obligated to finance and 
construct, for the benefit and at the expense of the government, all 
infrastructure including water, sewer and electrical installations, sidewalks, 
street lighting, parking, telecommunication and other public utilities in the 
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planned areas193 (Solidere, 2001a). In effect, Solidere SAL was simply acting 
as an 'infrastructure contractor' to the government, with very loose definitions, 
in a legally binding role in terms of reimbursement, which as specified in 
Paragraph 5 of the Law No. 117 were either cash payments or ownership of 
reclaimed land. This turnkey operation made some parties uneasy as there 
was no maximum price that both parties agreed on. As such, in Beirut, the 
government's role at the national and local levels was extremely minor 
(Beyhum, 1992). 
On the 10th of August 1994 the Cabinet's decision left Solidere SAL to be 
reimbursed by the State for all infrastructure costs including installed roads, 
public spaces, gardens, networks, pavements, parking lots and power 
transformers. Solidere SAL's responsibilities included treating the refuse 
dumped in the area over the years, compacting the landfill, establishing sea 
protection, installing total infrastructure, marinas, boulevards and parks. 
Solidere SAL would be compensated in cash, lands belonging to the State 
and in the right to exploit reclaimed land. The CDR ultimately awarded a 
contract to Solidere SAL for the execution of the infrastructure works 
estimated at USD 475 million in return for an extra piece of land that was 
designated as a landfill, so Solidere SAL received the lucrative rights to the 
600 thousand sqm Normandy Landfill in lieu of compensation, which would 
generate over USD 1 billion in estimated revenues according to Solidere 
SAL's own data (Norkonmaa, 1995), and between USD 3 billion to USD 5 
billion in profits once the rehabilitation is complete. Weighed against the 
obligations of the company, to a certain extent, these exemptions reflected the 
raw bargaining power of both Solidere SAL and the Lebanese government. 
However, they were also a result of the basic financial incentives necessary to 
induce a private corporation to take on the project satisfy its opportunity 
cost194, and still make a profit. The overall public cost of the process would be 
calculated as: USD 1bn (estimated revenues) less USD 475 million (total 
                                                          
193
 As outlined in Clause 3, Item 7 of the "Rights and Obligations" of Law No. 117. 
194
 Opportunity cost is the loss of other alternatives when one alternative is chosen. 
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Solidere SAL costs) to amount to USD 525 million (total Solidere SAL 
profits)195. 
 
Taxation Exemptions and Other Incentives 
 
As per a decision from the Council of Ministers, Abdali Investment and 
Development was given an exemption from the general sales tax on all goods 
and services purchased or imported during the years 2009-2011 for the 
purpose of the establishment of projects196. A calculation related to this finds 
that this saved AID USD 0.8 billion in sales tax, and USD 0.7 billion in custom 
duties. It is of note that 87% of survey respondents in Amman did not believe 
that Abdali should have received taxation exemptions. In considering public 
benefits and exemptions within Amman, of the sample set, 56% were aware 
that the Abdali project had in fact received tax exemptions (Thesis Survey, 
2012). The reasons cited within the 'should be given' and 'shouldn't be given' 
exemption categories are outlined below in Table ‎5-2: 
 
Table ‎5-2: Responses to the Question: "Should Abdali have been given tax 
exemptions?" 
If Yes If No 
If is for the public benefit 8% It is a private project 72% 
It will encourage more 
investment  
62% We need the taxes to produce 
other public projects 
52% 
But only if everyone is 72% It is unfair when others don't 68% 
Other 1% Other 2% 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
                                                          
195
 USD 1 billion is conservative as the plot may have been auctioned at a much higher price had it been 
left for the open market. 
196
 The project, as a total, cost USD 7.05 billion. On average 75% of total contractors‘ gross output is 
considered 'intermediate consumption' of which, 86% is used for construction materials, and the 
remaining 14% for services. The average customs duty is 13% (Find the Data, 2013), and the average 
sales tax is 16%. 
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The Abdali project also received an exemption on all non-Jordanian workers 
working in these projects from social service tax on income derived during 
2009-2011, provided that Jordanian workers make up no less than 30% of the 
company197. Many economists however say this 70% limit has been violated 
several times (Mansur, 2013) and the level of non-Jordanian workers is closer 
to 90%. Using the detailed assumptions, this cost the government a total of 
USD 8.2 million in incentives to AID. AID was also given a special exemption 
from ownership fees in instalments for foreigners wishing to purchase 
residences within Abdali, once only and for that property, in accordance with 
procedures to be prepared by the Department of Lands and Survey expressly 
for the purpose. However, no numbers exist to calculate this as a cost. 
Looking at Solidere SAL, the company was exempt from the Lebanese 
Income and Capital Gains tax for a period of ten years from the time of 
incorporation198. In addition, the firm's profits would be tax free for a period of 
ten years199. Shareholders were also exempted from the Lebanese 
Withholding Tax on Dividends and Capital Gains Tax for the same period. 
Working backwards with average 10 year taxation growth rate of 20%, we find 
that this exemption potentially totalled USD 44.5 million over that time period. 
Critics of these exemptions have questioned the Lebanese government's 
decision when the country was in such desperate need of revenues to allow 
the creation of a firm for the specific purpose of economic development that 
would be completely exempt from taxes.  
 
  
                                                          
197
 The Social Service Tax was 16.5% in Jordan at the time. The assumption is that in the best case 
scenario 70% non-Jordanians will be used. The average wages of USD 304 for construction workers, 
and USD 528 for construction site supervisors (Department of Statistics, 2010). The average workers 
per sqm ratio of 145 is taken from the 2009-2012 Central Bank of Jordan averages. Interviews with 10 
construction companies revealed an average of 17 construction workers per supervisor. These 
assumptions show the creation of 12,414 jobs, which by Jordanian averages translates into 6,207 
permanent jobs. This translates into 345 supervisors (241 non-Jordanians) and 5,862 direct construction 
workers (4,104 non-Jordanians). 
198
 Under Article No. 60 of ―General Provisions, in Exclusions and Exemptions,‖ the company would be 
exempt from the provisions of Article No. 1 in the ―Law on the Acquisition by non-Lebanese of Real 
Estate Rights in Lebanon,‖ and would not have to obtain the authorisations needed to acquire real 
estate property.  
199
 The costs on government were calculated using the average of the 2003 – 2010 growth rate for 
taxation and then working backwards. 
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Cost of Land 
 
Mawared lands were offered to developers at large discounts that fell far 
below market-price, and so minimised risks and promised high returns 
(Marroushi and Ford, 2006). The estimate for Abdali's land is USD 790 
million200 - this figure has not fully taken into account the extreme change in 
land value after increasing density and zoning rights201. The total 
expropriation costs for the Abdali project are estimated at just over USD 110 
million, of which 50% were covered by public funds. The total use of public 
funding in the expropriations related to the Abdali project was USD 55.12 
million. 
Solidere SAL was not required to cede 25% of the surface area to the state - 
as was typical in such projects - or to appoint public sector representatives to 
its Board of Directors. The 25% was to be considered contributions towards 
the rehabilitation project and relocation expenses for the BCD (Solidere, 
1994). Under Solidere SAL's Articles of Incorporation it would be Solidere SAL 
alone (rather than the government) that would set the criteria and decide 
which land plots to expropriate202. Based on assumptions from the annual 
reports, this totalled USD 453 million (Solidere, 2001b)203. 
 
Expropriation and Displacement 
 
The costs of expropriation do not end with the actual dollar value given to 
purchase the land (as discussed in Chapter Three on the Social Impact of 
RECHCOs). There is also a heavy cost associated with uprooting settled 
families from their homes and communities (De Souza Briggs et al., 1997). In 
                                                          
200
 This is calculated at USD 2,256 per sqm given the land density provisions over the entire 350,000 
sqm plot. 
201
 In 2010 land in and around the Abdali District was being sold for up to 15 times its original value. 
202
 Under the Lebanese General Company Law, a corporation can only be formed if its capital is fully 
subscribed to and the shares pertaining to each subscriber have been determined, identified and issued. 
The application of these rules would have prevented the incorporation of Solidere SAL until all the rights 
of the previous owners and tenants had been irrevocably fixed and determined and all the shares of the 
company had been allocated to each individual right holder. 
203
 2001 Solidere SAL properties were recorded on their books at USD 1,812,435,393 (Solidere, 2001). 
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terms of whether the price paid for the property was considered 'fair' in 
Amman for instance, when asked those affected directly (or who have 
relatives affected directly) replied as follows: 
 
Figure ‎5-4: Responses to the Question: "Was the market price paid fair?" 
 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
Those that had property expropriated from them, overwhelmingly found that 
the market price paid for the property was very unfair. This comes in contrast 
to those who have had property expropriated unrelated to Abdali where 69% 
felt that the market price paid was fair. Comments also came across from 
residents such as "we lost our homes and neighbours", and "I lost my 
childcare group" (Thesis Survey, 2012). Each of these comes at its own costs, 
though its financial value is not calculated directly. The literature argues that 
displacement of existing residents would "eliminate the social fabric" (Rowe 
and Sarkis, 1998, p132) and would "decimate the physical fabric" (Wagner, 
2008, p63) to create ―a dead city, an empty field open to the speculative 
ambitions of developers‖ (Philippou, 2010, p1). From Beirut and Solidere, 
many of those interviewed indicated that they would not purchase property 
within the cities again – another directly negative investment cost. There is the 
additional issue of whether the expropriations were considered fair at all, 
which is the issue of 'why' the land was expropriated. Only 8% of respondents 
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10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1= Definitely not 2= Mildly not 3= Neutral 4=  Fair 5= Generous
276 
 
view the Abdali expropriations as being for the public benefit (Thesis Survey, 
2012). 
The area surrounding Abdali was home to 152 families, including institutions 
such as the popular community college – Al-Quds - which had accommodated 
3,000 students in addition to 250 employees, and the Abu-Setta Investment 
Group, which included 150 employees (Al-Dustour, 2005), as mentioned in 
Chapter Two's Case Studies. TAGI was one of the most high profile tenants 
that had their property expropriated. An external auditor, Moore Stephens 
predicted that TAGI had accumulated losses of USD 11.8 million between 
June 2005 - June 2007, as part of the freezing of his lots and inability to 
complete construction (Moore Stephens International Limited, 2007)204. 
Through a series of interviews, the relocation costs internalised by the 
previous Abdali area tenants was calculated. The total relocation cost is USD 
4.46 million (USD 2.57 million for family relocation and USD 1.89 million in 
firms)205.  
Similar to Abdali, Solidere also caused major displacement amongst previous 
residents. A 1991 Solidere SAL survey of the downtown population listed 
2,500 illegal residents. In a 1993 count, the number soared to 4,500 
(Raschka, 1995). Some analysts have put the number as high as 20,000 
displaced families (Gavin, 2005). Even within the category of illegal residents, 
the Solidere SAL payoff scale was USD 8,000 per family for those forced to 
move, unless they were from Israeli-occupied south Lebanon. Considered 
hardship cases, the southern families received USD 4,000 more. Solidere 
SAL also engineered a 'political premium' to ensure the Shiite community's 
support for reconstruction. The cost of repatriating the 4,000, predominately 
Shiite, refugees squatting in the abandoned, bullet-scarred building in the city 
                                                          
204
 The TAGI was initially building its regional headquarters in Central Weibdeh – right on the edge of 
the Abdali project – on three major land plots in Basin 14 – No. 429, No. 658, and No. 659. In 2004 and 
early 2005 the group was granted a building license to build its new headquarters to accommodate a 
growing number of employees. The headquarters would merge together 60 branches and 180 centres 
and would then manage its regional operations with 600 employees and a turnover of USD 100 million 
annually. It was estimated that over 4,200 people would be directly supported by the operation 
(Sa‘aydeh, 2007b). These private costs have not been included in the calculations of this Chapter, 
though certainly they have consequences and could potentially discourage investors and as such reflect 
badly on the business environment. 
205
 Through several interviews conducted, the cost of relocation per family averages about USD 16,920. 
For corporations, on average each employee cost USD 1,889. At a total of 1000 employees and 152 
families this totalled USD 4.46 million. 
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centre was estimated at between USD 50 to USD 60 million, but Solidere SAL 
paid Amal USD 250 million for the party to distribute as it saw fit (Ohrstrom, 
2007).  
More than half of Solidere SAL‘s shares were in the hands of former property 
owners, whose opposition to the first plans of the project influenced the 
modification of the latter considerably. The former landowners saw 
themselves being deprived of their individual property titles (and decision 
making powers over their property) and forced into a highly speculative real 
estate venture. Interviews with landowners found that their appetite for any 
investments in Lebanon decreased substantially after their lands were 
expropriated (Solh, 2013). There were also more direct private losses. In 
accordance with Chapter VIII of Article No. 3 of Law No. 117, Solidere SAL 
setup a schedule outlining project phasing six months following its 
incorporation as explained in Chapter Four. Directly following the appraisal's 
completion, the company had exactly six months to allocate the cash 
subscriptions and provide the necessary liquidity (that must exactly balance 
the land value). This meant that the lower the appraisal value, the lower the 
amount of money that the company would have to raise and so property 
prices were pushed down. Property owners were insistent that they received 
no more than 10% of what their property was worth after Solidere SAL's 
announcement. This affected large numbers of people, at a total of 40,000 
property owners.  
 
Exclusivity and Crowding Out 
 
The concept of exclusivity and crowding out means, due to the presence of 
the RECHCOs, other private individuals and companies are not able to fairly 
compete in the real estate market place. This comes in the form of not 
receiving the same level of exemptions, and not being able to have access to 
the same density provisions and so they are 'crowded-out'206. Mansur notes 
                                                          
206
 Crowding out is an economic concept where increased public sector spending replaces, or drives 
down, private sector spending. 
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that economic growth over the past decade was not developmental in nature 
as it concentrated wealth in the hands of a few (Mansur, 2013). This form of 
crowding out has materialised for critics as the loss of public space as well as 
opportunity cost for the general public. In terms of Abdali, a lot of critics had 
wished for the geographic space - which is central in Amman - to be utilised 
as a big public space such as a big garden, which was lacking in the city 
(Thesis Survey, 2012). The Abdali project, instead, in addition to forcing a 
"maze" of streets on the surrounding neighbourhood (Post, 2013), had also, 
much to the astonishment of local environmentalists received exclusive 
permission from the Ministry of Agriculture allowing it to uproot well over 750 
trees. Senior officials at the Ministry of Agriculture reported to the press that 
the ministry had first refused the company's request, but was overruled by a 
Cabinet decision (Namrouqa, 2012)207. 
The neighbourhood residents were effectively and steadily 'priced-out' of the 
area. People and businesses could no longer afford the higher costs, and so 
an exodus was seen from the Abdali District, and its replacement with more 
exclusive businesses through a process of gentrification. Similarly there was 
much talk of segregation due to Abdali from the thesis survey with people 
mentioning that it was not a "place for them anymore" (Thesis Survey, 2012). 
When asked to explain the price differences that occurred after the Abdali 
project was announced alongside the expropriations, residents noted at over 
70% that prices went up highly (see Figure 5-5). Further comments note that 
this meant that residents, and local businesses, could no longer afford rents in 
the area. 
 
  
                                                          
207
 The Council of Ministers approved uprooting 541 trees instead of 750 and ordered replacements, but 
the Jordan Environment Societies Union noted that replacing the trees was not an acceptable 
compromise considering the age of the uprooted trees. 
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Figure ‎5-5: Responses to the Question: "What happened to the prices after 
expropriation?" 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
Arguments that low-and middle-income families were being left out in the cold 
were not without merit for as Abu Hamdan, was quoted as saying, ―we are 
aware that low- and middle-income people are struggling to find affordable 
properties. This is a national problem. We would prefer it if the prices of land 
were cheaper and construction costs were lower‖ (Robertson, 2006, p1). 
Indeed, Abdali soon became known for its luxury price market niche in 
Amman. Average prices in Amman are about USD 319 (Department of 
Statistics, 2010). The starting prices for the Damac project in Abdali began at 
USD 1,600 and rose to USD 3,300 for the top floor apartments, with the 
penthouse boasting a price tag of USD 4,000 per sqm. Damac's first project 
'The Heights' was sold out, and they soon after announced the construction of 
a 20-storey Business Heights (Executive Magazine, 2007b). 
Of respondents to the survey in Amman, 72% indicated that the Abdali project 
should receive incentives such as taxation exemptions only if the option is 
available for other investors as well (Thesis Survey, 2012); otherwise they felt 
it marked a case of unfairness. This was also the case for Solidere. Through 
its exclusionary nature, Solidere threatened to become a ―massive white 
elephant‖ like the Canary Wharf urban development scheme in the London 
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Docklands (Makdisi, 1997a, p703). The average Lebanese citizen was as 
such "edged out of the city centre, the interests and needs of the poorest 
segments of society living on the urban periphery were not even recognised" 
(Höckel, 2007, p6)208. 
Solidere SAL through its political pull encouraged the 'crowding-out' of other 
developers. One proposal to relocate major ministerial buildings to the 
downtown area was intended to provide a trigger for further development – an 
advantage that the other private developers did not receive. The idea was that 
governmental buildings would not only bring the image of a political capital to 
the centre, but also encourage developers' trust in the area as a whole 
(Kabbani, 1992). However, since the Solidere SAL proposal was a private 
plan and the public sector was bearing the cost of infrastructure 
improvements, the benefit of relocating public buildings to the Solidere project 
was only going to increase the company's profits with no immediate effect on 
public returns (Kabbani, 1992). While it was in the public interest to undertake 
the redevelopment of the BCD, it was also essential that the public acquired a 
certain share of the appreciated land value through additional collections of 
property taxes – on the increased values – as a means to spread the benefit, 
which did not happen in the Solidere case. 
Solidere SAL, according to interviews with local restaurant and coffee-shop 
owners, was also engaged in another kind of behaviour prompting exclusivity 
by imposing partnerships on restaurants and cafés that want to do business 
within the project boundaries. For this purpose, the real estate giant has 
established 11 subsidiary companies (Wehbe, 2013), making it even more 
exclusive. A brief survey of the tenants that have opened shops in the Beirut 
Souqs also shows the depths of this enforcement (Hourani, 2011, p156). Of 
the 103 shops that participated in the grand opening in late 2009, at least 41 
are owned by just five business groups, each of which is distinguished by 
                                                          
208
 This type of gentrification was also seen in the London Docklands. Short (1989) notes the large 
literature available on the "UCD-led yuppification" of the designated development areas such as the 
Docklands as an unintended inevitable consequence of this type of development.  
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extensive shop holdings in the BCD. Fifteen are owned by just one such 
business network: the Azadea Group (Hourani, 2011, p156)209. 
The Solidere and Abdali experience are also promoted to a more extreme 
nature of exclusivity by default of their size withdrawing liquidity of the market 
place. That free liquidity in the form of petro-dollars from the Gulf for instance, 
that exists in the market is taken up as investments in the RECHCOs (outlined 
in Chapter Two). To this end, stalling of the projects, as was the case for 
Mawared's AID withdraws liquidity from the market. AID alone took out loans 
of hundreds of millions of USD (YaLibnan, 2008), with local banks looking to it 
as a preferential loan backed by government (Mansur, 2013). 
From another perspective, AID was also indebted to local construction firms 
with over USD 141 million (Obeidat, 2011). The fact that these contractors 
remained unpaid caused a more intensive withdrawal of liquidity from the 
market, and additionally prompted a form of "capital flee-ing" (Mansur, 2013) 
that meant other investors were afraid to go into other projects (Obeidat, 
2011). The Contractor's Union indicated that some contractors might be 
forced to lay off staff in the short term if payments were not received. In 
addition, ―the Abdali project was not spared the effects of the global financial 
crisis like so many other large, mixed use developments,‖ said Salim 
Majzoub, deputy CEO of AID, further noting: ―Since the start of the crisis, not 
a single investor has pulled out; however, construction work on some of the 
projects was halted for a period of time. Currently, some 15% of the 
developments in Phase I are on hold" (Speetjens, 2012, p1)210. The extensive 
nature of the RECHCOs and their magnitude means that any hiccup will 
negatively affect the entire economy. 
 
 
                                                          
209
 The Hamra Shopping and Trading Company owns three shops, in addition to several shops in the 
surrounding areas, and is constructing a mini-mall just across the street to the west of the Souqs to 
house its own multi-brand 'Grand Stores'. Another network, the Tony Salameh Group, while owning only 
five of the shops in the new Beirut Souqs, owns several more luxury boutiques on the restored Rue 
Moutran in the Foch Allenby district just to the east. 
210
 Large real estate projects are directly affected by global economic developments. For example, when 
the property market collapsed in 1990 it meant that the LDDC's income from land sales plummeted from 
USD 191 million in 1988-89 to USD 40 million in 1989-90. This significantly strained the LDDC's 
financial autonomy (using today's dollar) (Oc and Tiesdell, 1991). 
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Other Public Debts 
 
Public subsidies are camouflaged in other ways as well. In 2012 it was 
predicted that Mawared would face certain deficits with debt obligations being 
racked up due to AID's outstanding debts211. Other issues that are of 
importance include the cost of unintentional issues such as additional traffic 
within the area. The situation was seen as a "crisis" in terms of traffic in one of 
the busiest areas in Amman (Thesis Survey, 2012). One economist asked: 
"How many others have suffered from lost time, spent gasoline and lost 
opportunities due to such a project being placed where it is without thinking of 
the national cost of wasted time and resources?" (Mansur, 2011)212. The 
inefficiency due to extra traffic would total an increase in consumption of fuel 
and deprecation could easily be USD 32.3 million per year or a USD 141 
million over the period, which would bring the total economic loss to USD 494 
million. This is equivalent to an indirect subsidy by the government to the 
project of USD 32.3 million per year213. 
Additionally, any public funding spent on the project would not be spent 
elsewhere in the city or on other social services, forming an opportunity cost 
of funding the projects. Indeed, the heavy reliance on subsidies and funds in 
order to support private capital means that the RECHCOs themselves rely to 
a large degree on public financing. This makes the state ostensibly (in the 
case of Abdali through Mawared) a partner in a highly speculative project. In 
Beirut, while the central business district received the greatest share of 
investment, the remainder of Beirut—alongside the majority of the 
geographical city and its residents—received little. Similarly, the original city 
                                                          
211
 In February 2012, Mawared asked for USD 46.08 million officially from the Government of Jordan to 
cover capital expenditures.  
212
 These losses are known as 'dead-weight loss', or that loss which is due to inefficiency. 
213
 According to a local economist, one can easily calculate that 9 million minutes or 150,000 hours are 
lost per day due to the diversion of traffic. Over four years, the loss is USD 296 million. This is a national 
loss, but it does not include all the losses due to inefficiency, because only the loss in production is 
calculated. In terms of employment, the USD 74 million per year loss due to inefficiency are equivalent 
to 4,700 jobs per year (given a labour force of 1.5 million) or 18,800 jobs over four years (significant for 
a country where the average unemployment rate during 2007-2010 was around 14%). Assuming, for 
simplicity sake, that businesses affected by the project, which is right at the main intersection of the city, 
suffered a loss of USD 14 million per year, which is conservative, the loss over four years is USD 56 
million, bringing the efficiency loss to USD 353 million. Moreover, in terms of added fuel consumption 
and depreciation of vehicles, the loss is also significant; Ammanis spent an annual USD 705 million on 
fuel for commuting in 2009 (Mansur, 2011). 
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centre of Amman did not receive adequate funding, whereby Abdali's 
infrastructure was fully sponsored in the municipality budget. This shift in 
funding by the municipality contrasts with the wishes of Ammanis who at 94% 
would prefer to rehabilitate the current centre than provide public funds to the 
benefit of Abdali (Thesis Survey, 2012). Subsidies also take the form of 
additional privileges especially in terms of increased density provisions. The 
surface proposed by Dar al-Handasah in 1991 in Beirut for instance, was 
increased by 40% and attained 4.7 million sqm in the plans presented by 
Solidere SAL in 1994. These conditions were undoubtedly adjusted to help 
the operation become a successful speculation. Abdali's height was not given 
to other investors in Amman, who then felt that they could not compete fairly 
on an even playing-field (Mansur, 2013). 
 
Corruption 
 
Corruption existed within this connection and within the approval processes. 
Corruption is difficult to estimate and "notoriously hard to measure, and 
empirical economic research on the question is very meagre" (Mauro, 1997, 
p1). Corruption was perceived to be commonplace as discussed in Chapter 
Four. Based on capital expenditure figures and Lebanese experts‘ estimates 
of the percentage of corruption in contracts, corruption‘s share varies between 
203 and 704%. Others note that while the actual costs covering the 
reconstruction of the BCD and the rehabilitation of infrastructure are declared 
to be USD 50 billion, the real costs of reconstruction are estimated at no more 
than USD 5 billion. This difference is attributed to an "exorbitant waste of 
public resources through predatory activities by the Rafiq Hariri entourage and 
the need to 'buy consensus' from opponents or to bribe legislators to pass 
certain laws" (Höckel, 2007, pp7-8). According to certain sources, during the 
capital subscription phase, Rafiq Hariri urged his friends in politics, deputies 
and MPs to go and subscribe to the shares. Rafiq Hariri facilitated lines of 
credit at low interest rates. After two months the subscription was closed and 
Solidere SAL was listed on the market. The shares rocketed the first month 
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(at which point those in-the-know sold) before they dropped. One critic 
explains "we discovered it was these politicians who sold ... it was a way to 
bribe the politicians in a legal way, so everyone made USD 500,000 in four or 
five months" (Ohrstrom, 2007, p1). As incentives for the bankers to pitch 
Solidere SAL stock to their clients, the company offered commissions of 7%, 
winning the sector's support from the outset (Ohrstrom, 2007). Other 
economists such as George Corm estimate the overall loss of revenue at 
USD 0.5-1 billion per year (Corm, 1996) due to corruption. Converting this to a 
present value lump sum makes a total of USD 5 billion214. 
In terms of Jordan, the lead Master Plan consultant in Amman noted that 
while he didn‘t witness any direct corruption, "it was clear that Abdali did not 
play by the rules and had 'ins' to the decision makers" (Post, 2013). Omar Al-
Atout - the TAGI lawyer- for his part, thinks the expropriation decision has 
repercussions on investors‘ perceptions in Jordan: ―Regarding the 
expropriation decision – not the court‘s decision – what I am afraid of is that 
this property which the GAM is expropriating now, will later be sold to the 
Abdali Company...we are concerned for the country‘s benefit – not [just ours]‖ 
(Kayyali, 2008). This corruption also comes at a cost. In Jordan for instance, 
we see a direct link between Jordan's corruption score and its ability to attract 
FDI as shown in Figure 5-6.  
 
  
                                                          
214
 The USD 5 billion represents the net present value after discounting the annual conservative 
estimate given at USD 0.5 billion.  
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Figure ‎5-6: Foreign Direct Investments and Corruption in Jordan 2003-2010  
 
Source: Data selected and graphed from Transparency International 2012 
and World Bank Development Indicators 2012 
 
Loss of Local Hegemony 
 
Prestige projects are portrayed by their advocates as benefiting all groups and 
interests within the area they are located. Rather, developments such as 
RECHCOs serve to exacerbate existing social divisions within urban areas 
(as argued in Chapter Three). Developments are often presented by policy 
and decision makers as being in the unitary interest of cities, and thus of 
'value-free' development (Keating, 1991; Harding, 1992) since all groups (both 
residents and business interests) stand to gain from enhanced local 
prosperity. There seem to be three different types of loss. In the first instance, 
it seems to be the case that while RECHCOs are supposed to focus on the 
local level, their policies and governance are often undertaken nationally, 
meaning a loss of local hegemony. In fact, this was one of the reasons quoted 
for the project's success. The efficiency of the project was attributed to 
market-driven real estate and also attributed to the "willingness of Beirut's 
municipal government to give up control over such a prominent and vital 
project" (Calame and Charlesworth, 2009, p188). 
In the second instance, by linking the process of development to profit 
motives, and the unit value of a more-or-less public stock, local political 
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influences were minimised at the expense of shareholder involvement. The 
responsiveness to the concerns and expectations of local residents was also 
thus reduced. The RECHCO itself in terms of magnitude seems to detract 
from government at the local and even at the national level, through 
expanding internationally and responding to market rather than governmental 
forces. The local was no longer controlled by a representative government, 
but rather by company shareholders. In a survey in Amman comments such 
as "I don't have control over my own city" and "why should I bother voting 
when I can't stop Abdali" were heard (Thesis Survey, 2012). In the case of 
Solidere, Kathrin Höckel notes that the welfare function of the state, whereby 
it provides to its citizens, has been hampered causing a "loss of a large part of 
the government‘s influence and acceptance among its citizens" (Höckel, 2007, 
p9). Citizens, as was described in Chapter Four, therefore begin to turn 
towards other non-state actors and antagonistic methods of expression in 
order to return their influence. 
In the final instance, the loss of local hegemony involves the additional burden 
of Mawared, and Solidere SAL, going international and opening up branches 
and undertaking projects around the world. From Solidere SAL and 
Mawared's perspective the move was 'commercially savvy', however, the 
move also forced the shareholders to assume an additional international risk, 
with rights that are diluted as investors received premiums for buying shares 
at a discounted price (Ohrstrom, 2007). Another critic commented "the 
problem with going international is that Solidere SAL was conceived and 
made to redevelop the centre of Beirut, and is supposed to look after the 
people of Beirut and the 130,000 shareholders‖ (Ohrstrom, 2007, p1). From 
the expansion it is clear that both Solidere SAL and Mawared operate as 
financial private companies, with goals that include maximising profits, 
alongside initial commitments to the public benefit. Mawared's expansion has 
not been publicised in Jordan, and with a less sophisticated and outspoken 
critic group, it has passed relatively unnoticed. 
The costs described across the above section can be summarised in Table 5-
3: 
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Table ‎5-3: Summary Costs from Abdali and Solidere 
Costs Abdali  Costs Solidere  
USD 69.1 million for 
Infrastructure 
 USD 525 million for 
Infrastructure 
 
USD 846 million in Sales Tax 
Exemptions 
 USD 44.5 million in Taxes  
USD 701.5 million in Custom 
Duties Exemptions 
 USD 453 million in Private 
Land Costs 
 
USD 8.2 million in total Social 
Security Exemptions 
 USD 5 billion in total 
corruption losses 
 
USD 55.12 million in 
Expropriation Costs 
   
USD 4.5 million in Displacement 
Costs 
   
USD 493.5 million in Inefficiency 
Loss 
   
    
USD 2.18 billion in Total 
Losses 
  USD 6.02 billion in Total 
Losses 
 
Source: Author's own analysis 
 
5.4 RECHCOs' Accomplishments 
 
Benchmarked against the promises, the RECHCOs had a series of 
achievements that are outlined and tallied below: 
 
RECHCOs Succeed where Government Fails 
 
RECHCO advocates cite the trickle-down economic benefits of concentrated 
institutional investment, and assert that the complex incentives that propel 
private investment are allowed revitalisation to proceed at a fraction of the 
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time and cost that would have been required if the job had been left to 
Lebanon‘s crippled public institutions (Calame et al., 2009). In both Jordan 
and Lebanon the narrative indicates that the government couldn‘t establish 
either logistical or financial support. Issues such as disputes over property 
right conflicts made development seemingly impossible for the government in 
the case of Lebanon, for example. The 'world-class' Solidere standards have 
meant that development sqm costs are higher than those to be found in Beirut 
on average, meaning that purchase or rent of space is limited. 
Robert Fisk, in an article written for The Independent, said ―the very existence 
of this wealthiest of all prime ministers - Forbes magazine lists him among the 
world‘s 100 richest men - has increased the value of the long-devalued 
Lebanese pound and is drawing big investors back to the country‖ (Fisk, 
1994, p1). When his attentions were turned to the creation of a new 
downtown, it could only be embraced. In other words, if the private sector was 
not available the government would not have succeeded. The government 
had turned to the private sector to jumpstart the entire reconstruction process 
across the country. It was in this spirit that the reconstruction efforts that 
existed in post-Civil War Lebanon had been strongly focused on Beirut, with 
the implicit assumption that the positive spill-over effect would extend to the 
rest of Lebanon.  
 
A Rebuilt and Modern Centre 
 
In Amman, Abdali is seen to have placed a new image on the city in terms of 
its modernism, towers and settings. While criticised for many things, Amman's 
residents appreciate and look forward to the "modern city feel that Abdali will 
bring" (Thesis Survey, 2012). By some, Abdali is seen to have transformed 
the Amman skyline as well into a "modern city" (Thesis Survey, 2012). There 
are many positive aspects relating to Solidere. Many view it as creating Beirut 
as a "new blossoming international centre of finance and commerce" (Gavin 
and Maluf, 1996, p34). Much international media looked at Rafiq Hariri's new 
downtown (Nicholson, 1994b). Rafiq Hariri's vision for reconstruction was very 
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clear - to transform Beirut "from a war-ridden nowhere land into a prosperous 
'Hong Kong of the Mediterranean'" (Beyhum, 1995, p50). Gavin and Maluf 
(1996) describe a situation where Solidere plays a large role in the 
modernisation of Lebanon‘s regulatory and institutional framework for urban 
development (Gavin and Maluf, 1996). Nothing speaks as well for Solidere‘s 
contribution to Beirut as pictures can. Comparing before and after images, it is 
easy for the reader to see the incredible transformation that occurred. The 
extent of rehabilitation carried out by the firm speaks for itself.  
 
Figure ‎5-7: Beirut: "Before" and "After" Pictures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons 
 
  
290 
 
Figure ‎5-8: Amman: An Image of Abdali 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons 
 
 
 
 
According to anecdotal interviews, the city centre drew tourists back to 
Lebanon. Beautiful images of ports, new residential neighbourhoods, and 
booming business replaced the potholed building pictures that had 
traditionally represented Beirut‘s image in international media. An outcome of 
central area reconstruction would be to re-establish the area as the neutral 
arena for all the country‘s diversified communities. The BCD - at the 
geographic heart of the metropolitan area, with access to the airport and port, 
forming the traditional centre of government, hotels, banking and shopping - 
could readopt its natural role as the city‘s meeting point. The numerous ethnic 
and religious communities, polarised during the War that remained to a large 
extent disengaged, might be reconnected through this project. Solidere also 
cleared up the area. In Beirut, the CDR took note of the uncontrolled growth in 
the landfill in the centre, including the city dump which collected building 
rubble amongst other domestic rubbish over the years, and which offered the 
opportunity to reclaim new waterfront lands. According to the project's 
planners this would give a much-needed breathing space and allow for future 
expansion of the city centre (Gavin and Maluf, 1996). 
Authors investigating investment in inner city commercial property is "liable to 
produce poor long-term rates of rental growth and experience substantial 
risk," (Berry, McGreal and Deddis, 1993, p153) rationalising the need for a 
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vehicle such as a RECHCO with public sector support. RECHCOs are 
sometimes used as tools to help inspire the private sector to participate in 
projects they may not necessarily find completely profitable or feasible. 
Supporters of the Solidere project explain that in no other post-conflict city 
was there as comprehensive a physical reconstruction initiated so decisively 
and implemented so quickly with such high technical standards. The efficiency 
of the project was attributed to market-driven real estate and also to the 
"willingness of Beirut's municipal government to give up control over such a 
prominent and vital project" (Calame et al., 2009, p188).  
 
Brought Investments into the Cities 
 
The RECHCOs inevitably seem to be a hub for attracting investment through 
creating a critical mass of highly desired investment with positive externalities 
spilling over into the whole economy (both AID and Solidere SAL companies 
have dedicated arms to promoting investment in Jordan and Lebanon, 
respectively)215. The impact of Mawared's investments has been substantial 
according to its supporters. Abu Hamdan initially projected that Mawared's 
investments could bring in over USD 50 million each year to the country in 
terms of real estate. The Abdali Investment and Development Company 
announced that it would unveil a second phase of its expansion216 to almost 
double the investment value of the project to ultimately cater to the strong 
demand of major investors, who confirmed the venture as a solid and 
sustainable development. 
Beirut's reconstruction program did offer interesting opportunities for investors 
eager to take them. Among them were some political figures as well, such as 
Nabil Boustany, Deputy of the Chouf, who obtained 3% of the shares. In 
general, the USD 650 million that were sold in B shares was distributed 
among 20,000 investors (19,000 of them being Lebanese); USD 550 million 
consisted of capital held outside of the country by Lebanese expatriates. 
                                                          
215
 These investment amounts have been focused within the projects and their sums tallied in this 
sections' analysis. 
216
 During its participation at Cityscape Dubai 2007. 
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Considering this pattern of investment, the intention to bring foreign 
investments to the capital was not realised in this first stage of the project. In 
the present phase of development however, Arab investors from the Gulf are 
the main stakeholders involved in buying and building on the lots sold by 
Solidere SAL. 
The envisioned real estate venture, Solidere, supported by a mixture of Arab 
and Lebanese investors, was expected to invest an equivalent sum to match 
the real value of the proposed site; thus avoiding bank loan restrictions and 
enticing the repatriation of the considerable wealth held by the Lebanese in 
Diaspora. Expatriated Lebanese were expected to be able to mobilise up to 
USD 30 billion (Khalaf and Khoury, 1993). Even if they were unwilling to 
return, Solidere SAL expected to lure them to reinvest a portion of the 
substantial wealth, professional skills and contacts they had amassed abroad. 
More than other groups they were predisposed to play a prominent role in 
their country's recovery. Solidere SAL by 2010, in an announcement of total 
investments, had recorded land development costs of about USD 2 billion 
invested, with development costs of USD 108 billion. There remained about 
50% of the investment still left to develop (Solidere, 2011). 
 
Provide upper-end realistic office and retail space and Modern 
infrastructure 
 
Both Solidere and Abdali were specifically designed for higher-end 
developments. Abdali is being developed as a smart city centre converging 
media and telecom infrastructure to enable the delivery of state-of-the-art 
technologies to each and every home, office and outlet, while offering district 
energy solutions and central gas systems to guarantee a safe and friendly 
environment in addition to the large savings in energy cost (The Star, 
2007). Solidere SAL markets the project as "the most premium residential 
address in town" (Ahlein, 2010, p1) (though not always accessible as seen in 
Chapter Three). There were also other unique project aspects. For the first 
time in Jordan, fibre optic cables were put in place for the best technologies in 
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telecommunications, and a company created for that specific purpose, in 
order to support sustainability of the project. In Abdali, district energy was 
introduced. This both reduced greenhouse gas emissions and aesthetically 
eliminated the need for chillers on the rooftops, allowing advantageous use of 
these spaces. 
 
Jobs 
 
Job creation, construction and post-construction have always been a major 
component to 'sell' the plan. Jobs created by the project are both direct, 
indirect and induced in nature217. The appropriate multiplier for construction 
level jobs in Jordan for a project of Abdali's nature is 0.8218 (Mango, 2009). For 
Abdali, 6,207 permanent jobs were created of which 242 are white-collar and 
4103 blue-collar219. At USD 20,000 for what it takes for the government to 
create one job in Jordan this totals USD 124.1 million in benefits. For Solidere 
there are no calculated numbers, but the city centre planned for 40,000 
residents, to create 105,000 jobs. At USD 18,000 for what it takes for the 
government to create one job in Lebanon this totals USD 1.89 billion in 
benefits220.  
Historically, though an essential part of the marketing scheme for these 
projects, RECHCOs have not had a good track record in terms of job 
creation221. Jobs were mostly relocated from other areas (as stores or 
                                                          
217
 Direct jobs include those created directly by the project (including construction jobs). Indirect jobs are 
those not directly engaged in the project (for example those jobs created in the construction materials 
sector), generated in businesses that supply goods and services and support to the sector. When the 
income from direct and indirect jobs are spent and re-spent on a variety of items in the broader economy 
(e.g., food, clothing, entertainment), it gives rise to induced employment effects. Induced employment is 
therefore that employment created by the extra spending in the market. 
218
 An employment multiplier is one of the measures used to determine the impact a business from 
particular industry will have when it arrives or departs. In its simplest terms, the employment multiplier 
measures the amount of direct, indirect and induced jobs created (or lost) in the area as a result of the 
business. Generally, industries with a higher multiplier are more desirable for the economy. 
219
 On average there are 17 blue-collar workers per one white collar-worker. This totals 6207 permanent 
jobs. Of which 242 are non-Jordanian white-collar workers, and 4,103 are non-Jordanian blue-collar 
workers. 
220
 This is taken on Solidere SAL's published figures alone. 
221
 For the sake of benchmarking, on the employment front, the LDDC had not had overwhelming 
success. Though it had provided training, the Conservative Employment Select Committee of the House 
of Commons criticised its lack of a coherent training programme for local people and failure to reduce 
unemployment rates. In March 1987, 7,877 jobs had been noted to have been created since 1981, 
however, only 2,838 were new - the rest were transfers from other areas (LDDC, 1998). Between 1981 
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branches of businesses moved) rather than created entirely new. Some critics 
have put the number of new jobs as not over one-quarter of total jobs 
(Mansur, 2013), however for the purposes of the calculations of this Chapter 
and to give the benefit of the doubt to the RECHCO calculations have been 
completed on the most optimistic scenario, all jobs are considered 'new' in 
nature. Many critics have indicated that there was a systematic failure of 
being able to distribute the benefits and jobs from prestige projects in an 
equitable manner to the various disadvantaged groups and localities. In the 
case of the UDCs, many of the promised jobs went to non-residents of the 
area. This is certainly the case for Abdali where only 30% of the jobs went to 
Jordanians, and most from governorates outside Amman (Mansur, 2013). The 
types of jobs generated were of a different skill-set to the current residents 
and so resulted in a mismatch of skills. Often the local authorities are not able 
to guide the selection enough to ensure that sufficient numbers of local 
residents are selected. Abu Hamdan acknowledged the situation, and 
explained from his perspective: ―While I agree with the government‘s policy to 
create more jobs [for locals], we do need more foreign labour to come in, 
coupled with training programs for Jordanians. Until the local labour force is 
more qualified, we cannot shut the door on foreign labour‖ (Robertson, 2006, 
p1). 
 
Tourism Promotion 
 
Increased tourism and visitors to the area is a prominent part of the 
RECHCOs' appeal. Many critics argue that it is difficult to isolate the effects of 
the Solidere project on tourism in Beirut or Lebanon, but certainly the project 
has given an outlet for additional tourism expenditure. The Director General of 
the Tourism Ministry indicated that ―Beirut‘s downtown is the success story of 
the entire region. People are visiting in huge numbers‖ (Schellen, 2004, p2). 
As an indicator, the number of outdoor cafes: numbers rose from around 40 in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and 1996, the numbers unemployed in the Urban Development Area rose from 3,533 to 4,673 
(Docklands Forum, 1996). Overall there was a net loss of jobs over the six years after the creation of the 
LDDC. 
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late 2001 to over 70 in the summer 2002, 99 in autumn of 2003, and more 
than 110 in 2005 (Schellen, 2004). Interviews of shop owners within Solidere 
indicate that they estimate an average of USD 11 more per tourist spent as a 
result of the visitation – although this estimate is very rough, we will consider 
the entire amount as being public funds given that tourism spending is high in 
taxes, spill-over effects and brings hard currency into the country.  
With 1.37 million as the total arrivals related to tourism in 2012 (Ministry of 
Tourism, 2013) the figures above would translate into USD 15.02 million in 
additional income annually. Calculating the net present value of this income in 
perpetuity, this would total USD 150 million more or less. Interviews indicate 
the success of foot traffic in Beirut's downtown, whereby each outdoor chair 
might bring an extra USD 60 daily into a restaurant or cafe, which provides an 
incentive to remain in Solidere. Owners, however, also indicate that they 
believe they might have opened anyway in another "happening" location 
regardless of the Solidere project (Solh, 2013). AID predicted USD 100 million 
annually as extra tourism generated income. This would total USD 988 million 
overall. 
 
Taxation 
 
To date Solidere SAL has paid USD 210 million in taxes, as shown in the 
graph below. Abdali has just begun operations, so there is no taxation data. 
The company has received taxation exemptions on sales tax related to inputs 
and social security taxation, however. The future taxation potential of the 
projects, though not yet realised, is considered in the conclusion. On talking to 
economists and policymakers, similar levels of taxation might have been seen 
if other independent entities were allowed to establish commercial outlets in a 
manner similar to Solidere SAL, so it is important to keep in mind that the 
benefits are not unique to the RECHCO itself. 
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Figure ‎5-9: Potential Income and Other Taxes 
 
Source: Data selected and graphed from Solidere 2004b, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 
 
Tallying up the calculations above generates the following overall tables, 
which will be compared to costs in the concluding section of this Chapter: 
 
Table ‎5-4: Summary Benefits from Abdali and Solidere 
Benefits Abdali   Benefits Solidere   
    6,207 permanent jobs which 
total USD 124.1 million 
 
105,000 permanent jobs 
which total USD 1.89 billion 
 USD 987 million in tourism 
revenue (taken as a direct 
Abdali assumption) 
 
USD 150 million in total 
tourism benefits 
 
  
USD 210 million in taxation 
(though could be replaced 
by others) 
 
    USD 1.11 billion in Total 
Benefits 
 
USD 2.25 billion in Total 
Benefits 
 Source: Author's own analysis 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
While the costs and benefits were tallied quantitatively in the two sections 
above, the issue includes putting a dollar value on how city residents perceive 
RECHCOs. Surveys have been able to attain such a value by systematically 
giving residents a value scale and asking them what they would pay for the 
project to exist. This can then be compared to what residents view the actual 
cost of the project as. If we take Amman as an example, residents were asked 
how much they thought they were paying for Abdali as well as how much they 
ought to pay. The differences can be thought of as the net cost that residents 
perceive Abdali as having on the city. Taking the results shown in Figure 5-10, 
if averages of how much residents 'should' pay annually compared to 'do' pay 
are taken, are multiplied against the total residents in Amman we find that the 
'should' totals about USD 42.3 million, and the 'do' totals about USD 1.5 billion 
annually – meaning that from the perspective of the city's citizens the project 
is a massive net loss222. 
 
Figure ‎5-10: Responses to the question: "How much residents 'should' and 
'do' pay for Abdali" 
 
Source: Thesis Survey, 2012 
 
                                                          
222
 In the literature strong evidence suggests that physical redevelopment provided in prestige projects 
such as the London Docklands did not guarantee any rise in the level of economic activity" (Imrie and 
Thomas, 1999a, p10). 
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If we compare this to the costs and benefits tallied in the section above we 
find a USD 1.07 billion in net loss for Abdali and USD 3.77 billion in net loss 
for Solidere. To date these figures show that without factoring in other 
qualitative costs and benefits, the Abdali and Solidere projects are running at 
a major loss. It is of note that other future benefits might also be factored in, 
including taxation revenues to the state for Abdali once completed223. Taking 
Abdali's USD 5 billion pro rata (though it in fact might not be achieved), this 
would mean USD 140 million annually, or USD 1.4 billion in total in taxation 
revenue (inclusive of the USD 987 in tourism revenue) were we to give a 
present value for the total sum. This would however still leave an excess of 
about USD 0.413 billion in total or a net loss for Abdali of USD 0.653 billion 
after being factored in. 
In economic terms, the trickle-down development strategy that Solidere 
through Rafiq Hariri and Abdali through Mawared promoted, did not work out 
for two reasons; the first being that Rafiq Hariri's project was built on 
erroneous economic assumptions. Costs for reconstruction were calculated 
on the basis of over-optimistic expectations of rapid economic growth at an 
average rate of 8% per year. This did not take into account the fact that the 
War as well as increased competition in the region had stripped Lebanon of 
several competitive advantages that had allowed for its 'economic miracle' of 
the 1960s. The optimistic growth expectations could not be met and in the end 
costs (estimated at USD 50 billion between 1990 and 2005) were higher, 
growth lower and progress slower than initially forecast. Consequently the 
Lebanese state became increasingly indebted224. Furthermore, a mismatch 
between allegedly comprehensive national development strategies and an 
outcome that favoured the interests of an exclusive minority saw an 
overestimation of the demand for luxury apartments and office space. This led 
                                                          
223
 To take a similar project in Aqaba that has been proposed as an example, Emad Kilani, Al-Maabar's 
CEO in Jordan, said the USD 10 billion project, which is the largest in the Arab World, will create around 
17,000 jobs and its direct and indirect revenues to the state budget would reach USD 282 million per 
year. Al Maabar is launching Marsa Zayed, a 3.2 km site that stretches over half the central area in 
Aqaba and includes 2 km of prime waterfront offering expansive retail, recreational, entertainment, and 
business districts. The Marsa Zayed project includes: high-rise residential towers, retail, recreational, 
entertainment, business and financial districts and several branded hotels. Several marinas will add to 
the current berthing capacity in addition to a state-of-the-art cruise ship terminal. 
224
 Net public debt stood at USD 34.8 billion or 158% of GDP in December 2005, reaching over USD 40 
billion or 185% of GDP by the end of 2006. 
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to a situation of vacant housing and space in the city centre paralleled by a 
shortage of affordable housing.  
As discussed in the Chapter, Rafiq Hariri‘s reconstruction strategy, which 
assumed an automatic positive spill-over effect from a reconstructed city 
centre to the national economy and the political stability of the whole country, 
clearly failed. It underestimated the complexity of a holistic development 
project, neglecting large parts of the Lebanese, and indeed Beirut society and 
was accompanied by unrealistic predictions as to the economy‘s potential for 
quick recovery. Together with the loss of resources due to waste, corruption 
and sectarian distribution, his strategy led to stunted growth produced by 
Solidere. The same holds true for Amman. 
RECHCOs are susceptible to the unpredictability and instability of the national 
and international property market and the state of the national economy, and 
thus do not offer a reliable foundation for generating sustainable local 
economic development (which can be a criticism also levelled at property-led 
regeneration strategies in general - see Brownill, 1990; Healey et al., 1992b; 
Coulson, 1993; Turok, 1992; Colenutt, 1993; Lloyd and Black, 1993). In this 
context, the intended attraction of private investment by RECHCOs is almost 
wholly dependent on state resources. In other examples of large projects 
internationally, the context of intense inter-urban competition for investment 
and jobs means private sector interests are in a powerful position to secure 
`reverse leverage‘, so that RECHCOs may threaten to halt development and 
construction if they are not adequately supported by public funds225. Thus the 
development of RECHCOs may confer some short-term benefits or 
advantages but may also lead to greater and longer-term financial costs for 
public agencies. This makes the issue of a loss of local hegemony even more 
critical. 
RECHCOs argue alongside their advocates that they provide benefits to all 
groups and interests within the area they are located. Though, it is argued by 
critics that such developments serve to exacerbate existing social divisions 
within urban areas (argued in Chapter Three for instance). These sorts of 
developments have historically been presented by policy and decision makers 
                                                          
225
 See Kotler et al. (1993) for UK examples. 
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as being 'value-free' (see Keating, 1991; Harding, 1992 for past examples), 
since all groups (both residents and business interests) stand to gain from 
enhanced local prosperity. In practice this has not been the case.  
In Amman, there was a general sense that Baha Hariri had taken advantage 
of the Jordanian citizen through the public sector, and a feeling that when the 
project is over, Baha Hariri will have gotten a free ride at Jordanian tax payers 
expense, and the profits will go to a handful of powerful Jordanians, and those 
who subsidised the Abdali project with their taxes will get inflation and a 
commercial centre that is out of reach for most Jordanians. A cartoon at the 
time in a popular daily (See Figure 5-11) jokes that the Abdali towers' had a 
'positive' effect on low-income families by providing enough advertising 
material and cardboard that Amman's urban poor were able to afford building 
shelters, thereby interpreting the project's trickle-down effect. 
 
Figure ‎5-11: Cartoon Depicting Amman's Urban Poor 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons 
 
 
 
 
 
While critics admit that "by virtue of single-mindedness" (Oc and Tiesdell, 
1991, p328) large projects such as the RECHCOs are able to undertake 
massive construction initiatives, the question of how the benefits of the project 
are then distributed is not adequately studied. Large luxury projects such as  
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RECHCOs are mostly confined to profitable (or potentially profitable) locations 
for private sector investment and this has been the case across the world (see 
examples in Healey et al., 1992a). Such areas tend to be located within or 
adjacent to the city centre or the waterfront, rather than in areas with high 
concentrations of disadvantaged groups and fewer clear opportunities. While 
the locations are natural areas for financial success, the RECHCOs often 
argue the threat of financial distress in order to fully attain their developmental 
goals.  
However, as Keating notes, the benefits which may accrue from large real 
estate developments, even if completely successful, are unevenly distributed 
between urban residents and also between private sector interests. This type 
of development, alongside the RECHCO model of regeneration is premised 
on wealth creation with almost no attention given to wealth distribution issues. 
This is especially the case when we consider that only 30% of Abdali's jobs in 
the best-case scenario went to Jordanians. Even then, most of these jobs are 
blue-collar; with the major benefits retained by investors226. This came up in 
several interviews with comments such as "I feel I paid for Abdali and will get 
nothing in return" and "I subsidised the rich of Amman further" (Thesis Survey, 
2012)227. 
What can be termed a 'property-based' approach to development may attract 
criticism as it does not seem to be the ideal platform for holistic economic 
regeneration – even in physical terms – considering accessibility and 
distribution. This is reflected in the primary 'measures of success' that are 
often utilised by local authorities in evaluating prestige schemes which focus 
on economic outputs such as leverage ratios, private investment totals, levels 
of visitor expenditure generated, floor-space developed and aggregate 
numbers of jobs created (see UDC evaluations such as Clark, 1988; CLES, 
                                                          
226
The failure to provide jobs for disadvantaged residents historically in the UK prestige project 
examples is cited in Deakin and Edwards, 1993. 
227
The financial restrictions of the UDC forced it to compromise its social and community components. 
The LDDC spent only 6% of its budget on community support and housing (LDDC, 1995). Canary Wharf 
was seen as evidence that the London Docklands were booming; though its sustainability was still in 
question. The Docklands Consultative Committee (DCC) - which was a body representing the 
Docklands' local authorities and a number of other groups, stated that "benefits have accrued primarily 
to property developers and those...able to cash in on the housing boom in the South-East...yet the 
reality is that it has singularly failed to tackle effectively the very real and severe problems of East and 
South London" (Oc and Tiesdell, 1991, p313).  
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1990; Deakin and Edwards, 1993). Such measures, however, ignore wider 
social equity questions, since it is largely assumed that disadvantaged groups 
and areas will automatically benefit via the trickle-down process. However by 
demanding – and receiving – the funds, the RECHCOs entailed the diversion 
of scarce public sector resources away from welfare-related needs (such as 
social housing, education and social services) and other deprived and needy 
neighbourhoods.  
The changing urban landscape within Amman (and Beirut) has been noted to 
be a serious effort at bringing private market-oriented solutions to help solve 
the social and economic problems being faced by local government within the 
city (Parker, 2009). The solution of turning to the private sector is one that 
carries many issues with it. The primary difference between a private 
company expropriating land for the public benefit, and the government 
carrying out the same process, is that the definition of success in each case is 
different. Even though Solidere SAL‘s overall aim was to rebuild the city 
centre for example, its annual reports allude to another phenomenon that 
does not exist in the public sector. This phenomenon is the one thing that 
every private firm desires; profits. In its brochures, encouraging potential 
investors, Solidere SAL's reports projected an internal rate of return between 
15.0% to 20.7% from 1994 to 2018. This figure was above the breakeven 
point of most public projects. While the end result is a rebuilt centre, private 
profits certainly detract from the 'publicness' of the venture. Based on a series 
of street interviews in Beirut, the most troubling aspect of privatisation for 
critics and landowners seemed to be the clear conflict of interest between the 
public officials and the CDR executives that had vested interests in privatising 
the project since they also represented potential private investors (a theme 
that was explored more in Chapter Four). 
Although in Amman and Beirut the RECHCO strategy came along packaged 
as a national development effort to help the country recover and unify, and 
was accompanied by huge publicity campaigns to win popular support, a 
closer look such as the analysis above reveals that the project was far from 
encompassing and must be characterised as exclusive in nature. It was 
clearly profit-oriented, catering only to an international network. While office 
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space and apartments in Solidere and Abdali were destined for use by an 
economic and social elite, public goods of less immediate economic value 
such as public transport or urgently needed social housing were not included 
in the grand plans. Tying the profit motive into analysis from earlier Chapters, 
some other critics believe that the excessive demolition accompanied Solidere 
SAL's renewal scheme to meet density and revenue benchmarks; "the more 
they destroy, the more they make a profit. The more they throw people out, 
the more they make profit" (Calame, 2005, p31).  
Proponents of Solidere and Abdali argued that it is important to remember 
that since the companies are a private initiative, they at the very least need to 
provide economic profits that outweigh opportunity cost in order to be 
attractive to investors. In paying the high costs of rehabilitation and 
development, the RECHCO shareholders took on a certain risk. The Solidere 
2002 Annual Report noted that "the success of their investment strategy has 
vindicated all our efforts" (Solidere, 2002c, p6). Samir Khalaf suggests that 
this is part of private interest and self-gain being promoted at the expense of 
the overall public good. In all three Chapters looking at the social, political and 
economic, the analysis has shown that the private good of the RECHCOs 
ultimately outweighs the public good of city residents, and this will be 
synthesised further in the Conclusion Chapter next. The weak state 
institutions that existed in both Amman and Beirut at the time (discussed more 
in Chapter Three) were not fully able to evaluate and properly contribute 
public funds. For this reason, they could not fully control the efficiency of the 
RECHCO projects. This was a major contribution to the "perpetuation of 
instability and the creation of new conflicts over assets, influence and identity" 
(Höckel, 2007, p3). Using the RECHCOs as a vehicle for growth and 
'modernity' (Elsheshtawy, 2008) the question left for Chapter Six's Conclusion 
is whether given the overall economic disadvantages there remains an overall 
convincing case for RECHCOs and their ability to improve the lives of citizens 
within cities. 
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6. Conclusion: The Overall Impact of RECHCOs 
  
6.1 Introduction 
 
Overview 
 
With mega real estate projects redeveloping city centres, the RECHCO 
phenomenon is one that has come to the forefront of urban development in 
the Arab World, due to its large impact on cities and their citizens. This thesis 
set out to assess the impact of these projects from a social, political and 
economic perspective. It intended to make the argument that though 
RECHCOs are appealing tools for cities by presenting with potential economic 
benefits to enhance the city's global competitiveness ranking, they do not live 
up to these promises.  Instead the social, political and economic effects are 
detrimental to the cities and their citizens without certain mitigation measures 
in place.  The Conclusion Chapter in its first section will review the problem 
statement and methodology.  The second section will synthesise the issues 
across the three pillars to discuss cross-cutting themes regarding the effect of 
the RECHCOs, going back to the initial themes laid out in Chapter One.  The 
third section will present a series of lessons learnt looking at the RECHCOs' 
suitability for replication so that the RECHCOs become effective policy tools.  
While on the surface RECHCOs appear to be no more than large urban 
projects with predominantly aesthetic impacts, the narrative in the Chapters 
showed that there are much deeper social, economic and political 
consequences to their use as well. The RECHCOs examined in Beirut and 
Amman, alter the centres of cities and as such act as a prism through which 
political life in the city and country can be understood (Najem, 2000). 
Reconstruction therefore becomes a metaphor for how citizens see 
themselves in the city; and in telling the story of RECHCOs, light is shed on 
the life of city citizens as well. Barthel writing on Arab mega-projects notes 
that while they are at the core of contemporary Arab town planning, this type 
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of development is a "laboratory" for urban action in terms of engineering, 
design, implementation and management (Barthel, 2010, p133). It is a place 
where new technologies and urban governance can be used to examine 
"composite models and hybrid ideologies embedded in these planning 
processes" (Barthel, 2010, p133). The thesis dissected the effects of this 
laboratory's experiments within Amman and Beirut, which is particularly 
important given their large scale use. Heiko Schmid calls the Solidere story an 
example of 'strategic truth' at work (Schmid, 2002) and in part the aim of the 
impact assessment is to see how much 'truth' there in fact is to the 
RECHCOs' claims to enhance city life.  
Most major cities around the world have in some way or another been 
touched by prestige projects (Loftman and Nevin, 1995). Though other 
projects may also have large impacts, RECHCOs remain for several reasons 
analytically distinct. RECHCOs as private mega-project receive significant 
support from the public sector in the form of subsidies and are granted 
expropriation rights of private land. RECHCOs are granted not only rights 
generally withheld for the most basic provision of government services 
(eminent domain rights) but are also given exclusive management of the most 
precious geographic location in the city – the centre - to reinvent it as a 
modern downtown. A lot of hope has been pinned on these new downtowns 
for economic growth in the form of investments, tourism, and public sector 
return, catapulting capitals into the modern world. Regionally, cities around 
the Arab World have seen extensive destruction, with the "dismantling of 
Baghdad" and the "bombing of Beirut" or the "grinding poverty in the slums of 
Cairo and Rabat" (Elsheshtawy, 2008, p2). Models are needed for change 
and the RECHCOs are looked to as ideals in urban policy for the future. As 
such the RECHCO spill-over effects go beyond just the city they are in. The 
cities have been seen to be "sites of struggle and contestation, spaces of 
doom rather than spaces of hope" (Elsheshtawy, 2008, p2). Rami Daher 
notes on the ripple effect of projects such as RECHCOs that "it is evident that 
Amman is embarking on a new era of urban/spatial restructuring which is also 
affecting Middle Eastern cities at large" (Daher, 2008, p37). 
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As noted in the Literature Review and the Case Studies, cities compete to 
attract transnational investment, driven by global elite at the national level, to 
prompt governments' appreciation of RECHCOs in the Arab World. Emulating 
the Solidere experience, Amman wished to engage in its own RECHCO of a 
similar level of cultural significance and commercial importance (Royal 
Hashemite Court, 2003). Mawared, in Jordan, indicated that the planners 
behind the project wanted to produce something similar to Solidere – and the 
term 'Soliderification' has been used to describe the phenomenon of 
emulating Beirut's RECHCO (Summer, 2005). The RECHCOs' marketing 
focused on the production of a "good city" for other cities to aspire to; always 
clean, tidy and closed to the "undesirable" (Post, 2013). As such, around the 
Arab World, the concept of RECHCOs is extremely important because it is 
being replicated across cities in the region, changing their landscape; "At its 
very essence it is a struggle for modernity and trying to ascertain one's place 
in the twenty-first century" (Elsheshtawy, 2008, p4). The cost of ascertaining 
this place is paid in part, as narrated in Chapter Three, by changing the 
history and traditional fabric of the city that helped to cement the city's social 
cohesion; and sidelining certain portions of the population, from participation 
in politics as shown in Chapter Four, and at an economic cost as shown in 
Chapter Five. 
The new planning regime of the Arab city puts aside history and culture, to be 
inspired by mostly western experiences (Elsheshtawy, 2008), and the 
RECHCOs changing centres are framed within this phenomenon. Through the 
pro-growth entrepreneurial strategies and mechanisms the planners employ, 
neoliberal ideology and visions of global competitiveness and commodification 
shared by the investors and planners is translated into exclusive urban 
landscapes. This sort of "new planning regime" (Roy, 2009, p77) is happening 
around the world with cities shifting to rely more heavily upon private 
developers to manage parts of the city - the RECHCOs being a specific and 
extreme manifestation of this. While it has historical manifestations in older 
planning traditions with an economic elite in the city, the modern applications 
of RECHCOs have a new host of impacts that have not been examined fully 
in the literature nor Arab cases documented well empirically. The new 
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planning regime forms a geometry, as seen in the case of the RECHCOs, of 
privatised space for corporate consumption to encourage large investments.  
As such, RECHCOs have changed cities' faces. The sleepy town of Amman 
has often been described as a "village-city" (Post, 2013). Amman, a city of 
four storey white buildings is almost "assaulted" by the towers (Thesis Survey, 
2012). While in the case of Solidere, the previous city centre was replaced by 
a new entity; Amman's city centre will face new competition from Abdali - 
which brands itself as 'Amman's new Downtown'. This shift away from 
Amman's traditional city centre will undermine the area's popularity and 
footcount as the municipality's resources are directed elsewhere and add to 
its already dilapidating condition due to increasing lack of popularity. The 
centres are extremely important to life in the city. One real estate developer – 
Robert Booth, the CEO of Emaar Dubai, from the Gulf notes "people judge 
cities by their downtowns. It is the city‘s heart and soul that the rest of the 
world looks to in order to understand a community‖ (Gulf News, 2004, p1). 
The importance of the Abdali as a downtown is reflected by the King 
inaugurating the site as shown in Figure 6-1. 
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Figure ‎6-1: Front Page Headline in Jordan Times "King inaugurates Abdali 
Boulevard, tours New Downtown" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While physically changing cities, due to their political and economic impacts 
that have been examined in the Chapters, RECHCOs also changed the way 
people feel about their city. In trying to create RECHCOs, the government 
inadvertently created a certain level of anger amongst the city citizens. The 
Thesis Survey in Amman and street interviews in Beirut showed the extent of 
this. The anger culminated in the occupation of Solidere physically through 
tents, and with hundreds of protests in Amman's old centre, which fed into the 
overall feelings of disenfranchisement felt by the city populations. Many 
through the Thesis Survey noted that the increasing inequality they saw in 
society that was embodied and materialised in the RECHCO was what  
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bothered them (Thesis Survey, 2012). Others mentioned that they felt they 
were sidelined from the entire process.  In Beirut, street interviews showed 
people's frustration at the political and economic inequalities they observed 
from Solidere's physical construct which they felt was causing social fractions 
(Beirut Interviews, 2013).  
 
The Thesis Structure and Literature  
 
My thesis sits within the literature on modern Arab World cities drawing from 
urban planning and political works that lends a certain theoretical framework 
relating to RECHCOs. There is a gap in the literature related to the lack of 
empirical studies on today's Arab city capitals with specifically no 
comprehensive literature presented on the consequences and impacts of 
mega-projects within the cities. There is a similar void in practical examples 
and critiques on which solid proposals can be built to move forward. Within 
the literature, the studies that have looked at Solidere have done so only 
qualitatively with regards to social or political impacts and have not been 
cross-cutting nor added any quantitative measurable dimensions. Amongst 
urban economic impact assessments, there is a clear gap of any impacts 
outside dollarised values that also include social and political aspects of 
mega-construction projects within cities (see Chapter One's Literature 
Review). The thesis aimed to look in more detail at the phenomenon of 
RECHCOs in the Arab World and empirically assess their impacts, and as 
such is a direct contribution to modern literature on the Arab City which lacks 
relevant and researched case studies.  In addition no substantial impact 
assessment on the qualitative and quantitative impacts for Abdali and 
Solidere exists. 
The thesis' structure was based on an empirical study of two cities in the 
Middle East – Amman and Beirut. To piece together the Case Studies, 
several interviews with stakeholders were undertaken and a systematic 
archival media review of relevant publications in both Beirut and Amman in 
addition to background governmental statistics and reports from public 
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agencies, legislation, authorisations and relevant public documentation was 
also gathered.  A comprehensive literature review was also conducted.  To 
start gaining more insight into citizens' views regarding the project, a series of 
street interviews were conducted in Beirut, and a 1,500 person survey in 
Amman over a statistically representative sample. In addition site 
observations were incorporated from my own time spent in the cities and on 
the sites. To examine the costs and benefits of RECHCOs, public sector 
statistics were gathered from the relevant public agencies, and data from the 
companies' own records and affected communities.  The data was then 
compiled and analysed to conclude with a series of lessons learnt. 
The Case Study section outlines, for the first time in the literature, a 
comprehensive storyline for Abdali. For Solidere, while versions of the story 
have been previously written, the Case Study pieced together a 
comprehensive version of the RECHCO from a variety of different sources 
and perspectives. The thesis dedicated one detailed chapter to each type of 
impact; social, political and economic. The research undertaken offers 
evidence of the implications – both positive and negative – of RECHCOs in 
cities to then lead into a series of lessons learnt from the experience.  The 
thesis was able to assess each of these impacts in detail to provide a 
comprehensive look at the effects of RECHCOs from the perspective of the 
city citizen. 
As mentioned in Chapter One's Introduction, this is not a thesis about being a 
citizen directly and so this literature is only touched upon briefly. However, it is 
a thesis about citizens' experiences within cities through the very specific 
example of the RECHCOs' impact. The limitations were primarily that 
empirical information regarding RECHCOs around the Arab World is neither 
widespread nor ordered; which meant that the boundaries of this research 
were strongly drawn around information that could be collected, ordered and 
analysed manually. Beirut's case was already fully in the public sphere 
debated in newspapers and on the street. For Amman the information had to 
be collected as the project was not adequately debated in papers, blogs, 
websites, and in conversation leading to the need for a survey. By looking at 
two cases that took place at different times and in different social, political and 
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economic settings meant that common themes and impacts could be 
generalised as more than site-specific effects. Statistics and approvals were 
pieced together from government archives manually, and the newspaper 
archives were dealt with in a similar manner, leaving room for human error.  
Through drawing out the main issues, the Conclusion will try to envision the 
skeleton of an alternative form of development so that the thesis takes the 
critique to offer a set of lessons learnt for the future. Ineffective and inefficient 
government structures and systems, failures of policy, institutions and 
processes for RECHCOs, as seen in Chapter Five, and a gap exists within the 
literature regarding what context is required to ensure success by RECHCOs 
and minimise negative impacts. RECHCOs remain attractive tools for 
governments with certain economic gains, and can be the mega-projects that 
have the potential to jump-start economies in certain instances (where more 
natural progression might have taken decades to reach that point). There is 
certainly little doubt that RECHCOs do rebuild city centres physically in a fast 
and efficient manner. However, there are undoubtedly also certain systematic 
economic market failures and social and political impacts that prevent 
RECHCOs from becoming the effective tools for "city-building" that they are 
envisioned to be (Post, 2013).  
 
6.2 Main Conclusions 
 
This thesis focused on the idea of RECHCOs within Arab capitals, and while 
there are certain specificities to RECHCOs within the Arab context, there are 
also generalities that might be brought across to similar megaprojects outside 
the Arab World. For instance, the space that such projects provide does not 
recreate the essence of what the city's traditional centre in terms of 
accessibility, social access and provision of a variety of economic functions.  
The space that is generated by these projects (whether the London 
Docklands or La Defense in Paris) managed by the private sector is geared 
towards the specific activities that will ensure maximum positive return in 
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terms of real estate rentals. In this way much of the social segregation felt by 
the RECHCOs' presence is a generic consequence of the project. 
It also seems to be the case that within the urban plans created by such 
projects as the RECHCOs there is not much thought given to inclusivity with 
facilities such as affordable housing. The expensive nature of the real estate, 
and luxurious products are geared less towards local neighbourhoods and 
more towards a certain transnational investor class.  Similarly, the benefits of 
the projects in terms of returns on investment and job creation tend to go 
outside the local communities they are physically located in. In addition, the 
RECHCOs are strongly tied to the international real estate economy. This was 
certainly the case for the Docklands. As such much of the economic letdown 
of the project is also similar across-borders. 
Much of the urban governance involved in such projects' decision making is 
national in nature.  The major proponents of the projects often begin with the 
national governments introducing the concept and advising local governments 
to endorse the project.  However, here there is a difference between what we 
see in the Arab as compared to Western examples.  In the Arab examples, 
the national governments continue to forge ahead with the projects, avoiding 
any sort of meaningful involvement from the local governments.  In Jordan, 
the Royal Court pushed the project strongly onto the Greater Amman 
Municipality.  In Lebanon the Beirut Municipality was not established in any 
functional way after the War. The level of inclusion of local level government, 
is seen far more strongly in Western examples, and is one of the major 
differences. 
It is also the case that the more developed policies of the Western world, in 
terms of preservation and architectural heritage are ingrained in urban culture 
to a larger degree, so that the vast destruction seen in Beirut of existing 
heritage, would not be seen in Western examples to the same extent. In 
addition, more established democracies and approval processes have meant 
that the Western projects have undergone higher degrees of public scrutiny.  
The extent of corruption and disregard for public policy is also more restricted.  
As such the case of the lone investor pushing forth these projects with limited 
degrees of involvement by government is reduced.  Finally, the urban design 
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standards which are more highly developed in the Western world do not allow 
for the blatant disregard of public space and access seen in Arab cases.  
Moreover anti-discrimination and public access laws have made other large 
examples more open and accessible to the general public as compared to the 
Arab RECHCOs. 
There are certain generalisations as shown above that can be drawn from the 
cases.  What makes the RECHCOs a specifically 'Arab' phenomenon for the 
purposes of this Thesis is the extent to which the RECHCOs were able to take 
advantage of existing gaps within existing political processes. Expropriation 
from private citizens and entities for the benefit of a private corporation rather 
than government was seen for the first time in these examples.  Bringing in 
'foreign' urban expertise was very much inline with western planning principles 
seen in these cities, and the grandiose architecture resultant reflective of 
distant large-scale colonial imprints on the city.  
 
The 'Central' Push for the RECHCOs  
 
Central governments push local governments to use RECHCOs because they 
are attractive economically. On the economic front, RECHCOs are marketed 
to provide clear economic benefits through employment gains, tourism growth 
and investment attraction. RECHCOs receive large public subsidies in 
response. However, as shown in Chapter Five, the economic gains are 
unrealised and come at a significant cost to the public.  For example, many of 
these jobs are blue-collar in nature and go to non-residents and the trickle-
down effects are minimal. The total costs associated with RECHCOs as 
calculated by Chapter Five exceed the total benefits. Other public costs 
included tax incentives, special density provisions and market distortions. 
These forms of public support were rationalised as the RECHCO was 
packaged as a tool for massive public benefit. The establishment of new 
regulating (and implementing) bodies such as Mawared was one reflection of 
the Jordanian state's concentration on economic prosperity. By creating an 
organisation to single-mindedly pursue a unique real estate venture 
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unencumbered by any relation or approval by local authority the national 
governments in the case of the RECHCOs argued that they would achieve 
success.  
Not only were the RECHCOs promoted by the national government, they 
were also promoted as the inevitable choice in the cases of both Amman and 
Beirut. As producers of urban space, RECHCOs are inherently speculative 
and highly risky, in the sense that their financial and economic viability is 
argued to depend on the future realisation of the produced increased urban 
rents. Due to the large investment and associated risks, the conventional 
agreement in government is that no one will undertake these projects but 
large investors; and that the extended risks have meant that these investors 
should be afforded a host of incentives. To ensure these rents are achieved 
requires certain subsidies and support, and in order to receive this RECHCOs 
are promoted by governments as the only rational choice to move forward 
with reconstruction and rehabilitation works as described in Chapter Two's 
Case Studies. The literature shows Solidere framed as an 'inevitable' choice 
by the government due to issues of financing and property fragmentation. In 
Abdali, the RECHCO was also framed as the 'only' choice to regenerate the 
city, in order for Amman to compete amongst modern capitals by drawing the 
needed investments to the city to ensure its economic well-being. The 
argument was made in Chapter Four that the narrative framing RECHCOs as 
the inevitable solution was somewhat of a pretence as other options existed 
and the RECHCOs were a choice pushed forward by an elite group of 
policymakers taking advantage of weak local government structures. 
However, the research has shown that other private citizens perceive these 
incentives as unfair, especially as they view alternative methods of 
reconstruction possible and equally as effective (as outlined in Chapter Four). 
The RECHCOs in Amman and Beirut were supported not only financially but 
also bureaucratically where all physical and infrastructure constraints were 
removed so that the development potential would be realised fully and that 
private capital would be attracted to invest in the area. As a consequence it 
became the national government's burden to demonstrate the RECHCOs' 
positive results, with their credibility in question. The three 'body' Chapters of 
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this thesis focused on the political, social and economic impact assessments 
of the RECHCOs. While the individual pillars have specific conclusions within 
the Chapters themselves, in this Conclusion, synthesised themes across the 
three pillars will be presented, linking the broad issues outlined in Chapter 
One. 
 
Centres within the City: Established Traditions are Undermined 
 
As the Literature Review of Chapter One noted, cities are built around 
traditions. These traditions may be social and religious, political or economic 
in nature. One of Chapter Four's major impacts noted that the political 
processes within the city at a local level were undermined. The RECHCOs, as 
was typical of other mega-projects, reflected a series of processes that were 
associated with changing spatial scales of governance and also meant 
shifting power within the management of the city's urbanisation. Social 
traditions and functions within the centre related to heritage, community and 
religion in addition to daily commerce and economic activities were sidelined 
by the RECHCOs. 
The RECHCOs modify the city's image in a way that is reflective of a new 
wave of urban politics. These images create a more attractive city to external 
investors. The city centre, as representational space, reflects city politics. 
Creating these new landscapes allows the state, in addition to transnational 
elites, to establish legitimacy. The cases of Beirut and Amman show that the 
local traditions of planners are undermined as a group of transnational 
investors and their allied planners begin their policies and implementation. 
The city then becomes somewhat of a 'personal playground' (see Chapter 
Three). The question moving forward becomes 'whose city' (Sassen, 1998) as 
mentioned in the Literature Review, given its planning by a certain elite of 
exclusive landscapes that are not easily integrated within the city 
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Social Traditions 
 
The relationship between public sphere and public space is an important one 
as seen through the lens of the RECHCOs. As explored in Chapter One's 
Literature Review, Mitchell argues that material space is essential to politics 
since disadvantaged groups have no other way to make themselves visible 
than to intrude in or occupy space where they are not meant to be. The ability 
to be 'visible' in such a central space is to make ones-self tangible to the 
'public sphere' (Mitchell, 2003). By excluding certain social classes from the 
central public space created by RECHCOs, the projects promoted a feeling of 
disenfranchisement amongst a certain sub-segment of citizens.  The feeling 
was that without visibility within the centre, these citizens were not visible in 
the public sphere, nor would they have a presence. This is comparable to 
what Lefebvre describes (as noted in the Literature Review) of a space that 
can also host urban politics (Lefebvre, 1974). The RECHCO story notes how 
places that were inclusive, such as the active and functional centre, were 
usurped and undermined thus straining citizens' relations with their city 
government.  
With the branded RECHCOs serving as 'new downtowns', the city began to 
appear to its residents to be more of a spectacle. In Beirut and Amman people 
complained about not feeling the city was "real" somehow (Thesis Survey, 
2012). The RECHCOs appear to bring forward something very foreign to 
impose upon the most local of places. Of those authors who speak positively 
of the experience, it is noted that the capital city has become a "showcase" of 
globalisation for attracting foreign capital and generating new investments and 
speculation on land tenure. The effect is not entirely negative; RECHCOs 
have also been known to introduce new architecture and concepts to cities. 
This has shown to be the case in Amman and Beirut, with introductions in 
Abdali related to grey water use and green energy for instance. Solidere used 
world-class architects to create new tourist sites within Beirut.  
Privatised space has become a very common phenomenon as explored in the 
Literature Review with authors noting how the elite 'playground' created would 
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incite policy-making tensions (Hall, 1996, p159). It is the case however that 
what should be taken from the RECHCOs is that it is not just the space that 
matters but also the process of its creation. What seemed to be missing in the 
RECHCOs was something more intangible that Hannah Arendt calls the 
'space of appearance' (Beltran, 2009). This space is only created when 
people "assemble to speak and act together as equals. This space is 
foundational because it is prior to politics in the usual sense, constituting a 
potentially revolutionary and constitutive site of assembly, speech, and action" 
(Notturno, 2013, p1). When the RECHCOs created the 'new downtowns' the 
foundational public space that would be the space of appearance conducive 
to Arendt's public sphere was not created. However, it is clear in the cases of 
Amman and Beirut at least empirically that the public plazas in the old city 
centres were very much used as platforms for communication, sharing and 
public dialogue. Indeed, it was specifically the case for Amman and Beirut that 
the major public protests stemmed directly from the geographic locations of 
the old centres.  
In terms of RECHCOs dividing cities, the empirical and statistical evidence 
showed extensively that people feel this way. While there were differences in 
perception based on income levels, overwhelmingly the RECHCOs made 
people feel like "they didn't belong" heard in interviews in both Amman and 
Beirut (Thesis Survey, 2012 and Beirut Interviews, 2013). The enclaves were 
primarily felt to be for use by an elite (sometimes even identified as "rich and 
non-Jordanian" in the case of Abdali in the Thesis Survey (2012)). Luxury 
stores and exclusive coffee-shops, with guarded entrances have meant that 
these 'new downtowns' are no longer public. They no longer entertain the 
mosque-goers, the street merchant, the peddlers and the activists. Instead, 
they are transformed to international commercial districts. The centre (which 
represented the historic agora public sphere to many) and was a place of 
politics, common markets and worship in both Amman and Beirut transformed 
to an open-air shopping mall of sorts catered to the international elite and their 
businesses. Affordability in terms of residences, offices and commercial 
stores remained at the upper end of prices in both cities, proudly setting new 
records in terms of dollars per sqm. Socially it was evident, that RECHCOs 
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were given physical control over the space and the functions within it. Many 
thus felt not only that RECHCOs were not the 'healing' tools they promised to 
be bringing together the different segments of society with shared benefits; 
rather they remained closed-off without consideration for segments with more 
limited income (see Chapter Three).  
 
Political Traditions 
 
As a setup the RECHCOs themselves in terms of a process remain exclusive 
with low transparency. In the process of the RECHCO approval from both 
Amman and Beirut it was clear that the project selection was manipulated to 
frame the projects as the 'inevitable' choice for the city (see Chapter Four). In 
doing so, the RECHCOs sparked a generation of new investors demanding 
exclusive and special treatment, to the extent that within Amman the new 
Special Projects Directorate was established within the municipality to deal 
with these high-level ventures. Both the Lebanese and Jordanian 
governments marketed their belief that nobody would care to invest in these 
large projects except for exceptionally large investors. Special treatment was 
granted, and so the processes at the local level generally adhered to were 
largely ignored. The highest levels of government celebrated the RECHCO. In 
a way, the involvement of the King or Prime Minister may intentionally 
'depoliticise' the mega-project through extensive promotion promising a bright 
future and it becomes difficult to avoid that sort of propaganda, making it a 
case of loyalty to one's country to approve and applaud the project. The 
financial transactions and the contract terms that were negotiated bypassed 
regular accepted political processes and were concluded 'informally', meaning 
that additional freedoms were granted that regular and smaller investors were 
not privy to. When decisions regarding city space are isolated from residents, 
their sense of belonging as a citizen deteriorates, and feelings of 
disenfranchisement begin.  
The RECHCOs' size and the lack of transparency within the approval process 
makes the situation even more precarious, as the government adopts the role 
Chapter 6: Conclusion  |  319 
 
 
 
of both "coordinator and adjudicator" (Beyhum, 1992a, p7) rather than 
regulator, wiping away objectivity. The RECHCOs and their major investors 
tend to have extensive amounts of political leverage and legal power. The fact 
that Solidere's destiny was tied to Rafiq Hariri's political career is only one 
example (Nizameddin, 2006). Later the Abdali project would show similar ties 
to the political system, being publically accused by some property owners as 
being "in bed with the municipality" (Talal Abu Ghazaleh International, 2007a, 
p1). 
Krijnen and Fawaz conclude through their research in Lebanon that the 
neoliberal 'turn' that led to this sort of bypass of processes in Lebanon seems 
to be a trend that is documented in cities across the world and that has 
materialised in different public interventions that are put in place at different 
levels to facilitate the circulation of capital. Amongst these effects, seen in the 
RECHCOs, are bypassed local policies and regulations, the delegation of 
planning to private actors, and the changed institutional environment to 
accommodate capital needs (Krijnen and Fawaz, 2010). One of the main 
implications of these changes has been the widening of informal decision-
making within the realm of public agencies. Such processes, it should be 
pointed out, have already been described in other regional contexts (Roy, 
2009) in relation to the intersection between public regulations and 
neoliberalism. Some writing on the projects believed that certain formal 
procedures and traditions need to be sacrificed to solve the major problems 
which "cannot be solved by regular, traditional, democratic means", as Fadel 
El-Shalaq, the president of the CDR claimed in an interview (Kabbani, 1992, 
p15). It seems that the investors would not even be interested in approaching 
the venture had they not received the "red carpet" treatment (Mansur, 2013). 
Other local investors do not receive the same treatment, which creates 
resentment and fears regarding local hegemony. Some cities in Lebanon 
feared that the plan and its financing mechanism was a demonstration of 
future Saudi - and by extension, American - political power and domination 
over their country (Kabbani, 1992).  
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Economic Traditions 
 
The functions of the city centre that were known to the city's citizens were 
outlined in Chapter Two's Case Studies, uniting residents in a variety of 
political, commercial, residential, religious and cultural forms. The new 
RECHCO centres' functions do not offer the same sort of socioeconomic 
satisfaction. Economic traditions of popular market places for food, artisans 
and stalls were part of a city attraction. On the economic front, the RECHCOs 
also undermined traditionally accepted values within the city. Samir Khalaf 
described the effects of the property rights class as a 'paradox' in Lebanon's 
Predicament (Khalaf, 1987). Lebanon, says Khalaf, is torn between valuing 
private property rights and upholding traditional concepts of communal land 
holding within families, and amongst religious groups. The RECHCO was 
seen to undermine both private and waqf holdings. In addition, post-
independence, the Lebanese were very proud of domestic ownership, as was 
the case with most post-colonial countries, and the citizens remained cautious 
of foreign land ownership (Khalaf, 1987). Solidere SAL undermined this by 
directly expropriating land and transferring ownership to foreign investors.  
Abdali saw similar issues in relation to property rights, and social rights and 
norms, with land being of great importance to economic traditions within 
Amman (Ali bin al-Hussein, 2007). More established court systems outside 
the Arab World may lessen these effects.  
 
Exclusion in Public Participation Confuses Citizenship: Segregation and 
Disenfranchisement Breeds Antagonism  
 
The process by which RECHCOs are approved holds many drawbacks, 
amongst which is that little public participation is sought after. Due to the fact 
that RECHCOs are built to be the city's 'new downtown', they physically 
occupy public space that some in cities view to be synonymous with the public 
sphere (see Chapter One's Literature Review). The public sphere is thus 
represented by a physical area of land, which is then easily fought over and 
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controlled by occupation of its geographic space. The power of the state is 
threatened by this exercise of public rights. This means that the space begins 
to represent the conflict between the desire for order and representation 
(Mitchell, 1995). Mitchell, in his example of People's Park in Berkley, shows 
how people fought on "behalf of expansion and opposition: the power of the 
state and corporate capitalism, they felt, had to be opposed by (re)taking 
space" (Mitchell, 1995, p124). The struggle in People's Park was another 
"Tiananmen Square" in which Park activists and homeless people together 
would halt the expansion of the corporate state (Kahn, 1991, p30). The 
representative value of the space created by RECHCOs in the city is 
significant. 
At a certain point, RECHCOs no longer demonstrate institutions that are the 
creation of contemporary citizens, and as such feelings of disenfranchisement 
emerge. Hobbes (1651) outlines a view that citizens are not obliged to submit 
to the government in cases where the government is in fact too weak to act 
appropriately. For others when a government fails to secure natural rights 
(Locke, 1689) or satisfy the best interest of society - or what Rousseau (1763) 
calls the 'general will', citizens may withdraw their obligation to the social 
contract. Locke (1689) was the first to argue that individuals would in fact form 
a state that would provide a 'neutral judge' to its members, and that the 
contract was void in cases that this did not happen. A more agonistic society, 
allowing for greater dialogue would be the ultimate goal, and that involves 
participation in aspects of society such as 'what defines public benefit' feeding 
directly into RECHCOs' structures.  
The failure of development projects to meet their social goals is an old 
concept, attributed by Laura Nader (1985) to lack of recognition by national 
and foreign development planners of the pluralistic nature of law and of 
property concepts in the Arab world (Nader, 1985, p30). Nader believes that 
many of the conflicts that occurred as a result of these area development 
schemes could have been avoided if planners had taken into account 
traditional legal institutions. The same can be said of citizens trying to disrupt 
the normal flow of business in the RECHCOs. 
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Figure ‎6-2: Tents Set Up in the Solidere Centre in a Physical Invasion of the 
Space 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons 
 
 
 
 
The spatial dynamics between the centre and the periphery observed in the 
two post-conflict reconstruction periods in Lebanon are remarkable as they 
exactly mirror the power relations and conflict lines that divide the country 
(Höckel, 2007). While the movement of political power during the first 
reconstruction occurred from centre to periphery when the marginalised 
citizens that had been crowded out of the capital joined the ranks of various 
local political actors, most notably Hezbollah, there was then an opposite 
movement back from the periphery to the city centre. Several hundreds of 
pro-Hezbollah activists from the Southern rural regions moved to, and 
occupied, Beirut‘s Solidere threatening to topple the government and 
preventing any business taking place in this part of the capital. This 
occupation of central Beirut was a highly symbolic event and can be 
interpreted as an attempt by those who had been crowded out of the city 
centre but who had built up a decentralised basis of power in the periphery to 
reclaim their place in the capital city (see Chapter Four). Lebanon is indeed a 
case that underlines the importance of the capital city and its post-conflict 
reconstruction in the process of state making. But it is also an example that 
demonstrates how reconstruction can fail and can lead to negative outcomes 
that perpetuate state fragility, if ambitious but exclusive reconstruction plans, 
are not accompanied by more inclusive and redistributive national 
development strategies. Ultimately, people lose faith in the process. The 
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Thesis Survey conducted in Amman shows this, whereby 38% of Amman's 
residents no longer want to participate at all in any urban policy processes 
(Thesis Survey, 2012) because they felt alienated from the Abdali decision-
making. If this is broken down further – it is the young people's cohort at 68% 
that stopped wanting to participate which is even more dangerous and 
disappointing for the future. 
 
Urban Governance and Policy: Undermining the Local  
 
RECHCOs Promote the National over the Local 
 
Through the three Chapters investigating social, political and economic 
impacts, the RECHCOs actively participated in creating exclusions that put 
national interests far above local interests. The local level, as is shown in the 
analysis of RECHCOs, was set aside in favour of policies, benefits and 
approvals at the national level instead. Höckel (2007) frames the 
characteristics of the reconstruction process into a double effect of 
disintegration. The first was vertical disintegration that led to a widening gap 
between rich and poor spatially highlighted by Beirut‘s Central District 
developments. Horizontal disintegration was the second form resulting from 
distribution of resources along sectarian lines, reinforced clientelist networks 
and hampered national reconciliation and national development strategies. 
RECHCOs obscure the social and economic realities, and deny the 
municipality of material and symbolic relationships that people have built with 
their homes, their work places and their localities. This happened in a variety 
of ways: 
 
Weak Local Government Weakened Further 
 
RECHCOs, in the cases mentioned, were approved by the patriarchal 
government with little to no local involvement. In Abdali, Mawared (one of the 
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shareholders) took on the development roles of the municipality. The local 
government deferred to the stronger national government with leaders at the 
central level enforcing their globalised ideology on the local level. As the 
national government pushed the RECHCO through, the local government 
implemented a national agenda drafted by the centre with little regard for local 
democratic accountability or principles. The state agencies that emerged are 
developed with the aim in mind to "minimise transaction costs" (Parker, 2009, 
p115) for global investors with a choice of any country around the world.  
The neoliberal agenda in this case would argue that to encourage RECHCOs, 
risk should be removed from the private investor and redistributed across the 
public at large. The public as such, become the stakeholders "whose return 
on investment is valorised as a public good" (Parker, 2009, p115). The 
resultant situation becomes one where the government is accountable and 
responsible to investors - through ensuring 'market requirements' over and 
above the needs of its own citizens. There were also exclusions regarding 
who was allowed to participate in the process. The consequences were a 
rising trend for vertical social disintegration and a vacuum left by the state 
being unable to adequately fulfil its basic functions, as explored in Chapter 
Four. These functions were taken over by para-state actors, in particular 
Hezbollah, who managed to establish a state within the state empowering 
them to operate outside state control and even provoke a new violent conflict. 
The strength of the para-state actors in the Arab World is much stronger than 
what might exist in the Western world as related to these projects.  
The Lebanese state did put in place a set of institutions to govern the 
reconstruction effort; however these were not strong enough to complete all 
state functions properly. These institutions – similar to those in Amman 
(Mawared) – designed as alternatives to the existing organisations perceived 
to be heavily bureaucratic (as outlined in Chapter Four), were not democratic 
in nature, did not gain the trust of citizens, and remained driven by the 
objective of encouraging investment. Salaam (1996) noted that the weak 
state's limited capacity to setup a planning central agency, implementation 
and monitoring of reconstruction after the Civil War allowed Rafiq Hariri to 
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take advantage of the system to internalise public subsidies to the Solidere 
project. 
 
Elite Process with no Public Grassroots Participation 
 
When local democratic participation mechanisms are not respected or are 
applied in a formal manner it results in a new choreography of elite power. 
However, grassroots movements sometimes manage to turn the course of 
events in favour of local participation, though this was not the case in the 
RECHCOs with weakened civil society structures. The desire to create quick 
iconic products, rather than taking time to build a common vision for the 
future, with all stakeholders working together, constitutes a trend also 
observed in western countries. Mega-projects are very often conceived as 
planned territories disconnected from the rest of the city. These sorts of 
projects take place outside the formal framework of decision-making and are 
based on exemptions from, and exceptions to, existing planning laws.  
The elite process meant, in its extreme, that approvals do not take place at 
the local level. RECHCOs and similar mega-projects have increasingly been 
used as a vehicle to establish exceptionality measures in planning and policy 
procedures as was explored in Chapter Four. This sort of new selective urban 
policy has been associated with new and less democratic governance forms 
that are driven by elitist priorities. The participatory approach has not been 
mandated in the design and implementation of mega-projects in Arab 
metropolises. Social mobilisation is almost absent because of both the 
weakness of civil society and the power of central government over the local. 
Some critics have denounced Solidere especially harshly as a circumvented 
way of exploiting the public for private interests (Adwan, 2005), and clear 
conflicts of interest have been noted in Chapter Four by Leenders (2003), 
Salaam (1996), and Nizameddin (2006) amongst others.  
The welfare function of the state was subordinated to a profit-oriented, 
exclusive reconstruction project allowing non-state actors to grow in power 
and influence to this end. Due to issues related to public debt, and interest 
326 
 
payments (explained in Chapter Five) in both the cases of Beirut and Amman, 
RECHCOs were marketed as heroes at the national level, which disfranchised 
the local level even further as the national government pushed through a 
certain agenda. This change meant that the government's influence and 
acceptance by its citizens was reduced. Sub-state actors started to fill the void 
left by the state, which increased their influence amongst significant parts of 
the population. 
Among Solidere's critics, many questioned the progress of reconstruction with 
no community consultation (Fisk 1991, Fisk 1992). Residents found that their 
role in the reconstruction of Beirut was limited (Beyhum, 1992a). Landowners, 
who had been opposed by the scheme and viewed it as unconstitutional, 
organised to protest it (Fisk, 1992). Samir Khalaf suggests that private interest 
and self-gain are being promoted at the expense of the overall public good. In 
Amman, landowners began to object and threatened sit-ins and protests. The 
bourgeoisie became indistinguishable from public officials, and both amassed 
wealth through real estate (Khalaf, 1993b). The weak state, and the 
opportunities provided by the available resources for reconstruction have 
been systematically exploited by individual actors to increase power and 
influence. The incapacity of the local government to set up efficient and 
private sector oriented institutions, a feature common to the Arab World, 
meant that in both Beirut and Amman within the construction process, private 
entrepreneurs like Baha and Rafiq Hariri were able to initiate profit-oriented 
schemes and benefit from public subsidies. This type of emerging urban 
governance model looks at the human agent behind global capital within the 
cities' 'new landlords', which was a transnational capitalist class represented 
through the shareholders of real estate companies and their managers and 
executives. Around the world, these landlords play a significant role in the city 
politics and through the dynamics of their investment promote a certain 
lifestyle within the projects (Ley, 2004; Sklair, 2001). 
As demonstrated in the Case Studies of Chapter Two, the elite process 
highlighted the strengths of individual investors. Rafiq Hariri, in the 
reconstruction project of Beirut‘s City Centre into a modern and ‗world-class‘ 
downtown, at the service of international business and elite consumption 
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practices, figures as both private investor and ‗globalising politician‘ servicing 
the investor‘s interests. In 2002, his private construction company Saudi Oger 
engaged in a very similar project in Amman. Baha Hariri, his son, in Amman, 
acted as a private investor with strong connections to government with the 
Mayor of Amman on AID's Board of Directors. By focusing on private 
investors receiving public benefits, the boundaries between the public and 
private sphere were blurred.  
 
Economic Exclusions with Benefits Not Going to Local Population 
 
While RECHCOs were constructed on a very specific site locally, they were 
nonetheless considered national projects as they were focused on economic 
benefits for the central government level. The lack of trickle-down effect 
meant that people turned away from government, and their trust in the system 
was undermined by low economic returns. The failure of trickle-down to 
distribute benefits and jobs from prestige projects in an equitable manner to 
disadvantaged groups and localities surrounding the area is attributable to a 
number of factors in the case of the RECHCOs. As argued in Chapter Five, 
job benefits went mainly to non-nationals in Jordan and Lebanon, taxation 
exemptions were granted, and the housing did not cater to the original 
residents. The opportunity cost of these developments meant that significant 
public funding was rerouted away from genuine social needs towards what 
some term "non-productive" (Mansur, 2013) concepts such as real estate. 
One author writing on Lebanon notes from an interview that "it is short-sighted 
for the government to come and waste so much money...when social 
differences are still great in Lebanon" (Calame and Charlesworth, 2009, 
p189)228. 
                                                          
228
 The same seems to be true of examples in the UK. Some reports in the literature found that benefits 
accrued directly to property owners (DCC, 1988, p37) and were not well distributed by mega-projects. 
For example, one report on the case of Canary Wharf in specific, found that it was "cosily isolated from 
the encroaching reality of the housing and unemployment problems besetting East London" (Crilley, 
1991, p13), other reports found that the initial policies concentrated on physical regeneration with limited 
thought given to social provision (Parkinson, 1989).  
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On the economic front, while the RECHCO was meant to promote local 
economic growth, many of the preconditions required for growth were not 
controlled at the local level and so the national government was the natural 
fall-back. There was no comprehensive plan dealing with post-war recovery 
and institutional roles were never integrated. Höckel, as discussed in Chapter 
Three argues that because reconstruction was concentrated in Beirut focusing 
on an elite part of society while sidelining other regions is one of the main 
reasons behind interruptions in sustainable peace (Höckel, 2007). The 
argument made here has shown that the RECHCO mega-projects are poorly 
integrated into the wider urban processes and planning. As a result, the 
impact on the city as a whole and on project locations is ambiguous. Chapter 
Five argues that the distribution of short-term benefits of expenditure was 
skewed away from the poorer populations of these urban development areas. 
The costs to the public sector were pushed through by central government 
decisions.  For instance, tax exemptions given to AID in Amman could only be 
decided at the central government level, though most other costs were locally 
based. In the case of Solidere, with the government's weakened structure and 
the focus on one private entity that would undertake the project, the post-war 
reconstruction was selective in planning and fragmented in implementation.  
Due to the fact that benefits are given to people outside of the local area, the 
plan began to be looked at as an attempt by the central government to force 
certain national solutions and ideologies related to development on specific 
local communities. This is especially the case when the RECHCOs do not 
benefit people at the very bottom of the ladder. The failure of local 
regeneration strategies, based on large-scale investment in mega-project 
developments, to make a demonstrable contribution to the quantity and 
quality of work available for disadvantaged groups was a main issue of 
sustainability and continued acceptance and success. For example, in 
Amman, the transportation terminal was relocated to the edge of Amman's 
city centre as an alternative in Tabarbour to the central area of the Abdali 
District. Those in need of public transportation marginalised at the expense of 
those who frequent high-end commercial districts. In Beirut, local residents 
Chapter 6: Conclusion  |  329 
 
 
 
could no longer afford to live in the centre in their ancestral homes, and were 
insufficiently compensated for their residences.  
 
Confusion of Public and Private Interests 
 
In the case of Lebanon, weak state institutions were not fully able to keep 
politics and resources related to reconstruction from being exploited for 
personal reasons, leading to the "perpetuation of instability and the creation of 
new conflicts over assets, influence and identity" (Höckel, 2007, p3). Rather 
than fulfilling the political tasks of a prime minister, necessary to establish the 
state‘s power and legitimacy, Rafiq Hariri responded to his role as a wealthy 
and powerful entrepreneur (Höckel, 2007). With this mix of public and private 
interests, investors within the new 'doing business' regime wanted to bypass 
the system entirely. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the experience of Solidere 
that blurred between private and public interests created what some have 
termed 'Harirism' in terms of policy. This Harirism is special in that it confuses 
private and public interests and "represents the colonisation of the former by 
the latter" (Makdisi, 1997a, p693). Critics did not question Rafiq Hariri's 
philanthropy towards Lebanon but feared that his private institutions were 
replacing the public sector. They argued that in Europe or the United States, a 
similar connection would have been regarded as a potential conflict of interest 
and a possible source of political embarrassment. The cost of the Dar al-
Handasah Master Plan, estimated to be several million dollars, was paid for 
by Rafiq Hariri as an individual before any official approval was given (see 
Chapter Four). The sidelining of elected representatives in the design of the 
project was perceived by some as a forfeiture of the prerogatives of local 
urban management. The political climate meant that urban planning brought 
in new forms of public government, which while offering increased power and 
authority to the private sector also intervened to facilitate the work of the 
parties. This was apparent in Amman where the Mayor was given the 
authority by AID to purchase land on their behalf. 
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The RECHCOs in Amman and Beirut changed how people view their 
interaction with their government and city and how they feel as respected 
citizens. The lack of participation of citizens exchanged with the participation 
of the private sector meant a very low level of public involvement and scrutiny 
that led to an enhanced opportunity for corruption. Mega-projects underline 
the fragility of a state unable to set a real strategy for its capital, but eager for 
bribes and other forms of corruption (Pfeifer, 2012). The systematic corruption 
was a symptom of two states: a fragmented civil society unable to pursue 
concerted collective action; and weak state institutions incapable of fulfilling 
their original functions. It was this constellation and setup that allowed a 
private actor to monopolise the reconstruction of the capital, pursuing an elitist 
approach - rather than a more inclusive pluralistic strategy. In a corrupt 
process the private and the public become intertwined both politically and 
socially in terms of space. It was the case for Amman and Beirut that 
perceptions of corruption were clearly identified, and certainly if a generalised 
statement were to be made it seems that corruption in some form (maybe 
through the process) is inevitable given the RECHCOs' magnitude and as a 
result of their intimate connections with government and the special treatment 
they receive as a result. 
 
Heritage and Memory: Physical Alterations Undermine Identity 
 
Chapter Three focused on heritage as one of the main issues. Issues of 
heritage, memory and even the melancholy that is felt when old areas of the 
city are lost cannot be ignored, and alongside it the "way they made us feel" 
(Thesis Survey, 2012). Not everyone felt that way, and some in Amman did 
feel that the 'new downtown' brought with it a certain glamour, finally bringing 
Amman into the modern age. However, these percentages were much more 
heavily leaned towards those people that felt a sense of loss as demonstrated 
in Chapter Three.  
The Abdali project in Amman is one that enjoys 'slick marketing' slogans 
targeted at the consumer mindset (Al-Masri, 2007, p182). Al-Masri also 
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comments that the development of such new areas in the Arab world tends to 
run in parallel to the neglect of the historic urban quarters within the same 
cities. In the Arab world preservation policy is not well developed and it is not 
uncommon to let historic city centres deteriorate (Daher, 2011). Nonetheless, 
the existing literature has shown the extent of the meaning and place that city 
centres have on city residents. The same was reflected in the empirical 
evidence gathered. Solidere SAL worked to produce a "clean slate" in the city 
centre by physically tearing down physical remains of older and damaged 
buildings (Shwayri, 2008, p89). In Amman, funding was directed to the Abdali 
project at the expense of the existing centre, where an overwhelming 
proportion of the population at 94% wished to sponsor the historic centre 
rather than the "new downtown" (Thesis Survey, 2012). The existing heritage 
within the city is sidelined by the RECHCOs. 
The physical alterations of the space have meant that there has also been a 
destruction of physical heritage. While the Beirut city centre‘s regeneration 
has been celebrated by many, especially in the international press (Financial 
Times, New York Times, Economist, see Chapter Two's Case Studies), many 
intellectuals decry the devastating destruction of heritage that was brought 
forth with Solidere's plan, which included the destruction of certain buildings 
and structures strongly embedded in heritage. Indeed, the project is 
characterised by two very different opinions. It seems that several different 
geographical imaginations were at play (Denoeux 1998). Many intellectuals 
saw the differences between the different styles as differences between two 
worlds. The changes in the physical heritage have meant both a loss of 
memory and heritage in the city in favour of more homogenous space. The 
perceived need to promote RECHCOs for economic competition has led to 
the overall homogenisation of space as cities all strive for similar things. 
However, with homogenisation comes repetition and lack of local satisfaction. 
This new urban RECHCO activity undermined conservation of heritage 
locations, especially within the historic city centres, which often constitute the 
older areas of the city.  
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Contested Space: RECHCOs are Seen to Cause Social, Political and 
Economic Exclusions and Divisions 
 
Each of the three Chapters (social, political and economic) reflects the 
RECHCOs as having exclusionary impacts. Chapter Three, for example, 
explored the notions of exclusions for social and functional reasons (with the 
type of commercial activities catering to a certain income class); Chapter Four 
explored how the process of approval was diverted from public participation 
and local decision-making; Chapter Five showed exclusions for price reasons, 
whether for real estate or services, and the furthering of divisions as the 
benefits were routed away from the general public towards a certain elite.  
The exclusion of many citizens from the benefits of reconstruction, ignorance 
towards their demands for democratic participation, and neglect of the basic 
needs of the poor and marginalised led to an atmosphere of disillusionment 
and discontent. The Thesis Survey similarly showed a perceived unfairness. 
 
Social 
 
On the social front, exclusions were faced by people feeling that the new 
RECHCO centre was a private area, with functions priced and catered to a 
certain social segment, with a private security force to monitor people's 
entrance and activity. As shown in Chapter Three not everyone felt welcome 
by the public space created by the RECHCO and there was a certain sense of 
bitterness associated with the project (Thesis Survey, 2012). 
An overwhelming majority of those surveyed in a statistically representative 
sample within Amman indicated that they were afraid of divisions in the city. In 
looking at these new projects in Jordan Rami Daher asks if "the Kingdom‘s 
prestige projects that started at the height of the credit bubble have become 
the biggest scars on our cities‘ landscapes. What happened and will they ever 
become anything but empty shells?" (Jo Magazine Staff, 2011, p2). The thesis 
found that the RECHCO that exists in Amman in its current format will in fact 
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become something more than 'an empty shell', and will be an active reminder 
of a city divided into the 'haves' and 'have-nots'. The creature that Abdali is 
set to become in the words of those interviewed during the survey is 
"something that will divide us, that we will see everyday and remember that 
we are not the same as the rich people" (Thesis Survey, 2012). The literature 
on Solidere noted that the average Lebanese citizen was slowly made 
unwelcome in the city centre (Höckel, 2007).  
As Chapter One's Literature Review noted, social control of public spaces 
helps redefine 'the public' (Sennett, 1992). This socio-economic restructuring, 
combined with the mosaic of newly constructed built environments with their 
associated increased rents, produces urban islands, a patchwork of discrete 
spaces with increasingly sharp boundaries, gentrifies areas such as city 
centres. The RECHCOs alongside other large projects accentuate 
socioeconomic polarisation through the real-estate market, with the rising 
prices of property within the RECHCO borders and changes in the priorities of 
public budgets that are increasingly redirected from social objectives to 
investments in the built environment. 
RECHCOs due to their construct provide physical rehabilitation plans that are 
not well integrated with national plans (as outlined in Chapter Three); and 
while the literature views reconstruction and regeneration as a series of 
processes institutionalising development in cities (Crawford and Killing, 2013), 
the RECHCOs are "one-off" projects, they neither allowed for cohesion in the 
social fabric, nor encouraged public participation (discussed later in this 
Conclusion). Spatial exclusion and its (qualitative) costs have been discussed 
in multiple places within global city theory (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; 
Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000; Sassen, 2001). The Abdali and Solidere 
projects have similarly been criticised for increasing spatial divides and 
creating closed off urban islands catering to the selected few (Daher, 2008). 
The 'prosperity' marketed by RECHCOs may lead to certain urban 
geographies marked by social displacement and exclusion with an intangible 
prioritisation of citizens as different classes of different importance (as 
Chapter Three notes). To certain critics, the RECHCO model represents little 
more than the corporatisation of urban forms and linkages that ultimately 
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dilutes heritage and the unique sense of space that the traditional centres and 
cities have. The property-led regeneration of RECHCOs has meant a focus 
only on certain localities with concentrated development and investment 
activity so that other areas have not received the same benefit. Those outside 
the target area are in one sense 'excluded' from the windfall of development. 
The spatial exclusion is a concept from these projects that may be 
generalised across internationally, although more stringent public access laws 
in the West may mitigate some of the damage experienced. 
 
Political 
 
In looking at the relationship between the RECHCOs and the political system, 
RECHCOs were found to almost inevitably work their way around streamlined 
political processes through special connections and even outright corruption 
as explored in Chapter Four. Along with full governmental support (outside the 
traditional democratic channels explored in Chapter Five) RECHCOs were 
pushed through with special incentives. The size and magnitude of the 
RECHCO and nature of its investors has meant that the traditional political 
processes are bypassed in favour of segregated decision-making at the top. 
The public was divided into investors given preferential treatment and "the 
rest" (Post, 2013). The division causes distrust. As a result, many of the 
citizens within the cities felt disenfranchised and distant from the political 
system. Their sense of fairness was undermined. In addition, many residents 
on principle refused to look beyond process issues when interacting with the 
RECHCO. In Solidere for instance interviewees often said "[Rafiq] Hariri 
robbed us of the land," "Solidere are thieves" and were unable to recognise 
other possible achievements because of the initial process details (Beirut 
Interviews, 2013). Figure 6-2 shows one manifestation of this in a large 'Stop 
Solidere' sign in Beirut.  Better established and more democratic political and 
legal systems in the West may make these aspects particularly indicative of 
the political structure currently in the Arab World.  
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Figure ‎6-3: A Huge 'Stop Solidere' Banner in Front of the High-End Zeitounah 
Bey in Beirut 
 
Source: Picture author's own, 2013 
 
Economic 
 
Economic exclusions primarily within Chapter Five were focused on residents 
being priced out of the Amman and Beirut RECHCO areas due to 
unaffordable commercial, office and residential rents and pricing. In addition, 
the commercial functionality offered was well beyond the reach of the average 
city citizen (Thesis Survey 2012; Beirut Interviews, 2013). The economic class 
focused on was upper-income and little was done to accommodate for 
activities that could cater to a larger audience.  The involvement of Gulf 
investors is another peculiarity of prestige projects in Arab metropolises. The 
simultaneity and convergence of petro-dollars in mega-projects is impressive; 
it seems a new trans-Arab capitalism, searching to implement high-end urban 
developments has emerged and found itself in the RECHCO. 
The Abdali project leaves behind Amman's traditional centre, which is a short 
distance away from the Abdali site. The traditional commercial setting of 
Amman's city centre, with its wide pavements, haggling vendors and colourful 
stalls is being replaced by a more sanitary modern setting with brand name 
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clothing stores as witnessed by the soft opening of the Abdali Boulevard in 
2014 - a downtown exclusively for those who can afford higher-end Western 
clothing. Amman's city centre was in all senses of the word a 'melting pot' for 
the residents, geographically in the middle of the city. The city centre has 
been the setting for political protest, it is the place of worship - with one of 
Amman's most important mosques (one that is right on the edge of the new 
Abdali project). Similarly Beirut's centre was a popular commercial area with 
several large religious and governmental institutions.  
Lebanon's reconstruction was focused on Beirut. To this end, reconstruction 
efforts focused primarily in the capital and on Rafiq Hariri's trickle-down 
strategy, which was built on the assumption of having positive spill-over 
effects from the capital's centre to the rest of the country. The assumption was 
that the concentrated efforts of development within the capital would be 
sufficient in terms of positive spill-overs to the entire country was a deeply 
flawed one. Amman's city centre and areas surrounding Abdali received only 
fractions of the public subsidy and funds given to the RECHCO. The case was 
the same for Beirut. It appears RECHCOs are merely mechanisms for 
achieving the physical and economic regeneration of discrete parts of urban 
areas. In the case of Beirut and Amman, this approach, has encouraged the 
fragmentation of cities and the development of urban regeneration and 
planning policies that focus on designated zones or sites (Harvey, 1988; 
Healey et al., 1992b). Wilkinson (1992) argues that this approach represents 
an obsession with urban fragments and the planning of individual elements 
rather than integrated urban systems (Wilkinson, 1992, p209). In this context 
RECHCOs are not geared towards creating equitable cities or localities, rather 
they are geared at restructuring the spatial form of parts of urban areas to 
meet the demands of the restructured national and global economy. These 
parts are by default catered to transnational investors through investment 
opportunities, luxury apartments, and global brands at the expense of local 
souqs. Such large income discrepancies are specific to the developing world.  
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6.3 Lessons Learnt 
 
RECHCOs as they currently exist have several serious misgivings. The 
process of approval does not adequately involve the public, which gives rise 
to social tension and political corruption. There is also a need for a 
transparent formula to decide the extent of public support and benefits. The 
process and projects within their current design in a predetermined format 
benefit only a small and select number of people, and the lessons learnt 
indicate that a series of litmus tests for the RECHCOs would help make them 
more effective urban policy instruments. With the priority status given to the 
RECHCOs and their importance in cities, reforming the process of approval 
associated with them and their impacts may help lay the foundations of a 
more democratic urban policy. The 'lessons learnt' described below are 
specific to the Arab RECHCO experiences, where low levels of transparent 
and sophisticated urban governance and policy exist; though some of the 
social impacts may be certainly be carried across into other experiences of 
such projects within the Western world.  
 
Limited Public Participation Lowered Accountability  
 
The RECHCOs as outlined in Chapter Four avoided public participation in 
their approval process on the assumption that it was time-consuming and 
would exacerbate project costs. While the overt costs of public participation 
may indeed start to derail a project, the consequences of sidelining the public 
have long-lasting effects on alienation and the integration of society within the 
spaces in the city centre. The RECHCOs as prestige projects within Beirut 
and Amman serve to curtail and undermine public debate and involvement in 
policy formulation, and open and accountable government in a number of 
ways. First, the lack of public participation brings about a crisis in efficiency in 
that the feelings of the public cannot be adequately managed by the 
government in the first instance. In the second instance, it brings about a 
crisis of legitimacy in that political representation based on democracy in 
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nations becomes no more than an indication on the ability of government 
(local and central) to internalise the wishes of its own people. The result of 
this process is an increasing distance and 'opacity' between citizens and their 
representatives (Dalton, 2005) and the city centre as a public space for 
dialogue is usurped. This also leads to a crisis of identity where people see 
their locality and culture completely disjointed from the politics around them 
and so their claims of autonomy take the form of resistance identity and 
cultural identity politics as opposed to their political identity as citizens (Barber 
1995; Castells 2004; Lull, 2007). The final phenomenon is a crisis of equity 
where the RECHCO itself increases economic inequalities. The political 
process outlined in Chapter Four showed that one of the major issues related 
to the transparent and smooth licensing of RECHCOs were the blurred lines 
between the public and private sectors, so that ordinary members of the 
public felt that their roles were being usurped. The citizens of the city were not 
able to actively participate and members of the public did not know how to 
further involve themselves in the process. The civil society which might have 
allowed for this was not available in Beirut and Amman.  
In the absence of a strong civil society monitoring capability these forms of 
mega-projects fail. With strong civil society present, however, there have been 
successful examples of how this has succeeded. In the cases of Jordan and 
Lebanon, where the state actively intervened to halt a weak civil society from 
progressing further in their criticism of the RECHCOs, either through the 
courts or media, the situation is more complex. In Abdali and Solidere there 
were no clear guidelines on public information to be provided by the 
RECHCOs, as well as accessibility to corporate records that would enhance 
public accountability, and no space was carved out for public dialogue.  
Ideas of how to integrate civil society around the world are plenty. Looking at 
the case presented by Mouloudi (2010) from Morocco it seems that in order to 
protect the affected communities, the elected officials proposed solutions to 
ensure the integration of collaborative planning involving landowners and 
proposed the establishment of a monitoring committee to study comments 
and objections made by citizens during the public inquiry. On the governance 
level as such, there are also plenty of practical solutions implemented from 
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around the world. Certain transparent forms of urban governance within 
opportunities for equal partnership have been explored in the literature, and 
Clerc and Hurault explored these for Damascus (Clerc and Hurault, 2010). 
Amman and Beirut had no specific public agency for planning that could 
coordinate public participation across stakeholder groups229, while 
simultaneously providing large investors the access to national agencies they 
desired to avoid administrative bureaucracy. The 'need for speed' bypassed 
local democracies, with public inquiries being seen as costly. As it stands now 
private investors seem almost to have been delegated the role of urban policy 
and planning over major cities in the case of the RECHCOs. Though Ottoman 
history in the Arab World saw large investors benefiting privately from their 
management of the public waqf souqs and benefiting privately from the 
matter, today's citizens, government by modern legislation and aware of 
democratic principles "want a say" in their city (Beirut Interviews, 2013). The 
balance between the transnational investors on the one hand, and local 
communities on the other was an uneven one, and the informalised planning 
process meant that there were no checks and balances to redefine the 
equation.  
The central government wished to attract investments with capital city real 
estate as its primary offering, but failed to incorporate the monies spent on 
investment attraction through public subsidy into a cohesive plan.  Chapter 
Five's economic impact assessments showed that in fact the costs of 
attracting these investments in terms of the subsidies and incentives 
outweighed the benefits230. The lack of cohesive plan meant that local 
authorities were disenfranchised, and the city's citizens felt simply "left out" 
(Thesis Survey, 2012).  Missing out partners in Lebanon provided para-state 
actors with a platform upon which to recruit as an alternative to government. 
In Amman, citizens took to the street in protest, and the Abdali project 
became one synonymous with 'corruption' - when asked to give the first word 
that came to mind when hearing about the Abdali project "corruption" was the 
                                                          
229
 There is a wide literature on the extent of public participation and its different forms (EPA, 2013), 
however, this is beyond the scope of the thesis. 
230
 Reports looking at the UDCs in the UK concluded that the flagship projects would have a role to play 
but only if they were fully integrated with local job creation and a coherent plan for community renewal 
(Ward, 1994, p. 12). 
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top ranking response as indicated by the Thesis Survey (2012). The 
concentration of funding within select areas of the capital city gave rise to 
local and national inequalities, as more rural residents viewed the rich 
residents of the capital as the sole beneficiaries of central government 
subsidies.  
The marginalisation of partners meant that the central government weakened 
the local government's credibility further amongst its constituents.  In addition, 
far removed from the city citizens, their true priorities were not included in the 
'new downtown' Master Plans.  Economic benefits therefore remained 
isolated, and the Abdali and Solidere projects already aesthetically separate 
from the surrounding neighbourhoods, guarded with private security forces, 
grew to be seen as even more of islands. The municipalities in both Amman 
and Beirut, and the associated planning agencies, did not have enough 
capacity or political mandate to 'localise' the projects adapting them to citizen 
needs. In addition, the introduction of a 'new guard' into leadership positions 
in the local municipalities pulled them further towards the central government 
vision. The global professional planning staff introduced to both Solidere and 
Abdali's planning teams also meant branding the plans with a certain 
predefined vision that was never coincided with local aspirations.  
The RECHCOs acted as marshalling points for mobilising powerful vested 
interests. The RECHCOs did not facilitate the development of a coalition of 
stakeholders; its partnership involving powerful and elite central public and 
private sector bodies in a framework that excluded democratic local 
government institutions. The importance of Abdali and Solidere at the national 
level, meant that had negotiations been included, a longer term sustainable 
vision to realise social priorities. With weak democratic control over the 
municipalities, public scrutiny over the RECHCOs and their accountability to 
the citizens was diminished. As citizens were sidelined with no platform to 
voice opposition, no room was left for either institutions or individuals to be 
included to ensure that citizens were engaged and corruption minimised. It 
was the case for Amman and Beirut that given the weak structure of local 
government it would have required institutional capacity building in order to 
have been able to participate adequately in the dialogue even had they been 
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given a platform for engagement. Alongside this upgrade institutionally, 
healthy and vibrant local communities, civil society and citizenry are also pre-
requisites to participation in urban policy, the cases of Abdali and Solidere 
reflect how easily community opposition is marginalised when there is no civil 
society base.  
In Calame's review of post-war efforts he notes that while the involvement of 
central government is required the most successful recovery plans allow for 
this authority to be eventually shared with local agencies to carry out the 
longer-term projects (Calame, 2005). Solidere and Abdali are still being 
pushed through by the central and national governments.  The local 
government has still not been transferred the reigns on the projects, and so 
feelings of disengagement amongst the city citizens persist. While the 
projects' planners in both Jordan and Lebanon argued that there was a 
danger to the excessive 'localism' when developing policy that derails from 
larger agendas (Post, 2013); with no integration of local politics, the project 
will never fully benefit the community as intended as reflected in the Case 
Studies presented by this thesis. The national governments in the case of 
Jordan and Lebanon as part of the Abdali and Solidere projects catered to 
global trends and politics without sufficient regard for national or local urban 
policies which skewed the projects' impacts and undermined the positive 
distributional effects.  
If properly planned for with the inclusion of all stakeholder viewpoints, the 
regeneration of the centres in both Amman and Beirut might have generated a 
new space for citizen engagement, and this space between state and society 
could have been used as a conduit for negotiation and dialogue (Cornwall and 
Coelho, 2004). Were Abdali and Solidere to have positively impacted the 
cities, the spaces provided may have been hosts for contestation in addition 
to collaboration, where diverse participants with divergent agendas come 
together to create new urban policy. In this context, Lefebvre's (1996) 'right to 
the city' does not so much refer to urban services like housing, work and 
education alone but also the right to participate in making 'the urban' and the 
right to inhabit and change urban space. One of the most critical elements of 
urban citizenship struggles – through contests of identity and belonging – and 
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the rights to the city is the assertion of the right to produce space in the city, 
and so this becomes a right of citizenship in the city itself. 
To this end, Abdali and Solidere had the ability to impact the process of 
democratisation as a whole. Democratisation in this sense of citizenship in the 
city begins with an expansion of the number of people who are able to 
participate in the collective decision-making; followed by the scope of issues 
that the citizens of the city are allowed to participate in; and the extent of their 
decision-making ability (Satterthwaite et al., 2007). In most cases, economic 
reform is sufficient in the short-run to pacify citizens; however in the case 
where there are no direct and immediate widespread economic benefits, 
political reform is the only remaining option (Razzaz, 2012). Continuing not to 
update the "social contract" process means, in part, destroying "the values of 
the work ethic, creativity, innovation, and the common public good (everything 
is a zero sum game) in society, and replac[ing] it with values of dependency, 
corruption, cronyism, deceit, and mistrust" (Razzaz, 2012, p6). The negative 
impacts economically, socially and politically of the RECHCOs make this 
concept a relevant one.  
 
Preconditions on Distributional Effects 
 
In part the RECHCOs failed at the economic level because there were no 
preconditions regarding the distributional effects in place. The RECHCOs 
depended highly on 'property-led' regeneration with little insight into other 
community economic needs. No minimum stipulations were given on the 
number of jobs provided to city citizens and local residents, similarly there 
were no provisions for affordable housing in either the Solidere or Abdali 
project. In terms of the initial goal of providing an impact assessment from the 
perspective of the city resident, the thesis was able to reflect on the economic, 
social and political effects. Though many critics have noted that while 
cooperation between the public and private sectors is worthy of admiration the 
relative strengths of both must be taken into account to ensure the limitation 
of coercion in negotiations (Clayden, 1990). The Docklands Boroughs 
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community were seen to be relatively 'powerless' (Oc and Tiesdell, 1991) only 
able to, at the most extreme, delay development through insistent calls for 
public inquiries, and 'procrastination' (Oc and Tiesdell, 1991).   
The RECHCO cases in Amman and Beirut did not include any stipulations on 
how some benefits might be distributed locally benefiting citizens in the area. 
The public subsidies and contributions given to the RECHCO were local in 
nature (infrastructure being built in Beirut and Amman sponsored by the 
municipal governments) and land being expropriated from local citizens; it 
follows that participation is to some extent expected by these citizens as was 
apparent through the Thesis Survey and the interviews that took place in 
Beirut. It is also of note that the RECHCOs appeared to affect different 
societal segments differently and some more adversely than others.  Young 
people for instance were more likely to be frustrated by the political process 
associated with RECHCOs and so opt not to participate in the future (as was 
the case in Amman shown in the Thesis Survey).  Females were more likely 
to feel negatively affected by the lack of family-friendly facilities in the 
RECHCOs (Thesis Survey, 2012).  
 
Strict Regulations Regarding Public Space and Space Usage 
 
The RECHCOs did not consider inclusion of the public in their plans, and 
even actively avoided it, leading to alienation of the citizens as an inevitable 
consequence. Market forces alone it seemed were developing real estate at 
the expense of memory, sense of place, and ultimately citizenship. Though 
technical institutions reviewed the plan in both the cases of Amman and 
Beirut, the RECHCOs did not give credence to criticisms of density 
assumptions, public space or space usage.  Solidere SAL for instance 
considered within its legal requirements for open public space to be unusable 
space around infrastructure, or landscaping alongside the major roads 
inaccessible to the public. Standards, accessibility and maintenance 
provisions were not developed and monitored adequately by a technically 
capable and politically able local government. This meant that Solidere and 
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Abdali did not adhere to the basic urban planning provisions other projects 
within the city abided by meant for citizens' protection.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In assessing the impacts of RECHCOs, it can be concluded that there are 
negative consequences of RECHCOs on the life of citizens within cities. 
RECHCOs, as they stand, fail in the three pillars of social, political and 
economic impacts due to their exclusive nature and lack of integration more 
fully to be inclusive of all the city's citizens. RECHCOs with their investors and 
capital override and deteriorate social, economic and political traditions in the 
city and cause widening divides hurting local communities. The RECHCOs in 
Beirut and Amman were considered by decision-makers as products rather 
than processes. However, their magnitudes alone substitute them for urban 
strategies and with proper thought given to local participation in decision-
making and the engagement of the local institutional structures the RECHCOs 
could have served as democratising vehicles and capacity building 
instruments. Today the RECHCOs studied here do not have mitigating 
measures nor a strict political process in place to ensure the transparent 
involvement of stakeholders to guarantee RECHCOs as working for the public 
benefit effective tools within cities. This thesis can therefore be read as part of 
a larger project where each of the impacts discussed is associated with a set 
of recommendations that do not diminish the importance of citizens within the 
city and include them as critical components of the reform as a next step to 
the study.  
The thesis' contribution to the urban literature as a whole comes through the 
examination of the broad themes set out in Chapter One's Introduction. The 
first of these themes included an analysis of the city centre's role in the city 
and how RECHCOs negatively affected this role. The second theme 
described the interaction between RECHCOs and public space, participation 
and citizenship and as such touched upon the relationship between space 
and citizenship within cities. The third theme focused on RECHCOs' as tools 
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within a framework of urban governance and policies, ending with a series of 
lessons learnt within the conclusion to help govern these issues. The fourth 
theme examined heritage and memory in the city in the context of RECHCOs 
contributing to the literature tying these issues into the experience of the city 
citizen. The final theme focused on privatised and contested space describing 
how the segregation incited by the RECHCOs gave rise to conflict within the 
city provoking antagonism amongst its citizens. 
The thesis started with examining Solidere which is over a decade old, and 
then looked at Abdali still under construction as an empirical contribution to 
the literature on the modern Arab city and a contribution to comprehensive 
urban impact assessments looking at social, political and economic issues. 
Both projects studied come from very different socioeconomic and political 
backgrounds at the national level in Lebanon and Jordan. The similarities 
across the impacts of both projects created a platform from which several 
more general meaningful conclusions about RECHCOs could be drawn. The 
lessons learnt illustrate the importance of RECHCOs' impacts on urban 
policies and their new downtown spaces on the city. The Conclusion Chapter 
demonstrated that without a studied framework for participation, cost-benefit 
analysis and transparent accountable processes to empower local institutions 
and communities within Arab cities, RECHCOs will not be the powerful 
vehicles for positive the social, political and economic effects that their 
narrative claims. This is the basis for detailed further research on the 
mitigation measures required for an idealised RECHCO process as a next 
step to the thesis.   
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Abdali Survey Questions 
This survey is designed to be about 30 minutes in length and will focus on your opinions 
regarding the Abdali project in Amman. The data gathered will be used to support my 
research into Real Estate Holding Companies within the Middle East.  
 
 
Date of Interview:     
     
Length of Interview:     
     
Time Started:      
 
Signed Consent Form: □ Yes  □ No 
 
Neighbourhood Location: ........................ 
 
 
Have you heard of the Abdali Project?   
 
□ Yes  □ No -> end interview and record statistic 
 
Section A: Personal Information 
 
1. Gender:  □ Male  □ Female   
 
2. Age:  □ 18-25   □ 26 - 35   □ 36- 50   □ 51-64   □ 65+ 
 
3. Marital Status:  □ Married   □ Single 
 
4. Children:  □ 0 □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 □ 5+ 
 
5. District: 
□ Tareq 
□ Jubeiha 
□ Shafa Badran 
□ Wadi al-Seir 
□ Marka 
□ Al-Nasr 
□ Umm Qusair and Muqablain 
□ Ras al-Ain 
□ Badr 
□ Abdali 
□ Basman 
□ Tla'a Al-Ali, Umm Al-Summaq, Khalda 
□ Sahab 
□ Badr al-Jadeedah 
□ Khareebat al-Souq, Jawa, Yadoudah 
 
□ Al-Quweismeh, Abu Alanda, Al-Rajeeb 
□ Zahran 
□ Marj Al-Hamam 
□ Al-Yarmouk 
□ Al-Madina 
□ Sweileh 
□ Al-Muwaqqar 
□ Uhod 
□ Al-Jeezah 
□ Husban and Umm Al-Basateen 
□ Naour 
□ Abu Nseir 
 
 
6. Household income: 
□ Less than 3600 JD annually 
□ Between 3600 - 6000 JD annually 
□ Between 6000 - 12000 JD annually 
□ Above 12000 JD annually 
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7. What is your level of education? 
□ Less than secondary school 
□ Secondary school 
□ Community or vocational college 
□ University degree or above 
8. Are you a member of a Community Based Organisation, Union or Political Party? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
 
9. Are you the chief income earner in the household? 
□ No 
□ Yes 
□ No income earners 
□ I am still a student 
 
10. If you are working: 
□ Public sector 
□ Private sector 
 
11. Are you at a managerial level? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
 
12. What is your annual municipality taxes payment? 
□ Less than 20 JDs 
□ 20 - 50 JDs 
□ 50 -100 JDs 
□ 100 - 150 JDs 
□ 150 - 200 JDs 
□ 200 - 300 JDs 
□ Above 300 
□ Don't know 
 
13. Do you contribute to tax payments in your home? 
□ Person most responsible 
□ Jointly responsible 
□ Not responsible 
□ Don't know 
 
14. What is the length of time you have lived in Amman? 
 
□ Less than 1 year  
□ 1 – 2 years  
□ 2 – 5 years  
□ 5 – 10 years  
□ 10 – 20 years  
□ 20- 30 years  
□ More than 30 years  
 
15. What is the length of time you have lived in your District? 
 
□ Less than 1 year  
□ 1 – 2 years  
□ 2 – 5 years  
□ 5 – 10 years  
□ 10 – 20 years  
□ 20- 30 years  
□ More than 30 years  
 
 
348 
 
16. Do you vote in Municipal Elections? 
1= Always 2=Often 3=Sometimes 4=Rarely 5=Never 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
17. Have you ever participated in a public meeting organised by the Greater Amman 
Municipality? 
□ Yes □ No 
If yes, how was the experience?_________________________________________________ 
 
18. Did you ever participate in a public meeting about Abdali? 
□ Yes □ No 
If No, do you feel you should have been asked? 
□ Yes □ No, explain:__________________________________________________________ 
If Yes, would you have participated if asked? 
□ Yes □ No, explain:__________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Have you or anyone close to you ever had property expropriated? 
□ Yes □ No 
 
20. If yes, did you feel the expropriation was for the public benefit? 
□ Yes □ No, explain:__________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Did you feel that you were paid a fair market price? 
□ Yes □ No, explain:__________________________________________________________ 
 
Section B: Introductory Questions 
 
22. How did you hear about the Abdali project? (You can check more than one) 
□ Saw the project/ the billboards around the project 
□ Newspaper 
□ People talking 
□ Used to use bus terminal nearby 
□ Used to frequent markets nearby 
□ Drive by the project frequently 
 
23.Have the things you heard/read been: 
 
1= Very Positive 2=Positive 3=Neutral 4=Negative 5=Very 
Negative 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
Explain:____________________________________________________________________ 
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24. Out of the list of features below which needs upgrading in your district? Please prioritise 
1-7, 1 being of highest priority, and 7 of lowest 
 
 Doesn't Need 
Improvement 
Needs Improvement Don't Know Priority to 
Improve (fill in 
1-7) 
Shopping space □ □ □  
Pedestrian plazas □ □ □  
High quality 
residences 
□ □ □  
High quality office 
space and business 
hub 
□ □ □  
Public green space 
and parks 
□ □ □  
Public community 
and youth play areas 
and facilities  
□ □ □  
Improved 
infrastructure 
□ □ □  
Sports facilities □ □ □  
Playgrounds for 
children 
□ □ □  
Cultural centres □ □ □  
Parking □ □ □  
 
25. Out of the list of features below which needs upgrading in Amman? Please prioritise 1-7, 
1 being of highest priority, and 7 of lowest 
 
 Doesn't Need 
Improvement 
Needs Improvement Don't Know Priority to 
Improve (fill in 
1-7) 
Shopping space □ □ □  
Pedestrian plazas □ □ □  
High quality 
residences 
□ □ □  
High quality office 
space and business 
hub 
□ □ □  
Public green space 
and parks 
□ □ □  
Public community 
and youth play areas 
and facilities  
□ □ □  
Improved 
infrastructure 
□ □ □  
Sports facilities □ □ □  
Playgrounds for 
children 
□ □ □  
Cultural centres □ □ □  
Parking □ □ □  
 
26. Have you, or someone close to you, ever dealt with licensing something at the Greater 
Amman Municipality (GAM)? 
□ Yes □ No 
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27. Do you believe the GAM treats the Abdali investors and other investors, including 
Amman's residents equally? 
1= Yes Equally 2 = Somewhat 
Equally 
3 = Somewhat 
Unequally  
4 = Extremely 
Unequally 
5 = Don't Know 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
Explain:____________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. Do you feel that investors/residents in Amman should build tower developments? 
 
□ Yes □ No 
□ It optimizes land use □ It will ruin the way the city looks 
□It looks better for the city □ It will create too much traffic 
□ It if regulations are clear and transparent 
for everyone 
□ There is no demand for it 
□ Other, specify □ Other, specify 
 
Explain:____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
29. Do you believe the Abdali project should have been granted a license to develop the area 
it was given? 
 
1= Yes 
Definitely 
2 = Yes 
with some 
reservations 
3 = Unsure  4 = No, not 
really 
5 = Definitely 
not 
6 = Don't Know 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
Explain:____________________________________________________________________ 
 
30. Do you believe that Abdali should be supported as a National Initiative? 
□ Yes □ No: Explain:__________________________________________________________ 
 
31. Is the Abdali project for the public benefit? 
1=Strongly 
agree 
2=Tend to 
agree 
3= Neither 4=Tend to 
disagree 
5=Strongly 
disagree 
6=Don't 
know 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
Explain:____________________________________________________________________ 
 
32. Which of the following features does Abdali provide? 
 
 Provides to all 
Jordanians 
Provides to a 
certain subset 
of Jordanians 
Does Not Provide 
Shopping spaces □ □ □ 
Pedestrian plazas □ □ □ 
High quality residences □ □ □ 
High quality office space and 
business hub 
□ □ □ 
Public green space and parks □ □ □ 
Public community and youth play 
areas and facilities  
□ □ □ 
Improved infrastructure for 
Amman 
□ □ □ 
Sports facilities □ □ □ 
Playgrounds for children □ □ □ 
Cultural centres □ □ □ 
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33. Make the following choices by checking which of the two options you would choose from 
in each line: 
 
1 Rehabilitate the current downtown 
□ 
Support the creation of the Abdali Project 
□ 
2 Support the creation of the Abdali Project 
□ 
Create a new park similar to the King Hussein 
Park 
□ 
3 Upgrade roads and pavements in various 
residential neighbourhoods within Amman 
□ 
Support the creation of the Abdali Project 
□ 
4 Support the creation of the Abdali Project 
□ 
Upgrade water network within the city 
□ 
5 Upgrade sewer network within the city 
□ 
Support the creation of the Abdali Project 
□ 
6 Support the creation of the Abdali Project 
□ 
Provide more government training initiatives 
to support jobs 
□ 
6 Create funds for entrepreneurship 
□ 
Support the creation of the Abdali Project 
□ 
7 Support the creation of the Abdali Project 
□ 
Support loan guarantee programs 
□ 
8 Provide a rebate from the municipality on 
taxes 
□ 
Support the creation of the Abdali Project 
□ 
9 Support the creation of the Abdali Project 
□ 
Create a fund to support tourism based 
initiatives 
□ 
 
Explain:__________________________________________________________________ 
 
34. Who should pay for the infrastructure upgrades surrounding the Abdali project? 
 Strongly 
agree 
Tend to 
agree 
Neither Tend to 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Don't know 
Abdali 
investors 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
Municipality □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Amman's 
citizens 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
Explain:__________________________________________________________________ 
 
35. Do you think the process of licensing Abdali was transparent? 
1=Very 
Transparent 
2= Transparent 3= Neutral 4= Not 
Transparent 
5 = Corrupt 
process 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
Explain:__________________________________________________________________ 
 
36. Do you think you can afford to shop in Abdali? 
□ Yes of course 
□ No most things are not designed for me 
 
37. Will you go drink a cup of coffee in Abdali? 
□ Yes, explain:____________________________________________________________  
□ No, explain:_____________________________________________________________ 
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38. Do you think it will be more expensive than the rest of Amman? 
1=Yes by a lot 2= Yes by a little 3= No 4= Less 
expensive 
5 = Much less 
expensive 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
39. Who are Abdali's investors? (Interviewer to check those mentioned out loud) 
 
□ Private Jordanian investors 
□ Investors from the Gulf 
□ Baha Hariri 
□ Mawared/Army 
□ It is a publically traded company 
□ Jordanian royalty 
□ Other, specify:..................................... 
 
40. Who will Abdali's customers be on a scale of 1-5, with 5 as most prevalent? 
 1=None 2=Few 3=Good 
Amount 
4=Quite a lot 5=Very much 
so 
Lower-
income 
Jordanians 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Medium-
income 
Jordanians 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Higher-
income 
Jordanians 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Non-
Jordanian 
Tourists 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Gulf Tourists □ □ □ □ □ 
 
41. Rank Abdali on its potential for the following qualities and attributes? 
 
 
1
=
 W
ill
 d
o
 
th
is
 h
ig
h
ly
 
2
=
W
ill
 d
o
 
th
is
 
3
=
N
e
u
tr
a
l 
4
=
W
ill
 n
o
t 
d
o
 t
h
is
 
5
=
W
ill
 
h
u
rt
 t
h
is
 
Create Jordanian white-collar Jobs □ □ □ □ □ 
Create Jordanian blue-collar Jobs □ □ □ □ □ 
Contributed to additional taxation for 
government 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Make the traffic situation much worse □ □ □ □ □ 
Will create more open space for the average 
Jordanian 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Will create a new downtown for Amman  □ □ □ □ □ 
Will cause further deterioration of Amman's 
existing downtown 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Will make Amman more beautiful □ □ □ □ □ 
Will help bring tourists in to visit Amman □ □ □ □ □ 
Will create a new business hub for the city □ □ □ □ □ 
Will bring on board high quality living spaces 
for the average Jordanian 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
42. Did you use public transportation that was located in the Abdali area? 
1= Yes all the time 2=Yes sometimes 3=Not very often 4=Never 
□ □ □ □ 
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43. Were you disappointed with the relocation of the terminal to Tabarbour? 
1= Yes very 2=A little bit 3=Not really 4=Not affected 
□ □ □ □ 
 
44. Should we have more projects like Abdali? 
1= Definitely 2=Maybe  3=Neutral 4=Not Really 5=Not at all 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
Explain:__________________________________________________________________ 
 
45. If neutral or no (3, 4 or 5), which of the following would change your mind? 
 
□ Restrictions and monitoring 
□ Public participation  
□ More building regulations 
□ Other, please specify: ................................... 
□ Nothing 
 
46. Would you consider buying an apartment here (select all that apply)? 
 
□ Yes □ No 
□ It is in the centre of Amman □ Dislike of project 
□Prices are appropriate □ Too expensive 
□ Design is attractive □ Not designed for Jordanians 
□ Other, specify □ Other, specify 
 
47. Was the Abdali location a good one? (Please check all that apply) 
 
□ Yes □ No 
□ It is in the centre of Amman □ It is a very crowded area 
□It is ideal for a business hub near the 
financial district 
□ It disturbs the residences around it 
□ It is a good location in terms of 
infrastructure 
□ Nowhere in Amman is a good location 
□ Other, specify □ Other, specify 
 
Explain:__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
48. Have you heard about the Abdali expropriations of land surrounding the project? 
□ Yes, positively:_____________________________________________________________  
□ Yes, negatively:____________________________________________________________ 
□ No:______________________________________________________________________ 
 
49. Do you believe they are in the public benefit? 
 
1=definitely not 2=mildly not 3=neutral 4=slightly in the 
public benefit 
5=very much in 
the public 
benefit 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Comment:__________________________________________________________________ 
 
50. Do you know that Abdali has been given tax exemptions? 
□ Yes □ No 
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51. Should Abdali have been given tax exemptions? 
□ Yes □ No 
□ If is for the public benefit □ It is a private project 
□It will encourage more investment  □ We need the taxes to produce other public 
projects 
□ But only if everyone is □ It is unfair when others don't 
□ Other, specify □ Other, specify 
 
Explain:__________________________________________________________________ 
 
52. Within your district of Amman what would you be willing to pay for the following 
improvements? (Over and above your current municipal tax) annually: 
 
 Shoppi
ng 
space 
Pedest
rian 
plazas 
High 
quality 
residen
ces 
High 
quality 
office 
space 
and 
busine
ss hub 
Public 
green 
space 
and 
parks 
Public 
commu
nity 
and 
youth 
play 
areas 
and 
facilitie
s  
Improv
ed 
infrastr
ucture 
 
 
Sports 
facilitie
s 
Playgro
unds 
for 
childre
n 
Cultura
l 
centres 
Zero, I pay 
enough 
already 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □    
1- 5 JDs □ □ □ □ □ □ □    
6- 10 JDs □ □ □ □ □ □ □    
11- 20 JDs □ □ □ □ □ □ □    
21- 50 JDs □ □ □ □ □ □ □    
51- 100 
JDs 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □    
101- 200 
JDs 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □    
201- 500 
JDs 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □    
501- 1,000 
JDs 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □    
1,001- 
5,000 JDs 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □    
5,001- 
10,000JDs 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □    
Over 
10,000 JDs 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □    
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53. Within Amman what would you be willing to pay for the following improvements? (Over 
and above your current municipal tax) annually: 
 
 Shoppi
ng 
space 
Pedest
rian 
plazas 
High 
quality 
residen
ces 
High 
quality 
office 
space 
and 
busine
ss hub 
Public 
green 
space 
and 
parks 
Public 
commu
nity 
and 
youth 
play 
areas 
and 
facilitie
s  
Improv
ed 
infrastr
ucture 
 
 
Sports 
facilitie
s 
Playgro
unds 
for 
childre
n 
Cultura
l 
centres 
Zero, I pay 
enough 
already 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □    
1- 5 JDs □ □ □ □ □ □ □    
6- 10 JDs □ □ □ □ □ □ □    
11- 20 JDs □ □ □ □ □ □ □    
21- 50 JDs □ □ □ □ □ □ □    
51- 100 
JDs 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □    
101- 200 
JDs 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □    
201- 500 
JDs 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □    
501- 1,000 
JDs 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □    
1,001- 
5,000 JDs 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □    
5,001- 
10,000JDs 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □    
Over 
10,000 JDs 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □    
 
 
54. How much in total JD value do you think the citizen of Amman should pay for Abdali 
annually? 
□ Zero 
□ 1- 5 JDs 
□ 6- 10 JDs 
□ 11- 20 JDs 
□ 21- 50 JDs 
□ 51- 100 JDs 
□ 101- 200 JDs 
□ 201- 500 JDs 
□ 501- 1,000 JDs 
□ 1,001- 5,000 JDs 
□ 5,001- 10,000JDs 
□ Over 10,000 JDs 
 
  
356 
 
55. How much in total JD do you think the citizen of Amman actually has and will pay for 
Abdali annually? 
□ Zero 
□ 1- 5 JDs 
□ 6- 10 JDs 
□ 11- 20 JDs 
□ 21- 50 JDs 
□ 51- 100 JDs 
□ 101- 200 JDs 
□ 201- 500 JDs 
□ 501- 1,000 JDs 
□ 1,001- 5,000 JDs 
□ 5,001- 10,000JDs 
□ Over 10,000 JDs 
 
56. What are the main reasons you would pay for the Abdali project in your city? (Please 
check all that apply) 
 
□ It offers a great public good 
□ It will create jobs 
□ It will incite tourists to visit 
□ It will provide a new shopping area for Amman 
□ It will provide pedestrian areas needed in the city 
□ It will create a new business hub 
□ It will modernise the way the city looks 
□ Amman needs a new downtown 
□ Other, please specify 
 
57. What are the main reasons you would not pay for the Abdali project in your city? (Please 
check all that apply) 
 
□ I object to paying higher taxes under any circumstances 
□ I cannot afford it 
□ I need more information before deciding 
□ The benefits that Abdali offers are not important to me 
□ I feel Amman's downtown is already great and does not need to be moved 
□ I feel I would rather upgrade the existing downtown 
□ I feel this money is better spent elsewhere 
□ I feel it will generate traffic that cannot be coped with 
□ I am against towers in the city 
□ I feel that this company does not offer a public good 
□ Other 
 
58. On a scale of 1-10, with 1 being the best, what are your overall impressions of the Abdali 
project? 
□ 1  □ 2  □ 3  □ 4  □ 5  □ 6  □ 7  □ 8 □ 9  □ 10 
 
Explain:__________________________________________________________________ 
 
59. Are you proud to have Abdali in your city? 
□ Yes □ No 
 
Explain:__________________________________________________________________ 
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60. Did the Abdali project in any way make you want to participate by voicing your opinion to 
do with development in the city more or less? 
 
1=a lot more 2=more 3=neutral 4=less 5=a lot less 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
Explain:__________________________________________________________________ 
 
61. Do you think you will be given a chance to do this in the future? 
 
1=a lot more 2=more 3=neutral 4=less 5=a lot less 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Explain:__________________________________________________________________ 
 
62. What is the first word that comes to mind when you think about the Abdali project? 
________ 
 
63. Any other comments? 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
 
Section C for Residents of Abdali: 
 
64. Do you, or anyone close to you, own your own property within the Abdali district 
□ Yes □ No 
Type of property 
□ Commercial □ Residential  
 
65. If yes: 
What happened to property prices? 
 JD/sqm 2000 JD/sqm 2006 or later 
□ Went up highly   
□ Went up a little bit   
□ Stayed the same   
□ Decreased slightly   
□ Decreased a lot   
 
66. Did you have property expropriated for the Abdali project? 
□ Yes □ No 
 
67. Did anyone you know have their property expropriated for the Abdali project? 
□ Yes □ No 
 
68. Was the market price paid fair? 
1=definitely not 2=mildly not 3=neutral 4= fair 5=generous 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
69. Any other comments? 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
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Appendix II: Abdali Survey Design and Methodology and Sampling 
Plan 
 
Survey Design and Methodology 
 
Survey Objectives 
 
The survey has several major objectives: 
 
1. Measure public awareness and attitudes surrounding the Abdali project 
and the extent to which it is positive or negative  
2. Assess perceptions of Abdali's public benefit and public costs 
3. Gauge actual USD level of public benefit and willingness to pay 
through a series of contingent valuation questions.  
 
To achieve these objectives, the thesis will use a statistically sound sample 
frame of Amman's residents across the distributional criteria outlined in the 
Survey Sample Plan of Section B.  
 
Questionnaire Design   
 
Questionnaire design covered several general stages including: 
 
 Preliminary design work on the areas to be explored in the survey by 
answering each objective with a series of questions 
 Question wording and sequencing in order to conduct a statistically-
reliable, geographically-dispersed survey. In general, closed questions 
are easier to administer but they require the researcher and the 
respondent to have similar understandings. Open questions allow more 
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freedom but are much more difficult to analyse. During the course of 
the questionnaire design, the decision of open ended versus close 
ended questions will be addressed, based on each question‘s 
importance and usefulness, in terms of both the type of question and 
the response needed. 
 Physical design or layout: After deciding on the questionnaire‘s 
questions, as well as the response methods, the design of the 
questionnaire will be developed by grouping related questions into 
similar sections.  
 
These broad points will be covered with detailed questions, in order to make 
sure that responses will reflect satisfaction levels accurately. Common survey 
principles state that questionnaire items must: 
 
 Be related explicitly to particular analysis objectives 
 Be understood by the survey respondents 
 Ask for factual information or attitudes that respondents can recall from 
memory 
 Avoid response bias or other negative influences on respondents‘ 
decision processes 
 Be formatted in a way that makes them useful to interviewer as well as 
respondents and be formatted in such a way that entry errors are 
minimised. 
 
Questionnaire Testing    
 
Questionnaire testing is critical for identifying problems, for both respondents 
and interviewers, with regard to question content, order/context effects, skip 
instructions, and formatting. Problems with question content, for example, 
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include confusion with the overall meaning of the question, as well as 
misinterpretation of individual terms or concepts.  
 
Problems with skip instructions may result in missing data and frustration by 
respondents. Formatting concerns are relevant to self-administered 
questionnaires and may lead to confusion, as well as loss of information.  
 
A Pilot Collection Model will be used to test the questionnaire, and a dry run 
sample survey will be conducted, where approximately 50 surveys (taking into 
consideration the different distributional characteristics as indicated in the 
survey sampling) will be covered to test survey instrument validity and 
reliability, and make adjustments as required.  
 
The feedback of the questionnaire testing shall be used to revise the 
questionnaire (e.g., modify questions, scales, length, etc.) in order to enhance 
the clarity, effectiveness, and suitability of the questionnaire in achieving the 
survey‘s overarching objectives.  
 
Survey Implementation    
 
The survey will be implemented across Amman, targeting local areas, with 
the characteristics of the sample distribution respected in terms of 
percentages for with at least 1500 surveys distributed proportionately, in order 
to avoid any later weighting of the sample.  
 
Data Tabulation, Analysis and Reporting of Results 
 
All the responses gathered from the field shall be verified on a daily basis, in 
order to ascertain that they are correct, along with tabulating, and analysing, 
the data in a suitable form.  
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The data shall be entered with suitable quality controls, which includes at 
least 10% of double data entry. 20% double entry is a method of data entry 
quality control. It requires at least 20% of all questionnaires to be entered two 
times and then matched to estimate the level of error. If the level of 
error/match is satisfactory, data entry is also considered satisfactory. 
 
Quality control measures include: 
 
 Double entry of data 
 Rejecting surveys with lower than 90% response rates 
 Benchmarking surveys against the target  
 Collect the incoming completed Survey questionnaires and conduct a 
100% check for incomplete, omitted or otherwise erroneous data 
recording practices. If necessary, replace unsatisfactory interviews with 
properly conducted ones, or ensure that requested answers are 
gathered from the target firm; 
 Use statistical methods to check the consistency, accuracy and quality 
of work. 
 
Confidentiality and Information  
 
A statistical sample will be designed to ensure geographic representation 
across the city of Amman based on the city's 27 districts.  Participants will be 
recruited from commercial districts in each of the identified regions in the city 
and approached on the street.  Certain restrictions of gender, age and 
nationality will be identified by the sample.  The consent form that each 
participant will sign will: 
a) Confirm that they are taking part in the survey of their own free will; 
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b) Be adequately informed, regarding the purpose of the survey and how 
any data provided in the course of the survey, including personal 
information and specific answers to survey questions, will be utilised 
and kept confidential; 
c) Have achieved an overall positive impression regarding participating in 
a survey; and 
d) Be amenable to the idea of taking part in a future survey. 
 
As a researcher I will ensure that: 
 
a) Interviewees will be shielded from unwarranted and undesirable 
invasions of privacy, or any other manner of harassment. 
b) In any event where the interviewee might be led to believe that 
divulging data is obligatory, it will be made clear that all interactions 
with the interviewer are strictly voluntary. 
c) Accurate and prompt identification is offered when requested. 
d) All questions asked by the interviewee will be addressed in a 
straightforward manner, without deception or ambiguity. 
e) There will be no attempts to mislead the interviewee  
f) All interviewees have the right to deny an interview, or to end a current 
interview.  
g) Recording equipment, such as photographing or sound recording 
devices, will only be utilised with the full knowledge and consent of the 
interviewee. 
 
Consent 
 
Each person will sign a consent form with the survey.   
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Anonymity of the participants 
 
The names and contacts of participants will not be included in the same file as 
the survey results and will in no way appear in the presentation of these 
results. 
 
How material will be anonymised 
 
The names and contacts of participants will be held in a separate file to the 
survey results and only linked through a numeric key once the data is 
inputted. 
 
Material at the end of the project 
 
The material will be retained for a period of five years and then destroyed. 
 
Sample Design  
 
The sample will be designed to collect data on Amman residents over the age 
of 18, who participate in some way to household expenses.  The participants 
will be approached in local areas, though it is important for this reason that the 
stratification of the sample is strictly adhered to.  Within each districts further 
neighbourhood targets will be created in order to ensure fair and equal 
distribution across the city.  
 
The sample is designed to produce reliable estimates for major survey 
variables for the country as a whole, and is proportionately distributed across 
the districts of Amman, of which there are currently twenty seven. 
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It is important that the survey is distributed proportionately amongst the 
different geographies of the city, even to the neighbourhood level inline with 
population, in order to ensure that the survey is not biased to a certain area.  
In addition, the different levels of income, sexes and ages will be observed to 
ensure that the sample is indeed reflective of the population (proportional 
stratification).  The sampling unit will be selected from the sampling frame at 
the neighbourhood level.  
 
The four main levels produced were: 
 
 Location: Stratification to ensure proper geographical coverage of the 
city within each of its districts. 
 Sex: Stratification by the sex levels to ensure the representativeness of 
the sample.  
 Age:  To ensure representation across the city's age groups. 
 Annual Income: As a proxy for other issues such as employment 
status, and standard of living 
 
Table ‎0-1: Population Distribution across Amman  
Amman District Population  Percentage 
Tareq  58,325 3% 
Al-Jubeiha  50,250 2% 
Shafa Badran  17,000 1% 
Wadi al-Seir  136,350 7% 
Marka 101,940 5% 
Al-Nasr  16,728 1% 
Umm Qusair and Muqabalain  42,000 2% 
Ras al-Ain  103,150 5% 
Badr  152,050 7% 
Abdali 105,709 5% 
Basman 238,070 12% 
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Tla'a Al-Ali, Um Al-Summaq, Khalda  128,350 6% 
Sahab 47,800 2% 
Badr al-Jadeedah  12,750 1% 
Khareebat al-Souq, Jawa, Yadoudah  98,290 5% 
Al-Quweismeh, AbuAlanda, Al-Rajeeb  156,780 8% 
Zahran 60,177 3% 
Marj al-Hamam  32,305 2% 
Al-Yarmouk 172,250 8% 
Al-Madina 35,188 2% 
Sweileh 71,200 3% 
Al-Muwaqqar 22,360 1% 
Uhod 17,346 1% 
Al-Jeezah 50,800 2% 
Husban and Umm al-Basateen  28,660 1% 
Naour 50,340 2% 
Abu Nseir  28,370 1% 
Total Amman 2,034,538  100% 
Gender   
Total Male 1,046,176 51% 
Total Female 988,362 49% 
Total Amman 2,034,538  100% 
Household Income231   
Less than 3600 JD annually  539,153 26% 
Between 3600 - 6000 JD annually 624,603 31% 
Between 6000 - 10000 JD annually 498,462 24% 
Above 12000 JD annually 374,355 18% 
Total Amman 2,034,538  100% 
Ages   
18-25 590,536 29% 
26-50 1,083,623 53% 
51-64 241,700 12% 
65+ 118,679 6% 
Total Amman 2,034,538  100% 
Source: Department of Statistics, 2004 
                                                          
231
 The exchange rate of USD to JD is pegged at USD 1.41 to JD 1. 
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Copies of the Forms 
 
The forms below will be used (and translated to Arabic) such that the 
participants have given written consent and have a clear idea of what the 
project is about. 
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GUIDE INFORMATION/CONSENT FORM FOR SURVEYS 
 
Title of Research Project  
Real Estate and Construction Holding Companies as Tools for Development 
in the Middle East 
 
Details of Project 
I am a PhD research student at the University of Exeter within the Politics 
department, and all data gathered will be used to support my research into 
Real Estate Construction and Holding Companies within the Middle East.   
This project is a PhD thesis which will focus on a proposed framework for 
policy makers to follow on how and when to use Real Estate Construction and 
Holding Companies (RECHCOs). The thesis will focus on two case studies: 
Solidere in Beirut and Abdali in Amman.  The Case Studies will provide insight 
into the motivations and politics behind two specific RECHCOs to support an 
argument that examines when RCEHCOs may indeed be positive tools for 
development.  The findings may later be used in certain publications and 
articles stemming from the dissertation. 
Research will be based on a comprehensive survey (1500+) and a series of 
in-depth background interviews.  This consent form relates to the surveys. 
 
Contact Details 
For further information about the research or your interview data, please 
contact: 
Tamam Mango, Department of Politics, Exeter University, Devon UK.  
Tel: 00 962 (0) 796760003, Email: tm318@ex.ac.uk  
If you have concerns/questions about the research you would like to discuss 
with someone else at the University, please contact: 
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Prof. Michael Dumper, Email: mick.dumper@exeter.ac.uk, Tel: 00 44 (0) 1392 
723167 
 
Confidentiality 
The survey will be filled out by the participant and reviewed at that time. The 
survey will not be used other than for the purposes described above and third 
parties will not be allowed access to them (except as may be required by the 
law). The data will be held in accordance with the Data Protection Act for a 
five year period then destroyed.  
 
Anonymity 
Survey data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of 
name, but the group of which you are a member may be referred to.  
 
Consent  
I voluntarily agree to participate and to the use of my data for the purposes 
specified above. I can withdraw consent at any time by contacting the 
interviewers.  
 
TICK HERE:     DATE…………………………..... 
 
Note: Your contact details are kept separately from your survey data 
 
Name:.................................................................... ......................... 
Signature: ........................................................................................ 
Email/phone:.................................................................................... 
Signature of researcher…………………………………………………. 
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INFORMATION FORM: SURVEYS 
These notes give some information about a study for a PhD thesis regarding 
the use of Real Estate Construction and Holding Companies (RECHCOs) in 
the Middle East, specifically looking at the case of Abdali in Amman in which 
you are invited to take part. 
The research is part of a PhD thesis being completed in the Politics 
Department at the University of Exeter.  It involves looking at a proposed 
framework for policy makers to follow on how and when to use RECHCOs, 
focusing on two case studies: Solidere in Beirut and Abdali in Amman.  The 
Case Studies will provide insight into the motivations and politics behind two 
specific RECHCOs to support an argument that examines when RECHCOs 
may be positive tools for development.  The survey is being distributed to a 
sample size of 1500+ across Amman and focuses on your opinions related to 
the project, and how much you as a resident of Amman would be willing to 
pay to see such a project established.  
You will also be asked to complete a consent form immediately before you 
complete the survey.  
Detailed instructions will be given within the survey.  You are asked to 
complete the survey in the presence of the surveyor yourself, and to feel free 
to ask any questions regarding the survey or its purpose. 
The entire survey will typically take about 20 - 30 minutes. You will be able to 
say that you wish to stop the survey and leave at any time, without giving a 
reason. This would not affect your relationship with the surveyor in any way. 
The survey will not benefit you directly.  It is perfectly in order for you to take 
time to consider whether to participate or to refuse participation. After signing 
the consent form, you will still have the right to withdraw from completing the 
survey at any time without giving a reason. The results of the survey will be 
held securely and you will not be identified by name in any publications that 
might arise from the study. Please feel free to ask any questions about any 
aspect of the survey. 
Tamam Mango 
Email: tm318@ex.ac.uk Tel: 00 962 (0) 79 676 0003 
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GUIDE INFORMATION/CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWS 
 
Title of Research Project  
Real Estate and Construction Holding Companies as Tools for Development 
in the Middle East 
Details of Project 
I am a PhD research student at the University of Exeter within the Politics 
department, and all data gathered will be used to support my research into 
Real Estate Holding Companies within the Middle East.   
This project is a PhD thesis which will focus on a proposed framework for 
policy makers to follow on how and when to use Real Estate Construction 
Holding Companies (RECHCOs). The thesis will focus on two case studies: 
Solidere in Beirut and Abdali in Amman.  The research will include a 
comprehensive definition of a RECHCO, a proposed cost-benefit analysis and 
approval process based on the Case Studies, and criteria for the conditions 
under which RECHCOs should be used and in what manner.  The Case 
Studies themselves will provide insight into the motivations and politics behind 
two specific RECHCOs to support an argument that examines when 
RECHCOs may indeed be positive tools for development.  The findings may 
later be used in certain publications and articles stemming from the 
dissertation. 
Research will be based on a comprehensive survey (of 1,500 Ammani 
residents) and a series of in-depth background interviews.  This consent form 
relates to the interviews. 
Contact Details 
For further information about the research or your interview data, please 
contact: 
Tamam  Mango, Department of Politics, Exeter University, Devon UK.  
Tel: 00 962 (0) 796760003, Email:  tm318@ex.ac.uk  
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If you have concerns/questions about the research that you would like to 
discuss with someone else at the University, please contact: 
Prof. Michael Dumper, Email: mick.dumper@exeter.ac.uk, Tel: 00 44 (0) 1392 
723167 
Confidentiality 
Interview tapes and transcripts will be held in confidence. They will not be 
used other than for the purposes described above and third parties will not be 
allowed access to them (except as may be required by the law). However, if 
you request it, you will be supplied with a copy of your interview transcript so 
that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit (please give your email 
below). Your data will be held in accordance with the Data Protection Act for a 
five year period then destroyed.  
Anonymity 
Interview data may be held and used with mention of your name with specific 
quotes attributed to you in the thesis.  If requested these quotes and 
attributions may be provided to you for approval prior to use. 
Consent  
I voluntarily agree to participate and to the use of my data for the purposes 
specified above. I can withdraw consent at any time by contacting the 
interviewers.  
 
TICK HERE:     DATE…………………………..... 
Note: Your contact details are kept separately from your interview data 
Name of interviewee:....................................................................... 
Signature: ......................................................................................... 
Email/phone:..................................................................................... 
Signature of researcher…………………………………………………. 
2 copies to be signed by both interviewee and researcher, one kept by each 
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INFORMATION FORM: INTERVIEWS 
 
These notes give some information about a study for a PhD thesis regarding 
the use of Real Estate Construction Holding Companies in the Middle East, 
specifically looking at the case of Abdali in Amman in which you are invited to 
take part. 
The research is part of a PhD thesis being completed in the Politics 
Department at the University of Exeter.  It involves looking at a proposed 
framework for policy makers to follow on how and when to use RECHCOs, 
focusing on two case studies: Solidere in Beirut and Abdali in Amman.  The 
research will include a comprehensive definition of a RECHCO, a proposed 
cost-benefit analysis and approval process based on the Case Studies, and 
criteria for the conditions under which RECHCOs should be used and in what 
manner.  The Case Studies themselves will provide insight into the 
motivations and politics behind two specific RECHCOs to support an 
argument that examines when RECHCOs may indeed be positive tools for 
development.  Stakeholders related to the projects will be interviewed to help 
gather data for the project.  In addition a 1,500-person survey is being 
undertaken. You will be asked to complete a consent form immediately before 
you begin the interview.  This form will outline issues related to anonymity and 
privacy.   
The entire interview will typically take about 1 hour. You will be able to say 
that you wish to stop the interview and leave at any time, without giving a 
reason. This would not affect your relationship with the interviewer in any way. 
The interview will not benefit you directly.  It is perfectly in order for you to 
take time to consider whether to participate or to refuse participation. After 
signing the consent form, you will still have the right to withdraw from 
completing the interview at any time without giving a reason. The interview 
results may be used in conjunction with your name as quotes.  If you wish to 
see these quotes or references to this interview you may do so by contacting 
me directly and you can request that these quotes be removed. Also note that 
while the transcripts of this interview will be used for the purpose of my 
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dissertation and not released to any third parties, I will be obliged to release 
them if I am required to do so legally by the relevant legal authorities so there 
may be negative political or legal repercussions to your comments during the 
interview and this must be kept in mind through our discussions.  Please feel 
free to ask any questions about any aspect of the interview. 
Tamam Mango 
Email: tm318@ex.ac.uk 
Tel: 00 962 (0) 79 676 0003 
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